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xvi Abstract 
Abstract 
Embodied interactive software agents are complex autonomous, adaptive, and social software 
systems with a digital embodiment that enables them to act on and react to other entities (users, 
objects, and other agents) in their environment through bodily actions, which include the use of 
verbal and non-verbal communicative behaviors in face-to-face interactions with the user. 
These agents have been developed for various roles in different application domains, in which 
they perform tasks that have been assigned to them by their developers or delegated to them by 
their users or by other agents. In computer-assisted learning, embodied interactive pedagogical 
software agents have the general task to promote human learning by working with students (and 
other agents) in computer-based learning environments, among them e-learning platforms based 
on Internet technologies, such as the Virtual Linguistics Campus (www.linguistics-online.com). 
In these environments, pedagogical agents provide contextualized, qualified, personalized, and 
timely assistance, cooperation, instruction, motivation, and services for both individual learners 
and groups of learners. 
This thesis develops a comprehensive, multidisciplinary, and user-oriented view of the 
design of embodied interactive pedagogical software agents, which integrates theoretical and 
practical insights from various academic and other fields. The research intends to contribute to 
the scientific understanding of issues, methods, theories, and technologies that are involved in 
the design, implementation, and evaluation of embodied interactive software agents for 
different roles in e-learning and other areas. For developers, the thesis provides sixteen basic 
principles (Added Value, Perceptible Qualities, Balanced Design, Coherence, Consistency, 
Completeness, Comprehensibility, Individuality, Variability, Communicative Ability, 
Modularity, Teamwork, Participatory Design, Role Awareness, Cultural Awareness, and 
Relationship Building) plus a large number of specific guidelines for the design of embodied 
interactive software agents and their components. Furthermore, it offers critical reviews of 
theories, concepts, approaches, and technologies from different areas and disciplines that are 
relevant to agent design. Finally, it discusses three pedagogical agent roles (virtual native 
speaker, coach, and peer) in the scenario of the linguistic fieldwork classes on the Virtual 
Linguistics Campus and presents detailed considerations for the design of an agent for one of 
these roles (the virtual native speaker). 
Zusammenfassung xvii 
Zusammenfassung 
Verkörperte interaktive Software-Agenten sind komplexe autonome, adaptive und soziale 
Software-Systeme, die mit einem digitalen Körper ausgestattet sind, der sie in die Lage versetzt, 
auf andere Entitäten (Benutzer, Objekte und andere Agenten) in ihrer Umgebung durch körper-
liche Aktionen einzuwirken bzw. auf sie zu reagieren, was die Verwendung von verbalem und 
non-verbalem kommunikativem Verhalten in persönlichen Interaktionen „von Angesicht zu 
Angesicht“ mit dem Benutzer einschließt. Diese Agenten sind für diverse Rollen in unter-
schiedlichen Anwendungsgebieten entwickelt worden, in denen sie Aufgaben erfüllen, die 
ihnen von ihren Entwicklern zugedacht bzw. von ihren Benutzern oder anderen Software-
Agenten an sie delegiert worden sind. Im computerunterstützten Lernen haben verkörperte 
interaktive pädagogische Software-Agenten die generelle Aufgabe, menschliches Lernen zu 
fördern, indem sie mit Lernenden (und anderen Agenten) in computerbasierten Lernumgebun-
gen arbeiten, wozu auch E-Learning-Plattformen auf der Basis von Internet-Technologien, wie 
z. B. der Virtual Linguistics Campus (www.linguistics-online.com), gehören. In diesen Umge-
bungen bieten pädagogische Agenten kontextualisierte, qualifizierte, personalisierte und zeitge-
rechte Hilfestellungen, Zusammenarbeit, Unterricht, Motivation und Dienstleistungen sowohl 
für einzelne Lernende als auch für Gruppen von Lernenden an. 
Die vorliegende Arbeit entwickelt eine umfassende, multidisziplinäre und benutzerorien-
tierte Sicht auf das Design von verkörperten interaktiven pädagogischen Software-Agenten, die 
theoretische und praktische Erkenntnisse aus verschiedenen akademischen und anderen Gebie-
ten integriert. Sie will zum wissenschaftlichen Verständnis von Problemen, Methoden, Theo-
rien und Technologien beitragen, die in das Design, die Implementierung und die Evaluierung 
von verkörperten interaktiven Software-Agenten für unterschiedliche Rollen im E-Learning und 
in anderen Gebieten involviert sind. Für Entwickler zeigt die Arbeit sechzehn grundlegende 
Prinzipien (Mehrwert, Erkennbare Qualitäten, Ausgeglichenes Design, Kohärenz, Konsistenz, 
Vollständigkeit, Verständlichkeit, Individualität, Variabilität, Kommunikationsfähigkeit, Modu-
larität, Teamarbeit, Partizipatives Design, Rollenbewusstsein, Kulturelles Bewusstsein und Be-
ziehungsaufbau) sowie eine große Zahl von speziellen Richtlinien für das Design von verkör-
perten interaktiven Software-Agenten und ihren Komponenten auf. Außerdem bietet sie kriti-
sche Bewertungen von Theorien, Konzepten, Ansätzen und Technologien aus unterschiedlichen 
Gebieten und Disziplinen, die für das Agentendesign wichtig sind. Schließlich diskutiert sie 
drei Rollen für pädagogische Agenten (Virtueller Muttersprachler, Trainer und Co-Lerner) im 
Szenario der linguistischen Feldarbeitskurse im Virtual Linguistics Campus und präsentiert 
detaillierte Überlegungen zum Design eines Agenten für eine dieser Rollen (den Virtuellen 
Muttersprachler). 
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1  Introduction 
For the average person in the modern, post-industrial world, especially for those who were born 
or grew up in it, a life without computers and other digital artifacts1 created by the information 
technology (IT) industry is unimaginable. Many people use these artifacts on an everyday basis 
to work, play, learn, socialize, bond, break up, make love, war, and peace, and recently even to 
build alternate identities and economic existences in synthetic worlds (Castronova 2006). In 
short, ever greater parts of our daily lives are lived with, through, and dependent on computers. 
As Johnson et al. put it, “computing technology is becoming ubiquitous and ingrained in our 
society, often becoming the focal point of our businesses and social interactions” (Johnson et al. 
2006: 447). It is certainly not an exaggeration to say that economies, governments, 
relationships, and individual lives thrive with, but may also crumble without, the help of 
computers. 
1.1  Roles of Computers 
In the present work, the term computer is taken to refer to a (typically electronic) device that 
can accept information (data) in a particular (usually digital) form (input) and can perform a 
sequence of operations on this data (processing), following a preset but variable sequence of 
instructions (program), to produce a result (output) in the form of information or signals. 
Computers may be stand-alone machines, but today, they are commonly connected with other 
computers or devices, typically over a network, such as the Internet, which serves as a medium 
for the exchange of messages generated by people or computers for interpretation by humans or 
machines. 
The traditional strength of computers is in their capability to process large amounts of data in 
a short period of time. While raw processing power is still important, computers nowadays 
serve people in many ways other than just “crunching numbers.” From the perspective of the 
user,2 the various functions of computers can be classified in terms of three large categories 
(cf. Figure 1). Computers can serve people as tools, as media, and as social actors (Fogg 2003: 
Chapters 2–5): 
• Computers as tools. The computer increases the capabilities of users. It helps them to 
accomplish tasks more easily or more efficiently, guides them through processes involving 
multiple steps, and does things for them they possibly could not do without technology. 
• Computers as media. The computer provides an experience for users, by conveying symbolic 
information (text, graphics, charts, icons, etc.), sensory information (mostly audio and video, 
rarely smell and touch), or a combination of both; by giving users the opportunity to interact 
with the information or the environment; and by immersing users in computer-based 
simulations (cf. Chapter 2.3.4) that allow them to explore cause-and-effect relations, 
rehearse behaviors, and become involved in motivating vicarious experiences. 
                                              
1  An artifact is any product of human craft or any object modified by humans, e.g. a tool, vehicle, 
household appliance, mobile device, web site, or software system ([INT 1]). 
2  A user is a person who makes use of a thing (here: the computer) to achieve something, for himself 
or herself or for other individuals, alone or in cooperation or competition with other users, for work, 
learning, or pleasure. Characteristics of users are discussed in Chapter 6.1. 
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• Computers as social actors. The computer creates relationships with users. It exhibits cues 
that trigger automatic and unconscious social responses in users, leading them to detect the 
(co-) presence of a social actor and to treat the computer as they would treat another human 
being (or some other living creature) (cf. Chapter 6.5). Further steps toward relationship 
building involve the computer showing verbal and non-verbal behaviors that promote liking, 
rapport, solidarity, and trust with the user. A third characteristic of computers as social actors 
is their ability to provide various kinds of support which people look for in relationships (e.g. 
advice, reassurance, assistance, social facilitation, etc.). 
The capacity of computing technology to lead users to perceive the presence of a social 
actor is an important prerequisite for the success of the principal actors whose design and 
roles are the concern of this thesis: embodied interactive software agents. These agents will 
be introduced in Chapter 3. When perceived as social actors, computers in general and 
agents in particular can influence users’ attitudes, behaviors, motivation, etc. through their 
co-presence and interactions with users in social situations and through their ability to create 
relationships with them. 
Today, computers fill more and more roles in society that traditionally have been filled by 
humans (Alvarez-Torres et al. 2001: 164f.), acting as bank tellers, receptionists, secretaries, 
market researchers, game characters, social companions, and teachers/tutors, to name but a few 
current ‘professions’ of computers. This thesis is concerned with the design of computer-based 
actors, or agents, for roles in education (cf. Chapter 16), in particular education delivered over 
the World Wide Web (cf. Chapter 2), although roles of agents in other domains will be 
discussed in Chapter 3.2. 
1.2  User Interfaces 
Not only the functions of computers are constantly evolving but also the ways in which humans 
interact with them. The interaction between human and machine occurs at the user interface 
(Shneiderman & Plaisant 2004), which consists of the facilities (hardware and software) by 
which people (the users) can exchange information and instructions with a particular computing 
device (the system). A user interface provides means of input (allowing users to control the 
system) and means of output (allowing the system to give users feedback by informing them 
about results, errors, and its internal state). Important types of user interfaces include the 
following: 
 
Figure 1. Different functional roles of computers and how they benefit the user. Adapted from Fogg 
(2003: 25, Figure 2.1). 
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• Command-line interfaces (CLIs) take parameterized commands in a formal language, which 
are provided as lines of text typed by the user on a keyboard, and execute them, presenting 
results as text output on the screen. 
• Graphical user interfaces (GUIs) involve the direct manipulation of items on a graphical 
desktop using a pointing device. GUIs are essential components of state-of-the-art computer-
based systems. After their central elements, they are also called WIMP (Window, Icon, 
Menu, and Pointer) interfaces. 
• Web-based user interfaces are graphical user interfaces that accept input and provide output 
by generating web pages which are delivered over the Internet and viewed by users in a web 
browser program. The web pages use text, graphics, animations, audio, and video to present 
information. Furthermore, they may contain hyperlinks, form fields, buttons, and other input 
elements that allow the user to provide information and exercise control. 
• Tactile interfaces use haptic devices like data gloves and joysticks for input and/or output. 
These devices enable the user to both provide information and to receive feedback from the 
computer in the form of a felt sensation on some part of the body (e.g. force feedback). 
• Touch screen interfaces are graphical user interfaces that make use of a touch screen display 
as a combined input and output device. The user directly manipulates elements on a touch 
screen using his or her finger or a stylus. Touch screen interfaces may also feature advanced 
input options, such as handwriting recognition. 
• Conversational interfaces are an emerging class of human-computer interfaces that allow 
their users to formulate requests in natural language, possibly combined with other input and 
output modes, in the context of an ongoing conversation between the user and the system. 
• Embodied conversational interfaces add an animated (human-like) character, or persona, to 
the interaction, which represents the system or another user. This character can engage a 
human user in a real-time multimodal dialogue that emulates the experience of human face-
to-face interaction, involving the coordinated use of verbal and non-verbal behaviors. 
The general purpose of user interfaces is to hide the complexity of the underlying system 
from users by helping them to experience the system in a way which they perceive as effective, 
efficient, enjoyable, and satisfying. Ideally, an interface should facilitate natural interaction 
(Valli 2004), which is intuitive and does not rely on complex devices or extensive prior 
instruction of users. People interact naturally every day through physical actions enabled by the 
means provided by their bodies: speech, facial expressions, gaze, gesture, posture, and 
locomotion (cf. Chapter 10.1). Embodied conversational interfaces have the ability to 
understand these actions and can respond with the same kinds of behaviors, performed by 
embodied characters, thus allowing users to interact naturally with the system and with each 
other. The present research is concerned with embodied conversational interfaces and, to a 
lesser extent, with conversational interfaces. The focus is on the design of embodied, agent-
based interfaces that are capable of multimodal (conversational) interaction with human 
learners. 
1.3  Intelligent Software Agents 
Human-machine interfaces have evolved considerably over the last fifty years. The cryptic 
command languages and outputs of the early days of computing have largely given way to the 
direct manipulation of on-screen objects in current graphical and web-based user interfaces. 
Another paradigm shift began in the early 1990s with the arrival of intelligent software agents 
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in the world of computing. Discussed in detail in Chapter 3, intelligent software agents can be 
briefly characterized at this point as computer programs that have been told (or have learned) 
what a particular user needs, prefers, or wants, and have the ability to autonomously perform 
specific tasks which the user has delegated to them. 
Human-computer interaction (HCI)3 has always been (and still largely is) a master-slave 
(some would say user-tool) relationship, in which the user monitors and controls the operation 
of the computer, telling the machine at each step in the interaction what to do next. Unlike their 
users, current computers rarely take the initiative or act according to their own agenda in order 
to serve the user. In addition, for the most part, they do not possess the ability to adapt to an 
individual user; instead, people have to customize them. In other words, computers are 
adaptable rather than adaptive machines (Opperman 1994; Jameson 2003). Then again, state-
of-the-art computer systems are not only sophisticated but also complex artifacts and have a 
constantly growing number of non-expert users. The intention and hope for intelligent software 
agents is that they can help to transform human-computer interaction from user-controlled 
command execution into a cooperative process, in which software agents adaptively, 
competently, and proactively assist users (and other agents) in various roles and domains 
(cf. Chapter 3.2). 
The cooperation between humans and software agents is facilitated if agents are capable of 
making the interaction natural for the user, as outlined in the previous section. Hence, agents 
should be coupled with an embodied conversational interface that can handle (spoken or 
written) natural language, facial expressions, eye gaze, posture, and locomotion, both as inputs 
provided by users and as the agent’s own outputs delivered by an animated, embodied character 
that portrays a rich individual and sociocultural identity and displays contextually and 
individually appropriate emotions. This thesis will discuss the design of both the front-end and 
the back-end components of embodied interactive agent systems for roles in education (referred 
to as pedagogical agents, cf. Chapter 4). The character-based front-end of these systems 
provides the body, face, and voice with which the pedagogical agent presents itself to and 
interacts with the learner, whereas the agent-based back-end implements the expertise and 
functionality that enables the agent to play its supporting role with respect to the learner and 
other participants (humans or other agents) in the learning experience. 
1.4  E-Learning 
The present work on embodied pedagogical software agents is embedded in the broader context 
of research and development involving the use of information and communication technologies 
(ICT) to facilitate and promote human learning. The broad spectrum of activities using ICT for 
educational purposes is commonly subsumed under the umbrella term e-learning. While there 
is no generally accepted definition of e-learning, in this work, it is taken to involve the creation, 
delivery, promotion, and facilitation of individual and collaborative learning processes and 
experiences situated in a learning environment built on computer and network technologies, in 
particular the World Wide Web ([INT 2]). These environments integrate communicative, 
interactive, and multimedia components for content management, content delivery, learning 
                                              
3  Human-computer interaction (HCI) is concerned with the design, implementation, and use of 
computer interfaces (Jacko & Sears 2003). The goal of HCI is to create effective and enjoyable 
systems that help people to accomplish their individual or collaborative tasks. 
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management, communication, collaboration, and student assessment. A more detailed account 
of e-learning will be given in the next chapter. 
The specific web-based learning environment providing the context for the present work is 
the Virtual Linguistics Campus (VLC) ([INT 3]; Handke & Franke 2006), the world’s leading 
e-learning platform for linguistics, which offers a wide variety of web-based courses in the 
fields of theoretical linguistics, applied linguistics, language technologies, teacher training, and 
linguistic fieldwork. The linguistic fieldwork classes of the VLC serve as the environment for 
three pedagogical agent roles, which will be discussed in Chapter 16. 
1.5  Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of seventeen chapters, which can be grouped into chapters on basic 
concepts including e-learning, intelligent software agents, pedagogical agents, and interactivity 
(Chapter 1 to Chapter 5); chapters on design, design principles for embodied interactive 
software agents, and agent design failures (Chapter 6 to Chapter 8); chapters on the design of 
different components of embodied interactive pedagogical agents (Chapter 9 to Chapter 13); 
chapters on agent architectures and technical platforms as well as on the evaluation of 
embodied interactive software agents (Chapter 14 to Chapter 15); a chapter which discusses 
three different pedagogical agent roles for the linguistic fieldwork classes on the Virtual 
Linguistics Campus (Chapter 16); and a final chapter summarizing the thesis (Chapter 17). The 
contents of the chapters following this introduction are summarized below: 
• Chapter 2 defines and delimits the scope of the term ‘e-learning;’ compares three major 
theoretical perspectives on human learning (behaviorism, cognitivism, and constructivism) 
and discusses the implications of each perspective for the design of instruction; reviews a 
number of e-learning technologies relevant to the present research; and provides an overview 
of the structure, components, and features of the Virtual Linguistics Campus. 
• Chapter 3 is concerned with intelligent software agents. It defines the concept and shows 
what distinguishes software agents from other types of computer programs; discusses the 
properties of software agents in detail; and describes different types of intelligent software 
agents. A separate section gives an overview of the qualities and components of embodied 
interactive software agents, i.e. intelligent software agents with a digital embodiment that 
enables them to act on and react to other entities (users, objects, and other agents) through 
bodily actions, including verbal and non-verbal communicative behaviors. 
• Chapter 4 introduces pedagogical agents as embodied interactive software agents designed 
to provide various kinds of assistance to human learners in the context of interactive learning 
environments. Furthermore, it describes the capabilities which enable pedagogical agents to 
facilitate learning and the requirements that pedagogical agents with these capabilities have 
to meet. 
• Chapter 5 discusses the notion of interactivity, which is widely regarded as a positive quality 
that artifacts, exchanges, and experiences should possess, although its precise nature and 
effects are not known (Bucy 2004b: 373f.). This is an unsatisfying situation for the present 
research, given that embodied interactive software agents by their very definition are capable 
of engaging in mutual give and take with other entities. To develop a better understanding of 
interactivity for agent design, this chapter examines the notion in some detail, revealing that 
it is more complex than it appears on the surface, but also contributing a number of useful 
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insights for the design of interactive agents in general and for roles in e-learning in 
particular. 
• Chapter 6 provides the necessary background on the field and process of design for the 
discussion of agent design in later chapters. It begins with a discussion of the nature and 
characteristics of the user as the individual who makes use of designed artifacts. The context 
which influences the use and usability of artifacts, including software agents, is discussed 
next. The remainder of the chapter consists of separate sections covering cognitive, affective, 
and social aspects of design. Fundamental concepts, including the usability of artifacts, the 
interplay between cognition and affect and its influence on users’ experience of artifacts, and 
the Media Equation, are discussed in these sections. 
• Chapter 7 argues that the design of embodied interactive software agents for education and 
other domains should be based on solid principles rather than intuition and ad-hoc decisions. 
Sixteen design principles are proposed in this chapter: Added Value, Perceptible Qualities, 
Balanced Design, Coherence, Consistency, Completeness, Comprehensibility, Individuality, 
Variability, Communicative Ability, Modularity, Teamwork, Participatory Design, Role 
Awareness, Cultural Awareness, and Relationship Building. 
• Chapter 8 analyzes two less than successful earlier designs of embodied interactive software 
agents, Microsoft Bob and the Office Assistant, from the perspective of the design principles 
discussed in Chapter 7, showing that their failure results from a lack of consideration for 
several of these principles and deriving a number of lessons for the design of embodied 
interactive agents. The chapter also provides the transition to the following chapters covering 
the different components of agent design (Chapter 9 to Chapter 13). 
• Chapter 9 is concerned with the first (and most immediately visible) aspect of the design of 
an embodied interactive software agent: the body with which the agent presents itself to the 
user. It discusses the pros and cons of humanoid embodiments, several guidelines for 
designing an agent’s appearance, the need for individual agent designs based on a character 
profile, the ability of the embodiment to move, the appropriate degree of realism for the 
agent’s representation, applications of complete and partial embodiments, and the issue of 
whether an agent should be able to change its embodiment. 
• Chapter 10 discusses the design of different kinds of behaviors displayed by an embodied 
interactive agent during its interactions with the user. Categories of behaviors involved in 
communication are the topic of the first section, including voice, gesture, facial expression, 
gaze, posture, and locomotion. The second section covers behaviors performed by an agent 
to enhance the believability of its persona. In the third section, behaviors that help to build 
agent-user relationships are discussed. Finally, the fourth section addresses the issue of the 
appropriate degree of presence of embodied agents on the screen (high vs. low profile). 
• Chapter 11 deals with the conversational abilities of embodied interactive software agents. 
The discussion begins with reviews of the state of the art in the technologies involved in 
giving (embodied) conversational agents the ability to understand and produce (spoken) 
natural language and to process multiple combined input modes. The focus of the remainder 
of the chapter is then on the design aspects of different types of conversational agents, 
including chatbots, dialogue agents, and embodied conversational agents. 
• Chapter 12 is concerned with the different components of the expertise of a pedagogical 
software agent. Following the classic subdivision made in intelligent tutoring systems, the 
chapter first discusses the agent’s domain model, including techniques for the acquisition, 
representation, and use of knowledge; then the student model, covering user modeling and 
student modeling in general as well as comparing different approaches to student modeling; 
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and finally the instructor model, describing various instructional interactions that embodied 
pedagogical agents can implement to assist learners. 
• Chapter 13 shifts the focus of attention from the cognitive, ‘rational’ aspects of an agent to 
its “inner life.” The major part of the chapter is concerned with the notion of ‘emotion’ in 
relation to embodied interactive software agents. The discussion covers the dual (cognitive 
and physical) nature of emotion, its functions in cognition and social interaction, 
communication-driven and simulation-based approaches to modeling emotion in machines, 
and ways for agents to interpret the emotional state of the user and to express their own 
(simulated) emotions. The two remaining sections of the chapter deal with the modeling, 
projection, and adaptation of the agent’s personality and discuss the need to add depth to the 
agent’s personality by enriching it with a detailed back-story. 
• Chapter 14 is concerned with technical aspects of agent design. It compares different basic 
architectures for software agents, including deliberative, reactive, hybrid, blackboard, and 
multi-agent architectures. Furthermore, it discusses four approaches to generate believable 
behaviors of embodied agents: behavior sequencing, layered generation, state machine 
compilation, and multi-character systems. Finally, different technical platforms for software 
agents are compared, including desktop computers, the World Wide Web, virtual reality, and 
mobile devices. 
• Chapter 15 discusses aspects of the evaluation of embodied interactive software agents. It 
begins by identifying motivations for doing evaluation research on and with these agents. 
One important motivation is the possibility to derive design guidelines from the results of 
evaluation research. Factors that can influence the evaluation of agents are discussed next. 
They include design parameters of the agent, characteristics of the user, and contextual 
factors. The following sections review different types of evaluation research (formative and 
summative, macro and micro evaluation), discuss basic aspects of evaluation research design 
(the research model, the research question, and constructs), and compare research strategies, 
data collection methods, and qualitative and quantitative data analysis, respectively. The 
chapter concludes with a section providing a set of guidelines for the evaluation of embodied 
interactive software agents. 
• Chapter 16 describes three different roles for embodied interactive pedagogical software 
agents in the context provided by the linguistic fieldwork classes of the Virtual Linguistics 
Campus. The three roles include the virtual native speaker, which serves as an interactive 
informant for the learner’s field research, the coach, which offers guidance and motivational 
support during the learner’s fieldwork activities, and the peer, which acts as a co-learner 
exploring the language together with the learner. The design and evaluation of the role of the 
virtual native speaker are discussed in detail. 
• Chapter 17 summarizes the main results of the thesis and provides an outlook on future work 
on the design, implementation, and evaluation of the pedagogical agent roles described in 
Chapter 16. 
1.6  Contribution of the Thesis 
The goal of the present work is both theoretical and practical in nature. One the one hand, its 
intention is to contribute to a scientific understanding of issues, methods, theories and 
technologies involved in the design, implementation, and evaluation of embodied interactive 
software agents for different roles in education. On the other hand, it aims to provide guidelines 
for practitioners, which help them to build agents for education and other application domains 
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that effectively play the (instructional) role for which they have been designed and are 
perceived by users as believable and competent artificial individuals. The main contributions of 
the thesis are the following: 
• A comprehensive, multidisciplinary, and user-oriented view of the design of embodied 
interactive software agents, which brings together inputs from a variety of both academic 
and non-academic sources, including the arts, computer science, linguistics, psychology, 
pedagogy, robotics, graphics and animation, the social sciences, computer game research and 
development, the science-fiction literature, and (animated) movies, all of which have made 
(intentionally or unintentionally) some kind of contribution to the understanding of what is 
involved in being human. The insights into the design of embodied interactive software 
agents compiled in this thesis have applications not only in the development of pedagogical 
agents but also in the design of embodied interactive agents for other application domains. 
• Sixteen principles and numerous specific guidelines for the design of embodied interactive 
software agents and their components. 
• A critical review of theories, concepts and approaches from various areas and disciplines that 
are relevant to the design of embodied interactive pedagogical agents, in preparation for 
future development work, which is outlined in Chapter 17. 
• The discussion of a concrete application scenario on the Virtual Linguistics Campus for 
embodied pedagogical software agents in three different roles (virtual native speaker, coach, 
and peer), including a detailed description of the design of one of these roles (the virtual 
native speaker). 
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2  E-Learning 
Education needs to prepare individuals for living and working in a world that depends on 
information and knowledge like humans depend on oxygen, and, despite the essential support 
provided by technology, still builds on the ability of the individual to acquire, understand, 
manipulate, create, update, refresh, publish, and preserve information and knowledge. Learning 
has become a necessary lifelong activity because knowledge and skills have to be refreshed, 
updated, and extended at an ever increasing rate until post-retirement. Furthermore, the amount 
of information available on the Internet and elsewhere grows exponentially and has to be 
handled by individuals, the society, and the education system without becoming overwhelmed 
by it. In addition, people increasingly need to be equipped “just in time” or “on demand” with 
the knowledge and skills necessary to handle a given problem or situation. As a result, 
education and training are nowadays usually expected to be flexible with respect to the place 
and time of learning. Finally, state-of-the-art information and communication technologies 
(ICT), such as computers, cell phones, and portable media players, have transformed the ways 
in which people work, play, and communicate. Especially for the younger people from the so-
called Net Generation4 (Tapscott 1998; Oblinger & Oblinger 2005) in first-world societies, who 
were born in the 1980s or later, have grown up with ICT, and are now starting out in their 
academic or vocational career, these are familiar artifacts, which they naturally use every day 
for communication, entertainment, and, recently, also learning. It is both a responsibility of and 
an opportunity for the education system to integrate ICT into learning scenarios in order to help 
people to learn more effectively and to develop the competence they need to make effective use 
of ICT as early as possible in life. 
The use of information and communication technologies to deliver, manage, and support 
learning experiences, usually in a networked setting, is often subsumed under the general label 
of electronic learning or e-learning. In recent years, e-learning has been proposed as an answer 
to the challenges that education faces in the information age, as outlined above. Comprehensive 
reviews of e-learning can be found elsewhere (Kearsley 2000; Ko & Rossen 2001; Rosenberg 
2001; Clark & Mayer 2003; Mason & Rennie 2006; Schulmeister 2006). Instead, the following 
discussion introduces a number of basic concepts, technologies, and scenarios related to e-
learning in order to provide the necessary background for the discussion in later chapters. 
Section 2.1 presents an elaborate definition of e-learning and delimits the scope of the term for 
the present work. Since e-learning requires a solid foundation in principles of human learning, 
Section 2.2 discusses learning and instructional design in the context of three major theoretical 
perspectives: behaviorism, cognitivism, and constructivism. Section 2.3 reviews technologies 
for e-learning. Section 2.4 describes the Virtual Linguistics Campus, the e-learning platform 
that provides the context for the present research. Finally, Section 2.5 summarizes the chapter. 
2.1  Definition and Scope 
The e in e-learning stands for elephant. Or at least it might. For like the blind men encountering 
an elephant in the old story, e-learning means different things to different people. One feels the 
                                              
4  It should be noted that the Net Generation is a quite controversial notion. In the German e-learning 
community, Rolf Schulmeister is one of the most renowned and outspoken critics of this idea 
(Schulmeister 2008). 
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tail and exclaims, “e-learning is like a T-3 line to the Internet backbone.” Another is slapped in 
the face by the trunk and says, “e-learning is about interactivity and feedback.” Yet another 
touches the elephant’s side and says, “Whatever e-learning is, it’s very, very big.” (Jay Cross, 
[INT 4], his emphasis). 
The term ‘e-learning’ covers a wide range of different uses of information and communication 
technologies for educational purposes. Its meaning has changed since it first appeared in the 
late 1990s (coined by Jay Cross ([INT 5])), and it has different connotations in different 
communities and contexts. Definitions of e-learning abound in the literature and on the World 
Wide Web (Romiszowski 2004). Some of these definitions emphasize content, others 
communication, and still others technology (Mason & Rennie 2006: xiv). While a number of 
views classify virtually any form of technology-supported learning (including the use of audio 
and video tapes, CD-ROMs, and satellite broadcasts to deliver educational content to learners) 
as ‘e-learning’, others reserve the term for educational scenarios that use the Internet as a 
platform (p. xiv), like, for example, Rosenberg: 
E-learning refers to the use of Internet technologies to deliver a broad array of solutions that 
enhance knowledge and performance. It is based on three fundamental criteria: 
1. E-learning is networked, which makes it capable of instant updating, storage/retrieval, 
distribution and sharing of instruction or information. (…) 
2. It is delivered to the end-user via a computer using standard Internet technology. (…) 
3. It focuses on the broadest view of learning – learning solutions that go beyond the traditional 
paradigms of training. (Rosenberg 2001: 28f.). 
Not only does e-learning mean different things to different people, as pointed out in the 
introductory quotation, but there is also a plethora of other terms which are related to e-learning 
and often confused with it, although they have (more or less) different meanings (Mason & 
Rennie 2006: xvf.). Examples include web-based learning, distance education, e-education, 
distributed learning, flexible learning, open learning, virtual classroom, and computer-based/-
aided/-assisted/-mediated education/instruction/learning/training, among many others. Guri-
Rosenblit correctly observed that: 
Often discourse on new technologies suffers from “The Tower of Babel Syndrome” – a confusing 
language and misleading conclusions, emanating from the fact that people refer to totally 
different functions and roles while using the same generic terms (…). It is not just the meanings 
attached to specific terms that are unclear. The language used in the relevant literature to depict 
the nature of study environments shaped by the new technologies is blurred and confusing. (Guri-
Rosenblit 2005: 6). 
To be as clear as possible about the meaning of the term ‘e-learning’ as it will be used in the 
present work, a definition is proposed below that is based on the author’s first-hand experience 
of creating and teaching several e-learning courses, both with and without face-to-face 
interaction, in the learning environment of the Virtual Linguistics Campus, and of programming 
a substantial part of the underlying technical framework of this environment: 
E-learning is the use of Internet technologies to create, deliver, and support individual and 
collaborative learning experiences and processes anytime and anywhere, with or without face-to-
face components and involving human (or non-human) staff to different degrees and in different 
roles (teacher, tutor, coach, guide, mentor, etc.). It integrates administrative, communicative, 
interactive, and multimedia elements into a computer-based, networked learning environment that 
is adaptive, dynamic, and individualized with respect to the content and support it provides. The 
design of the educational content, the learning support, and the environment as a whole is based 
on principles of instructional design and guided by formative and summative evaluations. 
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This definition is intentionally elaborate and comprehensive in order to cover as broad a 
spectrum of e-learning activities as possible. One focus of the definition is on the technical side 
of e-learning, in particular the components and properties of e-learning environments that use 
the Internet, especially the World Wide Web, as a platform. These environments have tasks 
which go beyond the delivery of educational content and include the provision of dynamic and 
tailored support for both the individual learner and groups of learners. The definition covers 
e-learning scenarios that are, in principle, independent of place and/or time but may combine 
online learning at the computer via the Internet with face-to-face sessions in the real world. 
Human instructors, but increasingly also non-human teaching and support staff, i.e. autonomous 
pedagogical software agents (cf. Chapter 4) with characteristics including embodiment, 
behavior, communicative abilities, expertise, emotion, and personality (cf. Chapter 9 to Chapter 
13), may be involved in these scenarios to different extents and in different roles. The process 
of developing the educational content, the mechanisms for supporting learning, and the overall 
environment has a solid foundation in principles for systematically planning, designing, and 
evaluating educational content and environments, and is constantly informed by repeated 
evaluations of increasingly sophisticated versions of the learning environment throughout the 
development process (cf. Chapter 15). 
Figure 2 shows the relationship between e-learning and a number of associated terms that 
will be discussed later in this chapter, as it is perceived by the author (other views may differ). 
In this diagram, e-learning both (partially) subsumes and is partially included in other terms, 
which are described briefly below: 
• Face-to-face refers to education that takes place when learners and instructors have direct, 
unmediated contact, i.e. when they interact with each other in the same physical space and at 
the same time. Education delivered in the classroom or in one-to-one tutoring sessions are 
classic examples of face-to-face scenarios. The emphasis of face-to-face instruction is on the 
interaction between learners and instructors; use of technology and (online) educational 
material is supplemental to human teaching. 
• Online learning (also called web-based learning) (Drave 2000; Kearsley 2000; Ko & Rossen 
2001) does not involve any face-to-face interaction between the participants but relies solely 
on information and communication technologies to deliver content, provide assessment, and 
offer support to learners, and to provide the tools for communication between and among 
learners and instructors (Mason & Rennie 2006: 126). Current online learning scenarios 
commonly use the World Wide Web as their technical platform. A typical web-based course 
has the following features (p. 126, cf. Section 2.4): 
• Instructional material, preferably in an interactive multimedia format; 
• Course description, dates and deadlines, course requirements; 
• Facilities supporting formative and summative assessment of learners; 
• Learner management tools (records, statistics, tracking, and modeling); 
• Communication tools (discussion forums, e-mail, and chat); 
• Links to further internal and external resources (databases, libraries, web sites, etc.). 
In addition, more recent online courses integrate tools such as weblogs and wikis to involve 
learners as co-authors of content (cf. Section 2.3.9). 
• Blended (or hybrid) learning (Bersin 2004; Bonk & Graham 2006) integrates elements of 
face-to-face and online learning scenarios, combining the flexibility (“anytime, anywhere”) 
of online delivery with the social environment of the classroom (Mason & Rennie 2006: 
12f.). For example, blended learning on the Virtual Linguistics Campus (cf. Section 2.4.2.3) 
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involves learners studying online educational content before participating in in-class sessions 
with the instructor that focus on discussion and practice rather than presentation of content. 
In general, blended learning is now regarded by many as superior to both face-to-face and 
online scenarios (e.g. Dean et al. 2001; Singh 2003; Dziuban et al. 2004; Frankle 2005). 
• Mobile learning (or m-learning) (Keegan 2002; Alexander 2004; Naismith et al. 2004; 
Sharples 2007) can be broadly defined as “any sort of learning that happens when the learner 
is not at a fixed, predetermined location, or learning that happens when the learner takes 
advantage of learning opportunities offered by mobile technologies” (O’Malley et al. 2003: 
6). M-learning is a recent buzzword (Mason & Rennie 2006: xvii) referring to ways of 
delivering educational content to the “mobile generation” in a format that is appropriate for 
cell phones, portable media players, and other mobile devices. Mobile learning shares some 
aspects with online learning, but educational content is typically downloaded to the mobile 
device (e.g. as a podcast, cf. Section 2.3.9) rather than studied online. 
• Distance education (Moore & Kearsley 1996; Moore & Anderson 2003; Neal & Miller 
2005) refers to scenarios in which learners are separated from their instructors and peers in 
terms of location and often also time (Neal & Miller 2005: 454). Starting with the first 
correspondence courses in the 1800s, various technologies have been used to deliver 
instruction to remote learners, including radio, television, computer-based courseware on 
CD-ROMs, audio- and video conferencing, and, recently, web-based courses and mobile 
devices (p. 455). While distance education implies that teaching and learning processes are 
separated by place and/or time, some face-to-face interaction may be involved (e.g. kick-off 
meetings, on-site workshops, and in-person exams). Distance education includes both online 
learning and mobile learning but is broader than both. 
2.2  Learning and Instruction 
Learning (Pear 2001) is the complex cognitive process by which people5 acquire and develop 
knowledge and skills from sources including experience, practice, study, and instruction (OED 
                                              
5  See Chapter 12.1.1.2 for a discussion of machine learning. 
 
Figure 2. The relationship between e-learning and various associated terms. Based on Mason and 
Rennie (2006: xvii, Figure 1). 
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1998: 1048; [INT 6]). It is an intra-individual process that is influenced by a variety of factors, 
including the individual’s mental and physical abilities, previous knowledge and experiences, 
current affective state, personality, and his or her physical and social environment. Learning 
induces relatively permanent changes in the individual’s actual behavior or his or her capacity 
for behavior (Schunk 1991: 2). 
Instruction is the deliberate process of initiating, promoting, facilitating, guiding, and 
assessing the learning processes of individuals and groups, which is working toward achieving 
specific learning goals identified for them (Smith & Ragan 2005: 4). In contrast to learning, 
instruction takes place between individuals. It targets learners individually or as a group from 
the outside in order to affect changes within each learner. Instruction is often used 
synonymously with the terms education, training, and teaching (p. 5). However, following 
Smith and Ragan (pp. 4ff.), in the present work, these terms are defined as related to, but also 
distinct from, instruction (cf. Figure 3). Education is the broadest category, which includes all 
experiences in which learning occurs, whether they are planned or unplanned, formal or 
informal, intentional or incidental. Instruction is completely included in education since all 
instructional activities are performed to promote learning. The reverse is not true, though, 
because people learn from many experiences that are not explicitly designed to be instrumental 
in the achievement of specific learning goals. While instruction is often reduced to strategies for 
the transfer of knowledge and skills from a knowledgeable source (e.g. the teacher, a textbook, 
or an e-learning course) to learners, the definition of instruction above also applies to student-
centered learning experiences, provided that they are directed toward specific learning goals. 
Training is instruction intended to help learners to acquire specific skills for which they have an 
(almost) immediate application. Often, training equips individuals with specific competencies 
which they need for their work in business, military, or governmental environments. However, 
training is only a subset of instruction because much of instruction does not prepare learners for 
accomplishing particular work-related tasks but has a more general scope. Furthermore, the 
knowledge and skills acquired are not for immediate application but may serve the individual 
on various occasions in his or her later life. Finally, the term teaching labels instruction that is 
provided by a live human teacher rather than by some kind of medium (e.g. a textbook, CD-
ROM-based courseware, or an e-learning environment). It is important to note that in contrast 
to traditional views that equate teaching and instruction and consider the presence of a human 
teacher to be mandatory, the diagram in Figure 3 shows that instruction is larger than teaching 
and includes experiences for which a human teacher is not necessary and can therefore be 
replaced with computer-based support, such as pedagogical software agents. On the other hand, 
teaching is not always aiming at pre-defined instructional goals. Instead, learning goals may 
emerge during activities designed and implemented by the teacher, often developed by learners 
as they are engaged in an activity, producing possibly unanticipated learning outcomes. 
Learning is a complex phenomenon that has attracted the attention of scholars for a long 
time, generating a vast body of theoretical insights from different perspectives (psychology, 
pedagogy, philosophy, linguistics, artificial intelligence, etc.). However, the results of basic 
learning research are usually not directly applicable to instructional practice but have to be 
translated into instructional strategies, techniques, and materials as well as guidelines for 
selecting the appropriate approach for a particular learner or group of learners in a specific 
educational context (Ertmer & Newby 1993: 50). Instructional design (ID) (Gagné et al. 2004; 
Smith & Ragan 2005) serves a bridging function between learning research and instructional 
practice (Ertmer & Newby 1993: 50) by “translating principles of learning and instruction into 
plans for instructional materials, activities, information resources, and evaluation” (Smith & 
Ragan 2005: 4). ID is a systematic, iterative, and reflective process (p. 4) that consists of 
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identifying learning needs and goals for the target audience; designing materials, activities, 
resources, systems, etc. to address these needs and goals; evaluating the designs created; and 
improving them based on the results of these evaluations ([INT 7]). Products of instructional 
design not only have to be functional with respect to their educational purpose but also need to 
appeal to the learner (Smith & Ragan 2005: 4), a requirement that was often forgotten in the 
design of early computer software for learning. Affective, cognitive, and social aspects of 
design are discussed in Chapter 6. 
Instructional design can draw important insights from an understanding of human learning 
processes. There are many different views and theories about how learning can be effectively 
achieved (Ertmer & Newby 1993: 51). Learning theories provide theoretical frameworks or 
models for the description and explanation of learning processes in humans and animals ([INT 
8]). Learning theories differ from each other with respect to the learning mechanisms 
postulated; the factors that are said to influence learning; the role that memory is assumed to 
play in the learning process; the ways in which learners supposedly transfer knowledge and 
skills to new problems and situations; and the types of learning for which the theory offers the 
best explanations (p. 53). Three major theoretical perspectives on human learning and their 
implications for instructional design with and without technology are reviewed in the following: 
behaviorism, cognitivism, and constructivism. 
2.2.1  Behaviorism 
Popular in the 1950s and 1960s, behaviorism contends that learning of animals and people can 
be explained by only focusing on their objectively observable behaviors while the individual’s 
internal cognitive structures and processes are not considered ([INT 9]) (i.e. the mind is viewed 
as a “black box”). At the heart of behaviorism is the stimulus-response model, which explains 
the observable behavior of an organism only in terms of the organism’s reaction (response) to 
some previous stimulus. The process in which an organism learns to associate a certain stimulus 
with a certain response is referred to as conditioning. Hence, behaviorism views learning as an 
observable change of behavior which emerges in reaction to environmental stimuli and as a 
result of conditioning processes (Arnold 2005: 2). In the classical approach to conditioning 
(Pavlov 1927), a neutral stimulus (e.g. a light or a sound) is repeatedly paired with another 
stimulus (e.g. food) that evokes a reflex reaction (e.g. saliva production), until eventually the 
two stimuli become associated and produce the same response ([INT 10]). In contrast, operant 
 
Figure 3. Instruction and related terms (Smith & Ragan 2005: 5, Figure 1.1). 
Chapter 2: E-Learning 15 
conditioning (Skinner 1938) is the process of modifying the behavior of an organism through 
repeated reinforcement of desired responses and punishment of undesired ones. Reinforcement 
and punishment are either ‘positive’ (i.e. a pleasant or unpleasant stimulus is added following a 
response) or ‘negative’ (i.e. an unpleasant or pleasant stimulus is removed after a response), 
with positive reinforcement being more effective than punishment ([INT 11]; Arnold 2005: 3). 
By selectively reinforcing (or punishing) behaviors, the ‘instructor’ can completely control the 
learning process from the outside (p. 2). Behaviorists regard knowledge as given and absolute 
(Dara-Abrams 2002); the role of memory in learning is typically not addressed (Ertmer & 
Newby 1993: 55). 
Instruction based on behaviorist principles emphasizes the attainment of observable and 
measurable learning outcomes, pre-assessment of learners to determine the starting point for 
instruction, simplification and standardization in instruction, decomposition of knowledge into 
basic building blocks, sequencing of instruction (cf. Chapter 12.3.11), mastery of the current 
item of instruction as a prerequisite for moving on to the next, reinforcement of desired 
responses through rewards and feedback, and use of cues, practice situations, and 
environmental conditions that strengthen stimulus-response associations (Ertmer & Newby 
1993: 56f. + 59). The goal of instruction is to transfer knowledge to learners as efficiently and 
effectively as possible (Bednar et al. 1992). 
Based on the ideas of behaviorism, Skinner developed the model of programmed instruction 
(Skinner 1968; [INT 12]), which, in turn, provided the theoretical foundation for the design of 
the first generation of programs for computer-based training (CBT) (Arnold 2005: 6). In these 
programs, the content of instruction is divided into small units, which are presented in a logical 
sequence ([INT 12]). Each unit is followed by questions or exercises for learners to determine 
their understanding of the material. Correct responses generate some positive feedback from the 
program and ‘qualify’ the learner for the next unit, whereas incorrect solutions have the 
opposite effect: the system states that the solution is incorrect, presents the correct answer 
and/or further information, and makes the learner repeat the unit or the exercise. Hence, the 
program completely controls the learning process, leaving the learner little or no freedom to act 
on his or her own. Drill-and-practice programs are classic examples of this approach (cf. 
Section 2.3.1) (Arnold 2005: 6). 
For some time during the 1950s and 1960s, behaviorism was the most influential approach in 
behavior and education research, and its proponents claimed that it provided a universal 
explanation for learning in animals and people (Arnold 2005: 3). However, behaviorism soon 
came under attack for neglecting the interior of the “black box” (the mind), i.e. of the cognitive 
structures and processes involved in perception, memory, problem solving, etc., and for 
reducing learning to observable changes of behavior (p. 3). 
Educational software based on behaviorist principles is appropriate for reinforcing simple 
skills and recollection (Bostock 1995), which are involved in vocabulary drills, basic 
calculation exercises, and spelling tasks, for example. However, these programs are not suitable 
for more complex content or skills, and they do not help students to establish connections 
between different pieces of knowledge, teach them how to apply newly acquired skills and 
knowledge in realistic scenarios, or encourage them to engage in critical reflection on their own 
knowledge (Arnold 2005: 7). 
16 Chapter 2: E-Learning 
2.2.2  Cognitivism 
Toward the end of the 1950s, the growing discontent with behaviorism marked the beginning of 
the cognitive revolution in psychology (Broadbent 1958; Chomsky 1959; Neisser 1967), which 
brought about a paradigm shift from the behaviorist view of the mind as a “black box” to a 
consideration of the internal cognitive structures and processes of the individual. Phenomena 
such as perception, memory, thinking, problem solving, and language processing became the 
focus of cognitive theories about how complex mental concepts and structures are acquired 
(Arnold 2005: 3). Cognitivists agreed with behaviorists that learning should be studied 
objectively by conducting empirical research. But unlike behaviorists, they tried to explain 
observable behavior in terms of its underlying internal cognitive structures and processes ([INT 
13]). Ertmer and Newby summarized the key points of cognitive research on learning as 
follows: 
Cognitive theories stress the acquisition of knowledge and internal mental structures; they focus 
on the conceptualization of students’ learning processes and address the issues of how 
information is received, organized, stored, and retrieved by the mind. (…) Learning is concerned 
not so much with what learners do but with what they know and how they come to acquire it 
(Ertmer & Newby 1993: 58, their emphasis). 
In the cognitive tradition, learning is viewed as mental information processing that works in 
a similar way to the input-processing-storage-output architecture of computers (Driscoll 2000: 
75; Siemens 2006): some input from the environment (e.g. explanations, demonstrations, 
worked examples, corrective feedback, etc.) enters short-term memory, where it is processed. 
The processed information is stored in long-term memory for later retrieval and/or results in 
some sort of (changed) behavior (output). The learner actively develops and repeatedly 
modifies cognitive structures by applying cognitive processes to incoming information; this is 
called active learning (Mayer 2005c: 36). These processes either change learners’ existing 
cognitive structures to adapt them to new experiences (accommodation), which can also involve 
the creation of new structures, or incorporate new experiences into existing cognitive structures 
(assimilation) (Piaget 1952). The goal is to overcome the individual’s state of perturbation 
(caused by unmet expectations about the environment) and to create a new equilibrium 
(Schulmeister 1997: 71). 
Cognitive research distinguishes between different kinds of knowledge, including factual 
knowledge (of basic terminology and specific facts), conceptual knowledge (of categories, 
principles, and models), procedural knowledge (of procedures, techniques, and methods as well 
as criteria for their application), and metacognitive knowledge (of one’s own knowledge and 
capabilities) (Mayer 2002: 625f.). Knowledge is assumed to exist independently of the 
individual; in other words, cognitivists (like behaviorists) see knowledge as given and absolute 
(Dara-Abrams 2002; Arnold 2005: 4). There is a single ‘correct’ mental model (knowledge 
structure) capturing the central concepts of the subject matter and the relationships between 
them, which is formed by the learner through active cognitive processing (Gentner & Stevens 
1983; Dalgarno 1996; Mayer 2005c: 36). Examples of basic knowledge structures include 
process, comparison, generalization, enumeration, and classification structures (Mayer 2005c: 
36). The task of instruction is to support learners’ construction of mental models, by helping 
them to process new information and integrate it with what they know in a way that facilitates 
later retrieval of relevant knowledge for transfer to a new situation or task (Clark & Mayer 
2003: 35–42). How this can be accomplished in the instructional design of multimedia learning 
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experiences is discussed in the following within the framework of Mayer’s cognitive theory of 
multimedia learning (CTML) (Mayer 2005c). 
The goal of this theory is to explain human learning by referring to “how mental processes 
transform information received by the eyes and ears into knowledge and skills in human 
memory” (Clark & Mayer 2003: 35). Multimedia learning involves constructing mental models 
from instructional materials that combine words (spoken or printed) and pictures (static or 
moving images), i.e. auditory and visual information (Mayer 2005b: 2). Three assumptions 
about human cognitive processing are central to the CTML (Mayer 2005c: 33–37): 
• Dual channels. Humans are equipped with two separate channels for processing auditory and 
visual information, respectively: an auditory/verbal channel and a visual/pictorial channel. 
• Limited capacity. There are limits to the amount of information that can be held and 
processed in each channel at any one time. 
• Active processing. Learning involves selecting relevant incoming information on the 
auditory and the visual channels, organizing the selected information from each channel into 
a coherent mental representation for that channel, and finally integrating the mental 
representations of the auditory and the visual information with each other and with existing 
knowledge (cf. Figure 4). 
Three memory stores play a role in cognitive learning processes: visual and auditory 
information is perceived through the eyes and ears, briefly held in sensory memory, processed 
in working memory, and finally stored in long-term memory (Clark & Mayer 2003: 35). The 
three stores are briefly described below (Mayer 2005c: 37f.): 
• Sensory memory stores perceived auditory and visual information separately as exact 
auditory and visual images for a very short time before they enter working memory. 
• Working memory is the cognitive structure in which conscious processing of information 
(including learning) takes place (Sweller 2005a: 29). It provides a capacity for storing and 
manipulating auditory and visual information; however, this capacity is severely limited with 
respect to how much information can be held and for how long (p. 29). “Seven plus or minus 
two chunks” is an often-heard estimate of the number of elements that can be stored in 
working memory at any one time (Miller 1956). The number of elements that can be 
simultaneously processed (i.e. combined, contrasted, or manipulated) is even smaller (2–4) 
(Sweller 2005a: 21). New information is retained only for a few seconds if it is not rehearsed 
(Peterson & Peterson 1959). 
• Long-term memory stores knowledge in large quantities and for a long time (Mayer 2005c: 
47). For learning to occur, new information in working memory has to be integrated with 
prior knowledge from long-term memory and encoded into long-term memory after active 
processing (rehearsal) in working memory. The encoded information has to be retrieved 
from long-term memory back into working memory when needed in later cognitive 
processing (Clark & Mayer 2003: 36). 
Hence, the cognitive theory of multimedia learning regards learners as information 
processors with certain inherent capabilities and limitations that have to be taken into account in 
instructional design. Sweller observed that “[g]ood instructional design is driven by our 
knowledge of human cognitive structures and the manner in which those structures are 
organized into a cognitive architecture” (Sweller 2005a: 19). 
Instructional design in the cognitive tradition aims to help learners to transform the incoming 
auditory and visual information from the learning experience, using the storage and processing 
capacities provided by their sensory and working memories, in order for the processed 
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information to be eventually integrated into the knowledge structures stored in their long-term 
memory (Clark & Mayer 2003: 36). This transformation involves five cognitive processes 
(Clark & Mayer 2003: 36–42; Mayer 2005c: 38–41): 
1. Selecting relevant auditory and visual information for processing. Learners can identify 
pertinent information sources more easily if their attention is guided by appropriate 
instructional methods and design techniques. For example, e-learning units may provide 
a list of learning objectives in their introductory section and use arrows, colors, font size 
and weight, and other visual cues to highlight important aspects of the information 
presented. 
2. Managing limited working memory capacity. Working memory can only store a very 
limited amount of information at any given time and is therefore a scarce resource in the 
learning process. The burden on working memory consists of both information to be held 
and information to be processed and is commonly referred to as cognitive load (Sweller 
2005a). The overburdening of working memory leads to cognitive overload. By reducing 
cognitive load in learning experiences, valuable capacity in working memory becomes 
available for the active processing of important information, which is the prerequisite for 
learning, and cognitive overload can be avoided. Ways to reduce cognitive load include 
off-loading (reassigning) information from the visual to the verbal channel (e.g. 
presenting words as narration rather than text), eliminating (weeding) interesting but 
extraneous (irrelevant) material, and synchronizing the presentation of auditory and 
visual material spatially and temporally (Mayer & Moreno 2003). 
3. Rehearsing and integrating information. The selected auditory and visual items are 
organized into different coherent knowledge structures by building structural relations 
among the auditory and among the visual elements, respectively. The next step is to 
integrate the resulting auditory and visual representations in working memory, first with 
each other and then with the learner’s prior knowledge retrieved from long-term memory 
(Mayer 2005c: 40f.), by creating connections among the new elements and between new 
and existing elements. This active processing (rehearsal) takes place in working memory. 
The integration of verbal and pictorial information is facilitated if text and graphics that 
belong together are presented together rather than separately (spatial contiguity) and 
animation and descriptive narration are played at the same time rather than one after the 
other (temporal contiguity) (Mayer 2005d). Practice exercises promote the integration of 
new information with existing knowledge because they require learners to connect what 
they know to what they are learning. Worked-out examples can be designed in such a 
way that problem-solving steps are gradually removed from an example and have to be 
supplemented by learners as they gain proficiency. This allows learners to move from 
studying prepared examples to completing partially worked-out examples to solving full-
fledged problems on their own while being able to handle the cognitive demands of 
problem solving at each stage (Renkl 2005: 238f.). 
 
Figure 4. Mayer’s cognitive theory of multimedia learning (Mayer 2005c: 37, Figure 3.2). 
Chapter 2: E-Learning 19 
4. Retrieving and transferring long-term knowledge. New knowledge and skills have to be 
encoded for storage in long-term memory in such a way that the learner can easily 
retrieve them back into working memory when he or she needs them later outside of the 
context in which they were acquired. Without successful retrieval, transfer of learned 
knowledge and skills does not occur. Accumulated and stored knowledge is of little use 
if learners are unable to apply this knowledge when and where they need it (Clark & 
Mayer 2003: 39f.). Thus, examples and activities should be appropriately contextualized 
by embedding them in scenarios that are similar to those in which learners will apply the 
acquired knowledge and skills later. 
5. Managing cognitive processes via metacognitive skills. Since the resources available for 
cognitive processing are limited, learners have to select salient pieces from the incoming 
information and determine the degree to which connections should be created among the 
selected items and between new information and prior knowledge. Metacognitive skills 
help learners to allocate, monitor, coordinate, and adjust their limited cognitive resources 
during learning (Mayer 2005c: 36). These skills may be more or less pronounced in 
different learners and have to be developed (Clark & Mayer 2003: 40). 
A major contribution of cognitive research on multimedia learning is a large number of 
principles for the design of multimedia learning environments, which have been derived from a 
substantial base of empirical research. These principles are discussed by Clark (2002), Clark 
and Mayer (2003), and by various authors in the Cambridge Handbook of Multimedia Learning 
(Mayer 2005a). Basic principles of multimedia learning described in these works are 
summarized in Table 1. 
Cognitivism provides the theoretical basis for a second generation of computer-based 
learning software, which organizes and presents instructional content in a way that can be 
effectively processed by learners, given their inherent limitations. Instructional design is guided 
by cognitive principles, including those presented in Table 1. Concept maps (Novak & Cañas 
2006) and other tools visualize the relationships between different concepts to facilitate the 
development of knowledge structures involving these concepts. Feedback from the computer 
goes beyond reinforcement and includes additional hints, comments, and information about 
potential sources of error (Arnold 2005: 8). Three further cognitivist principles for instructional 
design were described by Euler (1994). First, learners are given some control over the content, 
sequence, and pace of instruction, so they can study the material according to their own 
interests, needs, and preferences. Second, the instructional content is designed to be as close to 
reality as possible in order to make it easier for learners to integrate new information into their 
prior cognitive structures. Third, customized help is provided based on the learner’s knowledge 
or performance level and progress. Tutoring systems, which include an instructional component 
in addition to practice exercises (cf. Section 2.3.2), and intelligent tutoring systems, which can 
tailor both instructional content and methods based on a model of the individual learner (cf. 
Section 2.3.3), are examples of second-generation educational software with a cognitivist 
background (Arnold 2005: 7f.). 
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Table 1. Principles of multimedia learning and their implications for instructional design. 
Principle Description Implications 
Multimedia principle 
(Fletcher & Tobias 
2005) 
People learn better from words augmented by 
pictures than from words presented alone. 
‘Words’ may be printed or spoken words; 
‘pictures’ can be static (e.g. diagrams and 
photos) or dynamic (e.g. animations and 
video clips) (Mayer 2005c: 32). 
Augment the words of the 
instructional message with 
appropriate pictures that 
are relevant to the goal of 
instruction. 
Split-attention principle 
(Ayres & Sweller 2005) 
(cf. contiguity principle) 
People learn better when they do not have to 
split their attention between and devote 
cognitive resources to the integration of 
multiple information sources that are separate 
with respect to space or time, in order to 
make sense of the instructional message. 
Words and pictures in 
instructional messages 
should be physically and 
temporally integrated 
rather than separated. 
Modality principle 
(Low & Sweller 2005) 
People learn better when information to be 
presented is meaningfully distributed among 
the visual and the auditory modes compared 
to when all information is presented in one of 
the two modes. 
Present information using 
dual-mode rather than 
single-mode presentation 
techniques. 
Redundancy principle 
(Sweller 2005b) 
People learn better when multiple redundant 
forms of presenting the same information and 
unnecessary elaborations of information are 
avoided. Redundant information does not 
facilitate learning but makes it more difficult. 
Eliminate all redundant 
materials and activities 
from multimedia lessons. 
Less may be more. 
Contiguity principle 
(Mayer 2005d) 
People learn better when corresponding 
verbal and pictorial information are presented 
together in space (spatial contiguity) or in 
time (temporal contiguity). 
Present corresponding 
elements of a multimedia 
presentation together, both 
in space and in time. 
Coherence principle 
(Mayer 2005d) 
People learn better when a multimedia 
presentation does not contain extraneous 
(instructionally irrelevant) auditory and 
visual elements. 
Avoid words, pictures, and 
sounds that are not directly 
relevant to the goal of 
instruction. 
Signaling principle 
(Mayer 2005d) 
People learn better when cues are added to a 
multimedia presentation that indicate what 
material is important. 
Provide cues that guide the 
learner’s attention toward 
important information. 
Personalization 
principle 
(Moreno et al. 2001; 
Clark 2002; Clark & 
Mayer 2003: Chapter 8; 
Mayer 2005e) 
People learn better when the language of a 
multimedia presentation is conversational 
(using I and you and direct comments to the 
learner) rather than formal and when 
pedagogical agents are available that provide 
instructional assistance (cf. Chapter 4). 
Use conversational tone 
and/or pedagogical agents 
to increase learning by 
socially engaging the 
learner. 
Voice principle 
(Mayer 2005e) 
People learn better when a human voice with 
a standard accent (rather than one with a 
foreign accent, or a synthetic voice) speaks 
the words of a multimedia presentation. 
Use a standard-accented 
human voice to deliver the 
words of a multimedia 
instructional message. 
Image principle 
(Mayer 2005e) 
People do not necessarily learn better when a 
multimedia presentation shows an image of 
the speaker (e.g. an animated agent) on the 
screen. However, the experimental evidence 
is inconclusive (Mayer 2005e: 208f.). 
More research is needed to 
clarify the effects of using 
on-screen characters in 
multimedia lessons. 
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Other cognitivist approaches emphasize activities and tasks that require learners to apply 
problem-solving strategies (including search, trial and error, and exploration) (Schulmeister 
1997: 71f.). Two important methods in this context include learning by discovery (Bruner 
1961) and the use of microworld simulations, i.e. closed artificial environments representing 
selected aspects of the real world, which allow learners to perform experiments, try out 
different ways to solve problems, and develop a better understanding of the domain (Papert 
1980; Romme 2002). 
Cognitive approaches continue to make important contributions to educational psychology 
and the design of instructional systems (e.g. Clark & Mayer 2003; Clark & Lyons 2004; Mayer 
2005a). Because it emphasizes the role of internal structures and processes of the mind, 
cognitivism can better account for complex forms of learning (reasoning, problem solving, and 
information processing) than behaviorist approaches (Ertmer & Newby 1993: 59). However, it 
has been criticized for focusing too much on the cognitive (‘rational’) processes in the human 
mind and neglecting the social, emotional, and motivational processes that influence learning, 
memory, thinking, etc. (Arnold 2005: 4).6 Furthermore, cognitivism has retained the behaviorist 
views that knowledge exists independently of the individual (p. 4) and that learning processes 
can be controlled from the outside. Hence, instruction still has to find effective and efficient 
ways to communicate given knowledge to learners, which include simplification and 
standardization. Instructional content is sized, chunked, arranged, and weeded out so that 
learners can easily process the new information and incorporate it into their existing knowledge 
structures (Ertmer & Newby 1993: 59f.). All these aspects have been challenged by 
constructivist theories of learning. 
2.2.3  Constructivism 
During the 1980s and 1990s, a third paradigm gained a leading role in educational research, 
which grew out of dissatisfaction with the previously domineering views of learning through 
reinforcement (behaviorism) and learning through mental information processing (cognitivism). 
Constructivism (Duffy & Jonassen 1992; Ertmer & Newby 1993; Duffy & Cunningham 1996; 
Boethel & Dimock 1999; Arnold 2005) is an umbrella term for a broad spectrum of theories 
about knowledge and learning (Brooks & Brooks 1993: vii; Duffy & Cunningham 1996: 171) 
which share the view that knowledge is not given and absolute and mechanically acquired by 
learners (Liu & Matthews 2005: 387) but rather “a personal interpretation of experience” 
(Bednar et al. 1992: 21f.) that is actively and dynamically constructed by every individual for 
himself or herself through his or her experience in a particular context (Boethel & Dimock 
1999: 6) and based on his or her prior knowledge, beliefs, and experiences. Like cognitivism, 
constructivism views learning as a mental activity (Ertmer & Newby 1993: 62). Learners are 
assumed to build an idiosyncratic internal representation of knowledge by processing new 
experiences in the context of their prior experiences and understandings, with the goal of 
establishing consistency (Boethel & Dimock 1999: 7). This internal knowledge structure can 
always be extended or modified based on new experiences (Ertmer & Newby 1993: 63). 
                                              
6  However, the cognitive-affective theory of learning with media (CATLM) (Moreno 2005; Moreno & 
Mayer 2007), a recent expansion of the cognitive theory of multimedia learning, explicitly considers 
the mediating role of motivational and metacognitive factors in the learning process: the former 
increase or decrease cognitive engagement, whereas the latter regulate cognitive processing and 
affect (Moreno & Mayer 2007: 313f.). 
22 Chapter 2: E-Learning 
Opportunities for learning arise when learners reach a state of disequilibration (also called 
perturbation or puzzlement) because they encounter something that is at odds with their 
previous understandings (Duffy & Cunningham 1996; Boethel & Dimock 1999: 7f.). 
Constructivists reject the idea that knowledge can be transferred from one individual to 
another (e.g. from teacher to student). Instead, they emphasize that knowledge is the result of an 
individual active construction process and thus does not exist independently of the learner and 
the context in which it is constructed and used (Boethel & Dimock 1999: 6; Arnold 2005: 5). 
Knowledge is viewed as “a consensus of beliefs, a consensus open to continual negotiation” 
(Duffy & Cunningham 1996: 178). 
In a constructivist learning environment, learners are required to actively deal with topics 
and tasks and make their own experiences, which amounts to learning by doing, exploring, 
playing, constructing, criticizing, etc. rather than by listening or reading alone (Schulmeister 
1997: 74). The knowledge acquired in traditional classroom settings is mostly inert knowledge, 
i.e. students are taught information which they can reproduce in class, but which they fail to 
apply in real-world situations because they learned it out of context (Bednar et al. 1992: 23). 
Therefore, constructivism emphasizes that learning should be situated in a rich context that is as 
close to the real-world situation of learners as possible (p. 22). Learning is measured in terms of 
how effectively the learner’s constructed knowledge representation facilitates his or her 
thinking and acting in the subject domain (Ertmer & Newby 1993: 64), not by counting the 
learner’s correct answers or by assessing the correctness of his or her reasoning or problem 
solving. 
Another important constructivist idea is that learning processes are embedded in social 
contexts and are facilitated and mediated by social interaction between learners and their peers 
and instructors (Dalgarno 1996; Boethel & Dimock 1999: 6). Finally, in constructivist settings, 
the role of the instructor changes from the “sage on the stage” (transmitter of knowledge) to the 
“guide on the side” (facilitator or coach), who provides opportunities, ideas, and help for 
meaningful learning (Issing 1995: 198; Boethel & Dimock 1999: 13). Knowledge and meaning 
are not prescribed by the instructor (which is pejoratively called instructivism by 
constructivists) but constructed by the individual learner or negotiated through social 
interaction among and between learners, instructors, and other parties (cf. Chapter 5.4.5). 
Hence, a major contribution of constructivism is that control over the process and outcome of 
learning shifts from the instructor to the individual learner or communities of learners. 
However, this shift does not diminish the role of the teacher, who in his or her capacity as 
instructional expert is still instrumental to successful learning, since computer-based tools (e.g. 
word processors, e-mail clients, and simulations) cannot provide meaningful interactions on 
their own (Boethel & Dimock 1999: 21). Cunningham summarized the constructivist position 
on instruction as follows: 
The role of instruction in the constructivist view is to show students how to construct knowledge, 
to promote collaboration with others to show the multiple perspectives that can be brought to 
bear on a particular problem, and to arrive at self-chosen positions to which they can commit 
themselves, while realizing the basis of other views with which they may disagree. (Cunningham 
1991: 14). 
There are two major variants of constructivism, which differ with respect to their view of the 
role of social interaction in learning, focusing on the individual learner and on learning as 
occurring in the context of social interaction, respectively (Boethel & Dimock 1999: 8). 
Cognitive or radical constructivism, which originates from the ideas of Jean Piaget (Piaget 
1952; Piaget 1980), views learning as the result of an autonomous intrapersonal process of 
knowledge construction (Arnold 2005: 5), i.e. as the accomplishment of a single learner, who 
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individually constructs knowledge as he or she learns (Duffy & Cunningham 1996). Social 
interaction is said to facilitate learning, but it is not regarded as essential. Radical constructivists 
focus on how the individual solves problems and constructs ideas (Boethel & Dimock 1999: 8) 
and hence stress the importance of learner-centered and discovery-oriented activities. In 
contrast, social or realistic constructivism, which is based on the work of Lev Vygotsky 
(Vygotsky 1962; Vygotsky et al. 1978), emphasizes the role of the social environment and 
regards learning as a social and cooperative process (Arnold 2005: 5) that is embedded in a 
learning community and in which learners construct knowledge through interaction with their 
immediate environment, in particular with their peers and instructors. From a social-
constructivist point of view, language, culture, and context play important parts in the 
knowledge construction process (McMahon 1997; Liu & Matthews 2005). The most well-
known concept of social constructivism is the zone of proximal development (Vygotsky et al. 
1978), which is the distance between what learners can achieve on their own and what they can 
achieve through interaction with more capable others (Vygotsky et al. 1978: 86; McLoughlin & 
Oliver 1998: 128; [INT 14], cf. Chapter 12.3.2). With the help of more knowledgeable peers, 
instructors, or computer-based coaches, learners can master knowledge and skills which are 
beyond their individual capabilities. They are still responsible for actively constructing their 
own knowledge, but their interaction with facilitators is instrumental in the knowledge 
construction process and helps them to achieve a higher level of knowledge or proficiency 
(Cooper 2005: 31). 
With its emphasis on social processes in learning, social constructivism is related to situated 
learning (Lave & Wenger 1991), a model of human learning which situates the acquisition of 
knowledge in the context of authentic social and physical environments ([INT 15]). Learning is 
viewed as a fundamentally social process in which the individual actively participates in 
collective learning taking place in social groups formed by practitioners (e.g. artists, engineers, 
nurses, etc.) who have competence in and commitment to a shared domain of interest and 
develop a shared practice by means of continuous interaction with each other over a longer 
period of time ([INT 16]). These communities of practice (Wenger 1998) are “groups of people 
who share a concern or a passion for something they do and learn how to do it better as they 
interact regularly” ([INT 16]). The concept has found practical applications in various domains, 
including education, government, international development, organizational learning, and 
knowledge management ([INT 16]). 
Another situated approach to learning is the cognitive apprenticeship model (Brown et al. 
1989; Collins et al. 1991; Edmondson 2005: 19–22), which follows the example of the 
relationship between an apprentice and a master teacher, where the former learns a particular 
trade by working under the guidance of the latter in a realistic context (Edmondson 2005: 20f.). 
Likewise, in a cognitive apprenticeship, the master teacher (a human or a computer program, 
e.g. a pedagogical software agent, cf. Chapter 4) models concepts and skills for the learner in an 
authentic context. The learner observes the master as he or she is demonstrating the skill while 
explaining exactly what he or she is doing and why. These integrated performances and 
explanations help the learner to acquire relevant behaviors and a conceptual model of the skill 
(p. 21). In the next step, the learner practices the skill, imitating the master teacher (ideally both 
his or her behaviors and thinking processes), and the master provides coaching in the form of 
assistance (additional modeling, corrective feedback, encouragement, reminders, etc.) at those 
points which are just beyond the learner’s capabilities (i.e. within his or her zone of proximal 
development) (p. 21). Over several repetitions of this process, the learner’s skill level comes 
closer to the one of the master teacher, and the master gradually withdraws his or her support. 
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Eventually, the learner can perform the skill on his or her own, ideally at the same level of 
proficiency as the master (or at least close to it) (p. 21). 
Constructivism is the currently predominant paradigm in educational research and has 
spawned a wide variety of theories, techniques, and systems related to learning. In the field of 
computer-based education, constructivist ideas have fundamentally changed both the view of 
the role of the machine in the learning process and approaches to the design of learning 
experiences (Young 2003). The task is no longer to teach pre-defined content and then tutor 
learners in it, based on goals and methods determined by the instructional designer in advance, 
but rather to create computer-based environments in which the learner can self-directedly 
engage in activities (building, criticizing, exploring, playing, writing, etc.) that promote 
individual knowledge construction processes, as well as interact with other learners or human 
and computer-based coaches (Arnold 2005: 10). These self-directed activities are embedded in 
authentic contexts; are meaningful to learners; focus on the application, not the acquisition of 
knowledge; and exhibit realistic complexity rather than simplification for instructional purposes 
(Boethel & Dimock 1999: 14). “We must maintain the complexity of the environment and help 
the student to understand the concept embedded in the multiple complex environments in which 
it is found” (Bednar et al. 1992: 26, their emphasis). Computers and other media are not 
primarily delivery systems for instructional content (although some instruction may be involved 
where appropriate); instead, they function as cognitive tools (Lajoie & Derry 1993; Jonassen & 
Reeves 1996; Jonassen et al. 1998; Lajoie 2000) for the active construction of knowledge 
(Arnold 2005: 10). Cognitive tools may range in complexity from ordinary word processors to 
sophisticated simulation systems (p. 20, cf. Section 2.3.4). To facilitate social interaction, 
communication tools such as e-mail, discussion forums, chat rooms, instant messaging, and 
VoIP (“Voice over IP,” Internet telephony) may be provided. In general, in constructivist 
learning environments, the computer supports but does not direct or control the learning 
process, unlike (intelligent) tutoring systems (cf. Section 2.3.2 and Section 2.3.3). 
A number of broad guidelines for the design of learning experiences can be derived from 
constructivist principles. They include (Boethel & Dimock 1999: 12–15; Arnold 2005: 10f.): 
• Create authentic learning environments providing meaningful contexts for activities. 
• Start by introducing a problem rather than by explaining concepts, theories, or facts. 
• Relate problems and topics to learners’ lives, knowledge, and experiences. 
• Prefer complex, ill-structured problems over tasks simplified for didactic purposes. 
• Make room and provide the tools for active knowledge construction processes. 
• Give learners as much freedom of choice and exploration as possible. 
• Provide help and guidance where necessary (but without exercising control). 
• Present the learning matter in different contexts and from multiple perspectives. 
• Aim for in-depth coverage of central ideas rather than superficial treatment of many topics. 
• Promote communication and cooperation with other learners and with instructors. 
• Involve learners in a cognitive apprenticeship or in a community of practice. 
• Encourage learners’ articulation of and reflection on their knowledge and strategies. 
• Regard students’ errors as opportunities for learning. Guide learners through puzzlement. 
• Assess learners’ ability to transfer learning to new problems and situations. 
• Involve the target group of learners in the design process (cf. Chapter 7.13). 
Constructivist ideas have unquestionably made a significant impact on the ways in which 
people think about knowledge and learning processes. The merits of constructivism include its 
view of learning as an active process of knowledge construction, which is individual and 
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idiosyncratic but at the same time has a strong social component, and its doing away with the 
idea that learning processes can be controlled from the outside (Arnold 2005: 6). While these 
are common themes, it is also true that there is no single constructivist theory but a whole 
family of partially overlapping, partially competing theories can be subsumed under that label. 
In fact, “because there are so many versions of constructivism, with important overlaps, but 
also with major differences, it is difficult to see the forest for the trees” (Phillips 1995: 7). As a 
result, when some approach or design is labeled as ‘constructivist,’ it is necessary to determine 
which constructivist framework underlies it in order to understand the exact implications of the 
label in that context.7 The list of guidelines above can help to determine the constructivist 
orientation of a given computer-based learning scenario, but an instructional design that follows 
(some of) these guidelines is not necessarily constructivist in nature and even may not be 
intended to be. On the other hand, when the label ‘constructivist’ is claimed for a design, there 
is no guarantee that constructivist design guidelines have actually been applied (Arnold 2005: 
14). Because constructivism is the current mainstream, people are quick to adorn their course 
materials and systems with that label, but more often than not these materials or systems hardly 
follow any of the constructivist design guidelines listed above (p. 14). 
A more philosophical criticism of constructivist approaches accuses them of tending toward 
relativism (e.g. Phillips 1995), i.e. the belief that truth is not absolute but always relative to a 
language, a culture, or some other referential framework ([INT 17]). In response to this 
criticism, Bereiter noted with respect to the constructivist assertion at issue that “there is no 
objective standpoint” (Boethel & Dimock 1999: 10): 
This statement is sometimes taken simplistically to mean that there are no absolute truths, but that 
misses the point. The point is that there is no objective standpoint from which to judge whether 
something is an absolute truth. Also, the statement does not mean that there is no real, material 
world. It only means that we can never get down to an objective knowledge of it that can serve as 
a basis for our judgments, beliefs, and interpretations (Bereiter 1994: 4). 
Likewise, constructivist claims regarding the subjectivity of the learner’s knowledge and the 
idiosyncratic nature of his or her view of reality (self-constructed through learning) have given 
rise to some concern. In general, it is not advisable for any theory of knowledge and learning to 
risk losing the connection with the real world because the real world imposes considerable 
constraints on human knowledge construction (Phillips 1995: 12; Stone & Goodyear 1995). 
Furthermore, there are situations in which conformity may be important and idiosyncratic 
action or thinking may cause problems. For example, Merrill asked, “Do we want students to 
have a ‘self-chosen position’ with regard to the sound of letters in learning to read? Do we want 
students to have a ‘self-chosen position’ about the meaning of integers?” (Merrill 1992: 107). 
Or is it wise to allow learners to construct their own perspective on traffic rules when learning 
how to drive a car? The controversy is about whether there is knowledge that is ‘objective’ and 
can (perhaps even should) be taught to learners, or whether all conceptions of learners are 
necessarily idiosyncratic. Constructivists’ response to the criticism by Merrill and others is that 
learners inevitably develop their own position with regard to any subject matter (Boethel & 
Dimock 1999: 10). They argue that the construction of exclusively idiosyncratic conceptions 
(Duit 1995: 274) is prevented through social interactions that negotiate a shared understanding 
which enables coexistence and communication with others (Jonassen 1994). Still, for 
instructional designers and practitioners, the basic organizational problem remains that they 
                                              
7  The same is true of the other two paradigms. Behaviorism and cognitivism are also both umbrella 
terms for families of different but related theories. 
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have to find a balance “between supporting students in reaching their own understandings and 
steering them toward an accepted body of knowledge, i.e. the required curriculum” (Boethel & 
Dimock 1999: 12). “Teachers necessarily want to encourage students to make constructions that 
are personally meaningful, and yet recognize that they must also construct ideas that are 
acceptable to the wider society” (Wood 1995: 337). Another problem is the quasi-religious and 
ideological side of constructivism (Liu & Matthews 2005: 386): for many theorists, their 
particular version of constructivism has turned into a “secular religion,” and non-believers or 
members of other constructivist ‘sects’ are looked (down) upon with distrust (Phillips 1995: 5). 
2.2.4  Conclusion 
Despite its dominance, constructivism has not managed to oust behaviorism and cognitivism 
completely. In fact, both earlier paradigms continue to play an important role in educational 
theory and practice. While constructivists insist that “the findings of constructivism replace 
rather than add to our current understanding of learning” (Bednar et al. 1992: 30, emphasis 
added), constructivism has not brought the “end of instruction” (Kerres 1998), and most likely 
never will. Each of the three approaches, behaviorism, cognitivism, and constructivism, has its 
own niche in the design of effective learning experiences. Behaviorist principles form the basis 
of designs that reinforce simple skills and recollection of facts (know-what). Cognitivism 
informs the design of instructional experiences that equip learners with the know-how to solve 
problems by transferring learned knowledge and skills to unfamiliar situations (Ertmer & 
Newby 1993: 68). In addition, cognitive research has contributed valuable guidelines for the 
design of multimedia learning environments that facilitate the mental processing of information 
(cf. Table 1). Constructivist ideas have inspired a shift in the focus of instructional design from 
the externally controlled transfer of knowledge toward learning experiences that emphasize 
learner control, cooperation, authenticity, reflection, and multiple perspectives. The 
constructivist approach is particularly suitable for domains involving complex and ill-defined 
tasks and problems that require a high level of cognitive processing (Ertmer & Newby 1993: 
68). Actively participating in cognitive apprenticeships and communities of practice can help 
people to learn how to deal successfully with problems and tasks of this kind. 
It is interesting to note that some constructivists seem to agree that behaviorist and 
cognitivist approaches have a place in learning processes beside constructivism. For example, 
Jonassen (1991) distinguished between three stages of knowledge acquisition (introductory, 
advanced, and expert) and acknowledged that beginning learners may benefit more from 
objectivist (i.e. behaviorist and/or cognitivist) approaches during the introductory stage of 
knowledge acquisition. As learners become more advanced, they are better equipped to handle 
the complex and ill-structured problems presented in constructivist learning environments, 
which help them to discover, negotiate, and possibly modify or remove misconceptions and 
biases from the introductory stage (Ertmer & Newby 1993: 65). It appears that eclectism rather 
than dogmatism is the appropriate strategy for instructional design given the various theories of 
learning and their different practical implications. There is no single ‘best’ approach that works 
for every learner, subject matter, situation, competence level, and stage of learning. Instead, the 
task of the instructional designer is to pick those methods that achieve optimal instructional 
outcomes in the current design context (Ertmer & Newby 1993: 69f.). 
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2.3  E-Learning Technologies 
This section reviews a number of computer-based technologies that are used to create 
e-learning experiences. The review is selective rather than comprehensive and focuses on 
technologies that are important for this thesis. 
2.3.1  Drill-and-Practice Systems 
Drill-and-practice systems provide environments for the structured reinforcement (cf. Section 
2.2.1) of previously acquired knowledge and skills (Rist & Hewer 1996). Learners are assumed 
to have some background in the subject matter and are presented with questions and exercises 
giving them the opportunity to practice or recapitulate what they have learned (Grob & Seufert 
1996). The activities may be of varying levels of difficulty and may be selected by the system at 
random or in sequence, for example. Normally, learners have to successfully complete tasks at 
a given level before they are allowed to proceed to the next higher level. Their answers are 
analyzed (typically in terms of ‘correct’ vs. ‘incorrect’) and generate immediate feedback from 
the system (Pellone 1995; Arnold 2005: 7). Both the learner’s correct and incorrect answers are 
stored. Incorrect answers or failure to pass an entire task result in the repeated presentation of 
the respective question or task until the learner gives the correct answer or passes the task 
(Pellone 1995). Interactive and multimedia elements are often used to enrich drill-and-practice 
activities, like for example in the Interactive Tutor facility of the Virtual Linguistics Campus 
(cf. Section 2.4.1). Furthermore, the questions and exercises can be embedded in a game 
scenario that provides attractive rewards for the successful completion of tasks (Rist & Hewer 
1996, cf. Section 2.3.5). 
2.3.2  Tutoring Systems 
Tutoring systems are computer-based instructional systems that involve the computer in the role 
of an impersonal tutor teaching new topics in a given subject area, usually to a single learner. A 
tutoring system is equipped with knowledge about both the content of instruction and strategies 
for teaching it to learners. In addition, it typically also provides an environment in which 
learners can practice what they have learned. Hence, tutoring systems are like drill-and-practice 
programs in some ways, but they additionally have an instructional component (Arnold 2005: 
7). “The instructional emphasis is on displaying material to the learner, checking for 
comprehension by monitoring student behavior on narrow tasks with readily observable 
outcomes, then branching to further presentation or practice as appropriate” (Dede & Lewis 
1995: 10). While allowing for some degree of learner control (over the content, sequence, and 
pace) (Arnold 2005: 7), the tutor is firmly in charge of the learning process, “programming 
learners through a graduated sequence of skills and concepts” (Dede & Lewis 1995: 10). Three 
broad categories of tutoring system can be distinguished (Schulmeister 1997: 96f.; Meier 2006: 
154ff.). Linear tutoring systems only provide a single path of instruction, which the learner 
cannot leave. These programs are also called page turners because learners can only move 
backward and forward, similar to turning the pages of a book. Branching sequences of 
instruction are more flexible because they offer different paths of instruction depending on user 
inputs, leading the learner to alternative presentations, additional explanations, or questions at 
different levels of difficulty. In both linear and branching models, the possible paths of 
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instruction are wired into the system. In contrast, flexible or open program structures 
dynamically generate instructional paths, depending on the duration of the session, the progress 
of learners, their degree of motivation, or their requests. This requires sophisticated learner 
modeling capabilities, possibly based on techniques from artificial intelligence (see the next 
section). 
2.3.3  Intelligent Tutoring Systems 
Tutoring systems generally lack the ability to adapt the content and method of the instruction to 
the individual learner. Intelligent tutoring systems (ITS) (Wenger 1987; Shute & Psotka 1996; 
Freedman 2000; Padayachee 2002) have been developed to address this problem. Using 
techniques developed in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), an ITS attempts to emulate the 
skills of a good private human tutor (Servan-Schreiber 1987), which include the ability to: 
• Provide information; 
• Solve problems independently and explain solutions; 
• Analyze and diagnose the learner’s behaviors and mistakes; 
• Determine the learner’s understanding of the topic; 
• Adapt subject matters and teaching methods to the learner; 
• Communicate effectively with the learner. 
The four main components of an intelligent tutoring system are shown in Figure 5 (e.g. 
Wenger 1987: Chapter 2; Schulmeister 1997: 181–191; Freedman 2000; Padayachee 2002). 
The domain model organizes knowledge about the subject matter to be taught. The student 
model represents the system’s evolving view of the learner’s understanding of the subject 
matter. It is developed by diagnosing and recording the learner’s responses, and using the 
accumulating evidence to infer what the learner knows, does not know, and which aspects of 
his or her knowledge are incorrect. The tutor model embodies the teaching expertise of the ITS. 
It helps to design the content, form, and timing of interventions from the system in ways that 
are intended to benefit the learner. The domain model, the student model, and the tutor (or 
instructor) model will be discussed in detail in Chapter 12.1 to Chapter 12.3. Finally, the tutor 
interface provides input and output devices for meaningful interaction between learner and ITS, 
possibly involving natural language dialogue. Techniques for processing human-machine 
conversations in natural language will be discussed in Chapter 11. 
2.3.4  Simulations 
An educational simulation is a closed artificial environment providing a dynamic model of a 
(real or fictitious) process, system, or situation, which can be influenced by the learner’s actions 
or decisions prior to or while running the simulation. Simulations may receive a continuous 
stream of inputs (including actions and sensory percepts) from the learner and respond in real 
time, or the learner may set certain parameters first and then run the simulation to see the 
effects of his or her manipulation (Bostock 1995). Learners can observe simulations from the 
outside or, using, for example, virtual reality technology, become immersed in them, i.e. a part 
of the simulation. When a simulation represents aspects of reality, its fidelity becomes 
important, i.e. how closely the simulation models the original process, system, or situation. 
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Simulations create virtual learning environments (sometimes called microworlds) that serve 
as contexts for active, experiential learning in domains including the natural and social 
sciences, economics, and the operation of vehicles and machinery (Schulmeister 1997: 67). In 
these environments, feedback is intrinsic to the simulation rather than provided explicitly (as in 
tutoring systems) (Bostock 1995). Likewise, “much of the knowledge to be gained is implicit 
and contextual, mastered by the student through reflection on the results of interactions with the 
synthetic environment” (Dede & Lewis 1995: 13). 
One advantage of simulations is that they provide relatively risk-free environments for 
exploration and training (Mason & Rennie 2006: 106). The effects of learners’ actions and 
decisions (including those of his or her mistakes) are confined to the simulated environment and 
therefore cause no real harm, loss, or damage, neither to the learner nor to other people, objects, 
or equipment. Furthermore, simulations may allow learners to do or experience things that are 
impossible or too dangerous in real life (e.g. swimming in the blood stream through the body or 
walking around the core of a nuclear reactor). Finally, educational simulations can serve as a 
replacement for the real thing (e.g. the dissection of animals). 
2.3.5  Educational Games 
Computer games continue to be popular with people from all ages, and recently, there has been 
a surge of interest in online multiplayer games. Combined with the fact that “today’s learning 
generation is extremely game literate” (DeKanter 2005: 28), this has encouraged exploration of 
the potential of educational games as an e-learning activity (Mason & Rennie 2006: 53f.). For 
example, Purushotma examined “how content originally designed for entertainment purposes 
can be modified to provide natural and context-rich language learning environments, without 
sacrificing its entertainment value” (Purushotma 2005: 80). 
Playing educational games is said to increase learners’ motivation and to promote acquisition 
of knowledge and skills in the course of game play. Learning occurs by doing things (alone or 
together with others) in the game context, sometimes without learners being aware of it (Mason 
& Rennie 2006: 54). Game environments can be as simple as a game-show-like question-
answer format or as complex as a three-dimensional virtual reality simulation (p. 54) in which 
real and virtual humans (embodied software agents) can interact with each other (e.g. Johnson 
et al. 2005a). 
Effective educational games continuously present the learner with different challenges and 
offer motivating rewards, which makes them particularly attractive for younger groups of 
 
Figure 5. The architecture of an intelligent tutoring system. 
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learners (Mason & Rennie 2006: 54), although the average age of computer game players is 
increasing (Castronova 2006: 57). Games can allow learners to play various roles in both 
single-player and multi-player settings. Likewise, the computer and other learners can play 
different parts in the game experience, such as opponent, ally, referee, coach, etc. (cf. Chapter 
3.2.4). Educational multiplayer game simulations can promote collaborative learning of teams 
in authentic, challenging scenarios from areas such as business, government, or military (e.g. 
Rickel & Johnson 2003; Bonk & Dennen 2005). 
2.3.6  Hypertext and Hypermedia 
Coined by Theodor Nelson (Nelson 1965), the terms hypertext and hypermedia are used to refer 
to a non-linear organization of objects, which consists of a network established by means of 
connections (so-called hyperlinks) between related, self-contained units of information (Kuhlen 
1991: 27; Tergan 1997: 6). Both hypertext and hypermedia are closely connected to the World 
Wide Web. 
By following hyperlinks, a particular information unit can be reached from any number of 
other units linking to it. Unlike the linear presentations found in many textbooks, the users of 
hypertext or hypermedia systems are not restricted to following a single path through the 
presentation of material but can browse through the network, forming associations between 
linked pieces of information according to their own interests (Dede & Lewis 1995: 11). The 
difference between hypertext and hypermedia lies in the contents of the nodes of the network. 
While the information units in a hypertext system consist of text, hypermedia systems support 
different types of media (images, audio, video, etc.) in nodes in addition to text (Tergan 1997: 
6). However, for most authors, the terms ‘hypertext’ and ‘hypermedia’ are interchangeable 
([INT 18]). For example, Landow wrote: 
Because hypertext systems link together passages of verbal text with images as easily as they link 
two or more passages of text, hypertext includes hypermedia, and I therefore use the two terms 
interchangeably. (Landow 2006: 84). 
The associative nature of hypertext and hypermedia is believed to be more effective for 
learning than linear presentations because it is assumed to be closer to the way in which 
information is processed by the human mind (Shapiro & Niederhauser 2004: 608; [INT 18]): 
information about one topic usually evokes associations with other pieces of information about 
the same topic or different topics (Faber 1993). The resulting networks of associations may be 
more important than knowledge of isolated facts because they enable learners to understand 
patterns of relationships (Dede & Lewis 1995: 11f.). The linked structure of the information 
space in hypertext or hypermedia systems is claimed to facilitate this kind of associative 
processing because it gives learners immediate access to the information that is associated with 
a node (Faber 1993). Having said that, it can be difficult for people to locate specific pieces of 
information in complex hypertext or hypermedia structures and to navigate these spaces without 
losing their way in the web of cross-references and experiencing information overload because 
of the excess of available links ([INT 18]). This points to the need for effective navigation and 
search tools in hypertext or hypermedia environments. However, the changing habits and 
practices of people with respect to ingesting and digesting information also have to be taken 
into account. While previous generations were schooled in the reading and comprehension of 
linear text ([INT 18]), the Net Generation obtains much of its information from the World Wide 
Web, which is the most well-known implementation of the hypertext/hypermedia concept ([INT 
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19]; [INT 20]). Hence, it may be more natural for younger learners to deal with hypertext or 
hypermedia structures than for their parents or instructors. 
2.3.7  Multimedia 
Multimedia (Tannenbaum 1998) is “the combination of various digital media types, such as 
text, images, sound, and video, into an integrated multi-sensory interactive application or 
presentation to convey a message or information to an audience” (Neo & Neo 2001: 20). 
Multimedia learning environments deliver content to learners over multiple sensory channels 
simultaneously, ideally in ways that observe the capabilities and limitations of human 
cognition, as outlined in Section 2.2.2. However, multimedia not only provides vivid 
presentations of instructional material. In fact, a major feature of multimedia systems is their 
interactivity8 (Neo & Neo 2001: 20), which allows learners to manipulate elements of a 
multimedia presentation to produce certain illustrative and/or entertaining effects (in fact, 
instruction and entertainment are not incompatible in multimedia systems but symbiotically 
feed off each other). Another quality of multimedia content is that it may be linear or non-linear 
([INT 21]). Learners can experience different versions of a non-linear multimedia presentation 
by choosing among multiple paths through the content according to their interests (Dede & 
Lewis 1995: 11). In hypermedia systems, learners have considerable freedom to associate 
different pieces of multimedia information connected through hyperlinks (cf. Section 2.3.6). 
Finally, multimedia systems can be designed to accommodate users with different learning 
styles by allowing them to choose combinations of media that suit their individual preferences 
(auditory, visual, or symbolic) (p. 11). 
‘Multimedia’ is a term that was very popular in the mid-1990s but has come to be used to 
describe so many different experiences that it has lost much of its descriptive value (Mason & 
Rennie 2006: 82). More than ten years later, multimedia is no longer a novel concept; in fact, it 
is something that is more or less expected from state-of-the-art environments for learning, 
entertainment, and information. 
2.3.8  Computer-Mediated Communication 
Computer-mediated communication (CMC) (Thurlow et al. 2004) is an umbrella term for 
various technologies that support human-human communication over computer networks, 
including e-mail, chat, discussion forums, newsgroups, instant messaging, Internet telephony, 
audio and video conferencing. The role of technology is to mediate communications between 
two or more individuals rather than to provide or process information (Bostock 1995). CMC 
can be synchronous (the communication occurs in real time with all participants online, which 
applies to chat, instant messaging, Internet telephony, audio and video conferencing) or 
asynchronous (senders and recipients of messages are temporally decoupled; examples include 
e-mail, discussion forums, and newsgroups) and may involve sender-recipient relations of one-
to-one, one-to-many, or many-to-many (Bostock 1995). Most CMC today still happens through 
                                              
8  It is worth noting here that interactivity is a concept in want of a precise and widely accepted 
definition. The term is ubiquitous, and people seem to have some intuitive idea of what it means, but 
the concept is actually very hard to pin down. Different ways of conceptualizing interactivity will be 
discussed in Chapter 5. 
32 Chapter 2: E-Learning 
text, although the use of other media, such as audio and video, is becoming more and more 
important. 
2.3.9  E-Learning 2.0 
E-Learning 2.0 (Downes 2005; Karrer 2007) is a current buzzword used to refer collectively to 
a “second generation” of e-learning that is based on the philosophy and technologies of 
Web 2.0. This is another collective term for various recent social and technological 
developments that are changing how people experience and use the World Wide Web (O’Reilly 
2005; Panke 2007). While there is still no precise definition of the concept, for many, Web 2.0 
materializes as ‘social’ web-based applications that are easy to use, invite (actually rely on) user 
participation and collaboration, and promote the formation of communities and social networks 
among users. Important goals of Web 2.0 include increasing the involvement of users in the 
creation of content, improving the reusability of content, and making the search for information 
more effective (O’Reilly 2005; Panke 2007: 3). Often-cited examples of Web 2.0 applications 
are Flickr ([INT 22]), a site for publishing and sharing photographs, del.icio.us ([INT 23]), a 
site for sharing bookmarks, and Wikipedia ([INT 24]), a multilingual, web-based, free content 
encyclopedia editable by anyone ([INT 25]). Web 2.0 is commonly associated with a number of 
technologies, including: 
• Weblogs (or blogs) are web applications that provide simple content management features 
for creating, editing, deleting, organizing, and displaying regular time-stamped contributions 
(posts) written by a single author or (sometimes) a group of authors (Mason & Rennie 2006: 
14f.; Panke 2007: 17). Blog posts are shown in their temporal sequence on a common web 
page, typically starting with the latest post (Mason & Rennie 2006: 14). They contain their 
authors’ comments and thoughts on particular topics; however, weblogs go beyond personal 
journals in at least three ways: the posts may contain embedded images, video clips, etc. and 
links to other web resources; the contents of a blog is accessible to anyone; and most 
weblogs invite public comments on their posts from users and thus may gradually gain their 
own communities of readers (p. 15). A recent trend in blogging involves the creation of 
video blogs (vlogs), i.e. blogs whose entries consist (primarily) of video clips. 
• Web syndication is a form of content distribution that allows web sites to use content made 
available by other web sites ([INT 26]). News and weblog sites were among the first to use 
web syndication, but today, all kinds of digital information are distributed in this way. Web 
syndication commonly involves publishers providing frequently updated lists of content 
from their sites (so-called web feeds), and consumers who subscribe to these feeds in order to 
obtain new syndicated content for display in their own sites or browsers, automatically or on 
demand ([INT 26]). A web feed ([INT 27]) is a structured document written in one member 
of the RSS (Rich Site Summary or Really Simple Syndication) family of formalisms, which 
are based on XML (eXtensible Markup Language) (cf. Footnote 182). 
• Podcasting (derived from the blend of iPod and broadcast) is a syndication-based method by 
which audio (and video) content can be automatically distributed over the Internet to 
subscribers for playback on their portable media player or computer, allowing them to access 
the downloaded content when (and where) it is convenient for them ([INT 28]). Users 
subscribe to a podcast (i.e. a set of digital media files) syndicated (made available) by its 
author or host (the podcaster) and automatically receive new content when it becomes 
available ([INT 28]). 
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• Tagging is the human activity of associating a particular piece of information (e.g. a photo, 
blog entry, map, or video clip) with freely chosen descriptive keywords (tags). Users of sites 
like del.icio.us and Flickr add tags to information in order to make it easier for themselves 
and for others to find the tagged information later (Panke 2007: 16). As a result of this 
collaborative categorization effort by a large number of people, user-created taxonomies of 
metadata emerge, so-called folksonomies (cf. Chapter 12.1.2.5) (p. 16). 
• Wikis are web-based content management systems that enable collaborative authoring on a 
large scale by allowing users to add, modify, and remove (almost) any content, including the 
content created by others, easily and quickly using a web browser. The name comes from 
Hawaiian wiki wiki, which means ‘quick’ (Mason & Rennie 2006: 130) and indicates the 
ease and speed with which content can be created and refined in a wiki system. Wikis differ 
from other groupware systems by the concepts of open and collaborative editing, community 
ownership of content, and constant flux (or change) (pp. 130f.). Furthermore, wikis rely on 
social mechanisms established by the community of users rather than on strict workflows, 
access restrictions, and formal structures enforced by the software to regulate collaborative 
editing processes and maintain order (p. 131). 
The emphasis of Web 2.0 on interactivity, participation, collaboration, and social networking 
has drawn the attention of both researchers and practitioners in the field of e-learning because 
these characteristics are compatible with (social-) constructivist views of learning (cf. Section 
2.2.3) (e.g. Brown & Adler 2008). It is believed that Web 2.0 technologies can be used to give 
learners an active, participatory role in the learning process by making them authors of learning 
content, which they create from their own point of view and using information from all kinds of 
sources collected from the World Wide Web. Often, the content created by learners will reflect 
their own interests more than topics of the course (Downes 2005). During the authoring 
process, learners can develop skills in information literacy, critical thinking, writing, and self-
expression (Mason & Rennie 2006: 15). Furthermore, for example, in the course of writing one 
blog entry after the other or of making successive changes to a wiki document, learners may be 
encouraged to reflect on their thinking and writing over a longer period of time (p. 15). Through 
the sharing of blog entries and comments, the collaborative creation of web documents in a 
wiki, or cooperation to develop a taxonomy for the information in a domain through tagging, 
social networks and communities can form between learners, which are similar to Wenger’s 
communities of practice (Downes 2005, cf. Section 2.2.3). In all these scenarios, the role of e-
learning changes from medium to platform, from a tool for content delivery to a tool for content 
authoring (Downes 2005). In addition, E-Learning 2.0 has implications for the distribution of 
learning content. The traditional format of the pre-packaged complete online course is giving 
way to the syndication of microcontent (i.e. content conveying a single idea or concept in a 
form that is succinct and suitable for access and presentation through e-mail clients, web 
browsers, or mobile devices, cf. Dash 2002) from different sources, which learners aggregate, 
remix, and repurpose according to their interests and needs (Downes 2005; MacManus & Porter 
2005). 
2.3.10  E-Learning Platforms 
An e-learning platform is a software system that can host one or more e-learning environments 
and provides services for managing the content and users of these environments. Depending on 
their focus, two major types of e-learning platforms can be distinguished: learning management 
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systems, which emphasize the automation of administrative tasks and content management 
systems, which are tools for authoring and organizing e-learning content. 
2.3.10.1 Learning Management Systems 
The central concern of a learning management system (LMS)9 is the automation of selected 
aspects of the administration of the e-learning process. Typically, this includes the management 
of content, resources, instructors, and students. Content authoring capabilities are normally not 
part of a learning management system; instead, LMSs focus on delivering and managing 
content created by external sources. 
For the most part, learning management systems have been implemented as web-based 
applications to give learners, instructors, and administrators location- and time-independent 
access to learning materials and administrative tools ([INT 29]). Elements of a typical LMS 
include facilities for ([INT 29]): 
• Assembling courses from learning objects; 
• Handling roster operations (learner accounts and enrollment in courses); 
• Managing learners, instructors, courses, resources, roles, access, and privileges; 
• Calendaring and scheduling of activities, deadlines, events, etc.; 
• Sending notifications and other messages to learners; 
• Communication among learners, instructors, and administrative staff; 
• Tracking, assessing, and reporting on learner’s performance and progress; 
• Pre-testing and post-testing of learner’s knowledge and skills; 
• Grading course work and generating scores and transcripts; 
• Supporting both online and blended course delivery (cf. Section 2.1 and Section 2.4.2). 
Although a wide range of both commercial and open source learning management systems 
are available today, quite a number of successful e-learning systems, including the Virtual 
Linguistics Campus (cf. Section 2.4), have chosen to build their own LMS. The decision to 
make one’s own rather than buy or adopt an external learning management system is motivated 
by several disadvantages of the latter: 
• The LMS may be difficult to use due to an excess of features, confusing interface, bugs, etc. 
• The LMS may be incompatible with one’s e-learning concept and philosophy. 
• The LMS may include features that are not needed and may miss essential others. 
• The LMS may be difficult to customize (corporate identity, additional functions, etc.). 
• The LMS may not integrate easily with existing components and systems. 
• The LMS may involve high initial and follow-up costs (customization, licensing, etc.). 
• The LMS may cease to be developed and supported some day. 
                                              
9  A number of other, similar terms are used to describe essentially the same functionality (with a few 
nuances): virtual learning environment (VLE), course management system (CMS), managed learning 
environment (MLE), learning support system (LSS), and learning platform (LP), among others 
(Mason & Rennie 2006: xxxiii; [INT 30]). 
Chapter 2: E-Learning 35 
2.3.10.2 Content Management Systems 
A content management system (CMS) is a web-based or other computer application designed to 
organize and support all activities involved in the collaborative process of designing, testing, 
revising, approving, and publishing documents and other content which are typically part of a 
larger structured collection, such as a web site ([INT 31]). Web-based CMSs are often used to 
manage the different contents of large web sites ([INT 32]). 
In contrast to LMSs, content management systems provide dedicated facilities for authoring 
content, including the possibility to define templates, i.e. layouts with placeholders for assets 
(text, images, and other media), which can be filled in from a library of assets, by authors, or 
automatically on the fly, in order to create presentations of content. Modern CMSs usually 
include a database back-end which facilitates the storage and reuse of assets and content created 
using these assets. 
Content management systems for e-learning applications are often called learning content 
management systems (LCMSs). An LCMS allows both experienced and less experienced users 
to create, manage, combine, and present learning objects, i.e. reusable, self-contained units of 
learning (Mason & Rennie 2006: 71), in order to create personalized e-learning experiences 
([INT 29]). 
However, the use of (L)CMSs also has a number of disadvantages. These systems often 
generate static, cookie-cutter layouts of images and text that lack the flexibility and originality 
of designs developed by multimedia experts. Another problem of (L)CMSs, LMSs, and 
e-learning platforms in general is that they can lure people, in particular administrators, into 
thinking that simply buying and installing such a system will suffice to create an e-learning 
culture in their organization. In other words, e-learning requires much more than a sophisticated 
software product. 
2.4  The Virtual Linguistics Campus 
The Virtual Linguistics Campus (VLC) ([INT 3]) is the leading platform for e-learning in 
linguistics worldwide (Handke & Franke 2006). The VLC is the result of a multidisciplinary 
research and development effort since 2001, which involved teams from the universities of 
Duisburg-Essen, Marburg, and Wuppertal in the first phase (2001–2003) and was then carried 
on by the Linguistic Engineering Team (LET) at the University of Marburg (2003–today). A 
screenshot of the VLC homepage in October 2007 is shown in Figure 6. 
After several years of development, today, a wealth of certified courses and study material in 
the fields of theoretical linguistics, applied linguistics, linguistic engineering, and teacher 
training is available from the Virtual Linguistics Campus, supported by various tools for 
administration, communication, and linguistic education ([INT 3]). All VLC courses are 
suitable for both online and blended learning. A third option is to use selected materials from 
e-learning units of the VLC to supplement face-to-face instruction (see Section 2.4.2 for a 
discussion of these scenarios). The target group of the VLC includes students, instructors, 
theoretical and applied linguists, school teachers, university or college administrators, and other 
interested parties. 
Since 2001, the Virtual Linguistics Campus has been an integral part of regular teaching 
activities at various universities in Germany and other countries. In October 2007, the VLC had 
over 1,200 registered users from more than 55 countries, and the rising trend continues. The 
majority of users are students of language and/or linguistics in their early-to-mid twenties, of 
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both sexes (although there are significantly more female than male students), and mostly from 
Western (in particular German) culture. 
The VLC has recently spawned two further e-learning platforms: the Virtual Center for 
Teacher Training (VCT) ([INT 33]) and the LET-Vokabeltrainer (“LET Vocabulary Trainer”) 
([INT 34]). The VCT offers certified online courses for teachers and students of language and 
literature on e-learning, web development, content presentation techniques, and the new media 
in (foreign-language) education. The LET-Vokabeltrainer provides various exercises designed 
to train students from German schools in the vocabulary of (currently) English and Latin that 
they are required to learn as part of their curriculum. Each of the three platforms has a different 
target group of users: the VLC is designed for university students, the VCT for students and 
professionals of teaching, and the LET-Vokabeltrainer for learners in schools. 
Section 2.4.1 below outlines the structure and components of the VLC (for a detailed 
description, see Handke 2006a). The following section discusses how the VLC can be used to 
support different e-learning scenarios, including face-to-face teaching (cf. Section 2.4.2.1), 
online learning (cf. Section 2.4.2.2), and blended learning (cf. Section 2.4.2.3). Section 2.4.3 
describes the linguistic fieldwork classes on the VLC, which provide the setting for the 
different pedagogical agent roles discussed in Chapter 16. 
2.4.1  The Architecture of the VLC 
The Virtual Linguistics Campus is a web-based e-learning platform that provides an interactive 
learning environment integrating multimedia content, educational and recreational activities, 
information resources, and tools for administration, assessment, communication, research, 
 
Figure 6. The VLC homepage in October 2007. Screenshot taken on 20 October 2007. 
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community building and learner support. Where possible, the platform makes use of multimedia 
and database technologies to provide dynamic and interactive activities and content. 
The system architecture of the VLC is shown in Figure 7. It consists of three major 
components: a ‘free,’ unrestricted area, a ‘secure’ area whose contents is accessible only to 
(authorized) logged-in users of the campus, and an administration component for use by the 
VLC staff only. The free area provides general information about the VLC, what it has to offer, 
and how to use the platform. Furthermore, this area gives access to help facilities, demos, 
linguistic tools, and various other information and services that may be useful or interesting for 
visitors (Handke 2006a: 15). For a discussion of the options available in the free area, see 
Handke (2006a: 15ff.). However, most of the contents of the VLC are in the secure, restricted 
area (cf. Figure 7). To gain access to this part, people have to become registered users of the 
VLC first by creating a user account. With their account, they can then enroll in classes on the 
VLC or subscribe to the Global Access facility (see below). After successful enrollment or 
subscription, they can access the corresponding protected parts of the VLC through their 
personal page (“My VLC”). The third, administrative component became necessary to facilitate 
previously manual and labor-intensive management tasks in the constantly changing and 
growing environment of the VLC (Handke 2006a: 30), which include class compilation and 
administration, user management, and registration procedures, among others. The VLC 
Management System (Handke 2006a: 30–33) models the data structures required for the 
administration of the VLC as a set of databases and provides a web-based interface for 
managing modules, courses, classes, e-learning units, users, dates and deadlines, topic 
suggestions for term papers, and so on. The purpose of this interface is to hide the complexity 
of the underlying structure from non-developers (p. 32, cf. Chapter 1.2). 
The Virtual Linguistics Campus is first and foremost a platform which provides instructional 
content to learners, both as stand-alone units and as part of online courses. All courses on the 
VLC are designed in such a way that learners can study them completely online or blended, i.e. 
with supplemental in-class teaching (Handke 2006a: 20, cf. Section 2.4.2). 
The e-learning concept of the VLC is based on the following hierarchy (Handke 2006a: 
20 + 31f.). The Lecture Hall lists all VLC courses, grouped under their modules. Each module 
contains the VLC courses for a certain broad field of study (currently including theoretical 
linguistics, applied linguistics, teacher training, and linguistic fieldwork). Within a module, 
learners study courses (academic units) for credit by first registering for and then participating 
in one of their classes. Examples of VLC courses include Phonetics, Human Language 
Technologies, English Linguistics (for Teachers), and the linguistic fieldwork course Hindi. 
The classes within a course may differ (slightly) with respect to their content, the institution 
offering them via the VLC, and the person(s) teaching them. A given class has a fixed time 
period during which it is active and participants have access to the e-learning units of the class. 
Figure 8 shows the structure of a typical VLC e-learning unit, which consists of the following 
components (Handke 2006a: 23f. + 27f.): 
• The Introduction screen lists the learning goals and central topics of the unit, provides a 
definition (if appropriate), specifies a set of bibliographical references for further reading, 
and includes a link to specific advice for learners about studying the unit. 
• The Virtual Session is the core of an e-learning unit. Being the digital equivalent of a 
conventional lesson, it presents the instructional content, but in a multimedia and interactive 
format that emphasizes appropriate use of vivid graphics, sound, video, and animations over 
showing text-heavy pages (Handke 2006a: 28). The basic principle of the Virtual Sessions is 
that of explorative learning, guided by a set of questions that cover the important aspects of a 
Virtual Session (p. 27). Through the menu bar of the Virtual Session, learners can access a 
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Glossary of linguistic terms, display information about linguistic concepts from other Virtual 
Sessions via the Cross Searcher, search a Language Index presenting multimedia 
information about more than 75 languages, and read the biographies of key figures in the 
field of linguistics in the VIP-Archives (pp. 28f.). After studying the Virtual Session, learners 
can practice/reinforce what they have learned using the Interactive Tutor. This component 
provides various kinds of interactive exercises, including multiple-choice questions, listening 
tasks, transcription tasks, drag-and-drop exercises, identification tasks, input tasks, etc. 
• The Worksheet is a collection of linguistic analysis tasks, which learners typically have to 
submit as part of their credit requirements. Worksheets are implemented as web-based forms 
and enriched with multimedia elements where appropriate for a task. Students can submit 
them individually or in small groups of up to three people. Each Worksheet has a submission 
deadline. After the deadline, the model solution to the Worksheet is made available. The 
E-Worksheet is a variant of the Worksheet, which consists exclusively of online exercises 
that are generated, corrected, and evaluated by the computer. Both the instructor and the 
learner receive a notification after the learner has passed an E-Worksheet (Hente 2006: 76f.). 
• The Practical consists of a collection of exercises, problems, and tasks related to the topics 
of the unit, which is intended mainly as a resource for instructors of blended classes (cf. 
Section 2.4.2.3) who want to enrich their in-class sessions with additional activities. Hence, 
the Practical is like the traditional handout in some respects (Franke et al. 2006: 9), but 
unlike the handout, it may contain embedded multimedia elements. Model solutions to the 
tasks are available, which makes the Practical a valuable resource for both blended learners 
and online learners (who can try to solve the Practical tasks on their own and then look at the 
solutions) (Handke 2006a: 24). 
 
Figure 7. The architecture of the VLC. Adapted from Handke (2006a: 14, Figure 1.1). 
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• The Feedback facility is a web-based form that learners can use to submit questions or 
comments to the relevant contact person (e.g. questions about the Virtual Session to the 
instructor, technical inquiries to the webmaster, etc.). 
Booking and attending classes is the typical way of using the VLC. However, for those 
learners who want to study the Virtual Sessions without registering for classes (e.g. when they 
are preparing for an exam), the Global Access facility provides class-independent access to the 
Virtual Sessions of the VLC (Handke 2006a: 18). If teachers, universities, or other institutions 
are interested in building their own linguistic e-learning classes, they can compile them from 
the units provided by the VLC using the Course Builder (p. 19). These custom classes are 
delivered via the VLC and supervised by the person or institution that ordered them. 
The VLC Community Network is a recent addition to the Virtual Linguistics Campus. This 
feature gives users of the VLC the possibility to learn about other users, create friendship 
contacts, and exchange messages with their friends. To become a part of this network, users 
have to make their profile visible to others and set the visibility options for the different items 
in their user profile, which include a variety of personal information such as nickname, country, 
and e-mail address. 
Recently, a printed Workbook has been created for each course to serve as a study 
companion for learners (Unger 2006a). The Workbook comprises the contents of the Virtual 
Sessions in a serialized (rather than hypertextual) format, with many blank spaces for the 
learner to fill in while studying the Virtual Sessions, as well as pointers to online interactive 
multimedia elements. In addition, for each unit, the Workbook provides an introduction to the 
content, central goals, and topics; the Practical; and the bibliographical references. 
 
Figure 8. The structure of an e-learning unit on the VLC. Adapted from Handke (2006a: 23, Figure 1.8). 
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2.4.2  E-Learning Scenarios Involving the VLC 
The structure and contents of the Virtual Linguistics Campus facilitate its use in three 
instructional settings that involve different degrees of face-to-face contact, dependency on 
technology, and use of online components: face-to-face (f2f), online, and blended. The basic 
relationship between these scenarios is shown in Figure 9. In the first setting, selected elements 
of the VLC are used to support face-to-face teaching. In the second scenario, learners are 
studying VLC courses completely online, without any in-class teaching. Between these two 
extremes, blended learning courses based on the VLC combine the e-learning units of the 
campus with in-class practical sessions with the instructor, which focus on discussion and 
problem solving rather than on teaching of content. These three settings are discussed in the 
following subsection, using material that was previously published elsewhere (Franke 2003). 
2.4.2.1 Support for Face-to-Face Teaching 
Some instructors may want to integrate individual features of the Virtual Linguistics Campus 
into their regular face-to-face teaching but may not wish to change the basic approach and 
structure of their courses. These instructors can use selected elements of the VLC where they 
deem it appropriate in order to enrich their in-class teaching or to provide additional activities 
and resources for their students. Examples of how the VLC can support face-to-face teaching 
include: 
• Illustration of linguistic concepts with animations (e.g. articulation of speech sounds); 
• Discussions in the chat room or discussion forum; 
• Student assessment using the Interactive Tutor and (E-) Worksheets; 
• Preparatory and follow-up studying of Virtual Sessions for an in-class lecture; 
• Replacement of (e.g. canceled) in-class lectures with e-learning units. 
Hence, components of the VLC are used in an eclectic fashion to contribute to what is still 
essentially face-to-face, in-class instruction. E-learning elements play a supporting rather than a 
primary role. This approach is useful for introducing interested teachers to e-learning without 
immediately confronting them with the full range of tasks involved in managing a technology-
based blended or online course. 
2.4.2.2 Online Learning 
Online courses on the Virtual Linguistics Campus are delivered entirely through the VLC-
platform. They are characterized by the primarily technology-based interaction of learners with 
multimedia instructional content, instructors, and other learners. Learners can study the 
e-learning units of an online course using a standard web browser in their own time and at their 
own pace. Apart from constitutional meetings and in-class exams in some courses, there are no 
face-to-face meetings during an online course. Learners communicate with their instructors and 
peers through e-mail, chat rooms, discussion forums, or (rarely) over the telephone. Students in 
VLC-based online courses often come from different countries all over the world, but online 
learning has also become an attractive option for learners enrolled at the University of Marburg, 
the home of the VLC, to help them to resolve conflicts between simultaneous mandatory 
courses in their schedule. 
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For each e-learning unit in an online course, learners study the Virtual Session first, 
including the Interactive Tutor exercises, and then optionally submit the (E-) Worksheet of the 
unit as part of their credit requirements. In addition, they may post in the discussion forum, 
participate in chat sessions, and make friends and exchange messages with their peers in the 
VLC Community Network. The nature of the online learning situation (distributed learners, no 
face-to-face interaction with instructors and peers) and its potential negative effects on learners 
(uncertainty, isolation, frustration, decline of motivation, and eventually dropout) makes 
constant communication a necessity in order to establish and maintain contact and relationships 
between all individuals involved in an online course. The experience with online courses on the 
VLC has shown that the course instructor has to take the initiative in contact cultivation. The 
following is a list of qualities of an online instructor that have positive effects on the motivation 
of the individual learner and the overall atmosphere in an online course (see, for example, 
Kemshal-Bell (2001) and Denis et al. (2004) for a detailed discussion): 
• Good availability (e-mail, chat, telephone, in person, etc.); 
• Timely and detailed feedback on learners’ questions, solutions, performance, etc.; 
• Ability to solve learners’ technical problems; 
• Advisory capabilities (course choice, time management, learning strategies, etc.); 
• Source of knowledge, insight, and inspiration; 
• Help with the development of metacognitive skills; 
• “Tender love and care” for each learner, in particular the passive and frustrated ones; 
• Skills in facilitating online discussion and collaboration; 
• Promotion of learner-instructor and learner-learner relationships; 
• Competent course management (record keeping, scheduling, enrollment, etc.). 
Overall, the role of the instructor in an online course changes from transmitter of knowledge 
(this is largely the responsibility of the technology) to facilitator of learning processes (at the 
cognitive, administrative, and technological levels) (Denis et al. 2004) as well as of social 
relationships between the participants. 
Online courses as outlined above are offered regularly on the Virtual Linguistics Campus. 
Students appreciate the flexibility and constant availability which this format provides. 
However, the lack of face-to-face contact with the instructor and other learners is a problem for 
 
Figure 9. Online, blended, and face-to-face (f2f) courses compared. Adapted from Mason and Rennie 
(2006: 14, Figure 4). 
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online learners. The blended course format combines the advantages of both face-to-face 
teaching and online courses. 
2.4.2.3 Blended Learning 
Year after year, face-to-face interactions are ranked by all students in either first or second place. 
This replicates the results of many distance education studies that show students often feel that 
something important to their learning is missing when all interactions are mediated, whether 
asynchronous or synchronous. (Dede 2004: 7). 
As social beings, humans tend to feel uncomfortable when they are out of contact with other 
people for longer periods of time. We need to see, hear, and feel others around us; in other 
words, we crave human contact. The human need to socialize with others is an explanation for 
their strong preference for learning experiences that involve face-to-face interaction with 
instructors and other students and their uneasiness in online courses, where they normally do 
not meet their instructors or peers in person (with the exception of kick-off meetings and in-
class examinations) (Guri-Rosenblit 2005: 12). 
Both face-to-face teaching and online learning have their strengths and weaknesses (cf. 
Table 2). While online learning was originally propagated as an alternative to face-to-face 
instruction, the two approaches have recently come to be seen as complementary rather than 
competitive, and have been integrated into a hybrid approach to the organization of instruction. 
The term blended (or hybrid) learning gained popularity around 2000 and commonly labels 
combinations of online learning and face-to-face teaching (although other blends of 
technologies, resources, methods, and locations have also been labeled “blended learning”) 
(Mason & Rennie 2006: 11f.). 
The basic idea of blended learning is to achieve synergetic effects in learning by combining 
the strengths of online courses with those of face-to-face teaching. The mix of online and face-
to-face elements is intended to give learners as many options as possible in order to suit their 
individual learning needs and learning styles. Recent research indicates that blended learning is 
more effective and more enjoyable for learners than either face-to-face teaching or online 
learning alone, and preferred by instructors and learners alike (Dean et al. 2001; Aycock et al. 
2002; Guri-Rosenblit 2005; Rossett et al. 2003; Rovai & Jordan 2004; Frankle 2005). The 
challenge for instructional design is to develop a mixture of online and face-to-face components 
which maximizes success in learning (Kerres & de Witt 2003). 
Blended learning on the Virtual Linguistics Campus builds on the online e-learning units and 
combines them with face-to-face sessions with the instructor in the classroom. All blended 
courses on the VLC follow a common scheme: 
1. Learners study the Virtual Session online at a place, time, and pace that suits them. 
2. Learners optionally submit the (E-) Worksheet of the e-learning unit. 
3. Learners participate in weekly in-class practical sessions with the instructor. 
The major difference between online courses and blended courses on the VLC lies in the 
additional face-to-face sessions with the instructor, which take place every week during a 
semester. Unlike traditional face-to-face lessons, the purpose of the in-class practical sessions is 
not to teach content. Instead, their focus is on giving learners the opportunity to discuss and 
practice what they have learned during their online study of the Virtual Sessions. Building on 
the background provided by the current Virtual Session, the instructor can use the in-class time 
flexibly to deepen students’ understanding of the topics discussed in the Virtual Session 
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through various activities and exercises. In general, the practical sessions require careful 
preparation on the part of the instructor. Not only should the instructor be familiar with the 
structure and contents of the Virtual Session, but he or she should also come to the class 
equipped with meaningful activities based on the topics of the Virtual Session that illustrate 
important concepts, introduce new perspectives, give learners practice in linguistic analysis and 
other skills, and so on. The Practical of the e-learning unit provides valuable resources for the 
design of the in-class session (cf. Section 2.4.1). Furthermore, the instructor should be open to 
learners’ questions, suggestions, and needs as they arise in the course of the session. There is 
plenty of room for this, since the instructor does not have to get through a certain amount of 
instructional content as in a traditional lesson. Because of the different focus of the in-class 
practical sessions, the instructor should emphasize discussion, practice, and analysis over 
presentation (Hente 2006: 79) and try to overcome the passiveness of learners common in 
traditional class formats by involving all attendants in stimulating activities, giving learners the 
opportunity to actively participate in the learning experience by asking questions, contributing 
to discussions, performing analyses, etc. The experience with blended learning courses on the 
Virtual Linguistics Campus supports the accumulating evidence (see above) that blended 
learning is an effective instructional format, which is well-received by learners and instructors. 
2.4.3   Explorative Learning on the VLC 
The focus of many courses on the Virtual Linguistics Campus is on delivering instructional 
content about a particular subject area to learners, using interactive multimedia elements and 
various kinds of (online and in-class) exercises and other activities to illustrate linguistic 
concepts and deepen learners’ understanding of the topics discussed. In contrast, the linguistic 
fieldwork classes on the VLC (Unger 2006b) take a different approach. Simulating the classical 
linguistic field situation, they confront learners with an unknown language and provide them 
with the facilities to explore the language and discover as many details about it as possible. 
These facilities include (Unger 2006b): 
• A virtual native speaker playing the role of informant; 
• A virtual room featuring the virtual native speaker and various objects, which the speaker 
may simply label or use in more complex constructions when the learner clicks on them; 
• General information about the language; 
• Background on how to do linguistic fieldwork; 
• Summaries of current hypotheses about the language based on the data analyzed so far; 
• Growing vocabulary lists for the language; 
• Various linguistic tools (e.g. sound charts, help with phonetic transcription, etc.). 
Linguistic fieldwork on the VLC is a process that, on the one hand, challenges the learner 
and encourages him or her to engage in the active construction of knowledge (cf. Section 2.2.3), 
both about the target language and about linguistic analysis methods in general but on the other 
hand can quickly overwhelm especially beginning learners with its complexity. For the field 
research to succeed, it is necessary to inform, guide, and facilitate learner’s exploration of the 
target language. In real-world fieldwork scenarios, support from different human actors may be 
available, including native speakers, coaches, and peers. With the exception of the virtual native 
speaker, these actors have no virtual counterpart in the fieldwork classes on the VLC so far. 
Chapter 16 will describe virtual actors (so-called pedagogical software agents, cf. Chapter 4) 
playing these roles to assist learners in the fieldwork situation. 
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Table 2. The advantages and disadvantages (marked grey) of face-to-face teaching and online learning. 
I. Face-to-Face Teaching II. Online Learning 
The face-to-face environment facilitates social 
contact, relationship building, group formation, 
and instructional conversations. 
Learners have greater flexibility. They can work 
in their own time and at their own pace. They can 
access the online learning environment at their 
own convenience, anywhere and anytime. 
Instructional conversations can flexibly shift 
between instructor-learner, learner-learner and 
multi-party formats. 
Online instructional material can be easily 
updated and exhibits constant quality (compared 
to the variable performance of human 
instructors). 
The participants naturally coordinate verbal and 
non-verbal communication channels to negotiate 
meaning and resolve ambiguity. 
The combined use of multiple media (images, 
audio, video, animations, and text) 
accommodates different types of learners. 
Both learners and instructors can flexibly ask 
questions (including follow-up questions) and 
receive feedback immediately. 
Learners have simple and instantaneous access to 
a wide range of distributed information resources. 
Instructional conversations can be directed by the 
instructor toward desired learning outcomes. 
The online learning environment can be designed 
to adapt to the learner’s abilities, preferences, and 
progress, based on constant monitoring and 
modeling of different aspects of the learner. 
Learners can easily socialize with their peers and 
instructors. 
Learners can become immersed (i.e. experience 
presence) in simulated environments, manipulate 
them, and immediately observe the effects. These 
environments allow for the safe and inexpensive 
training of complex skills. 
Instructors can adapt their teaching flexibly to 
learners’ needs, for example in reaction to 
questions, suggestions, and perceived or 
pronounced issues. 
Computers are infinitely ‘patient’ and ‘friendly.’ 
Feedback from computers is immediate, 
objective, and positive/non-judgmental. 
Face-to-face instructional settings involve a 
familiar and comprehensible allocation of roles, 
which is in line with sociocultural stereotypes 
about education (“the instructor teaches learners; 
students learn from their teacher”). 
Learners can collaborate with real and virtual 
partners to accomplish tasks, using both 
synchronous and asynchronous computer-
mediated communication technologies. 
Instructors and learners have to be in the same 
place at the same time. Learners who have 
several parallel courses or other commitments 
may find it difficult to resolve the conflicts in 
their schedule. 
Both learners and instructors fear a loss of social 
interaction between and the resulting isolation of 
the participants in online courses. 
Differences between learners in terms of relevant 
previous knowledge and abilities can hinder the 
learning progress of the entire group. 
Possible incorrect conceptions of learners arising 
from their study of the online material can remain 
undetected by the online instructor because there 
is no direct feedback from learners. 
The weaker students in the group determine the 
pace of instruction, to the disadvantage of the 
more capable learners. 
Online learners have to motivate and discipline 
themselves considerably, which they may not be 
prepared for. 
In-class lessons are no longer available once they 
are over, except for handouts, notes, slides, etc. 
This can be a problem for learners who missed 
lessons or want to recapitulate them. 
Self-directed learners without guidance may lose 
orientation, feel overwhelmed by the wealth of 
information, and fail to achieve learning goals. 
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2.5  Summary 
This chapter reviewed selected concepts, theories, and technologies related to e-learning that 
are relevant to the present work. Furthermore, it introduced the Virtual Linguistics Campus, the 
e-learning environment that will become the ‘playground’ of the embodied pedagogical 
software agents whose design is the concern of this thesis. 
The goal of Section 2.1 was to clarify, by means of an elaborate definition, what the term 
‘e-learning’ is taken to imply in the context of the present research. In addition, the relationship 
of e-learning to other, related terms, including face-to-face instruction, online learning, blended 
learning, mobile learning, and distance education was discussed in this section. 
The second section focused on learning and instruction, defining and contrasting the two and 
distinguishing instruction from education, training, and teaching. Instructional design (ID) was 
discussed as a process that builds a bridge between theoretical research on human learning and 
instructional practice, by translating the results of the former into plans of action for the latter 
(Ertmer & Newby 1993: 50). Three influential theoretical perspectives on human learning and 
their implications for instructional design were reviewed: learning through reinforcement 
(behaviorism), learning through mental information processing (cognitivism), and learning 
through individual construction of knowledge (constructivism). It was concluded that each of 
the three approaches has its own niche in instructional design and that designers should be 
eclectic (rather than dogmatic) with respect to their choice of methods based on the different 
approaches. 
Technologies involved in the creation of e-learning experiences were discussed in the third 
section. The review covered technologies which enable learners to practice knowledge and 
skills (cf. Section 2.3.1); teach instructional content in a structured manner (cf. Section 2.3.2); 
can adapt instruction to the individual learner (cf. Section 2.3.3); provide simulated experiences 
for learners (cf. Section 2.3.4); engage learners in games with educational goals (cf. Section 
2.3.5); present content as hyperlinked networks of self-contained units of information 
(cf. Section 2.3.6); combine multiple media for multisensory delivery of instructional content 
(cf. Section 2.3.7); provide tools for mediating communication between learners over computer 
networks (cf. Section 2.3.8); allow learners to author their own content and form social 
networks (cf. Section 2.3.9); and, finally, facilitate the management and authoring of e-learning 
experiences (cf. Section 2.3.10). 
Section 2.4 focused on the Virtual Linguistics Campus. After summarizing its architecture, 
components, and features, it was shown how the VLC is used in three instructional settings: 
face-to-face teaching, online learning, and blended learning. The section concluded with a 
description of explorative learning on the VLC, as it occurs in the linguistic fieldwork classes. 
Three roles for virtual actors (i.e. pedagogical agents) in the fieldwork scenario were identified: 
the virtual native speaker, the coach, and the peer. These roles will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 16. 
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3  Software Agents 
Information and communication technologies are always increasing not only in sophistication 
but also in complexity while their usability (i.e. how effectively, efficiently, and satisfactorily 
people can use them to achieve their goals, cf. Chapter 6.3) has not substantially improved. 
Computers are still largely passive recipients of specific, highly detailed instructions whose 
execution needs to be monitored by the user. Generally, the user is expected to adapt to the 
machine while the reverse would be desirable to improve the accessibility of computers for the 
ever increasing number of non-expert users. In particular, “the interaction between computer 
and user (…) must become an equal partnership – the machine should not just act as a dumb 
receptor of task descriptions but should cooperate with the user to achieve their goal” (Jennings 
& Wooldridge 1998b: 7, their emphasis). 
Intelligent software agents (Genesereth & Ketchpel 1994; Wooldridge & Jennings 1995; 
Nwana 1996; Jennings & Wooldridge 1996; Bradshaw 1997; Jennings et al. 1998; Wagner 
2000; Russell & Norvig 2003) are claimed to solve (or at least mitigate) these problems by 
offering informed, adaptive, autonomous, and proactive assistance to users and other agents. 
Particularly at the user interface (cf. Chapter 1.2), software agents can thus transform the 
interaction from user-controlled command execution into a cooperative process (Maes 1994: 
31). 
In very general terms, an agent is an entity that perceives its environment and acts on it in 
some way (Russell & Norvig 2003: 32, cf. Figure 10). The agent is said to be situated in its 
environment (Jennings et al. 1998: 8). Agents perceive their environment through sensors and 
act on it by means of actuators (or effectors) (Russell & Norvig 2003: 32). Examples of sensors 
of artificial agents include keyboard, mouse, microphone, camera, accelerometer, temperature 
probe, Global Positioning System (GPS), etc. Some actuators include loudspeaker, display, 
virtual or mechanic body (parts), brakes, heater, lights, etc. 
This definition of agency is intentionally broad, encompassing such diverse entities as 
thermostats (and other kinds of control systems), animals, humans, robots,10 software 
daemons,11 non-player characters in computer games, and virtual peers and tutors. The 
environments in which agents are embedded may be physical or virtual and usually contain 
objects and other agents (both natural and artificial). Sensor inputs include percepts of objects, 
states, events, and relationships as well as communications from other agents. 
‘Intelligent’ agents have the capacity for autonomous, flexible, and goal-directed interaction 
with their environment, for themselves or on behalf of other agents. They are able to detect 
relevant environmental states and to perform actions in the environment in pursuit of their own 
agendas to achieve desired results (Rosenschein 2001: 411).12 While natural agents (humans 
                                              
10  A robot is a “machine that senses, thinks, and acts” (Bekey 2005: 2). Robots completely consist of 
electromechanical components (Menzel & D’Aluisio 2000; Craig 2004; Bekey 2005). 
11  A software daemon is a process (program being executed on a computer) that monitors a software 
environment (often the computer’s operating system) from the background and carries out operations 
to manipulate this environment according to a pre-defined schedule or when specific events occur. 
12  Whereas traditional approaches to building intelligent machines viewed intelligence as a property of 
“disembodied minds,” more recent embodied and situational approaches to machine intelligence 
(Pfeifer & Scheier 1999) emphasize that intelligent behavior critically involves the body and its 
sensory-motor processes (Chrisley 2004: 62). “Intelligence is viewed as the capacity for real-time, 
situated activity, typically inseparable from and often fully interleaved with perception and action. 
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and animals) exhibit all of these characteristics to varying degrees, the intelligence of artificial 
(human-made) agents is still inferior in comparison to that of natural agents. 
Intelligent software agents are software systems loosely conforming to the above criteria, 
which inhabit (are situated in) a computer or computer network environment, learn the habits 
and interests of human users, and can operate autonomously on users’ behalf to accomplish 
tasks delegated to them (Maes 1994; Maes 1995). The classic image of a software agent is that 
of a personal assistant (Maes 1994; Negroponte 1995: Chapter 12) with these qualities (cf. 
Section 3.2.5). Properties of intelligent software agents are discussed in the following section. 
3.1  Properties of Intelligent Software Agents 
Software agents are known by many other names, which emphasize particular characteristics or 
functions. The following is an incomplete list: 
• Autonomous agents; 
• Intelligent agents; 
• Adaptive interfaces; 
• Virtual assistants; 
• Softbots; 
• Entertainment bots; 
• File sharing bots; 
• Shopping bots; 
• E-mail agents; 
• Network agents; 
• Printing agents; 
• Search agents; 
• Knowledge navigators; 
• Guides. 
The variety of labels indicates that agent research and development cover an increasingly 
wide range of agent types. It has even been argued that the term ‘agent’ is overused these days 
because everybody seems to call everything an agent (Nwana 1996), depending on how broad 
the scope of their definition of the term is, in many cases to promote a product by giving it a 
stylish label. Quite often, the difference between agents and ‘ordinary’ computer programs is 
not clear (Franklin & Graesser 1996). 
                                                                                                                                                
Further, it is by having a body that a system is situated in the world in order to perform tasks that 
might previously have been thought to require the manipulation of internal representations or data 
structures” (p. 62). See Chapter 14.1.2 for a discussion of agent architectures based on this approach. 
 
Figure 10. An agent situated in its environment. Adapted from Russell and Norvig (2003: 33, Figure 
2.1). The agent is equipped with sensors through which it perceives its environment, and produces as 
output actions (including animations) that affect it, mediated by some kind of decision-making planning 
stage (Russell & Norvig 2003: 32f.). 
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Although the term ‘agent’ is pervasive, perhaps even overly so, the notion of agency to date 
has defied attempts to produce a single definition that would satisfy everybody (Wooldridge 
1999: 28), the one provided in this chapter being just one attempt among many others. Still, it is 
possible to identify a set of properties of intelligent software agents (Wooldridge & Jennings 
1995: 116ff.) which many agent researchers would accept and which different types of agents 
possess to a greater or lesser extent. These properties also distinguish software agents from 
conventional programs: “[a]ll software agents are programs, but not all programs are agents” 
(Franklin & Graesser 1996). 
3.1.1  Autonomy 
Autonomy means that an agent has the ability to act in a complex and dynamic environment for 
an extended period of time without (constantly) requiring direct instructions from humans or 
other agents (Wooldridge & Jennings 1995: 116). Figure 11 shows a taxonomy of different 
kinds of autonomous agents (Franklin & Graesser 1996), including biological agents (humans 
and most animals), robotic agents (cyborgs13 and mobile robots), and computational agents 
(autonomous agents that inhabit computers and networks). The latter can be subdivided into 
software agents (see above) and artificial life agents (autonomous agents that are born, grow, 
live, reproduce, die, and evolve in computer-simulated artificial environments)14 (Franklin & 
Graesser 1996). 
An autonomous agent is in control of its actions and internal state (Wooldridge & Jennings 
1995: 116), and acts to achieve a set of goals, which may be its own goals or those of others. 
This implies that the agent can decide by itself on the basis of its sensor input and internal state 
whether to perform a certain action. The internal state includes what the agent currently holds 
true about its environment, other agents, and itself (beliefs); what it would like (and could 
attempt) to achieve (desires or goals); and what it has opted to attempt to achieve (intentions) 
([INT 35], cf. Chapter 14.1.1). 
Fully autonomous agents require minimum human intervention, which gives them maximum 
flexibility but can also make them unpredictable and raises issues of their trustworthiness 
because the agent may have goals of its own which do not necessarily serve the human user. 
Semi-autonomous agents, in contrast, are less flexible because they require a higher degree of 
human intervention, but they also give their users a greater sense of being in control. From this 
point of view, users should be able to control the degree of agent autonomy (Sycara et al. 1996), 
preferably at the task level. 
3.1.2  Adaptiveness 
The ability to acquire, change, and improve their behaviors as they react to and/or interact with 
their environment is critical for intelligent agents. An intelligent software agent can learn from 
                                              
13  The term cyborg is an abbreviation for “cybernetic organism,” which denotes a hybrid of organic and 
machine (synthetic) components contained in a (human) body, with the synthetic parts added to 
enhance the body’s natural abilities (Gray et al. 1995; Mann & Niedzviecki 2001; [INT 59]). 
14  The various chapters in the volume edited by Langton (1997) provide an overview of the field of 
artificial life. A well-known artificial life simulator is the Creatures system (Grand et al. 1997; 
Grand & Cliff 1998; Cliff & Grand 1999). 
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its previous experience, by consulting other agents, and from the user (Maes 1994: 33f.). If an 
agent can learn from the user, it is in a better position to adapt to the user’s individual likes, 
dislikes, and procedures, which, in turn, allows it to become his or her personalized assistant 
(p. 32, cf. Section 3.2.5). Ways for agents to learn from the user include (pp. 33f.): 
• Observing and imitating the user. The agent performs a continuous long-term observation of 
the user’s actions to detect regularities and recurring patterns, and then suggests that it could 
automatically carry out these routine activities for the user. 
• Accommodating user feedback. The user’s response can be direct (the user explicitly 
communicates to the agent his or her opinion of its advice or actions) or indirect (the user 
follows or disregards a specific suggestion made by the agent), positive (e.g. “I would like to 
read more from this author”) or negative (e.g. “This chart is too cluttered, clean it up”). 
• Receiving explicit instructions (programming by example). Based on hypothetical examples 
of events and situations, the user instructs the agent what actions it should perform if such 
cases (or similar ones) occur. The examples may have different levels of specificity, ranging 
from descriptions of a single event or situation to templates (i.e. structures with slots for 
variable information) covering a whole class of events or situations. The agent integrates 
these examples and their associated actions into its knowledge base. 
3.1.3  Believability 
In the arts, a character is considered ‘believable’ if the audience can suspend their disbelief 
because the character successfully conveys the illusion of life (Thomas & Johnston 1984; Bates 
1994: 122). Believable interactive characters with autonomy (cf. Section 3.1.1) that are situated 
in a computer-based environment are called believable agents (Bates 1994; Loyall 1997; 
Mateas 1997) or synthetic characters (Elliott & Brzezinski 1998). 
Believable agents exhibit cues, behaviors, and properties that induce human observers and 
interaction partners to perceive (cf. Chapter 7.2) them as independent, sentient individuals 
rather than as cold, dependent, and uniform devices. Agents that seek to create and sustain the 
impression of being alive have to be able to act autonomously, proactively, responsively, and 
socially with respect to their environment in the first place. However, autonomy, proactiveness 
 
Figure 11. A natural kinds taxonomy of autonomous agents. Adapted from Franklin and Graesser 
(1996, Figure 1). 
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(cf. Section 3.1.6), responsiveness (cf. Section 3.1.7), and social ability (cf. Section 3.1.8) are 
also essential qualities of other types of intelligent agents which have to deal with a dynamic 
and unpredictable environment but are not necessarily believable. To achieve believability, an 
agent requires many more facets built on top of this foundation, which endow its persona with 
depth, appeal, and credibility: 
• A strong, interesting personality (i.e. a set of psychological traits which defines the agent as 
a distinct individual, cf. Chapter 13.5); 
• Expressiveness (i.e. the ability to convincingly and sensitively portray emotions (e.g. anger, 
happiness, surprise, etc.) and moods (e.g. cheerfulness, depression, optimism, etc.), cf. 
Chapter 13.4.2); 
• Empathy (i.e. the ability to understand the state of mind or emotions of other individuals (to 
put oneself into their shoes) and to interact with them accordingly, either replicating their 
emotional state to communicate the ability to identify with them (parallel empathy) or 
expressing different emotions to influence their (possibly negative) state (reactive empathy) 
(McQuiggan et al. 2008); 
• Consistency within and among appearance, behaviors, personality, etc. (cf. Chapter 7.5); 
• Idiosyncrasy (i.e. the possession of distinctive and peculiar manners of speaking, holding 
and moving one’s body, making gestures and facial expressions, etc., cf. Chapter 7.8); 
• Variability in the kinds, timing, and manner of behavior (cf. Chapter 7.9); 
• Change of attitudes, behaviors, moods, etc. over time; 
• Social relationships with users and other agents (cf. Chapter 7.16). 
The case for believable agents is usually made by arguing that an agent which users perceive 
as sentient rather than lifeless would provide a more agreeable communication and cooperation 
partner. Support for this view has been drawn from a series of studies which show that humans 
tend to respond socially to computers, like they would to other humans (Reeves & Nass 1998; 
Nass & Moon 2000, cf. Chapter 6.5). 
Cassell and Tartaro noted that there are close ties between the believability of an agent and 
the agent’s function or role (Cassell & Tartaro 2007: 406, cf. Chapter 7.14). Rather than 
striving to achieve the illusion of life in general, agent designers should be concerned with the 
more specific question “Is the agent we are building believable as a butler, salesperson, tutor, 
etc.?” (p. 406). That is, does the agent portray its appointed role in a way that makes people 
interact with it in ways similar to how they would deal with a human being in the same role? 
Cassell and Tartaro argued that realistic behaviors of an agent, especially in face-to-face 
communication (cf. Chapter 10.1 and Chapter 11), more so than its life-like appearance, may 
induce users to automatically suspend their disbelief and respond to the agent like they would 
behave toward a human interaction partner (pp. 406f., cf. Footnote 107). 
3.1.4  Embodiment 
Software agents working behind the scenes are typically bodiless entities, but there are other 
applications, including entertainment, education, and human-computer interaction, in which 
agents may show users a digital representation of themselves which is the result of carefully 
designing and integrating graphical and audio interface components to create an embodiment 
that is anthropomorphic (resembles human beings) in at least some respects. Typically, this 
representation is either a complete (i.e. fully articulate, with a face, hands, feet, and a torso, cf. 
Chapter 9.1) or partial virtual body (cf. Chapter 9.6) with a specific appearance (cf. Chapter 
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9.2) and behavioral repertoire (cf. Chapter 10). The crafted embodiment defines the agent’s 
identity and interactive potential. 
When talking about such embodied agents, it is useful to draw a distinction between their 
background functional aspects (the agent (program)) and the embodiment through which they 
interact with the user (the character or persona). These two components of an embodied agent 
are compared in Table 3. Embodied agents also need to be separated from avatars, which 
represent and are controlled by human beings (rather than computer programs) in virtual 
environments (Bailenson & Blascovich 2004, cf. Figure 12). 
Embodied agents are interactive if they can make use of their digital representation to act 
and react in relation to the user and the environment, which includes performing bodily actions 
to change the environment as well as verbal and non-verbal behaviors to communicate with the 
user. Embodied interactive agents are conversational if they can perform with their body like a 
human conversation partner in real-time multimodal dialogues face-to-face with human users 
(Bickmore & Cassell 2005). An embodied conversational agent (ECA) (Cassell et al. 2000a; 
Cassell 2001) uses its animated face and body for gaze, eye contact, facial expressions, 
gestures, locomotion, and body language, which support the agent’s verbal messages (cf. 
Chapter 10.1). Given a suitably rich multimodal user interface,15 the agent can both perform 
multimodal communicative actions and interpret such actions performed by the user in the 
context of the ongoing interaction. Embodied interactive agents are discussed in more detail in 
Section 3.3. 
Embodied interactive software agents have been included in computer-based applications 
chiefly because they are expected to facilitate the interaction between the computer and the user 
(Dehn & van Mulken 2000: 2). In a recent survey of the role of interactive online characters in 
educational and commercial applications, Reeves (2002) argued that interactive characters can 
enrich human-media interactions, in particular online experiences, with social intelligence, 
taking advantage of users’ natural social responses to interactive media (cf. Chapter 6.5). He 
identified the following benefits of interactive online characters (Reeves 2002): 
                                              
15  Multimodal user interfaces process combined user inputs from at least two modes (e.g. speech, face, 
gesture, writing, touch, etc.) and produce multimedia outputs that may be delivered by an embodied 
agent (Oviatt 2003: 287). Multimodal interfaces will be reviewed in detail in Chapter 11.2. 
Table 3. The two major components of an embodied agent compared. 
Agent (Program) Character 
• Back-end (functionality) • Front-end (visible interface) 
• Needs to be capable • Needs to be pleasant 
• Needs to have useful skills • Needs to be a good communicator 
• Needs to be adept, efficient, knowledgeable, 
or proficient 
• Needs to evoke an emotional or intuitive 
response, such as to be believable, 
compelling, persuasive, or sincere 
• Needs at least sufficient skills or knowledge • No need to be particularly skilled or 
knowledgeable 
• Performance glitches are not acceptable • Behavioral glitches are not acceptable 
• Must deliver good results • Must deliver a good performance 
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• Characters make explicit the social responses that are inevitable (Reeves & Nass 1998), by 
giving a social performance in interactions with the user that causes him or her to respond 
subconsciously in the same way. 
• Interactive characters are perceived as real social actors, automatically and by default. As a 
result, characters can motivate, persuade, evoke sympathy, and so on (Fogg 2003). 
• Interactivity increases the perceived realism and effectiveness of characters. Interactive 
characters can change their actions and responses, depending on user inputs and needs, in 
real time and as often as needed in the course of an interaction. 
• Interactive characters increase trust in information sources through their social presence (cf. 
Chapter 5.4.5), by making contributions to the interaction that promote trust, by appearing 
and behaving in a way that is consistent with the task, and by enacting relevant social rules. 
• Characters have personalities that can represent brands. Personality makes characters 
predictable and thus comprehensible (cf. Chapter 7.7) and agreeable partners in the 
interaction. It is possible to build characters with personalities that reflect corporate brands. 
• Characters can communicate social roles.16 Through appearance and behavior, they can 
show users who they are and how they will relate to them (as equals, subordinates, or 
superordinates) (cf. Chapter 7.14). 
• Characters can effectively express and regulate emotions. They can use their emotional 
intelligence (cf. Chapter 13.4) to communicate emotions that are appropriate and helpful for 
the current user and task and thus contribute to a positive user experience. 
• Characters can effectively display important social manners. They can make contributions 
to conversations with the user that are polite and culturally sensitive while also relevant, 
accurate, comprehensible, and sufficiently informative. 
                                              
16  A social role is a mutually recognized set of interconnected behaviors, rights, and responsibilities 
with respect to others, which are accepted for, expected of, and perceived in a particular individual in 
a given social status, position, and situation ([INT 36]). 
 
Figure 12. Digital representations in virtual environments may be controlled either by software agents 
or by human users. A representation puppeteered by a human being is called an ‘avatar,’ whereas 
embodied agents are completely program-controlled. The diagram shows this fundamental difference 
between avatars and embodied agents. Adapted from Bailenson and Blascovich (2004, Figure 1). 
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• Characters can make interfaces easier to use. They provide an obvious and known place for 
assistance and information (Wexelblat & Maes 1997), and through their appearance and 
behavior they invite conversational interaction (Laurel 1990b: 359) that may combine 
spoken or written natural language with elements of non-verbal communication (cf. Chapter 
10.1) to mimic features of face-to-face conversation, which humans are well equipped for 
and experienced in. 
• Characters are well liked by most users, not just by particular groups. However, characters 
have to be carefully chosen and designed as some characters are liked more than others. 
3.1.5  Mobility 
Mobility refers to the ability of a software agent to travel from one environment to another 
(Lange & Oshima 1998: 50). Mobile agents (Nwana 1996; Lange & Oshima 1998; Kotz & 
Gray 1999; Lange & Oshima 1999; Eid et al. 2005) visit different places in a computer network 
to accomplish tasks on behalf of their users (e.g. buying or selling goods, managing computers 
and networks, doing research, etc.), which often involves collecting information from remote 
sources and interacting with remote services, and return with the results when the task has been 
completed (Nwana 1996, cf. Figure 13). Migration to another environment occurs when the 
program of a mobile agent decides to end its operation on the current computer and transports 
itself together with the results of its work to a destination computer of its choice in the network, 
where it carries on (Lange & Oshima 1998: 50). 
Mobile agents have a number of advantages. For one, they can process remotely stored raw 
data in its location. As a result, only the results of processing have to be transferred over the 
network. Furthermore, mobile agents can take processing to another machine that has a smaller 
workload than the user’s computer. In addition, they allow asynchronous computing. Users can 
launch mobile agents and ‘forget’ about them until the results come in (Nwana 1996). Further 
advantages of mobile agents are discussed by Nwana (1996) and Lange and Oshima (1998: 
50f.). However, a number of issues need to be addressed in order to create successful mobile 
agents (Wayner 1995; Nwana 1996): 
• Transportation. How is migration to another environment accomplished? 
• Authentication. How can the identity of a mobile agent or its owner be verified? 
• Privacy. How can the user make sure that a mobile agent is careful with his or her personal 
information and that no one else can read the information carried by the agent? 
• Security. How can the user protect himself or herself against computer viruses brought back 
by his or her mobile agent? Or against ‘hijacked’ and ‘turned’ agents? 
• Payment. How are agents going to pay for remote information and services? How can they 
be prevented from spending too much? 
• Performance. How do large numbers of mobile agents at large affect network performance? 
• Interoperability. How can mobile agents locate and access appropriate remote services and 
execution environments? 
Mobility is not a defining characteristic of software agents. Neither does a piece of software 
require mobility to be called an agent nor does the possession of mobility alone justify the label 
‘agent’ (Nwana 1996). In fact, mobile agents are classified as agents mainly because they have 
autonomy (cf. Section 3.1.1) and social ability (cf. Section 3.1.8) rather than mobility (Nwana 
1996). 
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3.1.6  Proactiveness 
Rather than just responding to things happening in their environment, proactive software agents 
are capable of recognizing and seizing opportunities to take action in order to serve the user and 
their own agenda (Jennings et al. 1998: 8). The ability to take the initiative at appropriate points 
is an important aspect of autonomy (Nwana 1996, cf. Section 3.1.1). Proactive agents generate 
their own goals and attempt to achieve them through goal-directed behavior. They observe their 
environment to identify opportunities, and develop and execute plans of action to make use of 
them. 
3.1.7  Responsiveness 
In static environments, computer programs do not have to worry about their success or failure 
as the environmental conditions do not change, so they just execute blindly. In contrast, the 
environments of software agents are often dynamic and unpredictable, especially if they can be 
affected by humans and other agents. As a consequence, agents require the ability to perceive 
their environment and take appropriate action when it changes (Jennings et al. 1998: 8; 
Wooldridge 1999: 32). Responsiveness involves the following considerations: 
• The agent has to determine which changes are relevant to its agenda. 
• The agent may have to respond when only incomplete information is available. 
• The agent has to deliver its responses in time; otherwise they may be useless. 
• The agent must provide for failure. 
3.1.8  Social Ability 
In complex and dynamic environments, software agents often need the help of other agents to 
achieve their goals. Consequently, they require the ability to interact, when appropriate, with 
other artificial and human agents to complete their own tasks and to assist others with theirs 
(Jennings & Wooldridge 1996). 
Social ability is the prerequisite for coordination and cooperation in multi-agent systems, i.e. 
networks of multiple agents working together to solve problems that a single agent cannot solve 
on its own (Sycara 1998: 80, cf. Chapter 14.1.5). The agents in a multi-agent system coordinate 
and cooperate by exchanging messages in a shared formal agent communication language 
(Wooldridge 2002: Chapter 8). 
 
Figure 13. Mobile-agent operation. Adapted from White (1996). The mobile agent is dispatched by the 
user, traverses the network, and interacts with a service on a remote computer to accomplish its task. 
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Interaction with the human user can involve (combinations of) different input and output 
modes: apart from typing on a keyboard or handling a mouse, people may use speech or 
gestures to interact with agents. In response, agents may appear as life-like characters on the 
screen, which convey internal states, messages, and other behavior through appropriate facial 
expressions or body language (cf. Section 3.1.4). 
Social ability in the context of human-agent interaction also includes emotional intelligence 
(cf. Chapter 13.4). Agents with emotional intelligence can identify and interpret the emotions 
displayed by other (human or artificial) agents, communicate contextually and individually 
appropriate emotions, and manage emotions within others and themselves (Picard 2001). 
So far, most interactions between users and intelligent software agents have been short 
encounters, but long-term relationships spanning multiple sessions over weeks and months are 
likely to become more common in the near future. Some examples of tasks that agents could 
carry out in short-term and long-term human-agent interactions are provided in Table 4. Social 
ability helps an agent to build a productive partnership with the user, both in the short run and 
in the long run. Relationship-building skills (cf. Chapter 7.16) are essential for agents that 
interact regularly with the same people over longer periods of time, such as interface agents (cf. 
Section 3.2.5) and pedagogical agents (cf. Chapter 4). 
3.2  Types of Software Agents 
As with their definition, there are multiple ways to classify software agents. One way is to use 
the set of properties discussed in the previous section. Furthermore, one can compare the 
complexity and expertise (cf. Chapter 12) of the agents. Software agents exhibit different levels 
of sophistication, which can be broadly defined as follows (from simplest to most complex) 
(Jennings & Wooldridge 1996; Jennings & Wooldridge 1998b: 18): 
• Gopher agents are equipped with a set of pre-defined rules and assumptions which they 
apply to perform simple tasks. For example, the user could instruct an agent to notify him or 
her when the price of a certain product has dropped below a user-specified threshold, or to 
inform him or her about changes to a particular web site. 
• Service performing agents receive well-defined high-level assignments from users, such as 
“Find me the cheapest plumbing service in London” or “Arrange a date for the final project 
review with the team members in the last week of November.” 
• Predictive/proactive agents are autonomous and flexible, which enables them to offer the 
user information or services unsolicitedly and opportunistically. For example, they can 
monitor the user’s activities and suggest to take over recurring tasks. Or they have learned 
that the user likes a particular thing and inform him or her when they learn something 
interesting about that thing. 
A second way to classify software agents is according to their purpose, function, or role (cf. 
Chapter 16). Software agents can play many types of roles in different applications (Jennings & 
Wooldridge 1998: 18). Some examples include the following (see Jennings and Wooldridge 
(1998b: 10–18) for a discussion of different applications of intelligent agents): 
• Buying/selling. Agents purchase and trade goods and services on behalf of the user, for 
example participating as bidders or sellers in online auctions (cf. Section 3.2.2). 
• Decision support. Agents collect information pertaining to a particular decision situation and 
prepare recommendations for human decision makers. 
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• Digital butler/representative. Agents take calls, respond to e-mails, receive visitors, etc. 
when the user is absent from the physical or virtual environment (Negroponte 1995:  
149–152). 
• Entertainment. Agents serve as allies or opponents in computer games or as interactive 
characters in movies or television (cf. Section 3.2.4). 
• Guides. Agents show users around a new environment, such as a web site that the users visit 
for the first time, and introduce them to its features. 
• Information filtering and gathering. Agents facilitate information management and reduce 
information overload by acquiring and filtering information according to the user’s needs 
and capabilities (cf. Section 3.2.3). 
• Cognitive aid. Agents aid or enhance human processes of remembering, thinking, and 
problem solving. For example, a calendar agent (cf. Section 3.2.5) manages the user’s 
schedule and reminds him or her of important appointments or tasks. Pedagogical software 
agents can provide relevant advice, information, and scaffolding that facilitate learners’ 
retention, transfer, and problem solving (cf. Chapter 12.3). 
• Network management. Agents detect and handle congestions and intrusions, manage user 
privileges, etc. 
Finally, software agents can be classified according to their underlying architecture. The 
following agent architectures will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 14.1: 
• Deliberative agents generate alternative courses of action and choose one of them in order to 
achieve a goal. Deliberation involves manipulating complex representations of both the 
environment and courses of action (plans). 
• Reactive agents do not maintain complex internal representations but map sensor input more 
or less directly to action output. 
• Hybrid agents combine the strengths of the deliberative and the reactive approach in an 
architecture consisting of a hierarchy of interacting software layers. 
• Blackboard agent systems comprise multiple knowledge sources that cooperate via a shared 
global workspace (the blackboard) to solve problems. 
• Multi-agent systems are networks of cooperating agents that together solve problems which 
none of them could solve on its own. 
The following sections review different categories or types of software agents, which have 
been established largely on the basis of the agents’ properties and roles. The agents in each 
category may be of varying sophistication and may employ different architectures. A given 
agent may fit into more than one category; in that case, its actual classification would depend 
on what features or functions are emphasized. 
Table 4. Examples of agents’ tasks in short-term and long-term interactions with users. Adapted from 
Park and Catrambone (2007, Table 1). 
Short-Term Interaction Long-Term Interaction 
• Presenting information 
• Answering single questions 
• Recommending items or activities 
• Helping to carry out simple tasks 
• Giving guided tours 
• Teaching the user complex knowledge or skills 
that require multiple sessions 
• Assisting the user throughout a long-term task 
or program 
• Becoming the user’s companion 
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3.2.1  Conversational Agents 
Conversational agents make use of human language technologies17 to interpret user inputs in 
natural language and to respond with natural language outputs, possibly combined with other 
input and output modes (Sidner 2002; Lester et al. 2004; McTear 2004). The architectures and 
component technologies of different types of conversational agents will be discussed in Chapter 
11.3. 
The purpose of conversational agents is to engage human users in spoken or text-based 
dialogues that are social or task-oriented in nature or mix both elements. Social dialogues 
(Bickmore & Cassell 2005) are conducted to build a relationship with users, to keep them 
occupied and interested while they are doing or waiting for something, and to discreetly pump 
them for more information about themselves. Task-oriented dialogues (Allen et al. 2001a) deal 
with various kinds of routine inquiries in areas such as the following (Lester et al. 2004: 10-2): 
• Customer service. Agents answer routine questions about products and services. 
• Help desk. Agents handle internal routine inquiries and problems of employees. 
• Web site navigation. Agents show visitors to relevant sections of large web sites. 
• Guided selling. Agents answer questions and offer guidance, especially to novice buyers of 
complex products. 
• Technical support. Agents diagnose and solve technical problems interactively with users. 
Conversational agents portrayed as animated anthropomorphic characters (cf. Chapter 9.1) 
can participate in multimodal face-to-face dialogues with users in which ideally both humans 
and agents can use coordinated verbal and non-verbal communicative behaviors (Bickmore & 
Cassell 2005). The non-verbal behaviors (gesture, face, gaze, posture, and locomotion) provide 
redundant or complementary information with respect to speech, and they have regulating 
functions in conversations (Bickmore & Cassell 2005, cf. Chapter 10.1). In social dialogues, 
non-verbal communicative behaviors contribute essential social cues, including attentiveness, 
positive affect, liking, and attraction (Bickmore & Cassell 2005). 
3.2.2  E-Commerce Agents 
Electronic commerce or e-commerce (Hoffmann et al. 1995; Chaffey 2006) uses computers and 
networks (nowadays in particular the Internet) as a platform which enables individuals and 
businesses to purchase, sell, market, and distribute products and services electronically. Either 
two businesses or a business and a consumer may be involved in an e-commerce transaction 
(business-to-business, B2B vs. business-to-consumer, B2C), during which they (automatically) 
exchange data, goods, payment, and services. 
Intelligent software agents for e-commerce are (more or less) autonomous (cf. Section 3.1.1), 
adaptive (cf. Section 3.1.2), mobile (cf. Section 3.1.5), proactive (cf. Section 3.1.6), and 
socially competent (cf. Section 3.1.8). They can facilitate the following aspects of both B2C 
and B2B interactions (Maes et al. 1999; He & Leung 2002; He et al. 2003): 
                                              
17  Human language technologies (HLT) use knowledge about the structure of natural human languages 
and the world in tasks that require ‘intelligent’ processing of these languages, including dictation, 
document processing, human-computer interfaces, intelligent tutoring, and machine translation 
(Jurafsky & Martin 2008). HLT for conversational agents will be discussed in Chapter 11.1. 
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• Need identification (The buyer realizes the existence of an unfulfilled need). Agents can help 
users with routine purchases and make them aware of offerings that suit their preferences or 
habits. 
• Product brokering (The buyer acquires information that helps him or her to choose a 
product). Agents can collect and filter product information given an identified need. Filtering 
techniques include feature-based filtering (matching product features against features on a 
wish list), collaborative filtering (recommending products bought by users with similar 
profiles), and constraint-based filtering (narrowing down the range of products based on 
user-specified constraints). 
• Merchant brokering (The buyer finds the right seller for the product of interest). Agents can 
evaluate alternative vendors based on a comparison involving multiple attributes that may 
include price, delivery time, customer service, warranty, etc., in order to inform the user’s 
decision of where to make the purchase. 
• Negotiation (The buyer negotiates the price and other terms of the deal with the seller). 
Automated negotiations take place between agents representing their respective owners in 
order to work out contracts on the latters’ behalf (Sandholm 1999: 84). The negotiating 
agents are self-interested (i.e. they choose actions with maximum utility for themselves) and 
operate under bounded rationality (i.e. their capacity for problem solving and information 
processing is limited) and incomplete information without centralized control (Jennings et al. 
1998: 22). 
An important consideration in doing business with agents and letting them do business on 
one’s behalf is the building and maintaining of trust (Grandison & Sloman 2000; Patrick 2002). 
The New Oxford Dictionary of English defines trust as “the firm belief in the reliability, truth, 
ability, or strength of someone or something” (OED 1998: 1988). Trust is an interpersonal 
concept (Wexelblat & Maes 1997), “the condition in which one exhibits behavior that makes 
one vulnerable to someone else, not under one’s control” (Zand 1972, quoted in Patrick 2002: 
47). Trusting a software agent means that to a certain extent, users have to relinquish direct 
control and rely on the agent to perform its functions as expected when it carries out tasks on 
their behalf, thus rendering themselves vulnerable to any legal, monetary, or social risks 
associated with the agent’s failure (Patrick 2002: 47).18 The decision to trust an agent with 
buying, selling, or some other task inevitably involves balancing risk and trust: it has to be 
made by the user with regard to both the trust he or she puts in the agent’s competence (and 
loyalty) and the costs of the agent’s potential failure, which depend on the domain of interest. 
                                              
18  Users’ feeling of being at the mercy of an autonomous computer program may become even stronger 
when they realize that unlike people, computers are not moral agents, which means that they are 
unable to take responsibility, make amends, or accept punishment for their actions, even if they harm 
people in some way (Fogg 2003: 218). The problem with software agents is that people have to trust 
entities that can act autonomously without being able to face the consequences if they do something 
unethical or illegal (p. 218). In addition, anthropomorphic embodied agents (cf. Section 3.1.4) could, 
in principle, be made believable (human-like) to a degree that would enable them to successfully 
mislead users both with respect to their own status and in commercial transactions (Heckman & 
Wobbrock 2000). If (and how) developers or owners can be held responsible and liable for the deeds 
of a software product with human-like appearance and behavior and/or capable of making decisions 
by itself is still an unresolved issue. 
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Trust is not an instant relationship but needs to be given time to develop between users and 
the agents carrying out tasks on their behalf (Jennings & Wooldridge 1998b: 10). A given agent 
can facilitate the process of trust building by showing: 
• Believable behaviors (cf. Section 3.1.3), in particular rituals involved in conversation, such 
as greetings, small talk, and farewells (Cassell & Bickmore 2000); 
• Predictable behaviors (Lewis 1998: 73f.; Heckman & Wobbrock 2000): 
• The agent exhibits consistency of behavior in response to input (cf. Chapter 7.5). 
• The agent’s behavior is comprehensible in terms of its underlying causes and rules (cf. 
Chapter 7.7). 
• The user understands the agent’s function, competencies, and dependability. 
While trying to win the user’s trust, the agent has to walk a tight-rope between seeking too 
much and too little guidance from the user, i.e. between needlessly annoying the user and over-
confidently overstepping its bounds (Jennings & Wooldridge 1998b: 10). In general, agents 
have to know both their capabilities and limitations, as well as communicate them to the user 
(Jennings & Wooldridge 1998b: 10; Heckman & Wobbrock 2000). 
3.2.3  Information Agents 
An ever-increasing volume and diversity of information can be stored, distributed, and linked 
using today’s computers and computer networks (in particular the Internet and its most widely 
used service, the World Wide Web). Given their limited resources, people cannot keep up with 
this development, which results in the experience of feeling lost (not finding anything) in the 
vast network of information or of being overwhelmed by an excess of information (information 
overload;19 Edmunds & Morris 2000; Eppler & Mengis 2004). Information agents are designed 
to help humans to process information by facilitating information management and reducing 
information overload (Nwana 1996). They are equipped with the ability to access distributed 
and heterogeneous information sources (e.g. legacy databases, the World Wide Web, or other 
information agents) and to acquire, collate, and manipulate information on behalf of the user or 
other agents, preferably just in time (Jennings & Wooldridge 1996; Nwana 1996; Sycara et al. 
1996, cf. Figure 14). Information agents possess attributes including autonomy, adaptiveness, 
mobility, proactiveness, and social ability to varying degrees (Nwana 1996). 
Information agents maintain representations of available information sources. In addition, 
they possess strategies to select and access these sources, handle conflicts and inconsistencies, 
and integrate different pieces of information (Nwana 1996; Sycara et al. 1996). An information 
agent takes action either in response to queries formulated by users or other agents or when it 
detects certain patterns while monitoring a set of information sources (Sycara et al. 1996). 
Information agents can perform both information filtering, allowing only relevant information 
to reach the user, and information gathering, proactively searching information sources and 
fetching relevant information on the user’s behalf (Jennings & Wooldridge 1996; Sycara et al. 
1996; Jennings et al. 1998). 
Much information is still stored as natural language text in documents, which is more 
accessible to humans than to machines. As a consequence, information agents require effective 
                                              
19  The term first appeared in a book by the sociologist and futurologist Alvin Toffler (1970). 
60 Chapter 3: Software Agents 
ways to process the content (rather than the form) of text documents. These content-based 
document processing techniques include the following: 
• Information retrieval finds and retrieves documents to satisfy user queries for information 
(Baeza-Yates & Ribeiro-Neto 1999; Tzoukermann et al. 2003; Grossman & Frieder 2004). 
• Information extraction identifies and extracts selected types of entities, relations, or events in 
documents (Cowie & Wilks 2000; Grishman 2003; Cunningham 2006; Sarawagi 2008). 
• Question answering finds answers to users’ questions in a large collection of online 
documents (Harabagiu & Moldovan 2003; Maybury 2004). 
• Automatic summarization condenses the contents of one or more documents in such a way 
that the resulting document is much shorter while preserving the important information of 
the original document(s) (Mani 2001; Hovy 2003; Das & Martins 2007). 
In e-learning (cf. Chapter 2), information agents can serve as an adaptive and interactive 
research tool that provides a uniform interface to the various resources (text, graphics, 
animation, audio and video elements) of a web-based learning environment. These virtual 
librarians (Stephenson 1993: 99–103) use both local resources and others they find in external 
sources, such as the World Wide Web, to retrieve relevant documents, extract information of 
interest, provide concise responses to learners’ questions, and create summaries of extensive 
resources, all in response to content-based (rather than keyword-based) queries for information. 
3.2.4  Game Agents 
For a long time, development of computer games has focused on improving the quality of game 
graphics. However, with computer graphics approaching the level of photorealism, less and less 
innovation can be expected from that aspect of computer games. Therefore, in recent years, 
 
Figure 14. Agent-based information management on the Internet. Adapted from Jennings and 
Wooldridge (1996, Figure 1). 
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voices have multiplied which argue that artificial intelligence (AI)20 will be an essential 
ingredient of quality computer games in the future (Laird & van Lent 2000; Laird 2001; Laird 
& van Lent 2001; Isla & Blumberg 2002; Mateas 2003; Narayek 2004). 
The primary role of AI in computer games is seen in providing intelligence for non-player 
characters (NPCs), including friends, foes, guides, mentors, traders, and other entities,21 which 
have different goals, knowledge, and capabilities (Laird & van Lent 2001: 16; Narayek 2004: 
60). Humanoid NPCs should be endowed with similar strengths (and limitations) as the human 
player, in terms of accuracy, creativity, flexibility, perception, and skill (Laird & van Lent 
2001: 22). They should also be virtual individuals that players enjoy interacting with, so they 
need an appropriate physical appearance, communicative capabilities, social graces, and so on 
(Narayek 2004: 60). In other words, the goal of designing entities with artificial intelligence for 
games is not necessarily to produce a ‘perfect’ NPC but one that is as believable and enjoyable 
for players as possible (Narayek 2004: 60). Detailed requirements for different AI roles in 
computer games are shown in Table 5. 
3.2.5  Interface Agents 
Interface agents (Laurel 1990b; Maes 1994; Negroponte 1995: Chapter 12; Shneiderman & 
Maes 1997; Wexelblat & Maes 1997; Dehn & van Mulken 2000; Middleton 2001) are digital 
personal assistants designed to facilitate human-computer interaction by cooperating with the 
user to accomplish tasks in a computer-based environment (Nwana 1996). Unlike other kinds of 
intelligent user interfaces, interface agents are autonomous (cf. Section 3.1.1), adaptive (cf. 
Section 3.1.2), proactive (cf. Section 3.1.6) (Nwana 1996), and have social ability (cf. Section 
3.1.8). They determine users’ habits, interests, and preferences and are authorized to act on their 
behalf to perform (often mundane, tedious, or repetitive) tasks that have been delegated to them 
(e.g. scheduling meetings, filtering e-mails, booking flights, etc.) (Maes 1994; Nwana 1996). 
Interface agents thus change the nature of users’ interaction with computers from direct 
manipulation to indirect management (Kay 1990) and from user control to cooperation of users 
and agents in which both monitor the environment, engage in activities, and take the initiative 
in communication (Maes 1994: 31). This paradigm shift in human-computer interaction is 
hypothesized to suit novice and non-expert users in particular because they can benefit from the 
proactive assistance provided by software agents to help them to accomplish large and/or 
complex tasks (Nwana 1996). In addition, embodied interface agents with the ability to perform 
(and interpret) verbal and non-verbal communicative behaviors are expected to increase the 
naturalness of human-agent interaction (cf. Section 3.1.4). 
This optimistic view of the potential of interface agents is not shared by everyone, though. In 
fact, interface agents have a number of outspoken critics, who argue that humanizing the 
interface through (embodied) agent assistants might actually impair, rather than benefit, human-
computer interaction because (Shneiderman 1995; Lanier 1995; Erickson 1997; Norman 1997; 
Shneiderman 1997; Shneiderman & Maes 1997): 
                                              
20  Artificial intelligence (AI) aims to give computers and other devices the ability to perform tasks that 
people accomplish by applying their intelligence, such as chess playing, tutoring, medical diagnosis, 
natural language understanding, and face recognition (Cawsey 1998; Russell & Norvig 2003; Luger 
2005). The acquisition, representation, and use of knowledge has been a major concern in the field of 
AI throughout its history (cf. Chapter 12.1). 
21  Common social roles of non-player game characters are discussed by Isbister (2006: 229–250). 
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• It causes users to form incorrect mental models of an agent (cf. Chapter 6.3). As a result, by 
way of overgeneralization from existing human-like qualities of the agent, users may come 
to think that the agent possesses attributes and capabilities which it actually does not have 
(Norman 1997). 
• Many tasks in human-computer interaction (e.g. writing a letter or preparing a spreadsheet) 
can be accomplished more efficiently without social interaction with interface agents (cf. 
Section 3.1.8) because social interaction is not necessary for these tasks (Prendinger & 
Ishizuka 2004b: 6, cf. Chapter 8.3). 
• People like feeling in control of the artifacts with which they interact (Shneiderman 1995; 
Norman 1997; Shneiderman 1997). This preference is not immediately compatible with the 
Table 5. Roles of non-player characters with artificial intelligence and their requirements. Compiled 
from Laird and van Lent (2001: 21–24). 
Role Requirements 
Tactical Enemies • Autonomy 
• Reactive behavior, integrated planning, and commonsense reasoning for 
interacting with complex and dynamic environments 
• Models of high-level vision with human-like abilities and limitations 
• Navigation, including path planning, spatial and temporal reasoning 
• Ability to plan, counter-plan, and adapt to enemies’ strategies and tactics 
• Movement and reaction times similar to humans 
Partners • Cooperation and coordination with the human player, possibly using 
(spoken) natural language and gestures 
• Understanding of teamwork 
• Modeling the goals and adapting to the style of the human partner 
Support Characters • Portrayal of a supporting human role in the game environment 
• Ability to interact with and adapt to the environment, human players, and 
other support characters 
• Human-like realistic movement, personality, emotions, natural language 
understanding and generation 
Strategic Opponents • Low predictability 
• Ability to generate a cohesive high-level strategy (requires integrated 
planning, commonsense reasoning, spatial reasoning, plan recognition,  
and counter-planning) 
• Resource allocation (requires scheduling and temporal reasoning) 
• Playing with realistic reaction times and movements 
Units (teams, 
armies, etc.) 
• (Semi-) Autonomy 
• Path planning and path following 
• Commonsense reasoning 
• Coordination with other units 
Commentators • Ability to describe the ongoing game event in natural language 
• Plan recognition to uncover the strategy and tactics of teams and players 
• Deep knowledge of the game 
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need to relinquish control to an autonomous agent and to trust the agent that it will perform 
the task to the user’s satisfaction.22 
• Users have a preference for predictable systems (Shneiderman 1997). However, agents have 
some properties (in particular autonomy and proactiveness, cf. Section 3.1.1 and Section 
3.1.6) that can make their behavior unpredictable. 
• Adding an (eye-catching) object to an interface, in particular if it keeps unduly drawing 
attention to itself, e.g. by performing behaviors that are not related to the current task, may 
introduce a source of distraction for users (Walker et al. 1994), increasing their extraneous 
cognitive load and consequently impairing their performance (Paas et al. 2003; Sweller 
2005a; Clark et al. 2006, cf. Chapter 2.2.2). 
• Humanizing the interface can lead to dangerous dependency relationships with machines. 
Lanier argued that the use of intelligent software agents would cause people to “redefine 
themselves into lesser beings,” by making themselves ‘dumb’ in order to make the agent 
appear ‘smart’ (Lanier 1995: 67f.). 
These are valid concerns which need to be considered in the design of interface agents. They 
imply that interface agents should make their capabilities and limitations transparent to the user 
(cf. Section 3.2.2); engage in social interaction with the user only when the task requires it; 
make sure that they do not take control of the interaction and the task from users against their 
will (Wexelblat & Maes 1997); win the user’s trust by performing predictably and reliably (cf. 
Section 3.2.2); refrain from distracting the user with idle, irrelevant behaviors (cf. Chapter 
10.2); and adopt a subservient rather than dominant role in the relationship with the user. Table 
6 lists challenges that have to be addressed in order to achieve successful cooperation between 
agents and users. 
The architecture of an interface agent is shown in Figure 15. Interface agents interact with 
their employer (the user), applications (on behalf of the user), and other agents. As indicated 
above, adaptiveness is an important capability of interface agents, which helps them to improve 
their services for particular users over time. The different options for agents to learn that are 
illustrated in Figure 15 were already discussed in Section 3.1.2. To interact with users, interface 
agents can use different input and output modes, alone or in combination. When they deal with 
other agents, formal agent communication languages are used (cf. Section 3.1.8). Internal states 
and messages can be conveyed by a life-like animated character. For example, Peedy the Parrot 
(Ball et al. 1997) is an embodied interface agent that combines spoken language understanding 
(cf. Section 11.3.3.1), dialogue management (cf. Chapter 11.3.3.2), 3D animation (cf. Chapter 
9.4), synthetic speech output (cf. Chapter 10.1.1 and Chapter 11.1.2), and sound effects in a 
conversational assistant with human-like attributes and behaviors (while portrayed as a green 
parrot), which can interact with the user in task-oriented spoken dialogues (cf. Section 3.2.1). 
                                              
22  Schiaffino and Amandi found that users are distrustful of completely autonomous interface agents. 
The vast majority of users prefer to remain in control of their computer system and would rather not 
have an agent autonomously execute actions without their knowledge and consent, although they do 
not seem to be adverse to the idea of having a personal agent assistant in principle (Schiaffino & 
Amandi 2004: 135ff.). 
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3.3  Embodied Interactive Software Agents 
Embodied interactive software agents are complex software systems equipped with a digital 
embodiment (cf. Section 3.1.4) and the ability to make use of this embodiment to communicate 
verbally and non-verbally with the user and to perform bodily actions in the environment in 
which they are embedded. To accomplish their tasks, these agents interact with users, other 
agents, objects, and events in their environment as well as with software applications and 
database systems that provide necessary information and services. Interaction involves sensing 
the environment and acting on it (which includes the performance and interpretation of bodily 
actions) to communicate with the user or with other agents or to proactively participate in the 
environment, both in pursuit of a user- or a self-assigned agenda. 
The general architecture of an embodied interactive agent is shown in Figure 16. It consists 
of a pipeline of five processing steps that accepts communicative events and other sensory 
percepts as input and produces communicative and other actions as output. The peripheral steps 
deal with the recognition of sensor inputs and the synthesis of action outputs, respectively, 
while the internal stages are concerned with interpretation, internal processing, and behavior 
generation. The architecture also enables the agent to bypass the internal processing stages in 
                                              
23  McFarlane (1999) argued that users are sensitive to interruptions from computer-based systems, 
including intelligent software agents, due to their limited cognitive abilities. He identified four ways 
to time interruptions: (1) immediate (the agent interrupts the user whenever it sees the need, requiring 
him or her to attend to the matter at once); (2) negotiated (the agent lets the user know that his or her 
attention is needed and negotiates the time of dealing with the interruption with the user); 
(3) mediated (the agent informs a mediator about its need to interact with the user, and the mediator 
decides when and how the agent may interrupt the user); (4) scheduled (the agent’s interruptions are 
timed according to a pre-defined schedule, for example once per hour) (McFarlane 1999). Bickmore 
et al. (2008) found evidence for the superiority of a fifth method, empathic interruptions, in which the 
agent apologizes for the interruption, asks about the user’s emotional state, and expresses empathy. 
In general, knowing when and how to interrupt the user is critical for agents’ success: a high level of 
perceived intrusiveness of an agent has been shown to lead to user frustration and the agent’s early 
unemployment (Serenko 2006). 
Table 6. Challenges involved in the interaction between users and interface agents (Middleton 2001). 
Knowing the user • Identifying user goals through observation and feedback 
• Placing user goals in context 
• Adapting to changing user goals 
• Minimizing initial training time and effort 
Interacting with the user • Deciding on the agent’s degree of control over tasks 
• Developing the user’s trust in the agent 
• Finding a suitable metaphor for agent-based interfaces 
• Making agent-based interfaces easy to use for novices 
Competence in helping  
the user 
• Timing interruptions of the user appropriately23 
• Accomplishing tasks autonomously to the user’s satisfaction 
• Determining how to (partially) automate tasks 
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order to produce immediate (hardwired) reactions to environmental stimuli (Cassell et al. 
2000b: 43). The processing steps draw on several knowledge sources and maintain different 
kinds of models. The elements of the architecture (processing stages, knowledge sources, 
models, and back-end systems) are briefly described below: 
Processing Stages 
• The sensory module integrates technologies that enable the agent to perceive its environment 
and to accept user inputs. Examples include technologies for speech recognition; face and 
gesture recognition and tracking; monitoring objects, events, movement, etc.; and handling 
keyboard and mouse actions. 
• The interpreter fuses (combines) all percepts into a coherent and consistent interpretation of 
the incoming communication, events, and information about the state of the environment (cf. 
Chapter 11.2). 
• Internal processing includes dialogue management, decision making, interaction with 
external applications and databases, etc. 
• Behavior generation assembles action sequences consisting of speech, gesture, movement, 
etc. that, if carried out, achieve communicative or task-related goals. 
• The character player is concerned with the rendering of animations and the synthesis of 
speech. In particular, it delivers the animations and verbal utterances of the agent persona. 
• Hardwired reactions include instant behavioral responses of the agent to incoming stimuli, 
which are produced without passing the input through the internal processing stages (Cassell 
et al. 2000b: 43). 
Knowledge Sources 
• Pattern databases for speech; faces and facial expressions; gaze patterns; different kinds of 
gestures, body postures, and locomotion; object shapes; etc. are required for the low-level 
processing (detection, tracking, and recognition) of these different types of input. 
• Domain knowledge is knowledge about the agent’s area of expertise. 
• Linguistic knowledge comprises knowledge about language understanding and generation 
(grammars, lexicons, etc.). 
• Communicative knowledge includes knowledge about how to participate effectively in face-
to-face conversations, including initiation and termination, turn-taking, and feedback. 
• Affective knowledge enables the agent to interpret, express, and communicate or simulate 
emotions, moods, personality, etc. 
 
Figure 15. The architecture of an interface agent. Adapted from Nwana (1996, Figure 4). 
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• Sociocultural knowledge includes aspects of the target culture, such as traditions, gender 
roles, display rules, etc. 
• An animation library provides data and/or procedures at varying levels of complexity for 
creating animations. 
Models 
• The agent’s emotion model is a representation of its own simulated or communicated 
emotional state, i.e. how the agent ‘feels.’ 
• The personality model represents the combination of long-term psychological traits that 
distinguishes the agent from other individuals but also makes it predictable to some extent. 
• The dialogue model is a continuously updated model of the ongoing conversation between 
the agent and the user (or another agent). 
• The user model captures the agent’s evolving view of various characteristics of the user (e.g. 
goals, knowledge, and preferences). 
• The environment model is a continuously updated representation of users, agents, objects, 
and events in the environment. 
• The task model is a continuously updated record of the current task, including its history, 
current state, and next steps. 
 
Figure 16. The architecture of an embodied interactive software agent. 
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Back-End Systems 
• Applications include software systems that provide specific functionality and services which 
help the agent to carry out its tasks. 
• Database systems provide facilities for storing, accessing, and manipulating large quantities 
of data in an efficient and organized way. 
The architecture in Figure 16 presents a big-picture view of the components that have to be 
developed for embodied interactive software agents. How they can be effectively designed for 
embodied interactive pedagogical agents will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9 to Chapter 14. 
3.4  Summary 
This chapter introduced the concept of software agents, discussed their properties, and reviewed 
different types of software agents. Intelligent software agents were defined as software systems 
that are situated in a computer-based environment and have the capacity for autonomous, 
flexible, and goal-directed interaction with this environment. They can detect relevant states of 
their environment and affect it through their actions. Autonomous software agents follow their 
own agendas to achieve desired results, for themselves or in the service of a human user. The 
following properties of intelligent software agents were discussed in Section 3.1: 
• Autonomy. The ability to continually act independently of direct user control; 
• Adaptiveness. The ability to acquire, change, and improve behaviors; 
• Believability. The ability to create the illusion of life; 
• Embodiment. The ability to interact through a digital representation; 
• Mobility. The ability to migrate from one environment to another; 
• Proactiveness. The ability to recognize and seize opportunities for action; 
• Responsiveness. The ability to respond to changes perceived in the environment; 
• Social ability. The ability to interact with human users and other software agents. 
Software agents have been developed for different applications and roles. In Section 3.2, 
several types of software agents were described: conversational agents (cf. Section 3.2.1), 
e-commerce agents (cf. Section 3.2.2), information agents (cf. Section 3.2.3), game agents (cf. 
Section 3.2.4), and interface agents (cf. Section 3.2.5). 
The third section of the chapter discussed embodied interactive software agents in some 
detail, characterizing them as complex entities that interact (through bodily actions) with users, 
other agents, objects, events, software applications, and database systems in their environment 
in order to accomplish their tasks. A general architecture of an embodied interactive agent was 
presented in Figure 16. The components of this architecture, including processing stages, 
knowledge sources, models, and back-end systems, were also described in Section 3.3. 
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4  Pedagogical Agents 
Pedagogical agents are embodied24 interactive software agents embedded in interactive learning 
environments that work with students to facilitate their learning. These agents can promote 
effective and efficient learning by providing the individual learner, groups of learners, and/or 
other agents with contextualized, qualified, personalized, and timely assistance, cooperation, 
instruction, motivation, and services. Pedagogical agents are based on previous research and 
development in the fields of intelligent tutoring systems (Johnson 1998, cf. Chapter 2.3.3), 
software agents (cf. Chapter 3), and animated characters (Thomas & Johnston 1984; Bates 
1992; Elliott & Brzezinksi 1998; Prendinger & Ishizuka 2004a; Isbister 2006). 
Appropriately designed pedagogical agents are equally suitable for supporting the learning 
of both abstract subject matters (e.g. foreign languages, history, or physics) and physical, 
procedural tasks, like those that have to be performed to operate and maintain complex 
machinery (Rickel & Johnson 2000; Johnson et al. 2000; Lester et al. 2001). Figure 17 shows 
representative examples of animated pedagogical agents that have been developed in recent 
years. More information about these agents can be found in the references cited. While still a 
fairly young field of research, a number of surveys of pedagogical agents have already been 
published (Johnson 1998; Johnson et al. 2000; Johnson et al. 2001; Person & Graesser 2003a). 
The first section of this chapter25 provides an overview of the capabilities of pedagogical 
agents and shows how they can use these capabilities to assist human learners. The second 
section is concerned with the requirements which pedagogical agents with the previously 
discussed capabilities have to meet. The chapter concludes with a summary in Section 4.3. 
4.1  Capabilities of Pedagogical Agents 
Pedagogical agents enrich the learning experience with their capacity to act (Lachman 1997: 
32), to perform a wide range of instructional interactions (cf. Chapter 12.3) in order to promote 
learning (Johnson 1998). They add elements of human face-to-face instructional conversations 
to computer-based learning environments, helping learners with their knowledge of the subject 
matter, instructional strategies, and available resources for learning, and conveying enthusiasm 
for the subject matter and empathy for the learner by communicating thoughts and emotions 
(Johnson 2003: 78).26 Personifying the interface to the learning environment, they exploit the 
natural human tendency to respond socially to computers (Reeves & Nass 1998; Shaw et al. 
2004, cf. Chapter 6.5).27 Furthermore, Prendinger and Ishizuka argued that character-based 
                                              
24  There are, of course, pedagogical agent roles which do not require an embodiment. An example 
would be an agent in an administrative role, which usually works behind the scenes and does not 
have to interact ‘face-to-face’ with learners (cf. Chapter 12.3.14). 
25  Substantial parts of the following discussion were previously published in Franke (2006). 
26  Kim et al. reported that pedagogical agents as learning companions (PALs) which showed empathy 
in response to learners’ emotional state led the latter to demonstrate more interest and self-efficacy in 
tasks than learners working with a PAL that did not respond to their expressed emotions (Kim 2005; 
Kim et al. 2007). 
27  Nass and Sundar (1994) listed four cues which induce automatic social responses in people: (a) use 
of language; (b) interactivity; (c) playing roles traditionally filled by people; (d) voice. These cues 
will be discussed in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
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interfaces, including pedagogical agents, can take advantage of users’ previous knowledge 
about how to participate in face-to-face interactions with other humans: 
 [T]he power of character-based [interfaces] derives from the fact that people know how to 
interact with other people by using the modalities of their body (voice, gesture, gaze, etc.) and 
interpret the bodily signals of their interlocutors. Hence, character-based interfaces aim at 
realizing embodied interaction and intelligence (…) rather than interaction with ‘invisible’ 
devices ... (Prendinger & Ishizuka 2004b: 6). 
Human instructors naturally make use of their bodies to support their teaching activities. 
Learners, in turn, benefit from the rich sensory experience of interacting with the instructor (and 
also with their fellow learners) through the means and mechanisms provided by their bodies, 
including gestures, facial expressions, voice quality, gaze, posture, and locomotion (cf. Chapter 
10.1) apart from the actual instructional messages and behaviors. A significant drawback of 
current online courses (cf. Chapter 2.4.2.2) is the participants’ lack of access to bodily features 
and behaviors of other participants (Woodill 2004). Embodied pedagogical agents can be 
designed to address this deficiency by engaging in bodily (inter-) actions in a way that benefits 
information and communication processes in learning environments (Gulz 2004). 
Pedagogical agents combine capabilities that enable them to serve important instructional, 
communicative, and motivational functions for learners: 
• Monitoring. Embedded in learning environments, pedagogical agents can monitor learners’ 
actions and intervene with appropriate, contextualized problem-solving assistance when 
needed (Lester et al. 1997b). 
• Flexibility. A pedagogical agent has the ability to tune its behavior to changes in the learner 
and the learning environment (Johnson 1998). It evaluates the learner’s progress and seizes 
opportunities for instruction which occur in the course of the learner’s activities (Johnson 
1998; Johnson et al. 2000). 
• Explanation. Pedagogical agents can give each learner contextualized and customized 
explanations of concepts and procedures, on demand or when they perceive that the learner 
requires assistance (Johnson et al. 2000). 
• Demonstration. People often find learning a new task easier when they can watch an expert 
do it first (Isbister 2006: 146). According to social learning theory (Bandura 1977), human 
learning is facilitated in social contexts that allow people to watch and learn from each other, 
including their errors and achievements (Isbister 2006: 148). Embodied agents have the 
ability to demonstrate to learners how to solve problems and perform tasks by carrying out 
physical actions in the environment, which may be combined with explanations of what the 
agent is doing, and why (Johnson 1998; Johnson et al. 2000). 
• Dialogue. Embodied interactive pedagogical agents (cf. Chapter 3.3) can engage learners in 
a multimodal dialogue (Johnson 1998) that involves the coordinated use of interdependent 
verbal and non-verbal communicative behaviors (speech, facial displays, gaze, gestures, 
postures, and locomotion, cf. Chapter 10.1) by both parties. This emulation of human face-
to-face interaction provides a digital equivalent to the socially interactive aspects of face-to-
face learning environments (Dowling 2000; Gulz 2004). 
• Individual and team support. Pedagogical agents can serve both individual learners and 
teams of learners, by tutoring team members on their roles and filling in for missing team 
members (Rickel & Johnson 2003). 
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• Motivation. Pedagogical agents with emotional intelligence (cf. Chapter 13.4) can encourage 
learners by demonstrating a genuine interest in them and their progress, take action if they 
sense learner frustration, show enthusiasm for the content, and increase learners’ enjoyment 
(Elliott et al. 1999; Gulz 2004). 
 
Figure 17a. Adele is a web-based pedagogical 
agent that acts as a tutor and guide for learners 
engaged in problem solving in the fields of 
medicine and dentistry (Shaw et al. 1999; Johnson 
et al. 2003a). Screenshot from Johnson et al. 
(2000: 50, Figure 2). 
Figure 17b. Steve is an animated tutor agent that 
interacts with students in a virtual reality training 
environment to help them to learn how to perform 
operation and maintenance tasks (Rickel & 
Johnson 2000). Screenshot from Johnson et al. 
(2000: 49, Figure 1). 
Figure 17c. Inhabiting a virtual environment of 
networks and routers, Cosmo plays the role of a 
coach advising learners in their decisions about 
how to route packages of data through the 
simulated network. Cosmo explains both subject 
matter and problem-solving actions to the learner 
(Lester et al. 2001). Screenshot from Johnson et al. 
(2000: 51, Figure 4). 
Figure 17d. AutoTutor is an intelligent web-based 
tutor that provides an animated conversation 
partner which engages the learner in a tutorial 
dialogue. Versions of AutoTutor have been 
developed for the domains of computer literacy 
and physics (Graesser et al. 2001; Graesser et al. 
2005). Screenshot from Graesser et al. (2001: 40, 
Figure 1). 
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4.2  Requirements of Pedagogical Agents 
Since pedagogical agents are software agents, they must satisfy many requirements of the latter 
(Johnson 1998). They have to be able to perceive their environment in order to detect the need 
for intervention or opportunities for learning. Furthermore, they have to decide intelligently and 
independently on the actions to take either proactively (e.g. to prevent the learner from making 
a mistake) or in response to a multitude of environmental stimuli (e.g. a learner question). Their 
behavior has to be coordinated with the behavior of other (human and computer) agents 
(Johnson et al. 2000), which is particularly important for cooperative and team learning (Rickel 
& Johnson 2003). In addition, pedagogical agents must be able to adapt and improve over time 
through learning (cf. Chapter 3.1.2). Pedagogical agents also require flexibility in processing 
and behavior to deal appropriately with unforeseen situations and learner actions. 
Furthermore, the instructional role of a pedagogical agent may involve the need to engage in 
face-to-face interactions (Cassell 2000a) with learners (and possibly other virtual actors, cf. 
Chapter 16). This is only possible if the agent has a body with the necessary communicative 
capabilities. Pedagogical agents designed as embodied interactive software agents have to 
integrate graphical and audio interface components into a digital representation (cf. Chapter 9) 
that possesses at least some aspects of the appearance and behavioral repertoire of a human 
body and enables the agent to perform bodily actions in its dealings with the learner and the 
environment (cf. Chapter 3.1.4). Embodied conversational pedagogical agents should be able to 
participate in instructional dialogues with the learner in which they interpret and produce 
coordinated verbal and non-verbal communicative behaviors (cf. Chapter 10.1 and Chapter 11). 
Over and above the general and communicative requirements on pedagogical agents, their 
mission to facilitate human learning necessitates further characteristics which may not be found 
in other agents: 
• Believability. Through appearance and behaviors, a pedagogical agent should encourage its 
perception by learners as a sentient being (cf. Chapter 3.1.3). In particular, Baylor and Ryu 
(2003) suggested that the key features contributing to a pedagogical agent persona include its 
tendency to be: 
• Engaging. Interactions with the agent should be fun and hold the learner’s interest.28 
• Person-like. The agent should communicate emotions and a personality. 
• Credible. The learner should develop confidence in the agent as a trustworthy (cf. Chapter 
3.2.2), competent (cf. Chapter 12), and behaviorally consistent (cf. Chapter 7.5) partner.29 
                                              
28  The engagingness of educational software or pedagogical agents can be assessed in terms of learners’ 
experiences and attitudes, including their enjoyment of and perceived involvement in the interaction, 
as well as by looking at related measures of learner behavior, such as time spent in the environment, 
observed degree of activity, and willingness to use the program or agent again (Gulz & Haake 2006: 
323). Gulz and Haake summarized the relationship between attitudinal and behavioral measures as 
follows: “If a program is found engaging – that is experienced as involving, interesting or having 
impact – it is likely that users will become more active, stay on longer, and produce more. 
Engagingness in this sense is not to be equated with entertainment” (p. 323, their emphasis). 
Bickmore et al. (2005) called for making agents “continually engaging to use” in order to encourage 
their regular and sustained use. 
29  Credibility is not an inherent quality of people, objects, or information but arises as the result of a 
subjective evaluation of these entities (Fogg 2003: 122). However, according to Fogg, perceived 
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• Instructor-like. The agent should model behaviors of an instructor or mentor (cf. Chapter 
12.3) and stay in character during the interaction. 
• Deictic believability. Giving advice, explanations, or demonstrations requires pedagogical 
agents to make natural and unambiguous reference to objects in the learning environment 
using combinations of (spoken) language, gestures, and locomotion (Lester et al. 1999b; 
Lester et al. 2000: 124). For this purpose, they have to keep track of the locations of objects 
in their environment, their own position relative to these objects, and their own previous 
explanations (Lester et al. 2000: 124). 
• Explanation generation. Explanations delivered by pedagogical agents have to be situated in 
the current problem-solving context (Lester et al. 1997a; Lester et al. 2000: 126f.). That is, 
they should communicate advice or domain knowledge using combinations of media and 
agent behaviors (speech, gesture, and locomotion) that are appropriate for the current task 
and situation (Lester et al. 1997a; Lester et al. 2000: 127). 
• Knowledge acquisition, representation, and use. Pedagogical agents require substantial 
knowledge about the domain of instruction (Johnson 1998). This knowledge has to be 
acquired from different sources, manually by human knowledge engineers or automatically 
using machine learning techniques (cf. Chapter 12.1.1). The acquired knowledge then has to 
be formalized in some kind of knowledge representation (cf. Chapter 12.1.2) which provides 
sufficient flexibility and depth to support the agent’s instructional interactions and facilitates 
processes of acquisition and authoring (Johnson 1998). The agent applies its knowledge 
representation to solve problems related to the domain of instruction, the interaction with the 
learner, and its own persona. This involves setting (instructional) goals, defining problems to 
be solved (by the agent and/or the learner) that arise from these goals, finding satisfactory 
solutions to these problems, and finally using the generated solutions to demonstrate the 
sequence of problem-solving steps, to coach the learner while he or she is working on a 
problem (cf. Chapter 2.2.3), or to solve a problem together with the learner (Russell & 
Norvig 2003: 60f., cf. Chapter 12.1.3). 
• Mixed-initiative interaction. Agent-learner interactions can be initiated and controlled by the 
agent, the learner, or both. The first two options are too restrictive and too unpredictable, 
respectively. However, the third, mixed-initiative approach allows the initiative to shift 
frequently in agent-learner interactions, which gives the learner the opportunity to engage in 
active problem solving while the agent can still intervene where appropriate (Lester et al. 
1997a; Lester et al. 1999a, cf. Chapter 11.3.3.2.1). In general, pedagogical agents should not 
deprive learners of their sense of control over their actions. Learners might not take the 
feeling of lack or loss of control too well; furthermore, active learning, where learners are 
active participators in the learning process (cf. Chapter 2.2.2 and Chapter 2.2.3), is unlikely 
to take place if the learner’s role is reduced to the one of a passive recipient. 
• Instructional expertise. A pedagogical agent in a teaching or tutoring role requires the ability 
to present content, to solve problems on its own and explain solutions and problem-solving 
steps, to diagnose learner behaviors and mistakes, to assess the learner’s understanding of 
the topic, to adapt subject matters and teaching methods to the learner, and to communicate 
effectively with the learner (cf. Chapter 2.3.3). 
                                                                                                                                                
credibility involves two key factors: perceived trustworthiness and perceived expertise (pp. 122ff.). 
The trustworthiness dimension indicates the extent to which something or someone is perceived as 
truthful, fair, and unbiased (p. 123). Expertise (cf. Chapter 12) is the knowledge, experience, and skill 
perceived in a source (p. 124). 
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• Social intelligence. The challenge for pedagogical agents in interactions with learners is to 
say or do the right thing in the right way to or with the right person in the right situation at 
the right time. To address this multi-dimensional challenge, pedagogical agents require 
social intelligence that enables them to (Johnson et al. 2003b): 
• Carefully time and design their interactions with learners; 
• Respect sociocultural dos and don’ts and exploit cultural stereotypes;30 
• Adapt their interactions to the changing cognitive and emotional state of the learner; 
• Communicate understanding and support; 
• Work to build and maintain a long-term relationship with the learner. 
• Student monitoring and modeling. Assisting and instructing learners properly requires a 
pedagogical agent to keep track of learners’ activities, their overall progress, their cognitive 
and emotional state, and the changing state of the learning environment (Johnson et al. 
2000). What information the agent can collect about the learner and the environment 
depends on the array of internal and external sensors available to the agent. The former 
detect changes and learners’ actions within the learning environment (e.g. dislocated objects, 
navigation paths, and problem-solving steps) while the latter monitor aspects of learner 
behavior occurring outside the environment (e.g. facial expressions, gaze patterns, and 
speech).31 Since external sensors are harder to implement and need to deal with more 
ambiguity and variability in the input signal, the number and diversity of external sensors 
available to pedagogical agents are often limited. Ideally, the results of monitoring are 
incorporated into an evolving model of the learner, which allows the agent to adapt its 
assistance to the learner’s situation and needs (cf. Chapter 12.2). 
• Trustworthiness. Learners must be willing (and able) to trust the information and guidance 
provided by a pedagogical agent, otherwise they will be reluctant to accept the agent’s 
assistance (Cassell & Bickmore 2000: 50). Since trust is not an instant relationship but can 
take time to develop, pedagogical agents need to invest time and effort in winning the 
learner’s trust and eventually their friendship (Stronks et al. 2002). To facilitate the 
relationship building process, the behavior of pedagogical agents should be both believable 
and predictable (cf. Chapter 3.2.2). 
                                              
30  On the other hand, pedagogical agents also give developers the opportunity to work against negative 
effects of stereotyping by designing agents in a way that disrupts learners’ stereotypical expectations 
of roles and role behaviors and shows them new perspectives, for example with respect to gender role 
assignment. However, interfering with the role and value systems of other cultures based on the 
(implicit) belief that one’s own culture (or even one’s personal values) are superior in certain respects 
can be dangerous and may result in strong negative responses from the users of the target culture. For 
further discussion, see Chapter 7.15 and Chapter 9.2. The issue of whether to break with or exploit 
(visual) stereotypes in interactions between learners and pedagogical agents was also discussed by 
Haake and Gulz (2008: 9f.). 
31  The distinction between internal and external sensors is most apparent in interactive learning 
platforms for current computer desktops or the current World Wide Web. It is blurred in virtual 
reality simulations (e.g. Rickel & Johnson 1999; Rickel & Johnson 2000; Rickel & Johnson 2003) 
where learners are immersed in the environment, wearing special equipment to allow the tracking of 
their body movements. 
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4.3  Summary 
This chapter defined pedagogical agents as embodied interactive software agents whose 
mission is to facilitate human learning by working with students in computer-based learning 
environments. The first section discussed the capabilities of pedagogical agents, which include 
monitoring the learner and intervening when necessary, adapting to changes in the learner and 
the learning environment, giving contextualized and customized explanations, performing 
demonstrations involving bodily actions in the learning environment, engaging learners in 
multimodal dialogues, supporting both individual and team learning, and increasing learners’ 
motivation. 
As discussed in the second section, pedagogical agents with these capabilities have to meet a 
number of requirements that also apply to software agents in general (autonomy, adaptiveness, 
proactiveness, responsiveness, and social ability, cf. Chapter 3.1). To be able to communicate 
effectively with the learner, pedagogical agents additionally require an articulate digital 
embodiment. Further requirements that were discussed in the section are more specific to the 
instructional domain of pedagogical agents and include believability (both as an individual and 
as an instructor or mentor); deictic believability of combined gestures, speech, and locomotion; 
mechanisms for the generation and delivery of instructional explanations; the capacity to 
acquire, represent, and use knowledge about the domain of instruction; the ability to participate 
in mixed-initiative interactions with the learner; expertise in providing instruction to learners; 
social intelligence to adjust and time actions and messages; means to collect information about 
and develop a model of the individual learner; and trustworthiness as a guide and source of 
information. 
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5  Interactivity 
Everything a human does to or with another human can be called an interaction. Human 
interactions that use media are mediated human interactions. Everything a human does to or with 
a computer is a human-computer interaction. (Heeter 2000: 75). 
in’ter.ac’tive 
1. New technology that will change the way you shop, play, and learn 
2. A zillion-dollar industry (maybe). (Newsweek 31 May 1993, cover page). 
Interactivity is an overused, underdefined concept. (Heeter 2000: 75). 
One important aspect of embodied interactive software agents is their capacity for ‘interaction,’ 
or their ‘interactivity.’ Both terms are ubiquitous, but what exactly do they imply? Many writers 
attach them as convenient labels to artifacts, exchanges, and experiences, however rarely with 
more than an intuitive idea of the underlying concepts. Since the terms ‘interaction’ and 
‘interactivity’ are used throughout this thesis, it seems advisable to examine them in some detail 
before moving on, in order to better understand their implications for the design of embodied 
interactive software agents. The first two sections of this chapter deal with interaction and its 
relation to communication, respectively. Section 5.3 then provides an in-depth discussion of 
different views of interactivity that have been proposed in the literature, identifying essential 
elements of interactive experiences that are useful for agent designers to keep in mind. In 
Section 5.4, interaction and interactivity are discussed in the context of teaching and learning, 
with a focus on education taking place at a distance with support from technology (i.e. 
e-learning, cf. Chapter 2). Finally, Section 5.5 provides a discussion and a summary of the 
chapter. 
5.1  Interaction 
Interaction is a fundamental concept in various academic disciplines, among them chemistry, 
computer science, linguistics, media studies, medicine, physics, psychology, sociology, and 
statistics. While each of these disciplines has its own specialized view of the concept, in the 
most general terms, interaction means ‘exchange,’ ‘interplay,’ or “mutual influence” (Jensen 
1998: 188). More formally, it can be defined as “reciprocal action or influence” (OED 1998: 
950) between two or more entities (artifacts, events, organisms, substances, theories, etc.), 
where the action of each entity may have an effect on and elicit a reaction from the others. 
Action and reaction are also highlighted as key elements of human interactions with the world 
in the following definition by Heeter: 
An interaction is an episode or series of episodes of physical actions and reactions of an 
embodied human with the world, including the environment and objects and beings in the world. 
(Heeter 2000: 80). 
Interaction may be immediate (unaided) or rely on technology, by using some kind of 
intervening medium or interface (cf. Chapter 1.2). Actions and reactions of the participants may 
or may not be separated in space or time. If the interaction consists of a sequence of exchanges, 
later exchanges typically relate to and depend on earlier exchanges and the relationships 
between them (Rafaeli 1988). The capacity for reciprocal action or influence is called 
interactivity. Interactivity is a characteristic (for many even a feature) of technologies, 
communication settings, or users (depending on the researcher’s viewpoint), whose meaning 
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seems intuitively clear. However, interactivity as a concept is surprisingly complex below the 
surface, as the discussion in Section 5.3 will reveal. 
5.2  Interaction and Communication 
Interaction is closely related to another type of exchanges, communication, and the two terms 
are often used interchangeably. In fact, in line with a long tradition of previous research, Rafaeli 
and Sudweeks (1997) contended that “communication is mostly about and for the purpose of 
interaction.” Kress and van Leeuwen also emphasized the close relationship (even dependence) 
between communication and interaction, by stating that there is no communication without 
interaction (Kress & van Leeuwen 2001: 114). Communication has been conceived as a form of 
interaction, involving the purposeful reciprocal exchange of information (messages) and the 
negotiation of a shared understanding between participants according to a common system of 
rules and symbols (e.g. natural language): 
Communication is a form of interaction between agents belonging to a socially sophisticated 
species; in particular, it is an overt attempt to reach a situation which be [sic!] relatively 
satisfactory to all the participants. (Tirassa 1997). 
However, not all kinds of interaction involve communication. For example, human operation 
(or control) of computers and other devices involves forms of interaction which are at odds 
with the reciprocity and negotiation that characterize communication. “Within informatics then, 
(…) it is possible to have (human-machine) interaction without having communication, but not 
(computer-mediated) communication without also having (human-computer) interaction” 
(Jensen 1998: 190). On the other hand, there are forms of communication that do not involve 
interaction. For instance, broadcasting media like traditional radio and television provide one-
way communication from a sender to a group of receivers, with little opportunity for receivers 
to respond to the broadcasts. 
Artifacts can play two roles in interactions involving humans: people may use them to 
communicate with other people or the artifacts themselves may serve as partners in the 
interaction. Examples of artifacts in the former role as medium include computers, the 
telephone, and even paper and pencil. In general, mediation can be defined as “the interposition 
of an electronic or mechanical medium by which messages are transmitted between actors” 
(Burgoon et al. 2002: 661). While various artifacts qualify for use as a medium, the term 
mediated interaction is often reserved for settings that use computers to transmit messages. The 
use of computers to mediate communications between people is studied by the field of 
computer-mediated communication (CMC) (cf. Chapter 2.3.8). Compared to non-mediated 
face-to-face interaction between people, which is rich in terms of verbal and non-verbal cues 
(cf. Chapter 10.1), mediated interaction is characterized by a communicative inventory that is 
reduced to those cues that can be handled by the chosen medium, in computer-mediated 
communication for the most part still written text (Burgoon et al. 2002: 661). 
Apart from using artifacts to communicate with others, users can also interact with the 
artifacts themselves, i.e. the artifacts serve as interaction partners to users. The interaction with 
(and through) artifacts takes place via user interfaces. The most important types of user 
interfaces to computer-based systems were discussed in Chapter 1.2. Interaction with computers 
is the focus of human-computer interaction (HCI) research (Jacko & Sears 2003). 
Interaction through, but also increasingly with, artifacts takes the form of conversations. 
Conversation is a (mediated or non-mediated) linguistic interaction between two or more 
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parties, which can be characterized as (Brown & Levinson 1987; Levelt 1995: 29ff., cf. Chapter 
11.3.1): 
• Highly contextualized. Speakers’ contributions must be tuned to those of the other 
interlocutors, and they need to be anchored in the shared here and now of the interaction. 
• Intentional, goal-directed. Conversations serve to realize certain communicative intentions 
of the participants, such as giving information, sharing feelings, making agreements, etc. 
• Cooperative. Participants mutually assume that their contributions are purposeful, well-
conducted, or more generally, cooperative. 
• Polite. Speakers use language that is geared toward mitigating potential threats to the ‘face’ 
(i.e. the public self-image) of their audience. 
5.3  Interactivity 
Like interaction, the related concept of interactivity is studied by researchers from various 
backgrounds. As a result, the term has different meanings for different people in different 
contexts, such as communication, e-learning, entertainment, human-computer interaction, 
information studies, marketing, etc., and a variety of definitions can be found in the literature 
(e.g. Rafaeli 1988; Blattberg & Deighton 1991; Steuer 1992; Deighton 1996; Rafaeli & 
Sudweeks 1997; Ha & James 1998; Jensen 1998; Schultz 1999; Aoki 2000; Downes & 
McMillan 2000; Heeter 2000; Yacci 2000; Liu & Shrum 2002; Kiousis 2002; McMillan 2002; 
Bucy 2004b; Stromer-Galley 2004). In the early 1990s, interactivity became a buzzword and 
use of the term exploded in the popular, trade, scholarly, and technical press and media 
(McMillan 2002). However, the general problem with buzzwords is that “within a certain topic, 
[they] appear to refer to something very important and (…) – for a given time – are heard 
constantly, but are often difficult to understand since in reality nobody seems to know what 
they mean” (Jensen 1998: 185). In this respect, interactivity is similar to another buzzword that 
also had its heyday during the 1990s and is commonly mentioned in the same breath: 
multimedia (cf. Chapter 2.3.7). We cannot define neither of the two conclusively (yet), but we 
(think we) know them when we see (or, more broadly, experience) them. 
While its definition may present a challenge, most people researching or selling interactivity 
explicitly or implicitly assume that it is a characteristic of artifacts, exchanges, situations, and 
relationships that is invariably desirable and commonly has positive effects32 on a wide range of 
user-related aspects including acceptance, satisfaction, learning, and mastery; thoughtfulness, 
cooperation, and responsibility; and performance, motivation, and sociability (Rafaeli 1988; 
Bucy 2004b: 374). 
To shed some light on the ‘overused,’ ‘underdefined,’ ‘undertheorized,’ and ‘elusive’ 
concept of interactivity (Heeter 2000: 75; Bucy 2004b: 373), which seems to deconstruct itself 
under close examination (Rose 1999: 48), various attempts to define it from different 
perspectives are discussed in the following. The goal of this discussion is to identify elements in 
these definitions which are helpful for understanding interactivity in the context of interactions 
between humans and embodied interactive software agents. 
                                              
32  However, a growing number of researchers are more reluctant to ascribe unconditional positive 
effects to interactivity. Some authors have already written about limitations and undesirable 
consequences of interactive processes (e.g. Liu & Shrum 2002; Sundar et al. 2003; Bucy 2004b). 
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5.3.1  The Role of Feedback 
Interactivity research has its roots in cybernetics (Kiousis 2002: 359), which was originally 
defined by the mathematician Norbert Wiener (1894–1964) as the field of study concerned with 
“control and communication in the animal and the machine” (Wiener 1948). Modern views of 
cybernetics extend the original definition to encompass “the study of communication and 
control within and between humans, machines, organizations, and society” ([INT 37]). One 
distinguishing feature of cybernetics, compared to Shannon and Weaver’s communication 
model,33 which became available around the same time (Shannon & Weaver 1949), is its 
incorporation of feedback (Kiousis 2002: 359). In cybernetics, feedback refers to the process in 
which part of the output of a system is fed back into the system as part of its input in order to 
regulate its further output. The resulting loop is called the feedback loop ([INT 38]). Applied to 
communication, the ability of the recipient of a message to send a response which influences 
the sender’s next message, has become a principal component of many conceptualizations of 
interactivity (Kiousis 2002: 359), and the capacity of a medium or communication experience 
for inducing feedback is commonly viewed as a major criterion for calling that medium or 
experience ‘interactive’ (p. 367). This framework locates interactivity in the channel through 
which communication occurs as a dynamic, interdependent process between senders and 
receivers (p. 359). The definition by Straubhaar and LaRose illustrates this view: 
We will use the term interactive to refer to situations where real-time feedback is collected from 
the receivers of a communications channel and is used by the source to continually modify the 
message as it is being delivered to the receiver. (Straubhaar & LaRose 1996: 12, their emphasis). 
5.3.2  Interactivity as a Communication Concept 
The 1980s and the 1990s saw the rise of the so-called new media34 (Wardrip-Fruin & Montfort 
2003), which are nowadays exemplified by web sites (including weblogs and wikis, cf. Chapter 
2.3.9), e-mail, chat rooms, virtual reality, streaming technologies for audio and video, 
CD-ROMs and DVDs, mobile computing, and Internet telephony. Interactivity is generally 
regarded as a defining component of these and other new media technologies (Sims 1999; van 
Dijk 1999; McMillan 2002). As a result, further explication of the concept in the context of the 
new “interactive media” became necessary. Williams et al. offered the following definition: 
                                              
33  The Shannon-Weaver model (Shannon 1948a; Shannon 1948b; Shannon & Weaver 1949) is a 
general model of communication developed by Claude Shannon and popularized by Warren Weaver, 
which proposes that there are six common elements to all communication: an information source, an 
encoder, a message, a transmission channel, a decoder, and a receiver ([INT 39]). Communication is 
viewed as a one-way process, in which the message is encoded for transmission at the source, 
transmitted over the channel as a signal, which may be distorted by noise, and decoded by the 
receiver ([INT 39]). 
34  ‘New media’ is a generic term used to loosely describe those forms of media which are made 
possible through the use of digital technology. They are often contrasted with ‘old’ media forms 
originating in the pre-digital era, including analog radio and television as well as printed materials, 
such as books and magazines. 
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[T]he degree to which participants in a communication process have control over, and can 
exchange roles in, their mutual discourse is called interactivity. (Williams et al. 1988: 10, 
cf. Rogers 1995: 314). 
Important aspects of this definition include the notion of control and the need for 
communication roles to be interchangeable (see below and Rafaeli (1988: 111)). It further 
indicates that interactivity is not an absolute, present-or-absent characteristic. In fact, different 
interactive processes may involve different degrees, or levels, of interactivity. Therefore, 
interactivity is more appropriately conceived as a continuum or scale rather than an on-off 
dichotomy: 
We must conclude that the point is not: interactivity yes or no. The point is: more or less. All the 
named characteristics of interactivity are gradients. (Jaspers 1991: 22). 
The term “mutual discourse” in the definition by Williams et al. refers to the degree to which 
a given communication act is based on the sequence of communication acts preceding it. 
Furthermore, the emphasis of the definition has shifted away from the communication channel 
towards the relationships between the messages exchanged (Kiousis 2002: 359). This shift is 
also evident in Rafaeli’s now classic definition: 
Formally stated, interactivity is an expression of the extent that, in a given series of 
communication exchanges, any third (or later) transmission (or message) is related to the degree 
to which previous exchanges referred to even earlier transmissions. (Rafaeli 1988: 111). 
For Rafaeli, interactivity is “quintessentially a communication concept” (Rafaeli 1988: 113), 
a “process-related, variable characteristic of communication settings” and “not a characteristic 
of the medium” (Rafaeli & Sudweeks 1997), a view that is not shared by everyone (e.g. 
Stromer-Galley 2000). According to Rafaeli, “interactivity should apply to a wide range of 
communication settings: from the unmediated, face-to-face, and intimate to the relatively 
anonymous and mass mediated” (Rafaeli 1988: 111). His own work has focused on interactivity 
in computer-mediated communication between humans (Rafaeli & Sudweeks 1997). 
Rafaeli’s recursive, message-based definition states that interactivity is “the extent to which 
messages in a sequence relate to each other, and especially the extent to which later messages 
recount the relatedness of earlier messages” (Rafaeli & Sudweeks 1997). Full interactivity only 
begins with the third message in an exchange, when the initiator has the opportunity to 
incorporate references to the previous exchange in his or her new message. The term third-
order dependency is commonly used in the literature to refer to the interconnected relationships 
(or functional coherence) among the messages exchanged (Kiousis 2002: 359; Warnick et al. 
2005). Third-order dependency occurs if a person sends a message to another person (action), 
the receiver replies with a message of his or her own (reaction), and the original sender then 
reacts to the receiver’s reaction, relating both to the initial message and its response (Koolstra & 
Bos 2006). Only communication that exhibits such a reciprocal exchange of messages (i.e. 
third-order dependency) can be called interactive rather than just reactive (Kiousis 2002: 359). 
5.3.3  Interactivity as a Two-Way Process 
In Rafaeli’s explication, “interactivity varies along a continuum” (Rafaeli 1988; Rafaeli & 
Sudweeks 1997). Depending on how much later messages relate to earlier messages and their 
relationships, different levels of interactivity can be distinguished (cf. Figure 18). At the low 
end of the continuum, there is one-way (non-interactive) communication (e.g. broadcast radio 
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and television), where messages are not related to their predecessors. Two-way (reactive) 
communication involves one side responding to the other, but only to a single previous 
message. Finally, a communication is fully interactive if a given message refers to at least two 
earlier messages and the relationship between them (Rafaeli & Sudweeks 1997; [INT 40]). 
Rafaeli (1988: 119f.) discussed several implications of this model: (a) communication is not 
always interactive; (b) interactivity is not a characteristic of the medium or channel; (c) much 
use of new communication technologies is non-interactive; (d) interactivity is distinct from, 
actually a subset of, feedback. “Interactivity is feedback that relates both to previous messages 
and to the way previous messages related to those preceding them” (p. 120). 
Rafaeli’s model involves at least two parties that exchange and build on related messages 
(Tremayne & Dunwoody 2001: 115). Most researchers share this view that interactive 
communication is a two-way process in which two or more participants function as intentional 
senders and recipients in a reciprocal exchange of messages (p. 115): 
Interactivity means two-way communication between source and receiver, or, more broadly 
multidirectional communication between any number of sources and receivers. (Pavlik 1998: 
137). 
Likewise, Markus defined interactivity as a feature of technologies for multidirectional 
communication (Markus 1990). Many other authors have echoed Pavlik’s view (see the 
quotations in McMillan (2002)). In addition, the interchangeability of the roles of sender and 
receiver is often seen as an important characteristic of interactive exchanges: 
[F]ully interactive media imply that the sender and receiver roles are interchangeable.  
(Rice 1984b: 35). 
 
Figure 18a. Non-interactive communication. Adapted from Rafaeli and Sudweeks (1997, Figure 1).  
(P = Person; M = Message; A = Audience). 
 
Figure 18b. Reactive communication. Adapted from Rafaeli and Sudweeks (1997, Figure 1). 
 
Figure 18c. Interactive communication. Adapted from Rafaeli and Sudweeks (1997, Figure 1). 
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[T]he degree to which participants in a communication process have control over, and can 
exchange roles in, their mutual discourse is called interactivity. (Williams et al. 1988: 10, 
cf. Rogers 1995: 314). 
5.3.4  Responsiveness 
According to Rafaeli, interactivity resides in the relatedness of messages exchanged among 
participants in a communication setting (Rafaeli 1988; Rafaeli & Sudweeks 1997). A similar 
focus on message exchange can be found in the definitions of other authors: 
The essence of interactivity is exchange. (Haeckel 1998: 63). 
[Interactivity is] the extent to which the communicator and the audience respond to, or are 
willing to facilitate, each other’s communication needs. (Ha & James 1998: 461). 
An interactive communication involves responsiveness of the displayed message to the message 
receiver. (Miles 1992: 150). 
The term interactive, as we interpret it, points to two features of communication: the ability to 
address an individual and the ability to gather and remember the response of that individual. 
Those two features make possible a third: the ability to address the individual once more in a way 
that takes into account his or her unique response... (Deighton 1996, his emphasis). 
While it is often perceived as a characteristic of dialogue, interactivity is limited neither to two 
people nor to face-to-face communication. It can be seen as a variable of responsiveness in 
interpersonal and societal communication. (Schultz 1999). 
A key element of these definitions is the notion of responsiveness, which also plays an 
important role in characterizing interactivity in the context of human interactions with 
computers: An interactive computer system accepts and responds to user actions (Liu & Shrum 
2002), in particular data and commands, while the program is running. Interactive software, 
such as word processors, spreadsheets, and web browsers, is usually distinguished from non-
interactive programs like compilers35 or batch processing applications,36 which operate on pre-
loaded data without interacting with users ([INT 40]). After the first interactive computer 
systems had been introduced, “[i]nteractive (…) came to signify a modern, radically improved 
technology, usually in relation to an older one” (Aarseth 1997: 48), such as batch processing. 
In communication, according to McMillan (2002), responsive dialogue is characterized by 
the message sender’s awareness of the complete sequence of previous messages as well as his 
or her control over the exchange. The responsive dialogue model is implemented, for example, 
by web sites for customer service or e-commerce. In contrast, communication technologies such 
as chat rooms or instant messaging tools enable mutual dialogue, which is responsive but 
allows all participants to control the exchange. This, in turn, blurs the distinction between 
sender and receiver roles (McMillan 2002). 
                                              
35  A compiler is a computer program that translates from one computer language into another. The most 
common application of compilers is to translate (compile) programs written in a higher-level 
programming language into machine code for direct execution by the computer processor ([INT 41]). 
36  Batch processing involves the execution of a series of jobs (consisting of programs and data) on a 
computer without human intervention ([INT 42]). 
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5.3.5  Control 
Control is another central component of a number of definitions of interactivity. In particular, 
the field of human-computer interaction (HCI) studies how humans control computers and other 
new media (McMillan & Hwang 2002: 30). In this research tradition, interaction is “the process 
that takes places when a human user operates a machine” (Jensen 1998: 190). The concept of 
control executed by the user over the machine is at the core of the interaction process. At a 
workshop on the “Methodology of Interaction” in 1979, leading HCI researchers formulated a 
definition that emphasizes the central role of control:37 
Interaction is a style of control and interactive systems exhibit that style. (Guedj et al. 1980: 69). 
The idea of user control is also emphasized in later technology-based definitions of 
interactivity, both in the context of human-computer interaction and computer-mediated 
communication between people, in particular control over form and content: 
[T]he degree to which participants in a communication process have control over, and can 
exchange roles in, their mutual discourse is called interactivity. (Williams et al. 1988: 10, 
cf. Rogers 1995: 314). 
[Interactivity is the] quality of electronically mediated communication characterized by increased 
control over the communication process by both sender and the receiver; either can be a 
microprocessor. (Neuman 1991: 104). 
[Interactivity is] the extent to which users can participate in modifying the form and content of a 
mediated environment in real time (Steuer 1992: 84). 
In interactive systems, a customer controls the content of the interaction requesting or giving 
information. (Bezjian-Avery et al. 1998: 23). 
[I]nteractivity may be defined as: a measure of a media’s [sic!] potential ability to let the user 
exert an influence on the content and/or form of the mediated communication. (Jensen 1998: 
201). 
We define interactivity as a characteristic of a medium in which the user can influence the form 
and/or content of the mediated presentation or experience. (Lombard & Snyder-Duch 2001). 
As these definitions indicate, control is not only important for users’ interaction with 
technology but also for interactive communication between users that is mediated by 
technology. Liu (2003) argued that in both cases, users should have control over both the 
information sent and the information received to make sure that the reciprocal exchange is 
satisfactory for all parties involved in the communication. Reciprocal communication provides 
the channel for exercising control (Liu 2003). Recognizing the importance of both control and 
reciprocal communication for interactivity, Liu and Shrum defined it as 
the degree to which two or more communication parties can act on each other, on the 
communication medium, and on the messages and the degree to which such influences are 
synchronized. (Liu & Shrum 2002: 54). 
                                              
37  However, characterizing the relationship between humans and machines as one of control clashes 
with another pervasive view in the HCI community that sees human-machine interaction processes as 
widely analogous to communication processes between people (Jensen 1998: 190). 
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On the basis of their definition, Liu and Shrum proposed three dimensions of interactivity: 
active control (the user’s capacity for voluntary and instrumental action that influences his or 
her experience), two-way communication (reciprocal exchange between the communication 
parties), and synchronicity (the temporal distance between user actions and responses). 
Synchronicity requires that responses are provided in a timely fashion, i.e. it refers to the speed 
of the exchange, or the rate of the information flow (Kiousis 2002: 363). 
5.3.6  The Real-Time Requirement 
In addition to two-way communication and user control, time is another important dimension of 
interactivity, which involves the speed at which participants can deliver, process, and respond 
to messages. In particular, both developers and users view speed of response as a critical feature 
of interactive media (McMillan & Hwang 2002: 33), as illustrated by the definition below, 
which focuses on the time requirements of the interaction: 
Interactive speed is a construct that contributes to flow and is based on measures such as waiting 
time, loading time, and degree to which interacting with the Web is “slow and tedious.” (Novak et 
al. 2000: 29). 
The emphasis on response time implies that the exchange of messages should happen 
quickly in interactive communication (Liu 2003). That is, contributions by one party should 
elicit fast follow-up responses from other parties (Bretz & Schmidbauer 1983; Alba et al. 1997; 
Wu 1999; Liu 2003). The “need for speed” plays an important role in many conceptualizations 
of interactivity, and a number of authors even go as far as to reserve the label ‘interactive’ for 
real-time, synchronous exchanges: 
[Interactivity is] the extent to which users can participate in modifying the form and content of a 
mediated environment in real time (Steuer 1992: 84). 
We will use the term interactive to refer to situations where real-time feedback is collected from 
the receivers of a communications channel and is used by the source to continually modify the 
message as it is being delivered to the receiver. (Straubhaar & LaRose 1996: 12, their emphasis). 
The ideal interactive medium responds in ‘real time’ to user input; the response or lag time is not 
noticeable. (Lombard & Ditton 1997). 
Interactivity is the condition of communication in which simultaneous and continuous exchanges 
occur, and these exchanges carry a social, binding force. (Rafaeli & Sudweeks 1997). 
However, the real-time requirement is at odds with asynchronous online communication using, 
e-mail, voice mail, and discussion forums, among others, which involves an obvious time lag 
but is still commonly regarded as interactive (Tremayne & Dunwoody 2001: 115; Kiousis 
2002: 362). 
Speed is a measure of the rate at which information flows between participants in an 
exchange (Kiousis 2002: 363). However, speed can be harmful without control, so time 
flexibility (Downes & McMillan 2000), i.e. the degree to which participants can influence the 
rate of the information flow, is crucial to an interactive experience, in particular if the other 
party is a machine (Kiousis 2002: 363). 
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5.3.7  Interactivity and (Non-) Mediation 
Speed and time flexibility are obvious characteristics of communication that involves people 
talking to each other in person, or ‘face-to-face.’ In face-to-face communication, interactivity 
characterizes “the relationship between two or more people who, in a given situation, mutually 
adapt their behavior and actions to each other” (Jensen 1998: 188). The participants in this type 
of non-mediated communication can make use of a variety of verbal and non-verbal cues 
(voice, gesture, facial expressions, gaze, locomotion, and posture) to regulate the conversation 
process, contribute content to the ongoing conversation, and convey emotional and cognitive 
states (cf. Chapter 10.1). Given these qualities, it comes as no surprise that interpersonal 
communication, and in particular face-to-face communication, is regarded by many as the 
prototype of interactive communication and hence as a gold standard for interactivity (Bretz & 
Schmidbauer 1983; Williams et al. 1988; Heeter 1989; Kiousis 2002: 363): 
[Interactivity is] the capability of new communication systems (usually containing a computer as 
one component) to ‘talk back’ to the user, almost like an individual participating in a 
conversation (Rogers 1986: 34). 
Face-to-face communication is held up as the model because the sender and receiver use all their 
senses, the reply is immediate, the communication is generally closed circuit, and the content is 
primarily informal or ‘ad lib.’ (Durlak 1987: 744). 
Interactivity is generally assumed to be a natural attribute of face-to-face conversation, but it has 
been proposed to occur in mediated communication settings as well. (Rafaeli 1988: 110). 
[I]nteractivity generally refers to the processes of communication that take on some of the 
characteristics of interpersonal communication. (DeFleur & Ball-Rokeach 1989: 341). 
Traditional FtF [(face-to-face)] dialogue is the current prototype for highly interactive 
encounters because it is contingent, unmediated, same-place, same-time, participative, 
informationally rich and complex, and identified. (Burgoon et al. 2000: 558). 
On a simple everyday level, interactivity deals with the ability of systems to simulate interpersonal 
communication, although the features and components of it change with authors. (Kiousis 2002: 
367). 
As the definition by Burgoon et al. quoted above indicates, face-to-face communication 
possesses a number of features that make it highly interactive in comparison to other 
communication formats. Burgoon et al. proposed a set of structural properties that allow 
locating different communication formats along a continuum from high to low interactivity. 
According to their model, face-to-face communication is more interactive than other formats 
because it is (Burgoon et al. 2000: 557f.): 
• Contingent. Participants’ contributions relate to previous exchanges, resulting in a flow of 
communication that is sequenced and coherent but also has an element of unpredictability. 
• Unmediated. No medium is involved in the exchange of messages between the physically 
co-present participants. 
• Propinquitous (same-place). The interlocutors share the same space. 
• Synchronous (same-time). The exchange takes place in real time; there is no delay between 
or temporal decoupling of messages (i.e. no asychronicity). 
• Participative. All participants both send and receive verbal and non-verbal messages and 
feedback to the other participants. 
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• Modality- and information-rich. Participants can make use of rich sensor input, including 
environmental, visual, audio, and verbal information. 
• Anthropomorphic. The participants are human (or resemble humans to a high degree, such as 
robots and embodied interactive software agents). 
• Identified. The participants know who is involved in the communication; participants are not 
anonymous. 
Media facilitating communication that exhibits more features of face-to-face communication 
are considered more interactive than others (Jensen 1998: 191). The closer computer-mediated 
communication resembles interpersonal communication, the more interactive it becomes (Ha & 
James 1998; Liu & Shrum 2002). A similar emphasis on interpersonal communication can be 
found in work on interactive media design in psychology, which contends that the effectiveness 
of an interactive medium depends on how closely it can resemble the interpersonal (Leary 
1990; Kiousis 2002: 363). 
However, adopting face-to-face communication as the ideal may be an unrealistic approach 
because interactivity as a concept is typically associated with new media technologies and 
experienced in technologically-mediated environments rather than the non-mediated real world 
where face-to-face communication takes place (Jensen 1998: 200; Kiousis 2002: 363 + 373). 
One way to address this problem is to broaden the notion of interpersonal communication to 
include both mediated and non-mediated experiences (Kiousis 2002: 363). But a number of 
authors have argued that the concept of interactivity should be restricted to mediated interaction 
between humans or between humans and technology (e.g. Jensen 1998; Kiousis 2002; Bucy 
2004b; Newhagen 2004; Stromer-Galley 2004) (Stromer-Galley 2004: 392). The deliberate 
exclusion of non-mediated face-to-face communication can be seen in several definitions of 
interactivity: 
[Interactivity is the] quality of electronically mediated communication characterized by increased 
control over the communication process by both sender and the receiver; either can be a 
microprocessor. (Neuman 1991: 104). 
[Interactivity is] the extent to which users can participate in modifying the form and content of a 
mediated environment in real time. (Steuer 1992: 84). 
[I]nteractivity may be defined as: a measure of a media’s [sic!] potential ability to let the user 
exert an influence on the content and/or form of the mediated communication. (Jensen 1998: 
201). 
We define interactivity as a characteristic of a medium in which the user can influence the form 
and/or content of the mediated presentation or experience. (Lombard & Snyder-Duch 2001). 
Interactivity can be defined as the degree to which a communication technology can create a 
mediated environment in which participants can communicate (one-to-one, one-to-many, and 
many-to-many), both synchronously and asynchronously, and participate in reciprocal message 
exchanges (third-order dependency). With regard to human users, it additionally refers to their 
ability to perceive the experience as a simulation of interpersonal communication and increase 
their awareness of telepresence. (Kiousis 2002: 372, his emphasis). 
Interactivity, first and foremost, should be reserved to describe reciprocal communication 
exchanges that involve some form of media, or information and communication technology. (…) 
[I]nteractivity should not be considered synonymous with social interaction, person-to-person 
conversation, or face-to-face communication. (…) Limiting the concept to exchanges that are in 
some way mediated by technology begins to distinguish the term from any form of communication 
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and discourages its wanton application as a universal descriptor of all forms of dialogue. (Bucy 
2004b: 375f., his emphasis). 
Whether they include or exclude face-to-face communication, many definitions of 
interactivity are anthropocentric in nature, i.e. they are concerned with interactions in which at 
least one of the participants involved is human and tend to focus on human behavior in these 
interactions. The range of interactive scenarios that have been studied includes interactions 
between humans; between humans and computers; between humans, mediated by computers 
(and other technologies); between humans and documents;38 and, recently, between humans and 
embodied interactive agents (McMillan 2002, cf. Figure 19). As discussed above, a number of 
scholars do not regard the first scenario as interactive, although the “exclusion of ‘pure’ 
interpersonal communication is debatable” (Kiousis 2002: 373). 
5.3.8  Interactivity as Process vs. Product 
It might seem attractive to find a single conceptualization of interactivity that covers all the 
different scenarios in Figure 19. However, according to Stromer-Galley (2004), such an effort 
may be misguided because it obfuscates the nature and effects of interactivity. She argued that 
the term ‘interactivity’ covers two separate aspects: interaction between humans mediated by 
technology and interaction between humans and computers or networked systems (Stromer-
Galley 2004: 391). The former can be described as a process of mediated communication 
between two or more people, in which new messages make reference to previous exchanges 
(Bucy 2004b: 375) in the sense of Rafaeli’s definition (cf. Section 5.3.2), whereas the latter 
involves human users interacting with (rather than through) a computer or system equipped 
with the relevant features (Stromer-Galley 2004: 391), including content presented using that 
machine through a user interface (cf. Chapter 1.2). Stromer-Galley stressed that interactivity in 
mediated human-human communication processes and interactivity occurring in user 
interactions with technology are two distinct phenomena. She introduced the term interactivity-
as-process as a label for research concerned with human interaction mediated by technology in 
the field of computer-mediated communication. In contrast, interactivity-as-product refers to 
work on human interaction with technology that is done in the human-computer interaction 
tradition (Bucy 2004a: 371; Stromer-Galley 2004: 392). Other researchers have essentially the 
same dual view of interactivity as Stromer-Galley. For example, McMillan (2002) 
differentiated between user-to-user (process) and user-to-system (product) interactivity. 
Similarly, Lee (2000) identified two broad types of interactivity: interacting with people and 
interacting with technology. Finally, Carey (1989) provided the following two-part definition of 
interactive media: 
                                              
38  User interaction with documents comprises interaction with both documents and their creators. See 
McMillan (2002) for a discussion of user-to-documents interactivity. 
     
Figure 19a–e. Different types of interactive processes (H = Human; C = Computer; D = Document; 
A = Agent). Based on Tremayne and Dunwoody (2001: 115, Figure 1). 
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[Interactive media are] technologies that provide person-to-person communications mediated by 
a telecommunications channel (e.g. a telephone call) and person-to-machine interactions that 
simulate interpersonal exchange (e.g. an electronic banking transaction). (Carey 1989: 328). 
Given the dichotomy of interactivity-as-process vs. interactivity-as-product, the question 
arises if it is possible to classify any interactive experience as one of these two types or if there 
are experiences that have elements of both. In particular, embodied software agents capable of 
human-like participation in conversations involving the use of the full range of verbal and non-
verbal cues available to people in face-to-face situations may be such a ‘hybrid’ case. On the 
one hand, software agents are a kind of technology, so the product view of interactivity seems 
appropriate, which is the one taken, for example, by Bucy: 
[Interactivity] can also take the form of impersonal interactions with media content or non-
human agents – audio/video downloads, e-mail requests to a listserv majordomo, computer game 
playing, e-commerce transactions, and various other forms of content activity. (Bucy 2004b: 375, 
emphasis added). 
But on the other hand, if agent technology can play the part of a human interlocutor in an 
embodied conversation (cf. Chapter 10.1 and Chapter 11.3), it can be argued that the interaction 
between humans and embodied interactive software agents moves closer toward interpersonal 
(even face-to-face) communication while still mediated by technology (the user interface, cf. 
Chapter 1.2). Hence, it is also possible to consider the human-agent interactive experience as 
another mediated communication process. 
5.3.9  Perceived Interactivity 
Scholars may have different views on what interactivity is, but they do not agree on where it 
resides either. A growing literature is concerned with the issue of locating interactivity in the 
space defined by users, technologies, and communication settings. The different views of the 
conceptual whereabouts of interactivity are summarized in Figure 20. The definitions reviewed 
so far characterize interactivity as a property of the technology (medium) or the communication 
setting. From the former point of view, interactivity manifests itself in the system’s inventory of 
interface actions (e.g. Steuer 1992), whereas the latter approach observes interactivity in 
message exchanges, as described in the discussion of Rafaeli’s definition above (Bucy 2004b: 
376). While technological and message-related accounts focus on objective, observable aspects 
of interactivity, a third perspective has emerged since the late 1990s, which approaches 
interactivity from the subjective point of view of a participant, suggesting that interactivity is 
“in the eye of the beholder” (McMillan 2000; McMillan 2002), i.e. it resides, at least in part, in 
the perceptions of individuals (McMillan 2002, cf. Newhagen et al. 1995; Wu 1999; Wu 2000; 
Lee 2000; McMillan 2000; Downes & McMillan 2000; McMillan & Hwang 2002; Newhagen 
2004; Sohn & Lee 2005).39 By defining interactivity as a perceptual variable (Bucy 2004b: 
376), this approach locates the concept within the user (Newhagen 2004: 395) rather than the 
medium or the communication setting. The following quotations from the literature illustrate 
this view of interactivity as the subjective perception and experience of an individual user: 
The experience of interactivity is variant across people and without measuring how people 
perceive the interactivity, it is difficult to understand the essence of interactivity. (…) [P]revious 
                                              
39  See also the discussion of perceptible qualities of agents in Chapter 7.2. 
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research clearly shows that the most important to be examined in measuring the level of 
interactivity is not counting mere provision of technological features but investigating how users 
perceive/experience. User perception of interactivity is the key variable to be examined. (Lee 
2000). 
[Interactivity is] the extent to which a person perceives he or she controls over [sic!] the 
interaction process [and the extent to which the person perceives that] his or her communicative 
counterpart (a person, a mass-mediated environment, or a computer-mediated environment) 
personalizes and responds to his or her communicative behavior. (Wu 2000: 41). 
Ultimately it is the consumer’s choice to interact, thus interactivity is a characteristic of the 
consumer, and not a characteristic of the medium. The medium simply serves to facilitate the 
interaction. (Schumann et al. 2001). 
With regard to human users, (…) [interactivity] refers to their ability to perceive the experience 
as a simulation of interpersonal communication and increase their awareness of telepresence. 
(Kiousis 2002: 372, his emphasis). 
Fundamentally, human communication is concerned with meaning derived from content 
embedded in physical objects called symbols that serve as the base units in narratives, programs, 
and codes called messages. Content creation, provoked by interaction between internal mental 
states, takes place when information is embossed onto symbols. Interactivity, then, is an 
information-based process that takes place within the individual. (Newhagen 2004: 395, his 
emphasis). 
Human perception of interactivity is indispensable in studying the effects of interactive media on 
individuals: Whether people actually perceive a medium/vehicle as interactive is the only valid 
criterion for judging its interactivity. (Sohn & Lee 2005). 
Scholars studying interactivity as user perception have criticized technological definitions 
for their lack of consideration for the experiential dimension of interactivity. According to 
Bucy, regarding interactivity as a technological factor and looking for it only in physically 
observable actions and reactions (e.g. Heeter 2000; Sundar 2004) fails to account for the 
subjective qualitative experiences which individuals and different groups of individuals may 
equate with interactivity (Bucy 2004b: 376). In fact, virtually any mediated setting, including 
mass communication (which is often said to be non-interactive), may be perceived by users as 
offering possibilities for interaction or participation, even if it lacks many of the features 
typically associated with interactivity in the research literature (p. 376). In these media settings, 
 
Figure 20. Different views of where interactivity resides and where it can be observed. Adapted from 
Bucy (2004b: 376, Figure 1). 
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users may not have any real control over the content or perform observable communicative 
actions, but nonetheless, they may have the sense of “participating in the ongoing action of the 
representation” (Laurel 1991: 20f.) and feel that they are part of an interactive experience (Bucy 
2004b: 376). Furthermore, users with different skill levels and experience may perceive 
different sets of affordances, or sets of possible actions, in the same media technology (p. 376), 
which implies that on the one hand, it is possible for them to miss features, but on the other 
hand also that they can use or combine available features to enable new interactive experiences 
not foreseen by the designers of the technology (cf. Chapter 6.1). 
The perceived interactivity of ‘objectively’ non-interactive communication settings indicates 
the psychological dimension of the phenomenon (Bucy 2004b: 377). Bucy argued that “any 
networked medium or communication setting perceived as interactive becomes so to the user” 
(p. 377, his emphasis). From their seminal empirical research on the interaction between 
humans and media (cf. Chapter 6.5), Reeves and Nass concluded the following: 
[I]ndividuals’ interactions with computers, television, and new media are fundamentally social 
and natural, just like interactions in real life. (Reeves & Nass 1998: 5, their emphasis). 
What seems to be true is often more influential that [sic!] what really is true. Our studies show 
that perceptions are far more influential than reality defined more objectively. When perceptions 
are considered, it doesn’t matter whether a computer can really have a personality or not. People 
perceive that it can, and they’ll respond socially on the basis of perception alone. (Reeves & Nass 
1998: 253, their emphasis). 
Similarly, research by Turkle (1984) suggests that humans tend to perceive interactive 
systems as possessing human characteristics like being ‘alive’ or ‘cheating’ (Kiousis 2002: 364, 
cf. Chapter 9.1). Given these results, it appears that 
to some extent, interactivity is associated with the ability of individuals to experience different 
media as if they were engaging with other human beings. Accordingly, the simulation of 
interpersonal communication in an interactive environment is not confined to human-to-human 
communication, but includes human-to-machine communication as well. (Kiousis 2002: 364). 
If this conclusion is correct, it follows that communication between humans and embodied 
interactive software agents is another kind of experience that users can perceive and understand 
as interactive. In general, the lesson from research on interactivity as user perception is that 
interactivity as a concept cannot be understood without considering what happens inside the 
individual user’s mind, i.e. how he or she perceives and makes sense of an interactive 
experience. 
However, the conceptualization of interactivity as user perception is not without its critics. 
For example, Sundar contended that “interactivity is an attribute of the technology and not that 
[sic!] of the user” (Sundar 2004: 385). He argued that situating interactivity in the user rather 
than the medium invites subjective evaluations of the kind “I know it when I see it” (p. 386). 
Furthermore, he wrote, evaluations of interactivity would be influenced by the user’s skill level: 
if the user is skilled enough to use a given interface, he or she would give it fairly high 
interactivity ratings, whereas a user with a lower skill level would rate it more negatively. The 
result would be a confusion of perceived interactivity and perceived usability (cf. Chapter 6.3) 
(p. 386). 
Another problem with locating perceived interactivity within the user is that it is not 
physically observable and hence not immediately available for empirical investigation. For the 
purposes of empirical research, the concept has to be operationalized, i.e. associated with a set 
of measurable units (cf. Chapter 15.4.3). McMillan et al. (McMillan & Hwang 2002; McMillan 
et al. 2003) presented a set of 18 scaled measures of perceived interactivity (MPIs) to 
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operationalize perceived interactivity in the context of measuring consumer perceptions of 
advertising on the World Wide Web. These measures are organized in terms of three 
subdimensions (McMillan et al. 2003: 402): 
• Real-time communication. Capacity for conversation, two-way communication, concurrent 
communication, and interpersonal communication; 
• No delay. Speed of the transaction between human and computer; 
• Engaging. Content variety, appeal to the user, ease of navigation, and immediacy of 
response. 
Recent research (Sohn et al. 2003) has linked the concept of perceived interactivity to the 
expectations of users. As illustrated in Figure 21, Sohn et al. argued that interaction is a circular 
process in which users’ prior expected interactivity with respect to a chosen medium influences 
their actual interaction with instances of the medium and is, in turn, modified by users’ 
perceptions of the interactivity of that experience. Sohn et al. defined expected interactivity as 
“the extent of interactivity that a person expects to experience during a prospective interaction 
with a medium” (Sohn et al. 2003). For example, users’ subjective expectations about 
interactions with the World Wide Web in general before they experience an interaction with a 
web site will affect their actual interactions with specific web sites, which, in turn, will 
influence their perception of the interactivity of these sites after the interaction. Finally, users’ 
post-interaction evaluations of the interactivity of web sites will modify their expectations of 
interactivity with regard to the World Wide Web as a medium (Sohn et al. 2003). Hence, Sohn 
et al. proposed two levels of interactivity from the perspective of users: their expected 
interactivity toward a medium and their perceived interactivity of particular instances of that 
medium. The study conducted by Sohn et al. (2003) confirmed the role of expected interactivity 
in understanding the relationship between the user and the medium. In particular, expected 
interactivity was found to affect perceived interactivity when an instance of a medium (a web 
site) exhibited high-level interactive features (selected according to the dimensions of 
interactivity proposed by Ha and James (1998)). 
5.3.10  Multidimensional Views on Interactivity 
The discussion so far has shown that interactivity is a multi-faceted concept (Downes & 
McMillan 2000), which is difficult to capture with a definition that focuses on a single aspect, 
such as message exchange, as in Rafaeli’s classic account presented above. In fact, an 
increasing number of researchers acknowledge that interactivity should be conceptualized along 
multiple dimensions, with each dimension being represented by a continuum (Downes & 
McMillan 2000). An early multidimensional definition of interactivity by Heeter (1989) placed 
the concept in the structures and processes of the medium (McMillan 1998). She identified six 
measurable dimensions of interactivity, which she intended to cover all new (pre-Web) media 
(Heeter 1989: 225–231; Jensen 1998: 199f.; McMillan 1998; Chou 2003): 
1. Complexity of choice available (selectivity). The amount and variety of choices (actions or 
information) available to the user (this element is often associated with control, cf. Section 
5.3.5); 
2. Effort users must exert. How much physical or mental energy users require to access 
information or accomplish other tasks; 
3. Responsiveness to the user (conversationality). The extent to which a medium can react 
responsively to a user; 
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4. Monitoring information/system use. How well data about the behavior of users while on the 
media system can be collected across an entire user population; 
5. Ease of adding information. The degree to which users can contribute content to a media 
system that can be accessed by a large, undifferentiated audience; 
6. Facilitation of interpersonal communication. The extent of support available for 
(a-) synchronous mediated person-to-person communication. 
Heeter’s catalogue clearly emphasizes the role of the user (Kenney et al. 2000). Four 
dimensions (nos. 1, 2, 3, and 5) are concerned with the choices available to the user, what effort 
he or she has to expend, how responsive the medium is to him or her, and how easily he or she 
can contribute information, respectively. The sixth dimension treats both parties involved in a 
communication equally. Finally, the fourth dimension considers the other side of the two-way 
(or more) flow of information (the sender). Heeter’s conceptual definition has been adapted for 
several empirical investigations of interactivity, however with mixed success (e.g. McMillan 
1998; Massey & Levy 1999; Kenney et al. 2000). Jensen saw the problem of manageability 
when applying Heeter’s definition in practical situations, due to the large number of 
dimensions, their complexity, and the fact that they overlap each other (Jensen 1998: 200). 
Ha and James (1998) analyzed the interactivity of business web sites, defining the concept as 
“the extent to which the communicator and the audience respond to, or are willing to facilitate, 
each other’s communication needs” (Ha & James 1998: 461, see above). To operationalize 
interactivity, they proposed five dimensions (Ha & James 1998; Kiousis 2002: 367 + 380): 
1. Playfulness. The entertainment value of an interactive experience, which is provided by 
features including interactive games and “curiosity-arousal devices” (e.g. humorous 
animations); 
2. Choice. The number of options available to users (regarding color, speed, language, etc.); 
3. Connectedness. “[T]he feeling of being able to link to the outside world and to broaden one’s 
experience easily” (Ha & James 1998: 462); operationalized in terms of the number of 
hyperlinks on web pages; 
4. Information collection. The presence of mechanisms for monitoring user behavior (similar to 
Heeter’s fourth dimension); 
5. Reciprocal communication. The availability of response (feedback) mechanisms for users 
(e.g. contact forms, surveys, shopping baskets, etc.). 
In Steuer’s conceptualization, interactivity is determined by the “technological structure of 
the medium” and defined as “the extent to which users can participate in modifying the form 
 
Figure 21. Sohn et al.’s circular process of interactivity perception formation (Sohn et al. 2003, 
Figure 1). The diagram shows the interplay between prior expectations, interaction, and post-
interaction evaluation. 
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and content of a mediated environment in real time” (Steuer 1992: 84). Steuer examined three 
factors (or dimensions) that contribute to interactivity (p. 85f.): 
1. Speed of interaction (or response time). The rate of assimilation of user inputs enabled by 
the mediated environment. Real-time interaction (cf. Section 5.3.6) scores high on this 
dimension, as user actions change the environment immediately. 
2. Range. The number of possibilities for effecting change on the mediated environment at any 
given time (determined by temporal ordering, spatial organization, intensity (of sounds, 
images, and smells), and frequency characteristics (timbre, color)). 
3. Mapping. The ability of a system to connect human actions (through system controls) to 
actions in the mediated environment in a natural and predictable (vs. arbitrary and unrelated) 
manner. Mapping can be increased by adapting controllers to the affordances provided by 
the human body (e.g. speech recognition, data gloves, eye gaze tracking, etc.). 
In an attempt to operationalize interactivity in the context of computer-mediated 
environments, Downes and McMillan (2000) conducted in-depth interviews with individuals 
working in the field of interactive communication. From the responses which they received, 
they identified six dimensions of interactivity (Downes & McMillan 2000): 
1. Direction of communication. Support for two-way communication provided by the 
computer-based interactive environment; 
2. Time flexibility. The extent to which the timing of communication can meet the varying time 
demands of participants and can be controlled by them; 
3. Sense of place. The degree to which the environment can make users feel that they have been 
transported to a virtual place; 
4. Level of control. Users’ perception of the degree to which they can exert control over 
content, timing, participation, etc. in the environment; 
5. Responsiveness. The degree to which participants perceive the communication in the 
environment to be reacting responsively to their own actions; 
6. Perceived purpose of communication. Individual perceptions of communication goals in the 
environment (informational vs. persuasive). 
Jensen (1998) contributed another multidimensional conceptualization of interactivity, based 
on his definition of the concept as “a measure of a media’s [sic!] potential ability to let the user 
exert an influence on the content and/or form of the mediated communication” (Jensen 1998: 
201). He suggested four dimensions of interactivity, two of which can be conflated into a single 
dimension (pp. 201f.): 
1. Selective. The availability of choice, with or without a return channel enabling users to make 
requests to the media system. This dimension includes two subdimensions: 
• Transmissional. The availability of choice in a one-way media system with no return 
channel and hence without the possibility to make requests; 
• Consultational. The availability of choice (by request) in a two-way media system with a 
return channel; 
2. Conversational. The extent to which a medium allows the user to create and contribute his or 
her own information, whether stored or in real time; 
3. Registrational. The ability of a medium to collect information about a user and to use this 
information to adapt and/or respond to the user. 
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Jensen integrated the three dimensions (selective, conversational, and registrational) into a 
three-dimensional graphical model of interactivity, which is shown in Figure 22. It is worth 
noting that Jensen’s model includes intelligent agents (underlined in Figure 22), which he 
classified as ‘consultational,’ ‘conversational,’ and ‘registrational.’ That is, in Jensen’s model 
of interactivity, agents are two-way media systems that provide a return channel for user 
requests, accept different kinds of (multimodal) input from the user, and collect information 
about each user to adapt their behavior and responses to his or her actions, knowledge, needs, 
preferences, etc. 
 
Figure 22. Jensen’s three-dimensional representation of the dimensions of interactivity. Adapted from 
Jensen (1998: 202, Figure 9). For purposes of presentation, the cuboid has been split into two halves 
orthogonal to the registrational dimension. 
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5.4  Interactivity in (Distance) Education 
No topic raises more contentious debate among educators than the role of interaction as a crucial 
component of the educational process. This debate is fueled by surface problems in definition and 
vested interests of professional educators, but is more deeply marked by epistemological 
assumptions relative to the role of humans and human interaction in education and learning. 
(Anderson 2003b: 1). 
A long history of study has recognized interaction and interactivity as central ingredients of 
teaching and learning processes and contexts (e.g. Dewey 1916; Daniel & Marquis 1988; 
Moore 1989; Hillman et al. 1994; Wagner 1994; Sims 1997a; Sims 1997b; Berge 1999; Sims 
1999; Sims 2000; Yacci 2000; Bannan-Ritland 2002; Anderson 2003a; Anderson 2003b; Chou 
2003; Sims 2003; Wallace 2003; Anderson 2004; Muirhead & Juwah 2004; Phillips 2004; 
Roblyer & Wiencke 2004; Woods & Baker 2004; Wagner 2006), whether education happens 
face-to-face (same place and time) or at a distance (independent of place and/or time), with or 
without support from educational media (cf. Figure 23). 
Since the arrival of the new media in (distance) education, the potential to create interactive 
learning experiences with them has led many to consider learning from (as an instructor or 
tutor), with (as a tool), and through (as a medium for interpersonal communication with 
learners, instructors, and other people) information and communication technologies (Yacci 
2000) as superior to face-to-face classroom teaching and other traditional forms of instruction. 
In particular, the various applications of computers in education since the 1960s and 
increasingly since the 1990s, including, in chronological order, computer-assisted instruction 
(CAI),40 multimedia learning, and, recently, e-learning and mobile learning (cf. Chapter 2.1), 
have all been regarded as superior to traditional instruction because each of them is ‘interactive’ 
(Yacci 2000): 
Computer-based instruction provides greater potential for truly interactive instruction than any 
mediated teaching device to date, excluding in many instances, the human tutor. (Jonassen 1988: 
97). 
The word interactive, when used to describe computer-based learning resources, has tended to 
imply better experiences, more active learning, enhanced interest and motivation. (Sims 1999, his 
emphasis). 
[I]nteractivity is frequently used to refer to an inherent quality of the medium and learning 
environment, with an underlying assumption that the interactive characteristics of communication 
with other learners or content objects is beneficial to the learning process. (Sims 2003: 87). 
For technology-mediated learning, interaction is a key value proposition. (…) Interaction 
continues to be perceived as the defining attribute for quality and value in online learning 
experience [sic!]. (Wagner 2006: 44). 
While the beneficial effects of interaction and interactivity in education seem to be disputed 
by few, there is no unanimous definition of these concepts in the educational literature, just as 
                                              
40  Computer-assisted instruction (CAI) is only one example from the large collection of terms in use to 
refer to the application of computers and related technologies in education. Apart from CAI, many 
other abbreviations have been built from the initial letters of words including ‘computer’ (C), 
‘managed’ (M), ‘based’ (B), ‘assisted’ (A), ‘aided’ (A), ‘learning’ (L), ‘instruction’ (I), ‘training’ (T), 
‘education’ (E), and so on. 
Chapter 5: Interactivity 95 
no one has been able to define them conclusively in general, as discussed in the previous 
sections of this chapter. The overuse and underdefinedness (Heeter 2000: 75) of both terms in 
the context of education has been noted by a number of scholars: 
Interaction is another important term that carries so many meanings as to be almost useless 
unless specific submeanings can be defined and generally agreed upon. (Moore 1989: 1). 
Interactivity is important, but there appears to be no consensus of what interactivity actually 
represents or involves. (Sims 1997a: 160). 
[D]econstruction essentially reveals interactivity to be not a conceptual unity, defined in terms of 
clear distinctions between antithetical terms, but as a fragmented, inconsistent, and rather messy 
notion encompassing both privileged and marginalized binaries, and the range of meanings in 
between. (Rose 1999: 48). 
[A]lthough interaction has long been a defining and critical component of the educational 
process and context, it is surprisingly difficult to find a clear and precise definition of this concept 
in the education literature. (Anderson 2004: 43). 
To better understand the role of interaction and interactivity in the context of teaching and 
learning, the following sections discuss functions of interaction and interactivity in education 
(cf. Section 5.4.1), describe different types of interaction in (distance) education (cf. Section 
5.4.2), explore the nature of instructional interactivity (cf. Section 5.4.3), review the concept of 
transactional distance (cf. Section 5.4.4), examine the contribution of social interaction to 
educational experiences (cf. Section 5.4.5), and, finally, consider interactivity in the context of 
learning from computers (cf. Section 5.4.6). 
 
Figure 23. A qualitative diagram of different educational media charted against the degree of 
interaction and independence (of time and distance) supported by these media. Adapted from Anderson 
(2004: 44f., Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). As the extension of the box indicates, the World Wide Web 
provides support for all the educational media shown in the diagram. 
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5.4.1  Functions of Interaction and Interactivity 
Many researchers and practitioners in the field of education stress that interaction between and 
among learners, learning content, instructors, and other elements of the educational process and 
context is important for achieving desired learning outcomes: 
[Interactivity in learning is] a necessary and fundamental mechanism for knowledge acquisition 
and the development of both cognitive and physical skills. (Barker 1994: 1). 
Interaction is intrinsic to successful, effective instructional practice as well as individual 
discovery. (Sims 1997a: 158). 
Interaction serves a wide range of functions in the educational process. Some examples of 
the positive effects of interaction include the following (Northrup et al. 2002; Muirhead & 
Juwah 2004; Mason & Rennie 2006): 
• Interaction fosters active and participative learning of individuals and within groups. 
• Interactions can be designed to suit different learner needs and learning styles. 
• The capacity for interaction enables learners to contribute to and assume ownership and 
control of their learning process. 
• Appropriate interactions can help learners to develop higher-order knowledge and skills, 
including critical thinking, decision making, problem solving, reflection, etc. 
• Interactions give all parties involved the opportunity to provide feedback to each other that 
informs the learning process and enhances the learning experience. 
• Social interactions among participants in a (distance) learning experience are critical for 
building social presence and community, with positive effects on learning (cf. Section 5.4.5). 
• Interaction is important for learner satisfaction and contributes to student persistence in 
distance learning courses. 
Given these benefits, it is not surprising that more, and more sophisticated, interaction (or 
interactivity) in a learning experience, in particular one that is mediated by technology, is 
commonly expected to improve learning outcomes and learner satisfaction: 
The rationale for [exploring interaction in the context of technology-mediated learning] (…) 
revolves around two commonly held beliefs: 
• The perceived quality of a learning experience is directly proportional to and positively 
correlated with the degree to which that experience is seen as interactive. 
• If technology-mediated learning designs are to have any significant impact on current and future 
pedagogical practice, then learning design and development decisions need to maximize the 
benefit of interaction. (Wagner 2006: 45). 
Interaction and interactivity in education have also become increasingly important because 
of the high educational value attributed to them in modern theories of learning, which assign an 
actively constructive role to the learner (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). Looking at the historical progression 
of learning theories from behaviorism (cf. Chapter 2.2.1) through cognitivism (cf. Chapter 
2.2.2) to present-day constructivist theory, there has been a concomitant rise in the expectations 
of interactivity levels in learning activities. A number of taxonomies in the literature reflect the 
common view that the higher the level of interactivity, the better the outcome (see below). For 
example, Rhodes and Azbell (1985) proposed three levels of interactivity relating to the degree 
of user control (cf. Section 5.3.5) over content and structure. The lowest, reactive level involves 
basic stimulus-response interactions of a behaviorist character, granting learners only limited 
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control over content and structure. The second, co-active level gives the learner more control 
over either content or structure, but not both. Finally, at the highest, proactive level, the learner 
has extended control over both content and structure (Sims 1999). The notion of increased 
learner control corresponds well with constructivist ideas of learning (Metzger & Schulmeister 
2004: 266). 
5.4.2  Types of Interaction 
In processes and contexts of education, interaction has traditionally been conceived as an 
exchange between people. For example, Daniel and Marquis understood interaction “in a 
restrictive manner to cover only those activities where the student is in two-way contact with 
another person (or persons)” (Daniel & Marquis 1988: 339). Imposing the same restriction, 
Garrison defined interaction as “sustained, two-way communication among two or more 
persons for purposes of explaining and challenging perspectives” (Garrison 1993: 16). These 
definitions imply that in a formal educational environment, interaction is seen as occurring 
between learners and instructors, or among learners (Berge 1999). However, the participation of 
other elements in interactions involving learners has also been recognized. Moore (1989) and 
Juler (1990) described interaction between learners and content as another critical component of 
education (Anderson 2003b). Moore’s now classic trichotomy specified three distinct types of 
interaction in the context of distance education, defining interactions as transactions between 
learner and content, learner and instructor, and learner and learner (Moore 1989): 
• Learner-content interaction. The process of learners examining, considering, and 
assimilating the instructional content presented during the educational experience. Moore 
regarded this type of interaction as a “defining characteristic of education” (Moore 1989) 
because “[e]very learner has to construct knowledge through a process of personally 
accommodating information into previously existing cognitive structures [(cf. Chapter 
2.2.2)]. It is interacting with content that results in these changes in the learner’s 
understanding” (Moore & Kearsley 1996: 128). 
• Learner-instructor interaction. Communication between the learner and the instructor in 
which the learner can draw on the assistance, advice, encouragement, information, 
organization, and other kinds of support provided by the instructor (cf. Chapter 12.3), and 
the instructor can use feedback (cf. Section 5.3.1) from the learner to adapt to his or her 
needs. Mutual feedback between individual learners and the instructor is essential for this 
type of interaction; however, this is not feasible in all educational contexts. 
• Learner-learner interaction. Communication of learners with one or more peers in which the 
instructor may be present and/or influence the interaction or not. According to Moore, the 
value of learner-learner interaction “depends largely on the circumstances of the learners and 
their age, experience, and level of learner autonomy. For younger learners, the teaching task 
of stimulation and motivation will be assisted by peer-group interaction, though this is not 
particularly important for most adult and advanced learners, who tend to be self-motivated” 
(Moore 1989: 5). 
Moore’s three-part construct of educational interaction has seen several extensions and 
adaptations in subsequent, more complex models of interaction in educational settings (Woods 
& Baker 2004). Hillman et al. (1994) supplied a fourth interaction type, learner-interface 
interaction, acknowledging the increasing importance of user interfaces (cf. Chapter 1.2) in 
technology-based distance learning environments for facilitating interaction between content, 
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learners, and instructors. Being able to interact successfully with the interface was regarded as a 
prerequisite for learners to be able to interact effectively with content, learners, and instructors 
(Godwin 2005). “When dealing with any tool, it is necessary for the user to interact with the 
device in a specific way before it will do his or her bidding” (Hillman et al. 1994: 34). In other 
words, the interface is not a neutral component but influences interactions of the other types 
(Godwin 2005). It can even become “an independent force with which the learner must 
contend” (p. 35), in particular for less technically-adept learners, and learners may have to be 
literate with several interfaces (p. 39).41 
Another type of interaction was found by Burnham and Walden (1997). On the basis of their 
observations of the interactions in a distance learning environment, they added learner-
environment interaction to the set of interaction types (Woods & Baker 2004), which they 
defined as “a reciprocal action or mutual influence between a learner and the learner’s 
surroundings that either assists or hinders learning” (Burnham & Walden 1997). Learners may 
interact with their environment by conducting experiments, participating in field trips, attending 
in-class sessions, and doing other activities outside the computer-based learning environment 
(Godwin 2005). 
Three further types of interaction in distance education were added to Moore’s (1989) 
framework by Anderson and Garrison (1998): instructor-instructor, instructor-content, and 
content-content interaction (cf. Figure 24).42 The interaction of instructors with peers in 
communities of colleagues sharing their interests provides them with opportunities for 
professional development and support (Anderson 2004: 48, cf. Chapter 2.2.3). This type of 
interaction takes place at conferences, in seminars, through informal communication, etc. 
(Anderson & Garrison 1998: 105). Instructor-content interaction occurs as instructors create 
content and learning activities (Anderson 2004: 48). The World Wide Web and other recent 
technological achievements have enabled instructors to develop, collate, monitor, and update 
content and activities in more efficient and creative ways than before (Woods & Baker 2004). 
Finally, content-content interaction was introduced by Anderson and Garrison to acknowledge 
that more and more content is integrated with increasingly sophisticated tools (Woods & Baker 
2004), including databases, intelligent agents, search engines, weblogs, wikis, content 
syndication aggregators, etc., which enable content to update and improve itself through 
interaction with other automated resources (Anderson 2004: 48). 
In later work, Anderson (2003b) addressed the issue of finding an appropriate mix of the 
different interaction types in distance education in order to achieve deep and meaningful 
learning at acceptable costs and expense of time. In particular, he considered the equivalence of 
interaction modes and its implications for the design of educational experiences. Anderson 
(2003b: 3f.) noted that: 
• The transformation of instructor-learner and learner-learner interaction into enhanced forms 
of learner-content interaction is both feasible and desired. 
                                              
41  Pedagogical software agents implemented as embodied interactive characters can help to ‘humanize’ 
the interface to a computer-based learning environment by allowing learners to draw on their pre-
existing knowledge about human-human communication in their interactions with an agent. In 
addition, various forms of human embodied interaction with the environment itself can be considered 
as alternatives to traditional human-computer interfaces (Dourish 2004). 
42  Anderson and Garrison (1998) used the terms ‘teacher’ and ‘student’ rather than ‘instructor’ and 
‘learner’ in their framework. In the present discussion, the latter terms have been adopted instead to 
be consistent with the terminology chosen for the other types of interaction. 
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• Media are equivalent in their ability to support educational experiences. 
• The impact of media on learning is subject to a complex interaction between various factors, 
including content, learner preferences and needs, facilities and policies of institutions, and 
theoretical and practical frameworks of teaching and learning. 
• While educational theorists stress the importance of interaction, many learners opt for 
programs requiring minimal interaction with instructors and other learners. 
• “[T]here is a wide range of need and preference for different combinations of paced and 
unpaced, synchronous and asynchronous activity, and also a strong desire for variety and 
exposure to different modes and modularities of educational provision and activity” 
(Anderson 2003b: 4). 
Based on these observations, Anderson proposed an equivalency theorem to provide a 
theoretical basis for judging the appropriate relative proportions of learner-instructor, learner-
learner, and learner-content interaction in educational settings: 
Deep and meaningful formal learning is supported as long as one of the three forms of interaction 
(student-teacher; student-student; student-content) is at a high level. The other two may be 
offered at minimal levels, or even eliminated, without degrading the educational experience.43 
                                              
43  The team behind the Virtual Linguistics Campus (VLC) can actually confirm Anderson’s theorem 
from its own practical experience of both developing the VLC and having used it to deliver web-
based courses since 2001. During this time, it has been observed again and again that the high level 
of learner-content interaction provided by the classes in the VLC reduces the need for learner-
instructor and learner-learner interaction, since the content is largely self-explanatory (Handke 
2006b: 141). 
 
Figure 24. Six types of educational interaction in distance education. Adapted from Anderson and 
Garrison (1998). 
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High levels of more than one of these three modes will likely provide a more satisfying 
educational experience, though these experiences may not be as cost or time effective as less 
interactive learning sequences. (Anderson 2003b: 4). 
According to Anderson, the central implication of this theorem is the equivalence of the 
three types of interaction: one type can be substituted for one of the other two without 
diminishing educational effectiveness, provided that the substitute is at the same (high) level 
(Anderson 2003b: 4). In the following, he listed further corollaries and implications of his 
theorem (pp. 4ff.). From the perspective of this thesis, it is interesting to note that one of them is 
that “[s]ome student-teacher interactions can be automated, and thus substituted in whole or 
part, through the development and use of content resources, and especially those utilizing 
autonomous teacher agents” (p. 4, emphasis added), which assist the instructor. Teacher agents 
perform functions that support instructors in the administration of the educational process. 
These functions include (p. 5): 
• Communicating with student and content agents; 
• Monitoring and modeling learner progress (cf. Chapter 12.2); 
• Collecting and organizing educational resources; 
• Helping with marking, record keeping, and document management; 
• Scheduling deadlines, meetings, etc. and facilitating other time management tasks; 
• Bringing instructors into contact with colleagues sharing the same field or interests (via their 
teaching agents). 
Learners have their own student agents, which intelligently search for content and expertise; 
perform bookkeeping; set up (online) meetings with the instructor and other students; facilitate 
collaborative work among students; remind (teams of) learners of important deadlines; help 
them to document, publish, and archive their work; and so on (Anderson 2004: 51f.; Anderson 
& Whitelock 2004: 5). Finally, content agents are responsible for content rights management, 
automatic content updates, tracking learner use of content, etc. (Anderson 2004: 52). Teacher 
agents, student agents, and content agents are situated in the emerging Semantic Web (pp. 51ff., 
cf. Chapter 12.1.2.5). Another proposal in this context involves learning support agents that 
roam a web of semantically marked-up (annotated) educational resources44 to find, retrieve, 
filter, sequence, and present materials from different resources according to the abilities, needs, 
and preferences of the individual learner (Devedzic 2004). 
Learner-context interaction is another type of educational interaction proposed in the 
literature (Gibson 1998b). It contributes the view that learners are simultaneously active in 
multiple contexts extending beyond the learning environment and including family, workplace, 
peer groups, government, mass media, organized religion, and other sociocultural contexts 
(Woods & Baker 2004). 
Still other interaction types consider interactions taking place within a single entity involved 
in the educational process rather than between several entities. Learner-self interactions 
                                              
44  Educational resources are units of specialized learning content of various kinds and sizes, including 
video clips, animations, simulations, Virtual Sessions (cf. Chapter 2.4.1), and complete e-learning 
courses. Semantic markup of an educational resource may describe aspects including title, domain, 
author(s), central topics, learning objectives, instructional method, curriculum integration, and so on 
(Devedzic 2004: 58). 
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(Hirumi 2002) take place within each learner.45 They include cognitive operations that facilitate 
processes of learning and metacognition, enabling learner self-monitoring and self-regulation 
(Anderson 2004: 20).46 Learner-self interactions form Level I in a three-level hierarchical 
“framework for analyzing, designing, and sequencing planned e-learning interactions” (cf. 
Figure 25) described by Hirumi (2002). Level II of this framework comprises interactions that 
occur between the learner and human (learner-instructor, learner-learner, and learner-other) and 
non-human (learner-content, learner-interface, and learner-environment) resources (Anderson 
2004: 20). Level III is a meta-level responsible for organizing Levels I and II (Godwin 2005). 
At this level, learner-instruction interactions inform the design and sequencing of Level II 
interactions with the goal of stimulating Level I interactions (Hirumi 2002: 143). 
5.4.3  The Nature of Instructional Interactivity 
Moore’s original threefold model and the frameworks extending it all exhibit a focus on who is 
interacting and do not provide a clear definition of what the nature of interaction is (Woods & 
Baker 2004). In contrast, Wagner (1994) offered a broad definition of interaction, which aims 
to capture the essence of the concept while avoiding a restriction to specific types of interaction 
(Anderson 2003a: 130): 
[I]nteractions are reciprocal events that require at least two objects and two actions. Interactions 
occur when these objects and events mutually influence one another. (Wagner 1994: 8). 
Wagner’s definition moves the focus away from the entities that are interacting and towards 
the nature of what is happening between them. Two key elements of interactions appear in the 
definition: reciprocity and mutual influence (cf. Section 5.1). In distance education, these 
interactions are interpersonal, i.e. they take place between human participants in an educational 
context (Woods & Baker 2004). Wagner drew a distinction between this kind of human-human 
interaction and interactivity, which she regarded as an attribute of technology: 
Interactivity may eventually be viewed as a machine attribute, while interaction may be perceived 
as an outcome of using interactive instructional delivery systems. (Wagner 1994: 26). 
Yacci (2000) provided “a structural definition of interactivity for distance education and 
intelligent CBT.” This definition locates interactivity in the exchange of mutually coherent 
messages (i.e. the communication setting, cf. Section 5.3.2) but also stresses the importance of 
learners’ perception of interactivity (cf. Section 5.3.9), as well as positive cognitive and 
affective effects that can occur through interactivity. The definition identifies four major 
attributes of instructional interactivity: 
• Interactivity is a message loop. 
• Instructional interactivity occurs from the learner’s point of view and does not occur until a 
message loop from and back to the student has been completed. 
                                              
45  Other types of self-interaction include instructor-self interaction and content-self interaction (Godwin 
2005). 
46  Hirumi’s notion of learner-self interactions is close to Moore’s original idea of learner-content 
interaction (Godwin 2005), which he described as “the process of intellectually interacting with 
content that results in changes in the learner’s understanding, the learner’s perspective, or the 
cognitive structures of the learner’s mind” (Moore 1989). 
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• Instructional interactivity has two distinct classes of outputs: content learning and affective 
benefits. 
• Messages in an interaction must be mutually coherent. (Yacci 2000: 6, his emphasis). 
Yacci’s structural model defines instructional interactivity as a loop involving two entities 
(learners, instructors, computers and other media, pedagogical software agents, etc.) with the 
ability to send and receive messages. As Figure 26 shows, in this loop, messages flow from the 
sending entity to the receiving entity and back to the sending entity (Yacci 2000; Yacci & 
Hyman 2001). Examples of interactive loops include the following: 
• Instructor to Learner to Instructor; 
• Learner 1 to Learner 2 to Learner 1; 
• Learner to Computer Program to Learner; 
• Learner to Pedagogical Agent to Learner. 
It is important to note that an interactive loop does not exist unless there is a message flow 
from the originating entity to the target entity and from the target entity back to the originating 
entity (i.e. not until the circuit has been closed). Messages in the structural model may involve 
language as well as physical actions that can be observed by both participating entities (Yacci 
2000). 
The second major element of Yacci’s definition is the requirement that “interactivity in 
instruction must occur from the student’s point of view” (Yacci 2000). Considering the 
learner’s perspective in addition to that of the instructor or the computer program has important 
implications for the design of interactive educational experiences. First, an interactive loop may 
seem complete from the point of view of the instructor or the program but remains open 
(incomplete) from the learner’s perspective because feedback from the instructor or program 
concerning his or her response is not provided (Yacci 2000, cf. Section 5.3.1). This view is 
consistent with Rafaeli’s third-order dependency requirement: an exchange is fully interactive 
only after the third message, which relates both to the initial message and its response (cf. 
Section 5.3.2). The idea of feedback indicating the completion of an interactive loop has been 
mentioned by several authors (Weller 1988; Berge 1999; Liaw & Huang 2000; Northrup 2001). 
Learners expect and rely on the instructor (or program) to close the communications loop: 
 
Figure 25. Three levels of planned e-learning interactions (Hirumi 2002: 143). 
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Until students receive a ‘reply’ in some form verifying that what they sent was accurate, they 
typically are uncomfortable. Additionally, students may not be conceptualizing concepts in the 
manner intended. (Northrup 2001). 
Therefore, both instructors and designers of software for learning need to make sure that 
they provide feedback which completes the learner’s interactive loop. Second, even when 
feedback is given by the instructor or system, the learner may not recognize the message as 
related to his or her contribution and hence not perceive the response as interactive (Yacci 
2000). Hence, feedback should be appropriately contextualized and delivered in a way that 
learners can understand. Effective use of feedback is helpful in setting up a dialogue which 
involves the learner as an active participant rather than as a consumer of content (Brown & 
Voltz 2005). 
Yacci (2000) identified two distinct outcomes of instructional interactivity. The first, content 
learning, is a cognitive learning process for achieving an instructional goal, which involves the 
creation, extension, and modification of knowledge structures. The second outcome, affective 
benefits, includes the learner’s emotions and values attached to people, content, institutions, 
programs, etc. involved in instruction, which may be intensified or reduced in the instructional 
process. 
Finally, in Yacci’s model, mutual coherence between a message and its response refers to 
the extent that the content (‘payload’) of the message sent and the content of the responding 
message are related to each other (refer to the same topic). Yacci argued that “the extent of 
shared meaning between messages influences the perceived degree of interactivity” (Yacci 
2000). A high degree of shared meaning between messages leads to high mutual coherence and 
thus contributes to learner impressions of high interactivity (Yacci 2000). It should be noted 
that mutual coherence of messages does not consider how relevant an exchange is to 
instructional goals. The content of the exchange may even be irrelevant from a content learning 
perspective but may produce significant affective benefits (Yacci 2000), such as aiding in 
relationship building (cf. Section 5.4.5 and Chapter 7.16). 
Yacci et al. (Yacci 2000; Yacci & Hyman 2001) discussed several variables that influence 
the quality of the interactive loop, including lag time of response, message duration, amount of 
information content, and multiplexing. Lag time of response refers to the delay between sending 
a message and receiving a response that closes the loop. In synchronous communication, 
responses are generally expected within a few seconds. In contrast, the time lag between 
messages in asynchronous communication (mail, electronic mail, discussion forums, etc.) can 
be longer, but not too long. Again, it is important to include the learner’s point of view. If a 
learner sends an e-mail to his or her instructor and the instructor responds only five weeks later, 
although within minutes after reading it, there is no significant delay in response from the 
instructor’s perspective, but the perceived response lag for the learner is high (Yacci 2000). 
 
Figure 26. A completed message loop between two entities (Yacci 2000, Figure 1). 
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Northrup et al. (2002) studied learner perceptions of online interaction. They found that 
“[p]participants strongly stated that the need for timely responses from peers and from their 
instructor was of utmost importance” (p. 6). In general, the learners of today have grown or are 
growing up in a world in which cell phones, MP3-players, computer games, the World Wide 
Web, e-mail, instant messaging, and other digital technologies are natural elements of their 
daily lives. These ‘new’ learners, called the “Net Generation” (Oblinger & Oblinger 2005) or 
the “Digital Natives” (Prensky 2001a; Prensky 2001b; Woodill 2004), as opposed to the 
“Digital Immigrants” generation of their parents and instructors, who were born into a non-
digital world and entered the digital realm only as adults, “crave interactivity – an immediate 
response to their each and every action” (Prensky 2001b: 4, emphasis added). An educational 
system teaching the Net Generation with essentially the same approaches and technologies as it 
used on their parents is generally not well equipped to meet this demand. Digital Natives have 
low tolerance for response lags and quickly lose interest if these lags become significant, a fact 
that needs to be considered when designing online courses and other learning experiences for 
the Net Generation. 
Concerning the response times of interactive loops between learners and computers, 
Tognazzini (1993) argued with respect to software in general that responses which the machine 
can give at once should not be delayed. When the system needs some time to respond, learners 
should be reassured with immediate intermediary feedback, followed by displays, activities, etc. 
that keep them “interested and entertained” (in other words, occupied) during the waiting period 
in order to reduce their perception of the response lag (Tognazzini 1993). 
Message duration is another variable that refers to the length of time expired between the 
beginning and the end of a message (Yacci 2000; Yacci & Hyman 2001). The duration of 
messages in interactive exchanges is generally expected to be short or moderate, otherwise the 
interaction might be perceived as consisting of monologues; however, the tolerable length of a 
message may differ from one situation to the next (Yacci 2000). Yacci continued to point out 
that while message length has an impact on the mutual coherence of messages, the amount of 
information content, i.e. the quantity of new information included in a message, independent of 
its length, also contributes to mutual coherence. If the content of a message can be largely 
predicted by its recipient, the message is said to exhibit a high degree of information 
redundancy and a low degree of uncertainty or entropy (Shannon 1948a; Shannon 1948b) 
because it contains little information that is not known to the recipient. “The more we know 
about what message the source will produce, the less uncertainty, the less the entropy, and the 
less the information” (Pierce 1961: 23). In instruction, this is true of confirmatory feedback 
messages to correct learner responses. Yacci concluded that feedback to correct responses 
should be kept concise because it does not provide any new information. He went on to argue 
that feedback can be more effective if it follows incorrect responses because then the feedback 
message contains more information unknown to the learner (lower information redundancy; 
higher uncertainty and entropy) and may therefore be perceived as having higher information 
content, contributing to perceptions of higher degrees of interactivity. Redundant information in 
instructional responses is not always negative, though. In fact, it can help to reassure learners 
who lack confidence while they are doing some task. In these cases, information redundancy 
has benefits relating to learner affect rather than content learning (Yacci 2000). 
Concerning the nature of the content of instructional messages, Yacci (2000) pointed out that 
messages in an educational context may combine (multiplex) both cognitive and affective 
information into an aggregate contribution, which, for example, provides the necessary 
scaffolding (cf. Chapter 12.3.2) and encouragement (cf. Chapter 12.3.8) to help the learner to 
accomplish some task. In face-to-face communication, humans (and increasingly embodied 
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interactive software agents) naturally convey the affective component of a message by means of 
performing the various non-verbal communication behaviors discussed in Chapter 10.1 (speech, 
facial expression, gaze, gesture, posture, and locomotion), which Yacci (2000) referred to as 
paralanguage. In contrast, communication of affect is not a natural element of interactions in 
computer-assisted instruction and e-learning, especially as far as automated responses are 
concerned, but has to be explicitly designed into the educational experience. This is important 
because learners might interpret the lack of perceptible affective cues in instructional messages 
as the indicator of an indifferent or uncaring attitude of the instructor or system (Yacci 2000). 
Embodied pedagogical software agents can be designed to combine affective and cognitive 
information into multimodal messages which are delivered using verbal and non-verbal means. 
As in interactive experiences in general, the perceived interactivity (cf. Section 5.3.9) of 
educational processes and contexts influences learners’ perception of their own performance 
and their satisfaction with the educational experience. Swan (2001; 2002) conducted a large 
survey-based study of learners in online courses to elicit how they perceived their courses along 
various dimensions, including learning, interaction with the instructor, interaction with other 
course participants, their personal level of activity, and their satisfaction with the course. An 
important result of her study was that learners who believed that they had more interactions 
with both their instructors and peers reported higher levels of satisfaction with their courses and 
thought that they learned more (Swan 2001). Furthermore, Swan found significant positive 
correlations between learners’ reported levels of activity in the course and their reported 
satisfaction and learning, as well as between greater structural consistency within the course 
and learners’ satisfaction and perceived learning. Hence, “frequent and engaging interaction 
with course content” and “a clear and consistent course structure” also contribute to learners’ 
satisfaction and perceptions of learning (Swan 2002). In summary, Swan’s study showed that 
from learners’ point of view, interaction with content, instructors, and other participants plays 
an important role in successful online learning and therefore should be considered by 
instructors and developers of online courses alike. 
Other researchers came to similar conclusions. Flottemesch (2000) reviewed the literature on 
interaction in distance education and found support for the hypothesis that learners’ judgment 
of distance courses depends on their perception of their interaction with the instructor. This 
view is shared by a number of other authors cited by Woods and Baker (2004). According to 
these authors, learners’ perception that the level of interaction with instructors and other 
learners is ‘sufficient’ has a positive impact on their satisfaction with the learning experience 
because it helps them to develop a “sense of personalization and customization of learning” 
(Boettcher 1999: 43) and to get over feelings of distance and isolation (Woods & Baker 2004). 
If the interaction is perceived to be difficult, the level of learner satisfaction declines, whereas 
satisfaction increases when learners perceive that the course instructor places importance on 
interaction (Arbaugh 2000: 44ff.). 
5.4.4  Transactional Distance 
The “universe of teacher-learner relationships that exist when learners and instructors are 
separated by space and/or time” (Moore 1993: 22) is the subject of Moore’s theory of 
transactional distance (Moore 1972; Moore 1991; Moore 1993), which provides an account of 
the relationships between the parties involved in a distance learning setting (Bodomo et al. 
2001). Moore (1993) stated that the separation of learners and instructors in distance education 
results in certain behavioral patterns of the participants and influences both teaching and 
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learning processes. According to Moore, learners and instructors are separated by a 
“psychological and communications space” with an inherent potential for misunderstanding 
between learner and instructor inputs (Moore 1993). This space, called the transactional 
distance, has to be crossed in a distance education setting. Moore defined transactional distance 
as a function of the dialogue (interaction) between learners and instructors, the structure of the 
course design, and the nature and degree of learner autonomy (Moore 1993). As summarized by 
Wallace (2003), Moore’s conjecture was that a smaller transactional distance indicates greater 
learner involvement. More dialogue (i.e. purposeful, constructive, and valued interaction(s) 
(Moore 1993)) between learner and instructor would be a sign for a smaller transactional 
distance, whereas more structure provided by the instructor would result in a larger 
transactional distance (Wallace 2003: 245). As the role of dialogue becomes more prominent, 
the structure imposed by the course design, including instructional goals, activities, and 
assessment, decreases to allow for more learner control (Bodomo et al. 2001). In contrast, more 
structured educational experiences reduce students’ control of their own learning, which, in 
turn, diminishes their engagement with the content (Wallace 2003: 245).47 An example of high 
structure and low dialogue (and hence a large transactional distance) is the traditional lecture 
with no room for questions or discussion, whereas synchronous online discussions among 
learners exhibit a smaller transactional distance (low structure and high dialogue) (p. 245). 
Learner autonomy is a third factor which interacts with dialogue and structure and is defined as 
the extent to which the learner rather than the teacher determines the goals, experiences, and 
evaluation of his or her own learning (Moore 1993). Moore described the relationship between 
dialogue, structure, and learner autonomy as follows: more structure and less dialogue (i.e. 
greater transactional distance) in a distance learning scenario require the learner to exercise 
more autonomy, by taking responsibility, making judgments, and taking decisions with respect 
to his or her studies (Moore 1993). 
Pedagogical software agents can help to reduce transactional distance even in highly 
structured online learning scenarios with few possibilities for dialogue between learners and 
human instructors, by involving learners in instructional conversations with virtual coaches, 
experts, guides, etc. that are capable of various kinds of interactions available to human 
instructors (cf. Chapter 12.3). With their ability to monitor and adapt to the individual learner, 
these agents furthermore allow the learning environment to accommodate and be responsive to 
individual learners’ needs (cf. Chapter 4.2). 
5.4.5  Social Interaction 
Interpersonal interactions between and among learners and instructors are commonly not only 
about the instructional content or the task at hand (the educational dimension) but also involve 
a social dimension that has less do to with topics of the course and more with building trust, 
relationships (cf. Chapter 7.16), and community among the participants (Kreijns et al. 2003: 
342, cf. Figure 27). The term social interaction refers to exchanges between two or more 
individuals which aim to “transcend psychological distances and establish interpersonal 
                                              
47  In contrast, Borsook and Higginbotham-Wheat (1991) argued that the content and/or the instructor 
can provide structure which offers learners guidance and scaffolding. Leaving complete control to the 
learner has the inherent danger of causing confusion and loss of orientation (Godwin 2005). 
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connections” (Wagner 2006: 48) between them in order to facilitate both cognitive and socio-
emotional processes involved in learning.48 
Superficially, it could be argued that social interaction serves little purpose with respect to 
achieving instructional goals and poses an unnecessary source of distraction for learners, but, in 
fact, social interaction has been widely recognized as a key element of educational experiences 
in general and online courses in particular (e.g. Wagner 1994; Gilbert & Moore 1998; Liaw & 
Huang 2000; Northrup 2001; Kreijns et al. 2003). Students in online courses appreciate and 
benefit from interactions with their peers and the instructor (Wallace 2003: 250). When there is 
more social rapport among the participants in an online course, learners are said to experience 
less psychological distance, isolation, and frustration (Wolcott 1996). In addition, social 
interaction not only increases the total amount of interaction of an online course (Roblyer & 
Wiencke 2004: 27) but also directly fosters instructional interaction (Gilbert & Moore 1998: 
31) and thus enhances and furthers learning (Mason & Rennie 2006: 62). Many researchers in 
(distance) education share the view that social interaction is essential for effective (online) 
collaboration and communication and inseparable from it: “If there is collaboration then social 
interaction can be found in it, and vice versa, if there is no social interaction then there is also 
no real collaboration” (Kreijns et al. 2003: 338). Before they can effectively collaborate with 
their peers, learners need to build rapport with them in the early stages of forming a learning 
group, for which social exchanges are deemed a safer vehicle than content-related discussions 
(Mason & Rennie 2006: 63). This point was also emphasized by the following author: 
[I]f students are to offer their tentative ideas to their peers, if they are to critique the ideas of their 
peers, and if they are to interpret others’ critiques as valuable rather than as personal affronts, 
certain conditions must exist. (…) [S]tudents need to trust each other, feel a sense of warmth and 
belonging, and feel close to each other before they will engage willfully in collaboration and 
recognize the collaboration as a valuable experience. (Rourke 2000). 
Figure 27 summarizes the dual function of social interaction in learning experiences. On the 
one hand, social interaction facilitates socializing, getting to know each other, committing to 
social relationships, developing trust and belonging, building a sense of community, and other 
socio-emotional processes involved in relationship building, group formation, and group 
dynamics (Kreijns et al. 2003: 342). On the other hand, social interaction is also a central 
component of individual and collaborative cognitive processes of learning. Social development 
theory (Vygotsky 1962; Vygotsky et al. 1978) emphasizes the fundamental role of social 
interaction in the development of cognition (Bodomo et al. 2001). Social interaction is the basis 
for critical thinking, helps to develop shared understanding within a group of learners, enables 
the social construction of knowledge, and supports the acquisition of competences (Kirschner et 
al. 2003: 323, cf. Chapter 2.2.3). 
Social interaction is the preferred means for individuals to cross the psychological and 
communicative gap separating them from other participants in an educational experience (cf. 
Section 5.4.4) and to establish a sense of connectedness with their peers and instructors 
(Wagner 2006: 48). The degree to which an individual feels real (‘present’), or is perceived that 
way by other participants, in an online learning environment positively influences his or her 
perception of the strength of his or her connection with them, leading to greater overall 
satisfaction with the experience and greater willingness to stay within the environment or 
                                              
48  It should be noted that the term “social interaction” is used in this section in a narrower sense than in 
the rest of the thesis. Here, the focus is on the interpersonal dimension and on relationship building 
(cf. Chapter 7.16). 
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experience (p. 48). The notion of social presence has been used to describe this perception. In 
general terms, presence is “the perceptional illusion of non-mediation” (Lombard et al. 2000: 
77) created by an environment mediated by technology. Social presence is an important 
dimension of presence, where people feel that other intelligent entities co-exist and interact with 
them in the environment (Heeter 1992). According to Biocca, social co-presence may be 
indicated by a form, behavior, or sensory experience. Its amount depends on the degree to 
which an individual has a sense of access to the intelligence, intentions, and sensory 
impressions of another entity (Biocca 1997). In the same vein, Lee defined social presence as “a 
psychological state in which virtual (para-authentic or artificial) actors are experienced as actual 
social actors in either sensory or non-sensory ways” (Lee 2004: 45). In this state, technology 
users fail to detect both the para-authenticity of mediated humans and the artificiality of non-
human agents (p. 45; Lee et al. 2006: 964). 
Social presence theory (Short et al. 1976) is concerned with how different media influence 
perceptions of interpersonal communication regarding satisfaction and efficiency (Dirkin et al. 
2005: 117). This theory views social presence as a subjective quality of the medium used to 
communicate with other people (Short et al. 1976: 65). The social impact of different 
communication media is argued to depend on the degree of acoustic, visual, and physical 
contact between communicators which these media permit ([INT 43]). Social presence is 
defined as “the degree of salience of another person in an interaction and the consequent 
salience of an interpersonal relationship” (Short et al. 1976: 65). Key components of social 
presence include intimacy, immediacy, warmth, and interpersonal rapport ([INT 43]), which 
can be increased by providing more channels that can transmit relevant cues (such as facial 
expressions, body movement, and eye contact) between communicators (Lombard & Ditton 
1997). Different media vary in their capacity to convey verbal and non-verbal cues that 
facilitate the perception of other participants in the communication as physically salient and 
present (Kreijns et al. 2003: 345).49 
                                              
49  One implication of social presence theory is that media which are less capable of transmitting non-
verbal cues, in particular media that are text-based, such as e-mail and instant messaging, do not 
allow higher degrees of social presence because of the lack of social and affective information, 
resulting in negative effects on interpersonal communication (Rourke et al. 1999; [INT 43]). This 
 
 
Figure 27. The two functions of social interaction in learning. Adapted from Kreijns et al. (2003: 342, 
Figure 1). 
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Media providing a larger number of channels for communicating verbal and non-verbal cues 
can enhance users’ sense of social presence (Lombard & Ditton 1997) because they allow users 
to obtain richer information about the degree of realness of others as well as their own within 
the environment. The range of entities which are perceived as real, or having a social presence, 
is not limited to people. Lombard and Ditton noted that one type of presence is that of “social 
actor within medium,” which arises from perceptions and psychological processes that cause 
people to “illogically overlook the mediated or even artificial nature of an entity within a 
medium and attempt to interact with it“ (Lombard & Ditton 1997). Pedagogical agents capable 
of embodied conversation (cf. Chapter 11.3.4) and endowed with expertise (cf. Chapter 12), 
emotional intelligence (cf. Chapter 13.4), and personality (cf. Chapter 13.5) are such social 
actors within the medium that invite learners to suspend their disbelief (cf. Chapter 3.1.3). They 
can serve as a substitute for the social presence of instructors and other learners in computer-
based learning environments, creating a better sense of human-like interaction than other forms 
of learning from computers by broadening the bandwidth of social communication between 
computers and learners and increasing learner engagement and motivation (Johnson et al. 
2000). Early empirical investigation (Lester et al. 1997b; Lester et al. 1997c) revealed the 
persona effect, which is that the mere presence of a pedagogical software agent, even if the 
agent is not expressive, “can have a strong positive effect on student’s [sic!] perception of their 
learning experience” (Lester et al. 1997b). Later research found some support for the persona 
effect but also cautioned against believing in its unconditional validity (van Mulken et al. 1998; 
Dehn & van Mulken 2000; Moundridou & Virvou 2002; Dirkin et al. 2005; Yee et al. 2007). 
For example, the participants in the study conducted by Dirkin et al. (2005) perceived more 
social presence both when a computer-based tutorial only consisted of text and graphics and 
when it additionally featured an animated presentation agent using locomotion and pointing 
gestures and reading the text of the tutorial in a modulated voice with synchronized lip 
movements, adding commentary now and then to increase its believability as a social entity. 
Furthermore, participants in the text-only condition perceived the learning experience more 
positively. Given the ‘paradoxical’ results of their study, Dirkin et al. emphasized the need for 
careful design of social behaviors for animated pedagogical agents if they are to be of 
educational value, otherwise, the use of agent technology can actually detract from the learning 
experience. (…) [I]n certain contexts it may actually be better to have no agent than a badly 
designed one. In other words, as in most things in life, either do it well or don’t do it at all. 
(Dirkin et al. 2005: 113 + 125, emphasis added). 
A number of researchers (e.g. Berge 1999; Northrup 2001; Kreijns et al. 2003) have stressed 
that neither social nor task-/content-related interaction happens automatically but has to be 
explicitly designed into an online course (or any other educational experience). Therefore, 
designers and instructors of online courses commonly create activities and technologies 
intended to facilitate communication and collaboration and to promote social presence and 
community (Mason & Rennie 2006: 63). Given the positive connection between interaction and 
students’ (perceived) learning and satisfaction (cf. Section 5.4.3), it is tempting to incorporate 
more and more interaction into a course. However, an overuse or misuse of interaction may 
                                                                                                                                                
suggests, in turn, that social and affective interaction cannot be adequately supported by computer-
mediated communication, which is still largely text-based (Rourke et al. 1999, cf. Chapter 2.3.8), a 
phenomenon which has been termed the computer-mediated communication paradox (Hudlicka 
2003: 22). It should be noted, though, that this view has been contested by later reviewers (Rourke et 
al. 1999) and empirical studies (e.g. Burgoon et al. 2002). 
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backfire on the designer or instructor since it can lead to learner experiences of boredom, 
frustration, and overload (Berge 1999; Northrup 2001; Northrup et al. 2002). On the other hand, 
too little interaction is likely to increase learners’ psychological distance, isolation, and 
frustration and hence decrease learning and satisfaction (Northrup et al. 2002). 
5.4.6  Interactivity in Learning from Computers 
Research on distance education nowadays tends to focus on interpersonal communication with 
instructors and other learners through computers (Bannan-Ritland 2002; Kreijns et al. 2003) as 
well as learning with computers as cognitive artifacts (cf. Chapter 6.4) or ‘mindtools’ (Lajoie & 
Derry 1993; Jonassen & Reeves 1996; Jonassen et al. 1998; Lajoie 2000), subscribing to current 
constructivist views of learning, sometimes at the expense of considering processes of learning 
from computers through learners’ interaction with content presented in a computer interface, 
which are often regarded as obsolete (Yacci 2000, cf. Chapter 2.2.4). In contrast, Sims (1997a) 
explicitly considered the human-computer dimension, in particular “what makes an application 
interactive, instructional, and effective” (Sims 1997a: 158). In a later paper, he defined 
interactivity from a human-computer perspective as follows: 
Interactivity refers to the facilities provided by a computer-based application to provide the user 
with both control of the process and communication with content. This communication involves 
both the user initiating an action and the computer responding to that action. The computer’s role 
with interactivity is to enable the processing power to interpret and respond to a user’s action. 
(Sims 1999). 
Taking the point of view of a multimedia courseware developer, Sims (1997a) proposed a 
framework that can be applied to the analysis of learner-content interaction in computer-based 
learning environments. Similar to Yacci’s (2000) notion of the interactive loop (cf. Section 
5.4.3), Sims (1997: 159f.) discussed the necessity of setting up an “interaction circuit” between 
learner and computer, where the learner participates in a “true dialogue” with the computer-
based application. “It is this dialog [sic!] or circuit which we must pursue, enabling the users to 
be continually and productively active while working with the instructional content” (Sims 
1997a: 160). This view of interactivity goes beyond simple selection of menu items, clickable 
elements, linear sequencing of content, and the other elements of what has often been labeled 
‘interactive’ educational software (pp. 157f., cf. Chapter 2.3), moving towards interaction that 
is “involving and personal” (Dickinson 1995: 145). The classification proposed by Sims 
consists of a set of interactive concepts which he intended to serve as a guide to the different 
options for interactivity available to developers of multimedia courseware (Sims 1997a: 162–
168). Sims noted that these interactive concepts are not mutually exclusive but can be combined 
to create more sophisticated and engaging learning experiences (p. 162), as in the last two types 
(non-immersive contextual and immersive virtual interactivity). 
• Object interactivity. The user activates (clicks on) objects (buttons, people, and things) using 
some kind of pointing device. The activation produces an audio-visual response. 
• Linear interactivity. The instructional content is pre-organized as a linear sequence through 
which the learner can navigate forwards and backwards (“electronic page-turning”), without 
receiving response-specific feedback to his or her actions (cf. Chapter 2.3.2). 
• Hierarchical interactivity. The application provides menu-based navigation, offering several 
predefined options from which learners may choose a specific instructional path. In other 
words, learners are given more choices than in linear interactivity. 
Chapter 5: Interactivity 111 
• Support interactivity. The learner has access to different forms of performance support, i.e. 
“an electronic system that provides integrated access to information, advice, learning 
experiences, and tools to help someone perform a task with the minimum of support by other 
people” (Raybould 1995: 10). Performance support ranges in sophistication from help 
messages through FAQ (frequently asked questions) collections and knowledge bases to 
complex tutor, guide, and help desk agents (Franke 2006: 284–290). In distance learning, 
support should be available anytime and anyplace (Northrup 2001).50 
• Update interactivity. The learner engages in a dialogue with instructional content generated 
by the application. He or she is expected to respond to problems presented or created by the 
system (possibly according to the learner’s previous performance). The system analyzes the 
learner’s contribution and responds with appropriate updates or feedback. The complexity 
ranges from simple question-and-answer formats (cf. Chapter 2.3.1) to the context-sensitive 
and learner-adaptive responses of intelligent tutoring agents (cf. Chapter 2.3.3 and Chapter 
12.3). 
• Construct interactivity. The learner manipulates objects in the learning environment, which 
may involve building, re-arranging, dissecting, etc., in order to attain certain goals related to 
learning. This type of interactivity is closely linked to simulation interactivity because it 
helps to create authentic learning environments, but without the risk and costs associated 
with real-world situations (cf. Chapter 2.3.4). 
• Reflective interactivity. The application has a memory of responses given by other learners 
or recognized experts on the subject area, to which learners can compare their own answers. 
Hence, the learner has the opportunity to reflect on and assess the quality of his or her 
response. This strategy is useful in domains where it is difficult (in principle or for the 
machine) to evaluate the accuracy or correctness of the user’s response. 
• Simulation interactivity. This type of interactivity is closely related to construct interactivity. 
The simulation places the learner in the role of controller or operator with the ability to 
manipulate certain variables within the system (cf. Chapter 2.3.4). The learner’s actions can 
produce directly observable effects (updates) within the simulation; however, generation of 
an appropriate update may also require that the learner has completed a particular sequence 
of actions first. 
• Hyperlinked interactivity. The system provides abundant information for learners to explore, 
which is organized as a hyperlinked structure (cf. Chapter 2.3.6). The hyperlinking enables 
learners to access the information flexibly by following their own paths through the link 
structure. All possible (or relevant) paths have to be accessible. Learners also need tools that 
facilitate navigation and orientation. 
• Non-immersive contextual interactivity. The application integrates and extends the previous 
interactive concepts to create a complete virtual learning environment, which models a real-
world work environment or other setting and engages the learner in authentic tasks (cf. 
Chapter 16.1). 
• Immersive virtual interactivity. The learner is ‘transported’ into an immersive computer-
generated world which responds to his or her movement and actions and in which the learner 
experiences a sense of presence (of being ‘there’) in the environment and co-presence (that 
others are present in the environment together with the learner) (cf. Section 5.4.5). For a long 
                                              
50  While costly to realize with human resources, pedagogical agents can be designed to fill various 
supportive roles that meet the requirement of constant availability of performance support in online 
courses (cf. Chapter 16.2). 
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time, such environments were largely science fiction; however, with the recent availability, 
growing sophistication, and exploding popularity of synthetic worlds for gaming and 
socializing (Castronova 2006), such as World of Warcraft ([INT 44]) and Second Life ([INT 
45]), creating immersive educational experiences has become much more than a possibility 
(Bell & Trueman 2008). In these worlds, users cannot only interact with virtual objects but, 
importantly, also with other users (represented by their avatars) as well as embodied 
interactive software agents with different roles and complexity (cf. Chapter 16.2). 
Sims integrated his interactive concepts into a more comprehensive engagement-control 
model of interactivity, which defines three dimensions of interactive computer-based instruction 
(Sims 1997a: 168f.). Engagement is the first dimension, which refers to the nature of the user’s 
involvement and is either navigational (the user moves through the application) or instructional 
(the user interacts with the content). The second dimension, control, is concerned with the 
relative degree of learner vs. program control over making decisions regarding instruction or 
navigation. The third dimension is represented by the interactive concepts discussed above and 
indicates the type of interaction expected in different constellations of the model. 
Regarding the locus of control in the interaction between learner and computer, with a focus 
on pacing and sequencing, Borsook and Higginbotham-Wheat (1991) suggested that an optimal 
level of interactivity is neither associated with complete learner control nor with complete 
program control but involves a balance of control between learner and computer (cf. Figure 28). 
This view is in line with the general idea of the superiority of mixed-initiative human-machine 
dialogue over both system-initiative and user-initiative dialogue strategies (cf. Chapter 
11.3.3.2.1). However, in real learner-computer scenarios, the locus of control may shift from 
the medium point either towards the learner’s or the computer’s end, depending on additional 
factors, such as the nature of the task, the content, learners’ metacognitive skills and level of 
development, etc. (Godwin 2005). 
Each of the interactive concepts proposed by Sims (1997a) represents a particular level of 
interactivity in the interaction of learners with computer systems. Figure 29 locates the different 
types of interactivity along a continuum from low to high interactivity. A similar scale for 
interactivity was proposed by Schulmeister (2003; 2005). Referring to screens of multimedia 
courseware or web pages in e-learning platforms, he developed a taxonomy of the multimedia 
 
Figure 28. Interactivity and locus of control in learner-computer interactions. Adapted from Borsook 
and Higginbotham-Wheat (1991). According to Borsook and Higginbotham-Wheat, the level of 
interactivity reaches its maximum at a medium point between complete computer and complete learner 
control. 
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elements contained in a screen or web page, including text, images, diagrams, animations, audio 
and video clips, tables, formulas, and small embedded applications (Schulmeister 2005). The 
levels in this taxonomy differ with respect to the level of learner-content interactivity provided 
(Schulmeister 2003): 
• Level I. Viewing objects and receiving information; 
• Level II. Watching and receiving multiple representations; 
• Level III. Varying the form of the representation; 
• Level IV. Manipulating the content of multimedia representations; 
• Level V. Constructing the object or representation contents; 
• Level VI. Constructing the object of the representation and receiving intelligent feedback 
from the system through manipulative action. 
Schulmeister (2003) argued that even at the highest level of interactivity, current learning 
systems have not reached the human capacity for communication and social interaction yet (see 
also Sims (1997b)). However, equipped with increasingly sophisticated verbal and non-verbal 
behaviors (cf. Chapter 10.1), language processing and conversation capabilities (cf. Chapter 
11), expertise (cf. Chapter 12), and emotional competence (cf. Chapter 13), pedagogical agents 
can cross the gap between ‘artificial’ human-computer dialogue and ‘natural’ interpersonal 
communication and participate in instructional exchanges with the learner (cf. Chapter 12.3) 
that involve meaningful actions and conversation. With their capacity to make the computer an 
intelligent conversational partner in learning, pedagogical agents can improve the humanness 
and adaptiveness of learners’ interactions with computers and thus improve the ability of people 
to learn from them (Yacci 2000). 
5.5  Discussion and Summary 
While interactivity has gained currency in the popular and scientific literature and media outlets 
and people may have an intuitive grasp of the concept (“I know it when I see it”), the exact 
nature of interactivity remains controversial. Bucy admitted that “[a]fter nearly three decades of 
study and analysis, we scarcely know what interactivity is, let alone what it does, and have 
scant insight into the conditions in which interactive processes are likely to be consequential for 
members of a social system” (Bucy 2004b: 373, his emphasis) and that “we are still far from a 
coherent theory of interactivity, with an agreed-on set of principles and core assumptions” 
(Bucy 2004a: 371, his emphasis). Nevertheless, it is possible to extract from the various 
conceptualizations of interactivity reviewed in Section 5.3 a number of aspects that are essential 
ingredients of interactive experiences and thus instructive for the designers of embodied 
interactive software agents: 
 
Figure 29. Sims’s interactive concepts arranged according to the level of interactivity in the interaction 
between learner and computer system. 
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• Interactivity involves feedback: the recipient of a message can send a response which 
influences the sender’s next message (cf. Section 5.3.1). 
• Interactivity is not an absolute (yes-or-no) concept but a matter of degree (cf. Section 5.3.2), 
ranging from low to high levels of interactivity. 
• Interactive communication exhibits third-order dependency among messages, i.e. the third 
message in an exchange is a reaction to the response sent to the first message, relating both 
to the response and the initial message (cf. Section 5.3.2). 
• Interactive communication is a two-way (or multi-way) process in which the roles of sender 
and recipient of messages are interchangeable (cf. Section 5.3.3). 
• The participants in an interactive exchange, including both humans and machines, are more 
or less readily responding to each others’ contributions or communication needs (Ha & 
James 1998: 461), ideally with no perceptible delay (cf. Section 5.3.4). 
• Interactivity involves giving users some degree of control over the content, form, and pace 
of a mediated environment populated by humans and/or machines (cf. Section 5.3.5). 
• There is an emphasis on short response times in interactive exchanges. Preferably, the 
exchange happens in real time while users can still control the rate of the exchange (cf. 
Section 5.3.6). 
• Interactivity as a concept may include non-mediated face-to-face communication or may be 
restricted to mediated interaction (cf. Section 5.3.7). 
• Interactivity-as-process refers to the interaction between humans mediated by technology, 
whereas interactivity-as-product is concerned with interaction processes between humans 
and technology (cf. Section 5.3.8). 
• Interactivity is increasingly regarded not as an attribute of the technology (medium) or the 
communication setting but as something that resides, at least partially, in the perceptions of 
individuals (McMillan 2002). Interactivity as user perception emphasizes the subjective, 
experiential dimension of the concept (cf. Section 5.3.9). 
• Interactivity is a multidimensional construct. Each dimension is represented by a continuum 
(cf. Section 5.3.10). The multidimensional space has been defined and partitioned in 
different ways that emphasize different views on the nature of interactivity. 
Recently, the focus of the debate on interactivity has shifted from concerns about definition 
and descriptive typology to research of a more systematic and cumulative nature (Bucy 2004a: 
371). The emerging view in analyses is that “interactivity is not a fixed concept, associated with 
a particular information technology or mode of communication, but may reside in various 
locations, whether as a feature of media systems, message exchanges, or user perceptions” 
(Bucy 2004a: 371). Concerning its value in interactions between humans or between humans 
and machines, Burgoon et al. pointed out that 
interactivity is neither inherently positive nor negative. The extent to which interactivity helps or 
hinders is a function of a variety of factors including the nature of the interaction, the objectives 
to be accomplished, and the interactants themselves. (Burgoon et al. 2002: 660). 
It has been argued that interactive experiences should be classified as either ‘process’ 
(human interaction with other humans through technology) or ‘product’ (human interaction 
with technology) (Stromer-Galley 2004, cf. Section 5.3.8). For as long as human-computer 
interactions have been unable to reach the flexibility and sensory richness of (face-to-face) 
communication between humans, the classification of interactive experiences with respect to 
this dichotomy has been unproblematic. But as embodied software agents are becoming 
increasingly capable of acting as socially competent interaction partners that can use the same 
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verbal and non-verbal cues which are available to people in face-to-face situations, the line 
between human-human and human-computer interaction is blurred. Embodied interactive 
software agents (cf. Chapter 3.3) are both: social actor and technology. As their sophistication 
grows, human interaction with them will move closer to the human end of the continuum. Since 
interactivity is always also in the eye of the beholder (cf. Section 5.3.9), in users’ perceptions, 
agents might even reach human levels of interactivity before their capabilities actually allow 
them to get there. 
In (distance) education, interaction and interactivity are regarded by most researchers and 
practitioners as central elements of educational processes, both face-to-face and at a distance 
(cf. Section 5.4). As discussed in Section 5.4.1, learning experiences that provide more 
(sophisticated) interaction (or interactivity), in particular if they involve learning from, with, 
and through information and communication technologies, are commonly expected to result in 
improved learning outcomes and to increase learner satisfaction. Furthermore, they are highly 
compatible with constructivist views of learning (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). While few seem to doubt 
the benefits of interaction and interactivity in education, a definition of either term that appeals 
to everyone (or at least to most) is yet to appear (as for interaction and interactivity in general). 
One approach to capture the elusive concept of interaction in education identifies different 
types of interaction (cf. Section 5.4.2), including learners’ interaction with the content, the 
instructor, other learners, the interface, the environment, and the sociocultural context, as well 
as interaction between and among instructors and content. Anderson’s equivalency theorem 
implies that learner-content, learner-instructor, and learner-learner interaction are equivalent in 
that substituting one type for one of the others does not degrade the educational experience 
(Anderson 2003b: 4). An interesting corollary of the equivalency theorem is the option to 
automate certain interactions by employing teacher, student, and content agents. Apart from 
interactions between entities in the learning process, there are also interactions inside an entity, 
such as learner self-interactions. 
Shifting the focus away from who is interacting, the nature of instructional interactivity was 
discussed next in Section 5.4.3, starting with Wagner’s (1994) broad definition of interaction, 
whose key elements include reciprocity and mutual influence. The structural definition by 
Yacci (2000) describes interactivity as a complete message loop from and back to the learner, 
which involves the exchange of mutually coherent messages and produces cognitive and 
affective benefits. One important element of Yacci’s conceptualization is the emphasis on the 
learner’s point of view. In general, the perceived interactivity of educational processes has been 
found to have a positive influence on learners’ perception of their own performance and their 
satisfaction with the learning experience, for example in Swan’s study (Swan 2002). 
Moore (1972; 1991; 1993) identified a “psychological and communications gap” (Moore 
1991: 2f.) between the participants in a distance learning setting, the “transactional distance,” 
which he saw as a function of the dialogue (interaction) between learners and instructors, the 
structure of the course design, and the nature and degree of learner autonomy. It was suggested 
in Section 5.4.4 that transactional distance in online learning settings with much structure and 
little dialogue between the human participants could be reduced with the help of pedagogical 
agents engaging the learner in various kinds of instructional interactions. 
Interpersonal interactions in education are not only concerned with the instructional content 
or task but also involve social interaction among the participants to establish connections, 
relationships, and community (cf. Section 5.4.5). Social presence, i.e. the degree to which 
learners feel real (‘present’) or are perceived that way by others in an online learning setting, 
positively influences the perceived strength of interpersonal connections and thus contributes to 
learners’ satisfaction and loyalty. Social presence theory (Short et al. 1976) implies that media 
116 Chapter 5: Interactivity 
providing more channels for contact between communicators can increase users’ sense of social 
presence through their ability to transmit richer information about their own perceived realness 
and that of others. Not only people are perceived as real, or having a social presence, but also 
artificial entities like agents. Embodied pedagogical agents are social actors within the medium 
that can serve as a substitute for the social presence of instructors and other learners. The 
persona effect (Lester et al. 1997b; Lester et al. 1997c) was discussed as preliminary evidence 
for the positive impact of the presence of pedagogical agents on students’ perceptions of their 
learning experience, but the mixed results of later research caution against its unconditional 
acceptance and suggest that the social behaviors of pedagogical agents need to be carefully 
designed to have educational value (Dirkin et al. 2005). 
Current research emphasizes learning through and with computers but neglects the human-
computer dimension (learning from computers). In contrast, Sims (1997a), from the perspective 
of a courseware developer, proposed a framework for analyzing learner-content interaction in 
computer-based learning environments (cf. Section 5.4.6). He identified a set of options for 
interactivity available to developers of educational software and integrated these interactive 
concepts into an engagement-control model of interactivity. 
Sims’ interactive concepts represent different levels of interactivity in the interaction of 
learners with computer systems and have been located along a continuum from low to high 
interactivity. While Schulmeister (2003; 2005) maintained that even at the highest level of 
interactivity, computer programs still do not have the human capacity for communication and 
social interaction, it was argued in Section 5.4 that the increasingly sophisticated verbal and 
non-verbal behaviors (cf. Chapter 10), natural language processing and dialogue capabilities 
(cf. Chapter 11), expertise (cf. Chapter 12), and emotional intelligence (cf. Chapter 13.4) of 
pedagogical agents enable them to participate in reciprocal and symmetric instructional 
exchanges with learners that involve meaningful actions and conversation. 
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6  Design 
Design as an activity is the creative process of originating an idea and translating it into a 
blueprint or plan for an aesthetic and/or functional artifact. The term can also refer to the final 
blueprint or plan (a drawing, model, simulation, or other description), or to the result of its 
implementation (i.e. the appearance and functionality of the artifact produced). However, 
design is usually viewed as being distinct from implementation. 
Design is a complex field which consists of various subdisciplines. Some examples are 
provided below: 
• Information design defines, shapes and plans message content and presentation contexts to 
facilitate comprehension of the presented information. 
• Interaction design is concerned with designing interactive experiences (cf. Chapter 5). It 
considers the following aspects: human affect and cognition (cf. Section 6.3 and Section 
6.4), context of use (cf. Section 6.2), nature of the task, experience of the user, learnability of 
user interfaces, presentation of options, feedback on progress or errors, and recovery from 
failure in the interaction. 
• Interface design creates the components of an interactive artifact through which it presents 
itself to the user and which allow the user to access its functionality (cf. Chapter 1.2). 
• Product design develops artifacts that can be offered to a market. The process considers 
aspects of a product that include, among others, aesthetic appeal, usability, manufacturing, 
and market placement. 
• Visual design creates visual experiences in any media to communicate a message, using 
design elements like point, line, form, texture, and color (McClurg-Genevese 2005b), and 
following principles like balance, contrast, proportion, rhythm, and unity (McClurg-
Genevese 2005a). 
Design is fundamental and ubiquitous. Design decisions affect nearly every part of our daily 
lives. The process of designing an artifact that fits seamlessly into and easily becomes at home 
in our world thus requires considerable research, thought, modeling, iterative adjustment and 
redesign. Not only are aspects like appeal, cost, image, safety, viability, etc. important, but good 
design always starts from the nature and needs of the people who will be using the artifact in a 
particular set of circumstances. In other words, the artifact should be designed with careful 
consideration for the target group of users (cf. Section 6.1) and the intended context of use (cf. 
Section 6.2). In general, the design and use of artifacts for people and by people in a particular 
context has a cognitive, an affective, and a social dimension. These three dimensions are 
discussed in Section 6.3, Section 6.4, and Section 6.5, respectively. 
6.1  The User 
A user is a person who makes use of a thing to achieve something, for himself or herself or for 
other individuals, alone or in cooperation or competition with other users, for work, learning, or 
pleasure. Things may be used for their inherent or natural purpose, or for a foreign purpose, 
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which may not have been foreseen or intended.51 In the field of human-computer interaction 
(HCI), a user is an individual who interacts with a computer through a user interface to carry 
out certain activities, such as writing an e-mail, playing a game, or debugging a program. 
The term affordance refers to the perceived and actual properties of an artifact or system that 
indicate to users how to interface with it (Norman 2002a: 9). Good design creates intuitive 
affordances that meet existing user expectations. To achieve this, designers need to acquire 
knowledge about the people who will use the artifact or system. The target group of users may 
be more or less clearly defined in terms of the following (and other) attributes: 
• Gender (masculine or feminine);52 
• Age (e.g. children, teenagers, senior citizens, etc.); 
• Culture (e.g. Asian vs. European vs. Latino-American); 
• Education (e.g. academic degree, autodidact, (computer) literacy, on-the-job training, etc.); 
• Social class (e.g. lower, middle, and upper class); 
• Occupation (e.g. college students, office workers, retired or unemployed people, etc.); 
• Organization (e.g. business, charity, government, military, university, etc.); 
• Intrinsic limitations (cognitive, emotional, physical, and social); 
• Extrinsic limitations (legal, monetary, social, spatial, and temporal); 
• Skills (creative, cognitive, manual, and social); 
• Goals (related to happiness, health, productivity, religion, safety, altruism, etc.); 
• Needs (e.g. Maslow’s Hierarchy of Human Needs, cf. Figure 30); 
• Expectations (of interaction and performance, including consistency, effectiveness, 
efficiency, naturalness, predictability, and reliability); 
• Experiences (disappointment, enjoyment, satisfaction, etc.); 
• Preferences (e.g. input and output modes, interaction styles, language, brand, product design, 
etc.). 
6.2  Context of Use 
Context can be defined as the set of interrelated circumstances and conditions in which an 
object, event, process, statement, idea, linguistic unit, or other reality exists or occurs and which 
help to determine, specify, or clarify its meaning, function, or operation in that particular 
setting.53 The term context of use refers to the situational factors that influence the use and 
usability (cf. Section 6.3) of a given artifact. Among other aspects, the context of use includes 
users (cf. Chapter 6.1) and other (artificial and human) agents, tasks, equipment (computer 
                                              
51  For example, people may use a lighter to light a candle (its inherent purpose) or to open a bottle (a 
foreign purpose). On the World Wide Web, guest books of web sites are often used as a kind of 
makeshift asynchronous chat facility, with users exchanging messages via guest book entries. 
52  Gender can be defined as the ‘maleness’ or ‘femaleness’ that individuals identify in themselves, 
project to others, or that other people perceive in them. It has to be distinguished from sex, which 
refers to the biological categories of male and female. While sex is determined before birth, gender is 
the result of a process after birth by which men and women are socialized to be masculine or 
feminine, learning and adopting from their social and cultural environment (Isbister 2006: 108). 
53  This definition is intentionally broad. In fact, the term ‘context’ has a wide range of meanings in 
different domains and disciplines. For example, it means different things in artificial intelligence, 
contemporary art, literature, computer operating systems, and sitcoms. 
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hardware, software, networks, materials, machines, and tools), and the physical, sociocultural, 
and organizational environments in which the artifact is used. Physical context factors include 
space, lighting, temperature, noise level, and so on. Examples of sociocultural factors include 
the customs, fashions, norms, roles and role allocation (cf. Chapter 7.14), and other aspects of 
the target culture (cf. Chapter 7.15). The social network, management and organizational 
pressures, and processes of learning, teaching, and working are examples of organizational 
factors. Furthermore, time and its passage are another important aspect of the context of use. 
Not only does the temporal context affect the use and usability of an artifact (e.g. the artifact 
cannot be used before or after a certain point in time), but the context of use may also change 
with the passage of time. Artifacts that process natural language (cf. Chapter 11) additionally 
have to consider the linguistic context, i.e. the set of factors (provided by the surrounding text 
or utterances) which systematically determine what form a linguistic unit (a speech sound, 
word, phrase, sentence, turn, paragraph, text, or dialogue) takes, what it means, how appropriate 
it is, or how it should be translated (Arnold et al. 1994: 201). Different aspects of the linguistic 
context are discussed in Chapter 11 (see also Franklin (2003: 194–196) for a brief discussion of 
selected examples). A distinction is often drawn between the linguistic context and the non-
linguistic context. The latter includes knowledge and beliefs (cf. Chapter 12.1) shared by the 
speaker/writer and hearer/reader that are not internal to language but relate to external domains 
of experience. 
Context awareness is the capability of artifacts to sense and act on relevant situational 
factors and their changes over time in a timely fashion, allowing them to provide pertinent 
information and/or services in a given context and to adapt to each new or modified context of 
 
Figure 30. The Hierarchy of Human Needs was originally developed by the psychologist Abraham 
Maslow (1908–1970) in the 1940s and later extended by him and others (Maslow 1943; Maslow 1970). 
The diagram shows the eight-stage model from the 1990s (Chapman 2002). The hierarchy is a 
psychological model of human motivation, which states that humans meet their basic needs (physical 
and emotional well-being) first before they seek to satisfy higher order needs (knowledge, beauty, 
personal development, helping others). 
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use.54 By taking a series of snapshots of the context across a time span, it is possible to create a 
context history (Chen & Kotz 2000), which can be used as a memory of contexts in which 
previous operations or interactions with the user took place. This memory can help artifacts to 
predict and thus better adapt to future contexts and interactions. 
Careful consideration of the context(s) in which an artifact will be used by the target group 
of users from the early stages of design to the final field testing stages makes it possible to 
develop products which are better suited to the needs of the situation and the users, resulting in 
better usability and performance and hence a higher degree of user satisfaction. Therefore, 
usability testing, prototyping sessions, focus groups, end-user studies, and other types of user 
involvement in the design process (cf. Chapter 7.13) have to be carried out in the artifact’s 
intended context of use ([INT 46], cf. Chapter 15). 
For software agents, the context of use comprises the situational factors of the virtual and 
physical environment in which an agent is embedded (cf. Chapter 3). The virtual environment, 
consisting of computer hardware, software systems, and networks, is the agent’s habitat while 
the user is situated in the physical world (although the distinction between the virtual and 
physical realms is becoming increasingly fuzzy, with more and more people spending larger 
and larger portions of their lives in massively multiplayer online role-playing games 
(MMORPG), virtual communities, and other synthetic worlds55 (Castronova 2006)). The agent’s 
ability to perceive and act covers the virtual environment and may even extend to the physical 
environment if the agent is equipped with the appropriate sensory and actuatory hardware (e.g. 
cameras, microphones, mechanic bodies, etc.). Contextual information is collected via the 
agent’s sensors (cf. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.2). Time and resources are usually limited; hence, 
the agent has to separate relevant from irrelevant contextual information when processing the 
context, i.e. extract the situational factors pertaining to its goals and tasks. Furthermore, the 
complexity and dynamics of environments can easily exceed the capabilities of current sensory 
devices and algorithms, in particular those for perceiving the physical world, so agents have to 
allow for a certain error rate in their perceived input (and subsequent processing of that input). 
Context processing is important for various aspects of the agent’s operation, including 
disambiguating inputs, interpreting relationships, and generating outputs. To be able to use the 
contextual information extracted from the sensor input for its internal decision-making and 
planning processes, the agent has to create and maintain a representation of the (changing) 
context over time. This may involve combining lower-level contexts with other contexts or 
information into higher-level contexts (Chen & Kotz 2000). The result is a context hierarchy, 
which breaks down the context into successively more specific subcontexts (Schmidt 2002). 
6.3  Cognitive Aspects of Design 
The cognitive dimension of design centers on the concept of usability (Norman 2002a), which 
describes the quality of users’ experience when they interact with a human-made artifact to 
achieve a particular goal. The International Organization for Standardization, widely known as 
                                              
54  More precisely, this is what Chen and Kotz (2000) call active context awareness. In addition, they 
refer to passive context awareness as the ability of systems to dynamically present new or updated 
contexts to users and/or to store contexts for later retrieval. 
55  According to Castronova, a synthetic world is “an expansive, world-like, large-group environment 
made by humans, for humans, and which is maintained, recorded, and rendered by a computer” 
(Castronova 2006: 11). 
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ISO, defined usability as “the extent to which a product can be used by specified users to 
achieve specified goals with effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction in a specified context of 
use” (ISO 1998). Users may seek to achieve their own goals or the goals of others, for work, 
learning, or pleasure. Goal achievement is characterized by the quality of the result, the time 
and effort that had to be expended in the process of achieving the goals, and the user’s sense of 
accomplishment. Finally, a given product is always used under a set of specific conditions in a 
real-life or laboratory setting (cf. Section 6.2). 
In human-computer interaction, usability is a measure of how effectively, efficiently, and 
satisfactorily a person can navigate a user interface, find information on it, and achieve his or 
her goals. A combination of factors affects this experience ([INT 47]): 
• Ease of learning. How fast can a novice user learn how to use the system? 
• Efficiency of use. How much time and effort do experienced users require to carry out tasks? 
• Memorability. How easily can the user remember how the user interface works? 
• Error frequency and severity. How frequent and serious are user errors in the interaction, and 
what error recovery mechanisms are available? 
• Subjective satisfaction. How enjoyable is it for people to use the system? 
Norman (2002a: 13–29 + 52f.) suggested four principles for usable and understandable 
designs. First, designers should make things visible, i.e. always show clearly what the current 
state of the system is and what the user can do. Second, they should provide a good conceptual 
model for the user (pp. 189f.). The design and implementation of a system is guided by the 
design model, i.e. the conceptualization (or conceptual model) of the system in the minds of its 
designers. As users interact with the system, they build their own mental model of beliefs about 
the system and its operation (the user’s model) (Norman 2004: 75). This model helps them to 
understand the system, which includes explaining and anticipating its behavior. Designers 
expect the user’s model to be congruent with their design model. However, users can only learn 
about the design model indirectly through the system image, which is created by the way the 
system appears, operates, and responds to user actions, as well as any written material 
(advertisements, documentation, test reports, etc.) describing it (Norman 2002a: 190). Hence, 
designers must portray their system in a way that is consistent with the underlying design model 
and makes its operation transparent (Norman 2004: 76), thus allowing users to build the 
appropriate mental model. Figure 31 visualizes the relationships between the design model, the 
user’s model, and the system image. 
Norman’s third principle requires designers to provide good mappings, i.e. relationships 
between controls, affected entities, and results ([INT 48]) that make it easy for the user to map 
from actions to results, from controls to effects, and from the internal system state to observable 
system behavior (Norman 2002a: 53). Mappings are preferably natural, which means that they 
exploit physical analogies (e.g. controls are moved in the same direction as intended for the 
object they affect and cultural standards (e.g. screws are tightened clockwise) (p. 23). 
Norman’s final principle requires systems to give feedback, i.e. to inform the user about the 
actions performed by the system and their results (Norman 2002a: 27). Feedback should be 
timely (provided when the user needs or expects it), relevant (give the user the information they 
want or need), clear (be free from ambiguity), sufficient (not give more information than 
necessary), and (possibly) personalized (adapted to the user’s characteristics, cf. Section 6.1). 
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6.4  Affective Aspects of Design 
Usability design is rooted in the cognitive sciences.56 Cognition is an information processing 
mechanism that gives individuals the ability to interpret, reflect on, and remember things in 
their environment (Norman et al. 2003: 38). Cognitive artifacts are physical objects or software 
applications which are designed to support cognitive processing of humans or to enhance their 
cognitive abilities, by facilitating mental processes of remembering, thinking, and problem 
solving. Examples include calendars, to-do lists, diagrams, word processors, and pedagogical 
tutor agents. 
Cognition is tightly coupled with another information processing system: affect,57 which 
continuously evaluates and judges (‘appraises,’ cf. Chapter 13.1.2.1) the environment as it is 
perceived by and concerns the individual, providing immediate positive (e.g. ‘desirable,’ 
‘good,’ or ‘safe’) or negative (e.g. ‘undesirable,’ ‘bad,’ or ‘dangerous’) assessments of things in 
the world (Norman et al. 2003: 38). Many believe cognition and affect to be opposites, 
regarding the former as cool, human, and logical while describing the latter as hot, animalistic, 
and irrational (Norman 2004: 7). In fact, both systems are functionally inseparable and mutually 
dependent (cf. Chapter 13.2.1). Affect influences cognition, and cognition drives a number of 
affective states. Importantly, affect directs and focuses attention on entities and states of affairs 
that individuals have appraised as salient to achieving their goals or satisfying their needs (Nass 
& Brave 2005: 77). Furthermore, affect influences cognitive style (e.g. in problem solving) and 
task performance (easy tasks become more difficult, difficult tasks become easier), which has 
important implications for design (Norman 2002b), as shown in Table 7. 
                                              
56  The cognitive sciences (Wilson & Keil 2001; Harnish 2002; Nadel 2003) combine the analytical 
fields of psychology, computer science, human factors, and engineering. They study topics bearing 
on the nature and operation of the human mind and intelligence. 
57  In emotion research, affect is a head term for various conditions including, among others, emotions, 
moods, and preferences (Ortony et al. 2005: 174). Affect varies with respect to valence (the pleasant/ 
unpleasant dimension: positive or negative) and arousal (the degree of intensity: very high/high/ 
medium/low/very low) (Lisetti 2002). 
 
Figure 31. Three aspects of mental models: the design model, the user’s model, and the system image. 
Adapted from Norman (2002a: 190, Figure 7.1). 
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Finally, affect has an effect on people’s judgment. The number of options in decision making 
is reduced by rapid assessments from the affective system. But affect also functions as a filter 
through which individuals assess any entity, situation, or event, even if it has no relation to their 
current affective state (Nass & Brave 2005: 78). People in a good mood are more likely to give 
positive assessments and follow recommendations. However, while they are more willing to 
take risks when making hypothetical decisions, they are more cautious in actual risk situations 
(Isen 2000). 
Anxious people are more focused and thus require relevant information to be accessible and 
easily visible at all times, as well as clear and unambiguous feedback from an artifact about its 
operations. In contrast, people in a good mood are more creative and tend to be more willing to 
tolerate minor shortcomings of an artifact, in particular if they perceive it as fun and enjoyable 
(Norman 2004: 26). Isen (2002) found substantial evidence that experienced mild positive 
affect generally has positive effects on negotiation processes and their results; generosity and 
social responsibility (helping others and volunteering); self-efficacy; self-motivation to 
accomplish tasks; and openness to and flexible processing of new information (Burleson 2005: 
448). 
Technologies with the ability to induce positive affect in users, in particular when they sense 
(or reason) that an activity or experience negatively impacts users (cf. Chapter 13.4.1), may 
improve users’ emotional well-being, intrinsic motivation (cf. Chapter 13.2.2), performance, 
and creativity. For example, technologies could give users the opportunity to volunteer and 
encourage them to apply their skills in meaningful ways in the context of tasks that are 
challenging but also interesting and/or important (preferably both). 
The fact that affect and cognition are inseparable and indispensable for behavior indicates 
that the design of artifacts should not only be influenced by considerations of usability but also 
involve a strong, at least equally important, emotional component, an idea discussed in detail by 
Norman (2004). Hence, artifacts should be both usable (cf. Section 6.3) and pleasurable. 
“Attractive things work better” (Norman 2002b) because they make people feel good, which 
promotes curiosity and creativity and thus the ability to find alternative solutions to problems 
(Norman 2004: 26). What is true of artifacts has also been demonstrated to hold for people. 
There is plenty of research supporting the so-called halo effect: good-looking people with a 
healthy, symmetrical face and body, clear skin, straight profile, and other (culture-specific) 
                                              
58  Tunnel vision is a state of mind where people have a single-minded focus, with the result that they 
become blind to other options that would be obvious to them under normal circumstances (Norman 
2004: 28). 
Table 7. The impact of affect on cognition. Compiled from Norman (2002b; 2004). 
Affect Effects Implications for Design 
Negative Focuses thinking. 
‘+’: Improved concentration; 
‘–’: Tunnel vision.58 
Simple tasks become more difficult. 
Highlight function and minimize distractions, 
bottlenecks, and irritations in stressful 
contexts. 
Positive Broadens thinking. 
‘+’: Enhanced creativity; 
‘–’: More easily distracted. 
Difficult tasks become easier. 
Emphasize aesthetics in neutral or positive 
situations; attractive designs increase positive 
affect, creativity, and tolerance for minor 
difficulties. 
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attractive aspects (Isbister 2006: 7ff.) are ascribed more positive traits than less attractive 
people, including biological qualities like good genes, developmental and hormonal health, and 
a strong immune system (Green et al. 2008: 2457) as well as individual and social qualities 
such as independence, sociability, intellectual capability, trustworthiness, and appeal (Jones et 
al. 1978; Brigham 1980; Langlois et al. 2000; Green et al. 2008: 2459). Physical attractiveness 
contributes significantly to the social influence of both humans and artifacts: someone or 
something that is visually attractive to a certain target audience is likely to be more persuasive 
than people or artifacts that are perceived as unattractive (Fogg 2003: 92ff.). The fact that 
people tend to subconsciously assume all these things about others based on their looks can be 
exploited in the design of the appearance (cf. Chapter 9.2) of embodied agents (Gard 2000; 
Isbister 2006: 7ff.). However, designing appealing facades is not the lesson here: in good 
designs, appeal and usability (cf. Section 6.3) are in balance (cf. Chapter 7.3). 
Norman presented a model of design whose levels correspond to a three-level model of 
human behavior where processing at each of the three levels assigns meaning (cognition) and 
value (affect) to entities, situations, and events in the world (Norman 2004: 25; Norman et al. 
2003: 39). Table 8 gives an overview of the model. The relationship between the processing 
levels is shown in Figure 32. The following discussion of the three-level model of affect and 
cognition and the corresponding design levels draws primarily on the accounts by Norman et al. 
(2003) and Norman (2004). 
The reaction level contains automatic, pre-wired behaviors that allow an organism to quickly 
assess whether something is good or bad, safe or dangerous, etc. and to respond to perceived 
dangers or problems at once, by interrupting processing at higher levels, increasing arousal, and 
signaling the motor system to initiate or prepare an immediate response. Reactive processes are 
determined by genetic mechanisms and can be enhanced or inhibited by control information 
from higher levels. Environmental stimuli automatically trigger responses, with no reasoning 
involved. Table 9 lists various cues from the environment that can produce automatic positive 
or negative affect. 
The visceral level of design considers users’ automatic judgmental reactions to these cues 
and accordingly designs artifacts sending affective signals that elicit a favorable initial response 
from the members of the target group of users. The major elements of visceral design include 
appearance, texture, sound, taste, and smell. At the visceral level, the goal is to create artifacts 
that users perceive as, for example, ‘pretty,’ ‘cute,’ ‘fun,’ or ‘tasty,’ in general as ‘attractive.’ 
Humans have certain genetically determined preferences with regard to shape, symmetry, taste, 
smell, color, sound, touch, setting, and appearance and expressions of the human body, which 
are listed in the left column of Table 9. These features tend to produce positive affective 
reactions across cultures; however, designers also need to consider the influence of culture and 
the passage of time on what is considered as attractive and what is not (cf. Chapter 7.15.3). 
The routine level is the locus of default expectations as well as well-learned, routine 
behaviors. This unconscious mid-level controls everyday human behavior, in particular most 
motor skills (including language production). At this level, the individual is aware of its 
environment but not of his or her own individuality (Ortony et al. 2005: 179). Processing at the 
Table 8. Levels and design features in the model of cognitive and affective design (Norman 2004). 
Processing Level Design Level Salient Features of Artifacts 
Reflection Reflective Self-image, personal satisfaction, memories 
Routine Behavioral Functions, performance, usability 
Reaction Visceral Appearance, texture, sound, taste, smell 
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routine level is influenced by inputs from the sensory system, information from the reaction 
level, and control signals from the reflection level. The routine level exercises control of the 
reaction level by enhancing or inhibiting the responses of the lower level. Furthermore, it 
notifies the reflection layer when it detects something that deviates from its default 
expectations. 
Behavioral design targets the routine level of processing. It is concerned with the pleasure 
and effectiveness associated with the use of an artifact. Therefore, it emphasizes learnability as 
well as efficiency and effectiveness of use in design. At this level of design, artifacts have to 
possess features that endow them with function, understandability (or comprehensibility, cf. 
Chapter 7.7), usability (cf. Section 6.3), and physical feel. 
Function has to do with what an artifact does, what it is ‘good’ for, what purpose or role it 
has in a specific context of use (cf. Section 6.2). If the artifact has no discernible function or 
does not provide the function users need in a given context, it will be of little interest to users. 
As a result, designers have to learn about users’ needs through early and continuous 
involvement in the design process (cf. Chapter 7.13). What exactly people’s needs are (cf. 
Figure 30) is often not easy to determine, though. Users may not even be aware that they have a 
particular need which the artifact could serve. 
Understandability is a design feature that enables users to form the correct mental model of 
what an artifact does and how it works from the system image portrayed by the artifact. From 
the designers’ point of view, the user’s mental model is ‘correct’ if it is congruent with their 
own conceptualization of the artifact (cf. Section 6.3). To make sure that the image projected by 
the artifact allows users to build the desired mental model, user testing with successively more 
refined prototypes is necessary. The quality of a system image is indicated by the degree to 
which it makes transparent the purpose and operation of the artifact as well as its ability to give 
explanations of decisions, actions, and results occurring while someone is using the artifact, if 
necessary, in order to make them comprehensible to the user (cf. Chapter 7.7). 
Artifacts may serve the required function and may be comprehensible to users, but they also 
have to be designed in such a way that they allow for effectiveness, efficiency, and satisfaction 
of use. The concept of usability was discussed in detail in Section 6.3. Here, it should be added 
that interaction with everyday artifacts should not require extensive prior training or involve 
complex sequences of actions. Instead, the interaction should be as natural as possible, taking 
 
Figure 32. A model of affect and cognition. Adapted from Norman (2004: 22, Figure 1.1). 
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advantage of what users know without training, by virtue of being human, such as their ability 
to engage with others in face-to-face conversations (cf. Chapter 1.2). 
Finally, for physical artifacts, tangibility (weight, texture, and surface) is an important design 
consideration. The physical feel and touch influence people’s liking or disliking of an artifact 
and are critical to their assessment of its behavior. 
The reflection level is the level of self-awareness, at which the mind contemplates its own 
representations and operations. This level involves high-level cognitive functions, including 
conscious thought, full-fledged emotions (cf. Chapter 13.1), metacognition,59 self-reflection, 
                                              
59  Burleson, referencing the definition by Blakey and Spence (1990), defined metacognition as “the 
process of thinking about thinking, understanding what is known and not known. It involves: 
connecting new information to former knowledge; deliberately selecting and monitoring thinking 
strategies; and evaluating these processes” (Burleson 2005: 443). Self-regulating one’s own cognitive 
 
Table 9. Factors creating positive or negative affect. Adapted from lists in Norman (2004: 29f.). 
Automatic Positive Affect Produced By Automatic Negative Affect Produced By 
Environmental Conditions 
• Temperate climate • Extreme hot or cold 
• Darkness 
Animate and Inanimate Things 
• Symmetrical objects 
• Sounded, smooth objects 
• Looming objects (seemingly about to hit the 
observer) 
• Sharp objects 
• Snakes and spiders 
Sense Impressions 
• Sweet tastes and smells 
• Bright, highly saturated hues 
• Soothing sounds 
• Simple melodies and rhythms 
• Harmonious music and sounds 
• Caresses 
• Rhythmic beats 
• Sensuous feelings, sounds, shapes 
• Sudden, unexpected loud sounds or bright 
lights 
• Extremely bright lights or loud sounds 
• Harsh, abrupt sounds 
• Grating and discordant sounds 
• Rotting smells, decaying foods 
• Bitter tastes 
Places 
• Warm, comfortably lit places • Heights 
• Crowds of people 
• Empty, flat terrains (deserts) 
• Crowded dense terrains (jungles or forests) 
The Human Body 
• Smiling faces 
• Attractive people 
• Deformed human bodies 
• Human feces (and their smell) 
• Other people’s body fluids 
• Vomit 
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and learning (Ortony et al. 2005: 179). The reflection level is detached from sensor input and 
behavior control. However, it monitors, thinks about, and attempts to bias the operation of the 
routine level. On the other hand, its own processing is influenced by inputs from the lower 
levels. 
Reflective design relates to the reflection level of processing. It is concerned with the (inter-) 
personal and sociocultural meaning and message of (using) a particular artifact, i.e. with how its 
users rationalize and intellectualize what it means to themselves (or to others) and what it 
communicates (about themselves) to other people in a given cultural context. At this level, 
designs should seek to elicit positive answers to questions such as the following: 
• Does owning or using the artifact enhance the user’s self-image60? 
• Does the artifact send a message to others which the user approves of? 
• Can the user make memories (and stories to tell others) with and through the artifact? 
• Can the user form a lasting relationship with the artifact (cf. Chapter 7.16)? 
The visceral, behavioral, and reflective levels are interwoven and permeate any design 
(Norman 2004: 6). However, particular designs may put different emphasis on the individual 
levels. Some artifacts may have visual appeal but lack usefulness or usability; some may be 
intended for one-time use only, whereas others are designed with the potential to become life-
time companions to their users. Furthermore, different users or groups of users may have 
varying preferences with respect to the three levels in different artifacts or even the same 
artifact. Some users value appeal while others favor utility and still others appreciate meaning 
and message. Overall, designers need to be sure about what level(s) of processing (reaction, 
routine, and/or reflection) they want to appeal to in order to achieve their goals with a given 
artifact (sales, brand recognition, user satisfaction, learning gains, relationship building, etc.), 
and they need to learn as much as possible about the future users of the artifact they are 
designing (Norman 2004: 39), preferably by involving them early in and throughout the design 
process. 
6.5  Social Aspects of Design 
In addition to usability and attractiveness, design has to consider the social responses that 
artifacts elicit in users. The Media Equation (Reeves & Nass 1998) is a theory of the interaction 
between humans and media (computers, television, and new media) which is based on the idea 
that people’s interactions with media are “fundamentally social and natural” (Reeves & Nass 
1998: 5). That is, people interact with media as if they were real people and places, applying the 
same social and physical rules about face-to-face interaction with other people and the way the 
physical world works: “media equal real life” (p. 5). Reeves, Nass, and their colleagues found 
that all people are subject to the Media Equation, regardless of age, culture, education, and 
experience with technology,61 and that their social responses to media are automatic and 
                                                                                                                                                
processes requires an awareness of those processes ([INT 49]) and the ability to consciously reflect 
on and manipulate mental knowledge representations. 
60  A person’s self-image is the mental conceptualization which that individual has created of himself or 
herself, including views of his or her appearance, abilities, and personality, particularly in relation to 
others and their perceptions and opinions of the individual. 
61  There are other empirical studies on social attributions to computing technology that are more careful 
with claims of universal susceptibility. For example, Johnson et al. (2006), based on a model of the 
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unconscious (Reeves & Nass 1998: 252), i.e. “deeply instinctual and not available to conscious 
introspection” (Mishra et al. 2000: 3), in short ‘mindless’ (Nass & Moon 2000). While 
counterintuitive,62 the Media Equation is supported by substantial empirical research (Nass & 
Steuer 1993; Nass & Sundar 1994; Nass et al. 1994; Nass et al. 1995; Moon & Nass 1996; Nass 
et al. 1996; Fogg & Nass 1997; Nass et al. 1997a; Nass et al. 1997b; Reeves & Nass 1998; 
Takeuchi et al. 1998; Nass et al. 1999; Nass & Moon 2000; Nass et al. 2000a; Takeuchi et al. 
2000; Fogg 2003; Ferdig & Mishra 2004; Lee & Nass 2004; Nass & Brave 2005), which has 
produced surprising results. Some of the empirical findings reported include: 
• People are polite to computers, whether the computers are using text or voice (Nass et al. 
1999). 
• Humans automatically attribute gender to a voice, determine whether the assigned gender 
matches their own, and show social identification if it does, conforming more to voices with 
the same gender and regarding them as more trustworthy (Nass & Brave 2005: 16f.). 
• People treat computers speaking with female voices differently from those with male voices. 
Both men and women are more influenced by positive evaluation from a computer with a 
male voice than from a computer with a female voice, feel that dominance by a female-
voiced computer is unbecoming, and believe that a computer with a female voice is more 
knowledgeable about stereotypically feminine topics, whereas a male-voiced computer 
knows more about stereotypically masculine topics (Nass et al. 1997a). 
• People respond to different voices as different social actors. The same voice on different 
machines is treated as the same social actor (Nass & Steuer 1993). 
• People perceive different computer-generated voices as different individuals. Like human 
voices, synthetic voices are indicators of individuality (Nass & Brave 2005: 103). Consistent 
with the multiple-source effect,63 several synthetic voices are more persuasive than a single 
synthetic voice, and they lead to the experience of greater social presence (Lee & Nass 
2004). 
• People recall more information from a foreign-language tutorial involving a computer 
reading out instructions with a native accent than from a tutorial featuring a computer in the 
same role but with a non-native accent because they apply the stereotypical assumption that 
“a native speaker knows better” and thus pay more attention to the tutorial (Alvarez-Torres 
et al. 2001). 
• People are influenced by both sincere praise and flattery (insincere praise) delivered by 
computers and respond to them in similar ways as they do when other people praise or flatter 
                                                                                                                                                
computer as a social actor described by Marakas et al. (2000), found that the tendency of people 
toward social attribution is influenced by their core self-evaluation (i.e. how they subconsciously see 
themselves with respect to their view of the environment, confidence and sense of control), what they 
believe about the social role of computers, and the characteristics of the user interface. However, 
their results still indicated that “a significant portion of our society do indeed believe that computers 
have social agency and respond to computing technology accordingly. In fact, this propensity is 
actually magnified when exposed to a distinctly social interface” (Johnson et al. 2006: 457). 
62  Most people would reject the idea that they respond socially to media. In fact, the participants in the 
studies conducted by Nass, Reeves et al. uniformly were in denial of the specific social behaviors 
which they actually had shown during the experiments (e.g. Nass & Moon 2000). 
63  According to the multiple-source effect (also known as the source-magnification effect), multiple 
people giving the same opinion or statement are more convincing than a single source (Harkins & 
Petty 1981; Harkins & Petty 1983; Harkins & Petty 1987; Nass & Brave 2005: 100). 
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them. In particular, they feel better about themselves, their performance, the human-
computer interaction, and computer-generated evaluations when they receive sincere or 
insincere praise from a computer (Fogg & Nass 1997). 
• People like a praising computer more than one that criticizes.64 
• People think that self-praising media are less likeable and less competent than media that 
receive praise from others. Critical media are liked less when they criticize others than when 
they criticize themselves, but they are also perceived as more competent. 
• People respond to praise or blame provided by a computer but seem to take the feedback at 
“face value,” unwilling to reason more deeply about the intentions and reasons behind the 
computer’s responses (Mishra 2006). 
• People imbue computers with a personality (Nass et al. 1995), and their social responses to 
computer personalities are similar to their responses to human personalities. Furthermore, 
people are more attracted to a computer personality that is similar to their own (in terms of 
dominance vs. submissiveness) compared to one that they perceive as different (Moon & 
Nass 1996). 
• Images of faces that appear close make viewers react more strongly than distant images. 
• People respond differently to ‘generalist’ and ‘specialist’ TV news programs. 
• People can be convinced to accept computers as teammates, just by telling them that they are 
interdependent with the computer. The effects of perceived team affiliation are the same for 
human-computer teams as they are for all-human teams: human team members think that 
they are more similar to the computer and more cooperative. They are also more likely to be 
influenced by the computer; think that information provided by the computer is friendlier 
and of higher quality; and are more willing to conform to the computer (Nass et al. 1996). 
• People regard a computer itself as the source of information, not the programmer. 
• People show the same types of social reciprocal behaviors to computers as they exhibit in 
their interactions with other humans. Reciprocal behaviors are modulated by the social 
norms of the individual’s cultural background (Takeuchi et al. 1998; Takeuchi et al. 2000). 
• People can feel betrayed by computers and may retaliate with spiteful behavior, like they do 
toward humans. They tend to interpret the behavior of computers as intentional, accusing 
them of deception, lying, and trickery (Ferdig & Mishra 2004). 
People behave socially toward media because they know from their experience in the real 
world that sophisticated social behavior involving the use of language is confined to humans 
and that whatever object they perceive is real, and they apply this knowledge to mediated 
experiences (Reeves & Nass 1998: 12). Constantly looking for patterns in and trying to make 
sense of what (or who) is around them, whether mediated or real, it comes naturally to humans 
to categorize and stereotype media in the same way as other humans (Mishra & Wojcikiewicz 
2002). Entities that seem to be real people or locations are automatically perceived as real, 
including simulations of social actors and real-world objects, and these perceptions influence 
behavior (Reeves & Nass 1998: 12). It appears that this intentional stance (Dennett 1987), “the 
strategy of interpreting the behavior of an entity (person, animal, artifact, or the like) by treating 
it as if it were a rational agent that governed its ‘choice’ of ‘action’ by a ‘consideration’ of its 
‘beliefs’ and ‘desires’” (Dennett 2001: 412), is a matter of instinct rather than conscious control 
and is not influenced by the individual’s age, experience, or expertise (Weizenbaum 1976; 
Turkle 1984; Reeves & Nass 1998; Mishra & Wojcikiewicz 2002). 
                                              
64  Findings without bibliographical references were reported by Reeves and Nass (1998). 
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Overall, the Media Equation has a number of important implications for the design of media 
(Reeves & Nass 1998: 252ff.): 
• Only minimal cues are required to elicit social responses. For example, on-screen text and 
simple line drawings can create the perception of a personality. 
• Users tend to be influenced by their perceptions of reality rather than reality itself. Hence, 
media do not have to be identical (with respect to their qualities) to the real-world entities 
they portray; it suffices that they are perceived that way (cf. Chapter 7.2). For example, 
perceived intelligence or personality may matter more than actual intelligence or personality 
in terms of human responses. 
• People respond to what they see, hear, and interact with, i.e. to what is immediately present. 
For example, they assess intelligence based on appearance and language ability. They also 
regard an animated on-screen character delivering a message as the source of that message. 
• Users prefer simplicity and predictability: they feel more comfortable when there are fewer 
choices to make65 and when they know what they can expect. Media can thus help users by 
offering them freedom from (rather than of) choice and acting predictably and reliably in 
interactions. 
• Media should adhere to the rules governing social relationships and (inter-) actions in the 
real world that are already familiar to users. 
The Media Equation provides the basis for a line of research in the field of human-computer 
interaction which contends that people tend to interpret their interactions with computers in the 
same way as their interactions with other humans, provided that the computer as their partner in 
the interaction exhibits sufficient social cues (Louwerse et al. 2005: 694). Table 10 lists five 
primary types of social cues which users perceive as indicators of the presence of a living 
entity. In the context of multimedia learning (cf. Chapter 2.2.2), Mayer et al. proposed the 
social agency theory, according to which 
social cues in a multimedia message can prime the social conversation schema in learners. Once 
the social conversation schema is activated, learners are more likely to act as if they are in a 
conversation with another person. Thus, at least to some extent, the social rules of human-to-
human communication come into play. (Mayer et al. 2003: 419). 
Mayer et al. found in two experiments that the presence of social cues (specifically voice) 
activated a social conversation schema in learners, leading them to perceive the computer as a 
conversation partner rather than a presenter of a multimedia message. As a result, learners made 
more of an effort to understand the message, which, in turn, resulted in deeper learning (Mayer 
et al. 2003: 420 + 424). 
If computers exhibit appropriate social cues, learners are more likely to accept them as social 
partners in the learning process. The social-cue hypothesis predicts that the presence of social 
cues, such as facial expressions or human voices, in a computer-based lesson will improve 
students’ learning and cause them to rate the lesson more favorably (Moreno et al. 2000). One 
way to integrate social cues into computer-based lessons is to have them portrayed by animated 
pedagogical agents. Several studies found positive effects for the voice of an agent (Moreno et 
                                              
65  For example, concerning the question whether users should be given a choice from among a set of 
voices in an interface, Nass and Brave argued that while this may invite a close relationship between 
the user and the voice of his or her choice, in particular if the user can interact with the voice (for 
instance if it belongs to an agent), the number of available voices should nonetheless be limited in 
order to avoid overwhelming the user with too many options (Nass & Brave 2005: 110f.). 
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al. 2000; Moreno et al. 2001; Mayer et al. 2003; Louwerse et al. 2005) and presenting the 
agent’s words in a personalized conversational style (Moreno et al. 2000), whereas the visual 
presence (image) of an animated pedagogical agent had no effect on learning and ratings 
(Moreno et al. 2000; Moreno et al. 2001). However, social agency is not necessarily promoted 
by adding more social cues to an interface. In fact, Louwerse et al. found that any social cue can 
induce users to view the computer as a social partner (Louwerse et al. 2005: 702). If the voice is 
sufficient by itself, the image of an agent has little effect (Moreno et al. 2001; Craig et al. 
2002).66 
6.6  Summary 
Design is the complex creative process of coming up with an idea and translating it into a plan 
for an artifact that meets aesthetic and/or functional requirements. Since artifacts have to be 
designed with careful consideration for their target group of users and their intended context of 
use, this chapter began with a discussion of these two aspects in Section 6.1 and Section 6.2, 
respectively. 
The remainder of the chapter was concerned with the cognitive, affective, and social 
dimensions of the design of artifacts. The discussion of cognitive design aspects (cf. Section 
6.3) focused on the concept of usability, which describes the extent to which an artifact can be 
used effectively, efficiently, and satisfactorily by a particular group of users in a specific 
context of use. Norman’s four principles for creating usable and understandable designs were 
discussed (make things visible, provide a good conceptual model, provide good mappings, and 
give feedback). Mental models of an artifact or system have three aspects, which need to be 
harmonized: the design model (how designers conceptualize the system), the user’s model (how 
the user understands the system and its operation), and the system image (how the system 
presents itself). 
The affective dimension of design was the topic of Section 6.4. The discussion emphasized 
that cognition and affect, while seemingly opposite, are closely interconnected and influence 
each other, and went on to argue that the emotional side of the design of artifacts deserves 
                                              
66  It should be noted that in none of the experiments cited there was true conversational interaction 
between the pedagogical agents and learners. The agents merely presented information through 
voice, gesture, etc., but learners could not reciprocate using speech, gesture, or facial expressions. 
Hence, it seems that these presenter agents (cf. Chapter 12.3.12) did not tap the full potential of 
embodied pedagogical agents because they did not engage the learners in (multimodal) instructional 
conversations. 
Table 10. Primary types of social cues. Adapted from Fogg (2003: 91, Table 5.1). 
Type of Social Cues Examples 
Physical Face, eyes, body, posture, movement, voice 
Psychological Preferences, humor, personality, emotions, empathy, ruefulness 
Language (Spoken) language understanding and generation, conversational behavior 
Social dynamics Turn-taking, cooperation, politeness, reciprocity 
Social roles Doctor, teammate, opponent, teacher, pet, guide 
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careful consideration. In other words, artifacts should be both usable and pleasurable for users 
because “[a]ttractive things work better” (Norman 2002b). 
The third dimension of design is concerned with the social responses that artifacts elicit in 
users. The discussion in Section 6.5 focused on the Media Equation (“media equal real life”), 
which has become a particularly influential theoretical framework for explaining the ubiquitous, 
‘mindless’ social responses of people to computers, television, and other media. Support for the 
Media Equation comes from a large body of empirical studies, which have produced surprising, 
even counterintuitive results, some of which were presented in Section 6.5. 
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7  Design Principles 
Design is a means-to-ends process, i.e. it has a definite goal in view: an artifact that represents a 
solution to a given problem. The essence of design is thus problem solving (Manica 2005). 
Design problems are real-life problems with many solutions, some of which are more usable 
(Norman 2002a), enjoyable (Norman 2004), and socially adept (Reeves & Nass 1998) than 
others (cf. Chapter 6). 
Gut instinct and inspiration play an important part in the process of solving design problems; 
however, these things alone cannot prevent mistakes that introduce flaws in the design, which 
in the worst case can lead to an unbalanced or incomplete product. A better strategy bases the 
design on principles which ensure that the outcome meets the user’s requirements and is in line 
with knowledge about effective design. The following sections present a set of principles for 
designing embodied interactive pedagogical software agents.67 While the focus is on agents that 
facilitate learning, the principles discussed can also be applied to the design of embodied 
interactive agents for other areas (e.g. computer games, e-commerce, and human-computer 
interfaces, cf. Chapter 3.2). 
7.1  Added Value 
One objection that has been made against animated agents for education (and other domains) is 
that adding another (eye-catching) object to a multimedia learning environment introduces a 
source of distraction for the learner, particularly if the agent exhibits behaviors which are meant 
to enhance its own believability (e.g. toe-tapping, head-scratching, and cart wheeling, cf. 
Chapter 10.2) but serve no purpose with respect to what the learner is doing at the moment (cf. 
Chapter 3.2.5). While recent empirical studies have shown that the presence of an animated 
agent is not detrimental to student learning (Craig et al. 2002), but apparently quite the opposite 
(Lester et al. 1997b; Lester et al. 1997c; Moreno et al. 2000; Atkinson 2002; Babu et al. 2007; 
Kim et al. 2007), it is clearly not enough for the agent to be cute and entertaining: rather, it must 
add real value to the learning experience. A number of studies (Moreno et al. 2000; Atkinson 
2002; Babu et al. 2007) indicated that this added value was provided by the agent’s ability to 
communicate verbally and non-verbally with the learner. Therefore, it seems that pedagogical 
agents should be designed to facilitate instructional conversations between agent and learner by 
including advanced speech and language processing technologies (Jurafsky & Martin 2008) and 
by giving the agent the ability to use its face, hands, and body in human-like ways to organize 
and regulate the conversation with the learner (Cassell 2000a).68 
Whereas cuteness and entertainment effects soon fade away, it is the added value of a 
pedagogical agent’s ability to communicate that makes learners want to take advantage of the 
agent’s assistance regularly and over a longer period of time (Bickmore 2003; Bickmore & 
Picard 2005). This willingness of learners to make the pedagogical agent a part of their daily 
routine is essential if the agent is to enjoy lasting success (Gulz & Haake 2006: 335). 
                                              
67  The design principles discussed in this chapter were previously published in Franke (2006: 232–245). 
68  The verbal and non-verbal conversational capabilities of embodied interactive (pedagogical) software 
agents are discussed in detail in Chapter 10.1 and Chapter 11. 
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7.2  Perceptible Qualities 
It is highly controversial whether computer-based artifacts ever will (or should) possess 
intelligence, emotions, personality, and other qualities normally attributed to humans. People 
have embraced or abhorred the idea of intelligent, affective artificial entities and their practical 
and philosophical implications, and affirmed or denied the possibility of building them. The 
present work will not be able to settle this issue, but it should be pointed out that when people 
interact with agents, it becomes more important whether an agent seems emphatic, intelligent, 
and life-like (Hayes-Roth 2004: 452) than whether it actually has emotions or human-level 
intelligence (cf. Chapter 6.5). Agents’ possession of these qualities is less important than users’ 
perception of them in an agent (Isbister 1995). Tognazzini (1993) made essentially the same 
point, comparing Laurel’s (1991) split between the invisible computer and the visible character 
in the interface to the distinction between a magician and the role he or she plays on stage: 
A magician is an actor playing the part of a magician. (…) [T]he magician is not supernatural; 
the character he plays is. The computer is not capable of human intelligence and warmth; the 
character we create is. People will not end up feeling deceived and used when they discover, as 
they must ultimately, that the computer is nothing but a very fast idiot. (Tognazzini 1993). 
It follows that learners’ perception of the qualities of a pedagogical agent is critical for its 
success. If the agent exhibits cues69 that create and maintain the illusion of life, intelligence, and 
interest in the learner’s success and failures, it will be able to attract learners and keep them 
interested. Hence, pedagogical agents should be designed “through the eyes (and ears) of the 
learner” to make sure that learners interacting with an agent can suspend their disbelief (Hayes-
Roth 2004: 461) and perceive the agent as friendly, helpful, and intelligent. 
Two different qualities compete in the learner’s perception of an agent: its perceived 
intelligence (“traditional IQ”) and its perceived likeability (“social IQ”). An agent that shows 
off its intelligence may be less likeable (“just another brainiac”) while an agent with too much 
appeal may be perceived as less intelligent (“just another pretty face”). Both qualities are 
necessary, but they may have to be traded. As Reeves and Nass put it: 
Intelligence is a holy grail. But this may be short-sighted. When you think about the teachers that 
you value the most, are they the ones who were most intelligent, as in raw intellectual 
horsepower, or those who knew enough, and were nice – those with high social as well as 
traditional IQs? (Reeves & Nass 1998: 72). 
While increasing likeability may be of interest to developers of technology in general, 
designers of pedagogical agents should go beyond attempting to create a likeable agent and 
focus on aspects such as communicative ability (cf. Chapter 11), expertise (cf. Chapter 12), and 
emotional intelligence (cf. Chapter 13.4), which contribute to the agent’s effectiveness in its 
supportive role with respect to the learner. 
Another trade-off is between appearance and competence. In general, agents can go quite far 
by appearing knowledgeable without being overly competent. Humans assess performance 
based on simple rules. Designers can exploit these rules to build agents that appear more 
sophisticated than they actually are (Hayes-Roth 2004: 453f.; Nass & Brave 2005: 152). 
                                              
69  Isbister (1995) proposed a number of dimensions for assessing the intelligence of an interface agent 
(cf. Chapter 3.2.5), including the agent’s physical characteristics (i.e. its appearance, cf. Chapter 9.2), 
behaviors (cf. Chapter 10), language (cf. Chapter 11), and social skills (cf. Chapter 10.3). 
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Creating an attractive face and voice for an agent, labeling the agent as a specialist, reminding 
the user that his or her success depends on the agent, conforming to gender stereotypes in 
appearance (cf. Chapter 9.2) and behavior (cf. Chapter 10), having the agent flatter the user, and 
designing a personality for the agent that matches the one of the user are all ways to increase 
the perceived competence of agents and other kinds of interfaces (Nass & Brave 2005: 152, cf. 
Chapter 6.5). However, deception, while arguably necessary to some extent when dealing 
socially with other individuals, can be a dangerous strategy for agents in the domain of 
education. Depending on their role, pedagogical agents differ from other types of agents in the 
amount of knowledge about the subject matter they need in order to support instructional 
interactions (cf. Chapter 12.3). An agent that appears knowledgeable but is unable to answer 
students’ questions or fails to understand what the learner is doing will quickly destroy the 
impression of competence. Thus, the brain of an agent for education (cf. Chapter 12) must have 
capabilities that correspond more closely to the agent’s appearance than would be required of 
an agent for entertainment (Johnson et al. 2000: 48). As summarized by Masterton: 
A common problem with AI programs that interact with humans is that they must present 
themselves in a way that reflects their ability. Where there is a conflict between the ability of the 
system and the users’ perception of that ability a breakdown occurs and users may either fail to 
exploit its full potential or become frustrated with its shortcomings. (Masterton 1998: 215). 
7.3  Balanced Design 
One recurring pitfall when designing pedagogical and other agents is to make some of their 
aspects (e.g. character animation, emotion modeling, synthetic speech, etc.) very sophisticated 
(because the development team’s main research and/or expertise is in these areas or some high-
quality third-party components can be obtained) while others are not present or only 
rudimentarily developed. The result is an unbalanced system, which suggests human-level 
sophistication in some areas but fails in others when users put it to the test because they expect 
the agent to perform like a human in those areas as well, based on an incorrect mental model of 
the system (Norman 1997; Dehn & van Mulken 2000: 2; Wilson 1997, cf. Chapter 6.3) that was 
induced by the human-like features of the unbalanced design. 
Nass and Brave (2005) used the term mindless maximization for the tendency of developers 
to realize every aspect of a user interface with the most advanced technology available, even if 
it means that some dimensions of the interface will be clearly superior to others and hence the 
overall interface seem unbalanced. They noted that this strategy, while likely to elicit positive 
responses from marketers, colleagues, reviewers, and award committees, is often not well 
received by users, causing them to feel mistrust, frustration, and dislike with respect to the 
interface. Nass and Brave discussed two problems with mindless maximization that explain 
these negative responses (Nass & Brave 2005: 150–153): 
1. Contrast highlights failure. The human brain accentuates the contrast between the better and 
the less sophisticated parts of an interface, labeling the former as very high in quality and the 
latter as very low in quality. Two cognitive biases prevent perceptions of very high quality 
and very low quality from balancing each other out. First, negative experiences tend to be 
more arousing, memorable, and noticeable than positive ones, so in users’ perception, the 
flaws of an interface will be more important than its features. Second, perceived poor quality 
in individual components generally makes the interface as a whole appear less predictable. 
Together, these two biases induce more negative overall judgments of interfaces of mixed 
quality. 
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2. Smart interfaces can often seem dumber. Even the most sophisticated technology can make 
an interface seem dumb if its performance cannot compete with that of the average human 
being, which is still largely the case when the interface involves technologies for processing 
speech, language, or emotion (cf. Chapter 11.1 and Chapter 13.4). For example, an interface 
that generates natural language output may be perceived as less intelligent because it fails to 
produce messages that are appropriately worded and stylistically consistent (cf. Chapter 
11.1.4). Likewise, a computer that can recognize the user’s speech may be penalized for high 
error rates. Finally, users are likely to criticize a machine which delivers messages with both 
positive and negative content in a cheerful voice for its lack of emotional intelligence. 
The general lesson for the design of agents and other artifacts is that designers should rein 
themselves in sometimes when they could do better, and generally attempt to keep all aspects of 
an agent (or artifact) in approximate balance with respect to quality (Nass & Brave 2005: 151). 
The design should not raise expectations which the agent cannot meet since this will lead to 
frustration and the other kinds of negative user reactions mentioned above: 
Cheating becomes visible in situations when the complexity of the agent’s appearance does not 
match its behavioral and interactive potential. An unbalanced design might result in a mismatch 
of users’ expectations and agent’s performance, resulting in a rising frustration level of the user. 
(Dautenhahn 1999). 
In a balanced design, there is no single feature or capability of an agent that stands out at the 
expense of others. The performance of all components is on the same level. For example, the 
agent should not deliver carefully worded messages using a naturally sounding voice (cf. 
Chapter 10.1.1) if it is unable to understand a single word that the user says. Neither should it 
display a charismatic character without an interesting back-story to support it. 
Nass and Brave (2005) argued that designers and marketers, rather than blindly picking the 
most advanced technologies available all the time, should base such decisions on how users 
perceive and respond to (different versions of) the interface. The constant desire to offer more 
and more advanced features, while undeniably necessary for progress, can result in unbalanced 
and hence less usable systems because human-level performance of all components is not 
feasible in the near term. Nass and Brave called for mindful manifestation rather than mindless 
maximization in interface design. That is, designers should let users be the judges of interfaces 
being created, carefully considering for each aspect of an interface how it interacts with and 
influences users’ attitudes, behaviors, and cognitive processes (Nass & Brave 2005: 155). 
7.4  Coherence 
While interacting with the learner, a pedagogical agent must convincingly play its part in the 
evolving instructional conversation taking place in a dynamic learning environment. All its 
behaviors (speech, locomotion, gaze, gestures, postures, and facial expressions, cf. Chapter 
10.1) have to be designed for coherence, i.e. they must fit seamlessly together and into the 
ongoing flow of the interaction (Hayes-Roth 2004: 460). More specifically, agents should be 
designed to display (p. 460): 
• Strong local coherence. Within an episode of the ongoing interaction, agents have an 
immediate (though short-lived) local focus of attention and coordinate all aspects of their 
verbal and non-verbal communicative behavior in order to serve that focus. Clear signals 
mark the transition between episodes. For example, a pedagogical tutor agent may take the 
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blame for and express its distress with the user’s failure on a test for which it has prepared 
the learner and then make the transition to relaying the good news of the learner having been 
admitted to an important course in the curriculum. 
• Moderate global coherence. Across a series of episodes and interactions, the agent 
coordinates persistent elements of its conversation, gesture, facial expression, and body 
language to maintain an enduring persona. For example, an agent for conversation training 
portraying an English lord will always be the same kind of snobbish gentleman with a 
monocle and an elegant dress, who likes to have his tea served at the same hour every day. 
However, agents should also make use of variable context-dependent behavioral elements to 
create the impression of progression within and between episodes. For example, a tutor agent 
will be careful not to repeat itself in its interactions with a given learner. Furthermore, its 
intimacy with the learner will increase over time through the exchange of personal 
information. 
Glitches in behavior are not acceptable because they diminish the believability of the agent. 
In environments that change frequently and unpredictably, including interactive learning 
environments, coherent behavior cannot be achieved by relying (completely) on pre-planned 
behavioral sequences but must be generated dynamically in order to enable the agent to handle 
unexpected events and interruptions in a flexible way and then resume the original interaction at 
the point where it left off. To behave coherently and keep its overall focus in a dynamic 
environment, the agent needs to maintain a rich representation of context (Johnson et al. 2000: 
67f.), which includes the following aspects: 
• Pedagogical context. The instructional goals and a model of the learner’s knowledge; 
• Task context. The goals of the task in which the agent and the learner are currently involved, 
the current state of the learning environment, and necessary steps toward task completion; 
• Dialogue context. A model of the ongoing conversation between agent and learner; 
• Social context. The current state of and directions for the agent-learner relationship. 
7.5  Consistency 
People bring their own sets of expectations to their interactions with artifacts, especially about 
how the artifacts could be used. Well-designed artifacts provide intuitive affordances (cf. 
Chapter 6.1) that meet users’ expectations about how to interface with them. 
Embodied interactive agents can take advantage of natural human social affordances (Haake 
& Gulz 2007: 13). People know how to assess and communicate with other people, and they 
apply the same criteria to anthropomorphic agents. In particular, they prefer and rely on 
consistency when they interact with people and agents. That is, appearance, attitudes, behaviors, 
and language should all convey the same general impression of an individual because people 
use all the cues available to form an overall opinion (Reeves & Nass 1998; Nass et al. 2000a). 
Consistency not only facilitates information processing and allows the transfer of knowledge 
across situations, individuals, and artifacts, but also strongly influences user attitudes and 
emotional states due to the importance which people place on conformity to social attributes 
and norms (Nass et al. 2006: 374). Hence, designers of characters for cartoons, movies or 
intelligent agents should take great care to make their characters consistent, i.e. free from 
contradictions within and among their appearance, behaviors, and capabilities. 
On the other hand, it has been shown that simultaneous conflicting cues from an on-screen 
character will not only be noticed but also disliked by people (Nass et al. 2000a). For example, 
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it would be fatal if an agent was suggesting one type of personality with its voice and a 
completely different one with the way it looks or moves. Human observers would be confused 
because they normally rely on consistency in others to predict their actions and personality. 
Nass and Brave (2005) warned against confusing users with respect to the gender of voices, 
arguing that: 
[P]eople strongly prefer clarity in classifying and categorizing people. Anyone or anything with 
an ambiguous voice is classified as strange, dislikable, dishonest, and unintelligent. Therefore, 
whether using a recorded or a computer-synthesized voice, clarity of gender (and other 
characteristics) is critical. (Nass & Brave 2005: 16). 
Inconsistent cues perceived from an agent may undermine the agent’s relationship with the 
user, diminishing both the agent’s likeability and its influence.70 Therefore, especially designers 
of agents intended to serve as tutors, guides, or salespeople should pay particular attention to 
consistency (Isbister & Nass 2000: 264) and make every aspect of their agent consistent with 
every other aspect. Since agent design is commonly a team effort (cf. Section 7.12), a high level 
of coordination is required throughout the design process to ensure consistency. 
7.6  Completeness 
One of the major challenges in developing agents is to make them ‘complete,’ i.e. to integrate 
all relevant components into a coherent (cf. Section 7.4) and consistent (cf. Section 7.5) whole. 
A complete embodied interactive agent has: 
• A ‘face’ to communicate emotion and conversational functions; 
• A ‘body’ to act in the environment and in conversations with the user; 
• ‘Ears’ and ‘eyes’ to perceive users and their actions; 
• A ‘brain’ to be able to understand and (re)act intelligently; 
• A ‘tongue’ to communicate messages verbally; 
• A ‘heart’ to understand how the user feels and to respond appropriately; 
• A ‘life’ to give the agent’s personality depth and credibility. 
Completeness is essential for the agent to make a positive impression on the learner (cf. 
Section 7.2), whereas incompleteness would undermine the agent’s position. For example, an 
embodied agent that moves its lips but does not produce audible speech would be incomplete 
from the user’s point of view, as would a pedagogical agent that appears life-like but is unable 
to answer questions or give explanations. A similar case for the completeness of animated 
pedagogical agents was made by Gulz and Haake: 
The impact and engagingness of an animated pedagogical agent ultimately depends upon the 
agent as a whole – on a gestalt phenomenon including all visual aspects, together with other 
aspects, such as voice, dialogue, communicative style, facial expressions, and the design of the 
                                              
70  For example, Gong and Nass found in two studies (Nass & Gong 1999; Gong & Nass 2000) that 
adding a synthetic face increased the social appeal of a synthetic-speech interface (face and speech 
consistent) but decreased the social appeal of a recorded-human-speech interface (face and speech 
inconsistent). From their results, they recommended that face and speech should be kept consistent in 
an interface, i.e. a synthetic face should be used with synthetic rather than recorded human speech. 
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underlying intelligent tutoring system. The whole is more than the sum of its parts. (Gulz & Haake 
2006: 329). 
Intelligent agents bring back onto the agenda the problem of developing a complete artificial 
intelligent entity, which dominated the research on artificial intelligence (AI) in its early days 
(Hayes-Roth & Doyle 1998: 202; Sengers 1998: 3f.). Most work in AI during the past decades 
has focused on solving specific subproblems of general intelligence, such as machine vision or 
playing chess. An agent, in contrast, requires much broader capabilities, which integrate 
solutions from previous research on specific aspects. 
Completeness should not be confused with perfection (in the sense of coming close to 
human capabilities). For many tasks, human-level performance is not required. What matters, 
however, is that all parts of the agent fit seamlessly together and perform on the same level (cf. 
Section 7.3). Furthermore, it should be stressed that completeness of design includes all 
relevant aspects of an agent but not necessarily the entire list given above. For instance, some 
pedagogical agents may have administrative tasks (such as reminding the student of important 
deadlines), which do not require a body or the ability to speak, so those aspects would not have 
to be part of their design. 
7.7  Comprehensibility 
People have a preference for dealing with persons and artifacts that they can understand, based 
on their observed actions and qualities. Hence, for many applications, it is not enough for 
agents to be effective because users try to discover not only what the agent is doing, but also 
why. Furthermore, they do not see events in isolation but try to interpret them in relation to 
other events (Sengers 1999). 
Hence, agents should be comprehensible to people. That is, they should display behavioral 
cues that enable users to accurately interpret their beliefs, knowledge, personality, etc. 
Maximally comprehensible agents clearly express to the user what they are doing and why, and 
they make the relationships between their actions transparent to the user and how the actions fit 
together into a logical and coherent whole (Sengers 1999). This includes ensuring that the user 
understands the diachronic structure of an agent’s behavior, i.e. how its actions relate to each 
other over time (Sengers 2000). 
Comprehensible behaviors have to be simple enough that agents can communicate them 
adequately. Sengers proposed the following heuristic for designing comprehensible agents: 
Behaviors should be as simple as possible. The agent’s comprehensibility comes from thinking 
out the connections between behaviors and displaying them to the user. (Sengers 1999, her 
emphasis). 
Along similar lines, Wexelblat and Maes (1997) discussed the need for interface agents (cf. 
Chapter 3.2.5) to exhibit an “understandable competence,” which enables users to understand 
the capabilities of an agent. In the first place, users have to know what actions of the agent 
produce what results. In addition, information about how operations are performed can promote 
users’ trust and sense of control. 
How do humans try to understand the actions of agents? The view of narrative psychology 
(Bruner 1986; Sarbin 1986; Bruner 1990; Bruner 1991; Crossley 2000) is that humans, being 
“narrative animals” (Mateas & Sengers 1999), make sense of their experience by constructing 
and telling stories, or narratives, and by listening to and interpreting the stories created and 
communicated by others. The human capacity to organize experience into narrative form is 
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called narrative intelligence (Blair & Meyer 1997; Mateas & Sengers 1999; Sengers 2000). 
This line of research regards narrative as fundamental to human understanding of the behavior 
of humans and other intentional beings:71 people interpret intentional actions of other 
individuals by assimilating them into narrative structures (Bruner 1990; Bruner 1991). Building 
these structures requires sophisticated interpretation skills that, for example, determine how the 
observable actions of others over time relate to each other, speculate about what others think or 
how they feel about what they do, and interpret the behavior of others in their physical, social, 
and behavioral context (Sengers 2000). 
The implication for agent design is that an agent can become more intentionally 
comprehensible (Sengers 2000) to users if it allows people to use their well-developed narrative 
skills in interpreting the agent’s actions, by providing narrative cues, i.e. communicating and 
otherwise performing in ways that users can easily72 organize into a narrative explanation of the 
agent’s behavior (Don 1990; Sengers 1999; Sengers 2000). Comprehensible narrative agents 
carefully choose and manage behavioral cues so that users can construct their own story of an 
agent’s activity and thus create their unique understanding of this experience. In building 
narrative, people organize and interpret the narrative with respect to their own body of lived 
experience, including the things they have done and that have happened to them, the people 
they have met and lived with, their attitudes, beliefs, and expectations, and so on. Therefore, 
designing an agent to communicate a single default narrative is a one-size-fits-all approach that 
is unlikely to work with most users. Narrative is constructed from bits and pieces rather than 
absorbed in finished form, so agents should not provide pre-packaged stories of their activities 
but rather cues that can serve as building blocks out of which the individual user can build his 
or her own understanding (Sengers 2000). 
Beyond helping users to understand an agent’s actions, narratively comprehensible behavior 
also supports the user in making sense of the agent itself as an intentional being with its own 
attitudes, desires, and feelings (Sengers 2000). In addition, there are further possibilities to 
integrate agents and narrative: agents can act as characters in interactive fiction (Aylett 1999), 
they can tell stories, for example as part of their job as a tour guide (Isbister & Doyle 1999) or 
to build rapport and credibility with the user (Bickmore & Cassell 1999), and they can use 
narrative like humans do to understand the user and themselves. 
7.8  Individuality 
People stereotypically expect computers to be reliable (performing consistently without failure) 
and predictable (leaving no doubt about how they will behave in a particular situation). In 
                                              
71  Intentional beings are (perceived as) living, sentient creatures with their own thoughts, feelings, 
beliefs, and desires, which drive their behavior. 
72  The path of least effort would be for the agent to rely on stereotyped actions: always doing the same 
thing for the same reasons in the same way, thus achieving maximum predictability and reliability. 
However, the resulting narrative (and hence the agent) would quickly bore the user. Therefore, while 
agent designs should provide sufficient cues for the user to construct a narrative, they should also 
include elements of idiosyncrasy and unpredictability in order to give the user some work to do in 
narrative creation (Sengers 2000, cf. Section 7.8). Complete unpredictability or lack of convention is 
not advisable either, tough. An agent should appear familiar enough to users to be recognized as 
being similar to themselves while going against expectations enough to become and remain 
interesting (cf. Chapter 16.3.5.3). 
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contrast, they would be surprised and possibly even annoyed by an extreme level of reliability 
and predictability in other humans. In fact, the small inconsistencies in human behavior and the 
idiosyncrasies73 of individuals (even quirks) are what make them attractive to others (Hayes-
Roth & Doyle 1998: 208). Furthermore, individuals stand out because of their unique back-
stories, personalities, and emotional dynamics (Hayes-Roth 2004: 455). 
The implication for designing embodied interactive agents intended to be believable as an 
individual is to make them not overly reliable and predictable because this would diminish or 
perhaps even destroy the illusion of life. To manifest their own unique persona, agents should 
be designed with emotions (cf. Chapter 13.1 to Chapter 13.4), colorful personalities (cf. Chapter 
13.5), interesting back-stories (cf. Chapter 13.6), idiosyncrasies, and (where appropriate) 
signature behaviors74 (cf. Chapter 10.2) and reveal and express their personal (as an individual) 
and social (as a member of a group) identity (De Angeli et al. 2001b) in every aspect of their 
beings and behavior (Hayes-Roth 2004: 455). Back-stories should be told bit by bit in 
conversations with users who try to get to know a particular agent better. Reciprocal sharing of 
more and more personal details contributes to trust, closeness, and liking (Bickmore & Picard 
2005), and is therefore an important strategy for relationship building (cf. Section 7.16). 
However, it is not advisable to overdo individuality. A pedagogical agent that is more 
concerned with presenting itself than with facilitating learning is obviously of little use to 
learners. In general, an agent should always be aware of and stay true to its supportive role (cf. 
Section 7.14) and never draw more attention to itself than appropriate. 
7.9  Variability 
Few things are more disruptive to believability than repetition. In contrast to machines, people 
never do the same thing twice in exactly the same way. Hence, the illusion of life is quickly 
destroyed if an agent always delivers a given message using the same wording, tone of voice, 
and facial expression; follows the same steps in the same order when it performs an action; 
gives ‘canned’ replies to questions, no matter what went on earlier in the conversation; or 
displays a single behavior in response to a whole class of events. 
Variability of behavior becomes more critical with increasing frequency, recency, or 
importance of the agent’s message and the length or memorability of the human-agent dialogue 
(Hayes-Roth 2004: 459). These characteristics apply to instructional interactions between 
learners and pedagogical agents that serve as regular companions or tutors of the learner over 
longer periods of time. 
A believable agent must be able to vary the what, when, and how of its behavior in a way 
that seems incidental and unconscious (Hayes-Roth 2004: 459) and is perceived as natural and 
normal (Hayes-Roth & Doyle 1998: 208), not doing the same thing twice in (exactly) the same 
way to avoid the impression of repetitive behavior. “The greater the number of alternate ways a 
character has to perform a particular behavior, the stronger and deeper the perceived illusion of 
life” (Stern 2003: 345). Repetition is only acceptable to create an intended effect (e.g. in 
signature behaviors) (Hayes-Roth 2004: 459). 
                                              
73  Idiosyncrasies are peculiar patterns of behavior or thinking that set an individual apart from others. 
74  Signature behaviors are reliably and predictably performed by a character to establish its unique 
identity. For example, the cartoon character Bugs Bunny ([INT 50]) is famous for the signature 
greeting “What’s up, Doc?” 
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7.10  Communicative Ability 
Agents that are designed as animated screen characters with a body, a face, and a voice invite 
conversational interaction (Laurel 1990b: 359, cf. Chapter 11) because they are perceived as 
providing similar affordances for face-to-face communication as people are familiar with from 
human conversation partners (cf. Section 7.5). Nass et al. found in various empirical studies that 
humans show social responses not only to real people but also to mediated representations, 
human or otherwise (Reeves & Nass 1998; Nass et al. 2000a, cf. Chapter 6.5). People respond 
to the representation itself rather than to the author or programmer (Reeves & Nass 1998: 254). 
Research focused on giving machines natural language (face-to-face) interaction capabilities is 
based on the common assumption that users, being experts at social interaction, prefer to 
interact with machines like they do with other people (Fong et al. 2003: 145f.). There seems to 
be some preliminary evidence for this view (e.g. Qvarfordt et al. 2003; Veletsianos et al. 2005; 
Nguyen et al. 2007). Therefore, embodied pedagogical agents should be able to take advantage 
of all available communication modes (language, gestures, actions, facial expressions, etc.) in 
the exchange of messages with the learner (Hayes-Roth 2004: 452). Like people, they should be 
able to engage in mixed-initiative dialogues with learners, where both parties can initiate 
exchanges and respond to contributions from the other party (cf. Chapter 11.3.3.2.2). Agents 
need to be enabled to perceive their human conversation partners in the same ways as people 
perceive each other in face-to-face conversation, and to convey the same verbal and non-verbal 
cues as their human counterparts would expect from another human in this context. All this 
amounts to designing embodied interactive agents for mixed-initiative multimodal interaction 
(cf. Chapter 11.3.4). 
However, especially web-based environments (like the Virtual Linguistics Campus, cf. 
Chapter 2.4) are characterized by an asymmetry in the sophistication and availability of input 
and output modes. Today, an animated web-based agent can produce speech, locomotion, gaze, 
gestures, postures, and facial expressions while users can only express themselves using 
keyboard and mouse. Many users still do not have input devices like cameras or microphones, 
which would be necessary to capture their side of a spoken face-to-face interaction.75 The other 
problem is that the technologies for recognizing and understanding speech, gestures, facial 
expressions, etc. are improving, but their performance is often not good enough yet for real-
world applications (cf. Chapter 11.1 and Chapter 11.2). 
The restricted input channels limit the amount and diversity of information that a web-based 
pedagogical agent can obtain about the learner, which gives rise to uncertainties in the 
interaction, for example about how to interpret prolonged periods of learner inactivity. For the 
learner, interaction through keyboard and mouse is much less natural than face-to-face 
interaction with other people. Therefore, the design and implementation of interactive agents 
for education and other applications on the World Wide Web should focus more on developing 
the range of input modes that can be processed by an agent, allowing conversations to move 
from typing to speech and from point-and-click to gesturing. The challenge is to: 
                                              
75  Another question is whether all users would tolerate the intrusion into their private space resulting 
from using a computer with ‘ears’ and ‘eyes.’ At least some might be reluctant to reveal auditory or 
visual information about themselves and their surroundings in online interactions and rather prefer to 
remain ‘unheard’ and ‘unseen.’ 
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• Integrate and synchronize incoming information from multiple input channels in order to 
understand how the meanings contributed by each of the communication modes combine 
into the actual message intended by the user (cf. Chapter 11.2); 
• Select and coordinate media and behaviors (i.e. decide what media and behaviors to use, 
what information to express using each medium/behavior, and how to combine media and 
behaviors) in order to produce a coherent overall response that is tailored to users’ abilities, 
preferences, and tasks; 
• Develop and improve component technologies (e.g. gesture recognition, face tracking, 
natural language understanding, speech synthesis, etc.). 
Communication not only occurs between agents and users but also between agents. For 
example, in virtual team-training situations involving both human and artificial team members, 
pedagogical agents have to coordinate their behavior with human and agent teammates 
(Rickel & Johnson 2003). Among themselves, artificial agents typically communicate using a 
formal agent communication language (cf. Chapter 14.1.5). 
7.11  Modularity 
The development of complex interactive software systems in general and of embodied 
interactive agents in particular is a time-consuming and cost-intensive process requiring many 
people doing many months of design, implementation, and evaluation. To reduce the costs of 
future projects, both agents and their components (e.g. character animation or speech synthesis) 
should be designed for reuse in other domains or in other agents. This can be achieved by 
designing the agent as a system consisting of modules that are integrated into an overall 
architecture.76 One set of modules provides the agent’s core functionality (e.g. user modeling, 
language processing, face recognition, etc.), which is domain-independent, i.e. remains stable 
across applications. Another set comprises the resources required to adapt the agent to a new 
domain, in particular the domain model (cf. Chapter 12.1). Each module should be designed as 
generally as possible and provide well-defined interfaces to other modules. Principles of 
software engineering should be observed in the development of the modules (Ghezzi et al. 
2002). 
Not only can a team of agent developers benefit from the ability to reuse their own modules 
at a later point or in another context, but it can also reuse the work previously done by others to 
save time and money in the development process. In fact, a growing number of technologies 
and resources for implementing the components of embodied interactive software agents can be 
purchased as commercial products (e.g. speech recognizers and text-to-speech systems); are 
made available free of charge (e.g. agent frameworks, character players, and dialogue toolkits), 
possibly including their source code; or have been built by (members of) the developer team 
itself in an earlier project. 
                                              
76  While modularity is a proven technique to facilitate software development, Sengers (2000) opposed 
using this ‘plug-and-play’ approach in agent design from a narrative intelligence perspective (cf. 
Section 7.7), arguing that it undermines users’ perception of an agent as an intentional being when 
the separately designed components of the agent are visibly disjoint in its behavior. This is 
particularly likely to happen when the modules are designed by several developers from different 
backgrounds and locations. 
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As a general guideline, available technologies and resources should be preferred over 
proprietary developments wherever possible, i.e. where they significantly reduce the effort of 
the adopting team of developers. This indicates that a less than optimal choice of a third-party 
product might actually do more harm than good. Hence, the following questions may be worth 
considering during make-or-buy decisions: 
• How much may an external product cost? Free software may be inexpensive but also less 
sophisticated than commercial packages. On the other hand, for some problems to be solved 
in building embodied interactive agents, free solutions may be all that is available because 
the technology is not yet mature enough or has not yet generated enough interest to find its 
way into commercial products. 
• How much effort is required to customize and integrate the product? Any available software 
is of little value if it takes months to make it work. 
• Does the chosen product have the same level of sophistication as the other parts? Choosing 
the ‘best’ option might lead to an unbalanced system (cf. Section 7.3) if the other 
components cannot compete with it. 
• Does the provider of the product guarantee support and regular updates? Abandoned 
technologies should only be considered as a last resort and preferably should come with their 
source code. 
To facilitate the integration of the various modules comprising the implementation of an 
agent, a general architectural framework that easily fits different applications would be 
welcome; however, such a reference architecture for agent development is not available yet. 
Ideally, a reference architecture for embodied interactive agents would: 
• Allow rapid development of new agents; 
• Facilitate testing and refining of component technologies; 
• Encourage resource sharing among projects; 
• Foster plug-and-play interoperability of components from different groups. 
7.12  Teamwork 
To create successful embodied interactive software agents for any application, it is necessary to 
draw upon everything that is known about the human nature and condition, both individual and 
collective, and combine it with our knowledge about the nature and workings of machines. That 
is why agent development has to be multidisciplinary, with input ideally coming from the entire 
spectrum of academic and commercial efforts investigating the different aspects of being 
human and (or vs.) being a machine. 
The design of embodied interactive pedagogical software agents is thus both an art and a 
craft, involving artistic as well as scientific and technical considerations, and can only be 
accomplished by a multidisciplinary team bringing together human resources with multiple 
backgrounds and talents (Lester et al. 1997b),77 including the following: 
• Graphic artists and animators design the agent’s appearance and behaviors. 
• Audio engineers and musicians create the agent’s musical and sound effects. 
                                              
77  Interdisciplinary teamwork is also a characteristic of e-learning development in general. 
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• Voice actors deliver the agent’s verbal messages. Alternatively, the agent can use synthetic 
speech, which increases the amount and flexibility of its messages (cf. Chapter 10.1.1). 
• Actors model facial expressions, gestures, and body postures and movements for the agent. 
• Programmers develop, adapt, and integrate new and off-the-shelf agent modules. 
• Teaching experts contribute expertise on teaching and learning methods. 
• Psychologists supply models of emotion, personality, and user behavior. 
• Domain experts provide knowledge about the agent’s subject domain. 
• Human language technologies experts create the speech and language processing modules of 
the agent. 
• Knowledge engineers build the agent’s knowledge base and reasoning capabilities. 
• Human-computer interaction experts contribute insights into the design, implementation, 
and use of human-computer interfaces. 
• Evaluation experts guide agent development through formative (process-oriented) and 
summative (outcome-oriented) evaluations (cf. Chapter 15). 
It should be noted that this list represents an ideal assembly of human talents for designing 
and building an embodied interactive agent. In practice, however, not all of these talents may be 
present. Furthermore, multiple talents (and the associated responsibilities) may reside in one 
team member, due to lack of people with the required expertise, or restricted funding. 
7.13  Participatory Design 
Pedagogical agents are usually designed for a group of learners, which may be more or less 
clearly defined. Some of the attributes that characterize the target group include age, gender, 
ethnicity, social class, education, occupation, and organization (cf. Chapter 6.1). The 
composition of the target group affects the design of a pedagogical agent. The design is 
facilitated if the target group is homogeneous, consisting of members with the same or very 
similar characteristics. In contrast, heterogeneous groups, which are often encountered in web-
based e-learning environments, can make design difficult because cultural and individual 
differences need to be reconciled. For example, an agent will have to perform an apology in 
different ways for students from Japan and the United States, so several variants of the same 
behavior have to be implemented. 
It is highly advisable that designers get to know the learners that ‘their’ pedagogical agent 
will be dealing with. Otherwise, the agent may fail to meet the expectations of the target group. 
The best way to achieve this is through early and continuous involvement of learners, 
instructors, administrative staff, etc. in the design process, i.e. by designing the agent with them 
rather than for them. Participatory design (Muller & Kuhn 1993; Schuler & Namioka 1993; 
Muller et al. 1997) attempts to actively involve the end users of an artifact in the design process 
to help to ensure that the outcome meets their needs and is usable (cf. Chapter 6.3). One 
approach to participatory design of agents is to have users from the target group interact with a 
prototype agent and to include their feedback in a refined version with which the whole cycle is 
repeated. It can also be beneficial to make membership in, or at least familiarity with, the target 
audience a criterion for selecting the members of the team designing the agent because 
“designers do best when they create from and for what they deeply know” (Isbister 2006: 46). 
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7.14  Role Awareness 
All the world’s a stage,  
And all the men and women merely players:  
They all have their exits and entrances;  
And one man in his time plays many parts. 
(William Shakespeare. As You Like It. Act II, Scene 7.). 
Pedagogical agents are more than just another technology used in instruction. By their nature, 
they are much closer to the human participants in e-learning experiences than ordinary 
computers, being social actors (Fogg 2003) that play various instructional roles (cf. Chapter 16) 
in learning environments. A given instructional role affects all aspects of a pedagogical agent, 
including appearance, attitudes, behaviors, capabilities, language style, and tasks. 
Designing an agent for a specific instructional role helps to improve its performance, as it 
constrains the range of actions learners will take in their corresponding social roles (Isbister & 
Hayes-Roth 1998). In general, 
role-appropriate behavior by animate characters [(or agents)] can have a powerful effect on 
shaping the behavior and experiences of the people with whom they interact. (Hayes-Roth & 
Doyle 1998: 207). 
By knowing the social role of another person, people are able to determine what the person 
is like and appropriately modify their behavior toward that person. As a result, it becomes 
easier for people to interact with others because the social roles involved shape expectations 
about how each participant will act and relate to others, without the need for closer 
acquaintance. Relying on social roles reduces the potential for embarrassment, confusion, or 
unwanted conflict in interactions, and it increases the stability of social groups since their 
members can expect each other to be able and willing to behave according to their social roles 
(Isbister 2006: 226). 
By adopting a given social role, an individual puts on a social ‘face’ or mask that signals to 
others how he or she will behave toward them. People wear many different masks, depending 
on who they are dealing with and on the context of the interaction. Given the importance of 
social roles for relationships between individuals as well as larger social structures, people seek 
to preserve them by engaging in face work (Goffman 1967): they ignore inadvertent role-
inappropriate behavior of others in order to help them to maintain consistent social identities, in 
other words, keep their social masks intact (Isbister 2006: 227). Face work is discussed in more 
detail in Chapter 11.3.1. 
It follows that an embodied pedagogical agent should clearly portray its role in the learning 
environment, advertising its skills, capacities, and limitations (Dautenhahn 2004: 56f.). Ideally, 
the learners’ mental model of an agent playing a particular instructional role, which they 
develop based on their role-specific expectations and their interactions with the agent, and the 
designers’ model when they develop an agent for that role should be congruent. Both models 
are mediated by the agent’s portrayal of the role in its interactions with the learner (cf. Chapter 
6.3). Hence, the agent should play its role in a way that is consistent with and clearly 
communicates the design model, allowing learners to understand the portrayed role and to 
figure out how to engage with the agent based on its role. If the role design was informed by 
learners’ expectations and the agent portrays the role believably and clearly, congruence of 
learners’ and designers’ models can be achieved. 
When developing an agent for a particular role, it is necessary to identify what pressures and 
expectations from users are associated with that role and to equip the agent with the means to 
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handle them. Agents that adequately portray established social roles may require much less 
sophistication in other areas (Hayes-Roth 2004: 454). For example, an agent playing the role of 
a coach in linguistic fieldwork (cf. Chapter 16.2.3) should be able to model skills in that domain 
for the learner, but it would not be expected to, say, teach them how to cook. 
Roles have a cultural dimension (cf. Section 7.15) in that they reflect the underlying value 
systems within cultures, i.e. beliefs regulating the structure of society and the place of an 
individual in it (Isbister 2006: 54). Each social role is not only associated with culturally 
specific pressures and expectations but also with culturally defined patterns of interaction 
regulating how users and agents in their respective roles deal with each other (Maldonado & 
Hayes-Roth 2004: 167). For example, the design of pedagogical agents needs to account for the 
differences in teacher-student interactions across cultures (pp. 167f.). 
Agent roles can consist of and may be related to other roles. A given role is assigned to one 
agent at a time, but it can also be vacant or occupied by different agents over time (Odell et al. 
2003). Role assignment is the activity of creating a mapping between a set of (human and 
artificial) agents and a set of roles, making sure that each role is filled by the appropriate agent 
for the part and that an instructionally effective division of labor among the agents is found. At 
one extreme, one agent could play all the roles; at the other, each agent plays a different role. 
Practical instructional scenarios are somewhere between these two extremes. The classic role 
allocation in pedagogical agent systems involves a tutor agent and a human tutee, including all 
the agents presented as examples in Figure 17 (Adele, Steve, Cosmo, and AutoTutor). Other 
researchers have experimented with multiple pedagogical agents in different roles. One 
example is iSTART (“interactive Strategy Trainer for Active Reading and Thinking”) 
(McNamara et al. 2004; O’Reilly et al. 2004), which uses an ensemble of agents playing 
different instructional roles (instructor, student, tutor, and tutee) that help learners to improve 
the depth of their reading skills by modeling and guiding the learning process through their 
interactions with each other and with the learner. 
Conclusive empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of a single agent playing multiple 
different roles in comparison to a group of agents where each agent represents a different role is 
still sparse. However, one experimental study (Baylor & Ebbers 2003) investigated the question 
whether it is more effective for learning and motivation to have one agent with combined 
expertise and motivational support (Mentor) or two separate agents, one with expertise (Expert) 
and one with motivational support (Motivator).78 The authors found preliminary evidence for a 
pedagogical agent split-persona effect suggesting that two separate agents representing 
different functional roles (Expert and Motivator) may be preferable to one agent representing 
both of the roles (Mentor). In the study, the synergy resulting from the use of two agents 
playing the separate roles of Expert and Motivator produced a significant increase in learning 
(particularly recall), and the subjects perceived the two agents as significantly easier to learn 
from (Baylor & Ebbers 2003). 
7.15  Cultural Awareness 
The term culture means different things to different people.79 The UNESCO (United Nations 
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) defined culture as the set of distinctive 
                                              
78  On the experimental validation of these three pedagogical agent roles, see Baylor and Kim (2003a). 
79  Kroeber and Kluckhohn (1952) compiled a list of more than 200 definitions of culture. 
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spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group. This 
definition includes art, literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions, 
and beliefs ([INT 52]). 
Like other artifacts, embodied interactive software agents are both part and product of a 
particular culture. The cultural background of an agent is usually not modeled explicitly but is 
taken implicitly from the culture of the agent’s designers. For most current agents, including the 
ones shown in Figure 17, this is Western, industrialized culture (Sengers 2004). 
People tend to prefer to interact with others who they perceive as culturally or ethnically 
similar to themselves (Maldonado & Hayes-Roth 2004: 151; Nass et al. 2000a). When people 
meet other individuals, they ascribe cultural backgrounds to them on the basis of cultural 
stereotypes (Maldonado & Hayes-Roth 2004: 152), i.e. simplifications about appearance, 
attitudes, behaviors, habits, preferences, etc. of the ‘typical’ members of a particular culture. 
For example, one stereotype about East Asians (especially Japanese) is that they often bow 
when meeting others. Stereotypes generally allow people to compare other individuals to 
prototypes stored in their minds and to make quick assumptions about someone new. This not 
only saves time and effort but also increases the predictability of everyday encounters because 
by adhering to a shared stereotypical code in appearance and behavior, people can be confident 
that they will make the intended impression on others (Isbister 2006: 13). More information 
about the psychology of stereotypes can be found in a review by Hilton and von Hippel (1996). 
For embodied interactive software agents, the danger of causing misunderstanding, offense, 
and rejection increases in open environments like the World Wide Web, where they will usually 
deal with users from diverse cultural backgrounds. Adapting an embodied interactive software 
agent to a different culture involves careful (re-) consideration of the agent’s identity, back-
story, appearance, content and manner of speech, manner of gesturing, emotional dynamics, 
social interaction patterns, role, and role dynamics. The latter two aspects were discussed in the 
previous section, the others are covered in the sections below, following the account of 
Maldonado and Hayes-Roth (2004: 153–168). 
7.15.1  Identity 
Identity comprises the essence of who a particular agent is, i.e. its distinct personality as a 
persistent entity. This includes demographic aspects (e.g. the agent may be portrayed as a 
39-year old Chinese female) and traits and qualities (e.g. likes and dislikes, signature and 
idiosyncratic behaviors). The concept of identity has to be distinguished from appearance (cf. 
Section 7.15.3 and Chapter 9.2). The latter is merely a graphical or other representation of 
certain aspects of the agent’s physiological form (e.g. age, gender, race, build, hair style, etc.) 
and certain elements of its personality and background (e.g. dress style and social class). 
Cultural norms and roles influence the identity of an agent in every aspect of the interaction. 
For example, if the agent is designed to portray a child, cultural conventions will regulate the 
appropriateness and form of addressing people of varying ages. Female agents face the 
challenge that the social roles of women are more variable across cultures than those of men. 
Furthermore, in many cultures, professions and roles are still stereotypically assigned to 
particular genders and agents defying a stereotype may inspire less respect or confidence (Nass 
et al. 1997b, but see the discussion in Chapter 9.2). 
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7.15.2  Back-Story 
The back-story of an embodied interactive agent includes the personal experiences and history 
of the individual portrayed, which played a significant part in shaping the agent’s identity, as 
well as current personal facts which illustrate that the agent has a (continuing) life beyond the 
screen. Back-stories may contain elements such as family relations, friendships, childhood 
memories, political views, favorite colors, food and sports, changing love interests, and 
financial status. They are influenced by the norms and values of the culture in which an 
individual was brought up, so designers should be careful to provide for cultural variation in the 
story of an agent that is localized to different cultures. The design of agents’ back-stories will 
be discussed further in Chapter 13.6. 
7.15.3  Appearance 
Appearance is the first aspect of an embodied interactive agent that is perceived and interpreted 
by users. It influences how effectively and credibly the agent portrays its role and conducts 
interactions (cf. Chapter 9.2). Therefore, designers need to understand how gender roles, 
cultural norms, and traditional attires influence the user’s experience even at first sight of the 
agent persona. They should choose a representation for the agent that will appeal to the target 
group of users and adopt a dress code that will be considered acceptable or at least neutral for 
the targeted population and role. Doing this, designers should keep in mind that attractive 
features and fashions change with both culture and period. 
7.15.4  Content of Speech 
Embodied interactive agents should speak in a way that is comprehensible to the target 
audience. Hence, the language and dialect of the agent should be as closely matched with the 
target culture as possible. This includes idiomatic expressions, slang, colloquialisms, and the 
appropriate selection of words to express different states of affairs (cf. Chapter 11.1.4). 
Content of speech also concerns the choice of conversational topics. If an agent can talk 
about local historical events, geographical details, sports, favorite pastimes, recent local events, 
holidays, humor (cf. Chapter 10.3.2), etc., it will enhance its image as a representative of a 
particular culture. 
However, there are also sensitive topics that speakers avoid discussing with complete 
frankness in some, most, or all forms or contexts of speech. The range and treatment of 
sensitive topics in conversation varies across cultures. In Western cultures, such taboo subjects 
include sex, reproduction, death, excretion, and the human body. Since taboos prohibit the use 
of plain language, speakers (and agents engaging in conversations with them) must find ways to 
avoid or handle these topics in a manner that is considered acceptable in the particular culture 
of their interlocutors. A common strategy is lexical replacement, i.e. substituting some other, 
socially acceptable item for a tabooed word. Another option for speakers involves euphemism, 
i.e. the replacement of a word or expression that is taboo, negative, offensive or too direct by a 
mild or indirect one. 
Regarding the phrasing of utterances, agent design should make a difference between two 
major categories of cultures: individualistic and collectivistic (Ting-Toomey 1999: 66ff., cf. 
Table 11). Individualistic cultures emphasize individual identity, rights, and needs over the 
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identity, rights, and needs of the group (Allbeck & Badler 2004: 110f.), promoting self-
efficiency, individual responsibilities, and personal autonomy (Ting-Toomey 1999: 67). 
Emotion, thought, and action are viewed as being motivated by attributes of the individual and 
as independent of his or her environment. In contrast, in collectivistic cultures, the identity, 
rights, and needs of the group take precedence over those of the individual. Collectivistic 
cultures value relational interdependence, in-group harmony, and in-group collaborative spirit 
(Ting-Toomey 1999: 67). In these cultures, social relationships, roles, and responsibilities 
provide the framework for organizing, experiencing, and explaining the thoughts, feelings, and 
behaviors of the individual. 
Content of speech is also affected by the degree to which a culture prefers verbal vs. non-
verbal means to communicate messages. The continuum ranges from high-context to low-
context cultures (Hall 1976). In high-context cultures, considerable parts of a message are 
communicated through facial expressions, body language, and other indirect cues, rather than 
the actual words of the message. In contrast, low-context cultures tend to rely more on spoken 
language than non-verbal cues in communication and expect messages to be overtly clear 
(Isbister 2006: 51). Individualistic cultures, which value individual independence and freedom 
of expression, are low-context and consider communication as something that occurs explicitly 
through the verbal content of a message. Collectivistic cultures, which seek to preserve the 
harmony of the group and the social face of its members, make more use of non-verbal 
communication to protect the group and people’s feelings (p. 51). 
Table 11. Individualistic and collectivistic cultures compared (Ting-Toomey 1999: 67, Table 3.1). 
Individualistic Cultures Collectivistic Cultures 
• “I” identity 
• Individual goals 
• Interindividual emphasis 
• Voluntary reciprocity 
• Management of individuals 
• “We” identity 
• Group goals 
• In-group emphasis 
• Obligatory reciprocity 
• Management of groups 
Examples: 
• United States 
• Australia 
• United Kingdom 
• Canada 
• Netherlands 
• New Zealand 
• Sweden/France 
• Germany 
Examples: 
• Guatemala 
• Ecuador 
• Panama 
• Indonesia 
• Pakistan 
• Taiwan/China 
• Japan 
• West/East African countries 
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7.15.5  Manner of Speaking 
Apart from what an embodied interactive agent says, further cues about the agent’s cultural 
background are provided by how and when it delivers its messages. Intonation, pronunciation, 
timbre,80 and range of vocal expression are acoustic characteristics of speech that should be 
varied to localize an agent for a particular culture. Other properties of utterances that convey the 
identity and cultural background of agents include timing, speed, utterance length, frequency 
and choice of gap fillers (e.g. ‘hmm,’ ‘umm,’ and ‘like’), and stuttering. 
Designers should pay special attention to how an agent greets its interaction partner because 
the first impression is the one that lasts (cf. Chapter 9.2). Agents with faces (cf. Chapter 10.1.3) 
are expected to be able to recognize and remember users, and to address them accordingly. Title 
usage and familiarity play an important role in properly addressing an interlocutor. Some 
cultures prefer a first-name basis even on formal occasions (e.g. Iceland and Thailand), whereas 
other cultures license addressing someone by their first name only after years of close contact. 
Titles are avoided for the most part by American speakers, but in many Latin American 
countries, ‘doctor’ is used for anyone with a degree or a position of authority. 
7.15.6  Manner of Gesturing 
Gestures are an important vehicle for communicating meaning in everyday face-to-face 
interactions. People use their face and hands in dialogue regardless of language, cultural 
background, or age (Cassell & Stone 1999). However, certain gestures may cause 
misunderstandings and even offense in cross-cultural communication because the same gesture 
may have different meanings for members of different cultural groups. Emblematic gestures, 
which symbolize something abstract, are particularly problematic in this respect. Examples of 
such potentially dangerous emblems include gestures of assent and dissent, such as the ring 
gesture and the head nod. Gestures are discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.1.2. 
Gaze (cf. Chapter 10.1.4) is another example of non-verbal behavior that is associated with 
cultural cues and conventions. For instance, Japanese and Korean users might interpret a direct, 
sustained gaze of an embodied interactive agent as insulting or as a sexual advance. In contrast, 
users from the United States might regard an agent averting the gaze as dishonest, weak, or very 
shy. 
7.15.7  Emotional Dynamics 
The interpretation, management, and expression of emotions not only have an individual but 
also a sociocultural dimension. What emotion should be communicated by whom in what 
situation with what frequency and intensity to what addressee for what length of time, how 
much stimulation is necessary to trigger an emotional outburst, and how comfortable people are 
when directly confronted with certain emotional displays, varies from one culture to another. 
                                              
80  Timbre is a complex, distinctive quality of human voices which is determined by the different parts 
of human speech anatomy: the diaphragm, lungs, trachea, larynx, vocal cords, glottis, pharynx, oral 
cavity, jaw, teeth, tongue, and lips. Each of these elements, in turn, is influenced by an individual’s 
genetics, endocrine system, health history, physical environment, and habits (Nass & Brave 2005: 
98). 
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Agents need to deal with this multidimensional space of possibilities both when they interpret 
the user’s emotional state and when they generate their own emotional displays (cf. Chapter 
13.4.2). 
Agent designers need to choose an appropriate theoretical framework that facilitates cross-
cultural emotion expression and interpretation. One such framework is the Basic Emotions 
Theory (Ekman 1984; Ortony & Turner 1990; Ekman 1992a; Ekman 1992b; Ekman 1999a; 
Ekman 1999b). This theory is based on research by the psychologist Paul Ekman, who 
identified facial expressions and corresponding emotions that are not determined by culture but 
seem to be universal to the human species and thus possibly have a biological origin. These 
‘basic’ emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise, and embarrassment) are 
shared and recognized by humans across cultures. Hence, they can form the basis for believable 
emotional displays of agents that are universally recognizable (cf. Chapter 13.4.2). 
7.15.8  Social Interaction Patterns 
Different cultures have different views of how and when particular topics are appropriately 
brought up for discussion. Hence, interactive agents should be designed to respect the rules of a 
culture that regulate the manner and timing of talking about business, delivering bad news, 
taking the next step toward familiarity with the user, and so on. 
Given the present limitations of the technologies involved, agents will frequently make 
mistakes in their interactions with users and therefore need to be equipped with means to 
address their shortcomings. Socially acceptable ways for an agent to recover from a faux pas, 
acknowledge insufficient understanding, and apologize for a mistake depend on how mistakes 
are perceived in the target culture and how willing its members are to accept repeated 
apologies. Whereas in individualistic cultures, an agent may appropriately react defensively and 
non-apologetically to criticism of its performance in certain contexts, agents from collectivistic 
cultures may tend to accept the blame and apologize for their mistakes. 
Further culturally specific concerns for the design of human-agent interactions include how 
often an agent should take the initiative; how and when it is appropriate to interrupt the user; 
the pace of turn-taking in the conversation; ways for the agent to acknowledge the contributions 
of its interlocutor; and the acceptable frequency of exchanging questions with the user. 
7.16  Relationship Building 
A human or interpersonal relationship is a particular type of association, connection, or 
affiliation existing between two individuals or within a larger group of people. Relationships 
are social and emotional constructs, which are incrementally built and maintained over a series 
of interactions that can span a long time (Bickmore 2003). They may vary in their level of 
intimacy and sharing, both across relationships and at different points in time within the same 
relationship. People seek relationships for the various kinds of support they provide, such as 
(Bickmore & Picard 2005): 
• Emotional support, e.g. esteem, reassurance of worth, affection, attachment, and intimacy; 
• Appraisal support, e.g. advice and guidance, information, and feedback; 
• Instrumental support, e.g. material assistance; 
• Social network support, e.g. providing introductions to other people. 
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Humans develop social-emotional relationships not only with other humans and animals but 
also with human-made artifacts, such as cars, houses, toys, works of art, and animated 
characters in film. The strength and meaningfulness of relationships between people and 
artifacts can be similar to those of human-human relationships (Stern 2003: 333). The nature of 
the relationship has a direct impact on productivity, enjoyment, engagement, trust, and other 
aspects of the user’s experience with an artifact, and the importance of the relationship 
increases as the interaction extends over time (Bickmore & Picard 2005). 
Recently, people have also been shown to bond with various kinds of computer-based 
artifacts designed for use in art or entertainment. Turkle (2003; 2005; 2006a; 2006b; Turkle et 
al. 2006) introduced the term relational artifact for “computational entities that present 
themselves as having states of mind that are affected by their interactions with human beings, 
objects designed to impress not so much through their ‘smarts’ as through their sociability” 
(Turkle 2006a). Relational artifacts are realized as animated characters or physical robots and 
typically invite some form of interaction with users. Many of them serve as virtual pets or 
companions to the user, such as Aibo ([INT 53]), Creatures (Grand et al. 1997; Grand & Cliff 
1998; Cliff & Grand 1999), Dogz and Catz ([INT 54]), Furby ([INT 55]), and Tamagotchi 
([INT 56]). Users take care of their virtual pets, feeding them virtual food, petting them with a 
virtual hand, talking to them using a microphone, and generally giving them affection and 
attention. Pets that are well cared for thrive, whereas those that are neglected become distressed 
or weaker until they run away or die. Having a virtual pet is different from playing a computer 
game because it is not oriented toward an end goal (typically winning the game). The enjoyable 
experience for the user does not come from winning but from the process of having a 
relationship with a virtual pet, and some users seem to be eager to form emotional relationships 
with virtual characters, showing willingness to suspend their disbelief (Stern 2003: 337f.; Evans 
2004).81 As Turkle put it: 
When people are asked to care for a computational creature, they become attached, feel 
connection, and sometimes they feel a great deal more. We love what we nurture, biological or 
not. (…) [A]t the heart of the “holding power” of relational artifacts is that they call forth the 
human desire for communication and connection. (Turkle 2006a). 
Pedagogical agents are meant to be there for the individual learner, which invites a much 
closer social relationship than learners would form with human teachers in the classroom. This, 
in turn, addresses the human need for profound personal relationships with other individuals in 
                                              
81  It should be noted that owner-pet relationships are easier to establish and maintain than friendship 
and other more complex kinds of relationships because of their simpler dynamic and lesser need for 
communication between the parties involved (Fong et al. 2003). Furthermore, the relationship 
between a virtual pet and its owner, unlike friend-to-friend relationships, is inherently unequal (Stern 
2003: 338): the user ‘adopts’ his or her pet (typically by buying it) and the pet is dependent on the 
attention of its owner. In contrast, friendship usually happens because both individuals concerned 
choose to be friends with each other, and (ideally) there is mutual give and take between equals in the 
relationship. This raises the question if there could ever be relationships at the level of ‘true’ 
friendship (or more) between users and human-made interactive artifacts that have a price tag 
attached to them (including pedagogical agents), no matter how human-like they may be portrayed. 
(How can something be considered one’s equal if one has paid for it?) After all, the user might prefer 
to control rather than befriend his or her artifact (or agent), like any other acquisition. De Angeli et 
al. (2001a) explored users’ social reactions to a chatbot (cf. Chapter 11.3.2) and found that users 
preferred having an asymmetric relationship with the chatbot in which they were in the dominant 
position. 
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the learning process (Gulz 2004).82 Hence, the design of pedagogical agents should take 
advantage of the natural human tendency toward relationship building by making pedagogical 
agents relational, i.e. able to build long-term social-emotional relationships with their learners 
(Bickmore 2003). Since people build and maintain relationships primarily in the context of 
face-to-face conversation (Bickmore et al. 2005; Park & Catrambone 2007), pedagogical agents 
can implement relationship-building strategies as verbal and non-verbal conversational 
behavior (Bickmore & Picard 2005; Bickmore et al. 2005): 
• Social dialogue (cf. Chapter 5.4.5 and Chapter 10.3) to bridge interpersonal distance and 
establish a connection to the learner; 
• Communication of empathy (cf. Chapter 3.1.3) to provide emotional support; 
• Reciprocal deepening self-disclosure to increase trust, closeness, and liking; 
• Meta-relational communication (“talk about the relationship”) to clarify mutual expectations 
at the beginning, to periodically ensure that things are running smoothly, and to make the 
necessary ‘repairs’ if they do not; 
• Use of humor to increase liking (cf. Chapter 10.3.2); 
• Talking about the past and future together and reference to mutual knowledge to indicate 
acquaintance; 
• Use of continuity behaviors to bridge the time spent apart (e.g. appropriate greetings and 
farewells, talk about the time spent apart, etc.); 
• Emphasizing commonalities and destressing differences to increase solidarity and rapport; 
• Mirroring or entrainment, i.e. adoption of some aspects of the learner’s behavior, e.g. 
vocabulary (lexical entrainment); 
• Use of non-verbal ‘immediacy’ behaviors (e.g. close distance, direct body and facial 
orientation, and smiling) to indicate liking, conversational engagement, and solidarity (cf. 
Chapter 10.3.1); 
• Persistent memory of previous interactions with the learner to provide information about the 
shared history for other relational behaviors (e.g. talking about the past and future together 
and continuity behaviors); 
• Ability to (re-) identify and distinguish between learners to generate appropriate relational 
behaviors for the individual learner (Schulman et al. 2008). 
7.17  Summary 
The design of embodied interactive pedagogical software agents requires careful consideration 
of a host of artistic, engineering, and scientific aspects. Often, designers may be tempted to rely 
on their intuition and inspiration. However, this approach can lead to suboptimal decisions in 
design. As a first step toward a more solid basis for agent design, sixteen principles for the 
design of embodied interactive software agents for education and other domains were laid down 
in this chapter. These principles are summarized below: 
                                              
82  Learning environments with embedded socially interactive pedagogical agents have been called 
intrinsically social because no other human participants are required to provide the learner with 
social interaction, in contrast to extrinsically social learning environments, which rely on people to 
embody social agency and to enable social interaction (Gulz 2004). 
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• Added value. The agent should possess knowledge and skills (in particular in verbal and non-
verbal communication) that induce users to take advantage of the agent’s services regularly 
and over a longer period of time. 
• Perceptible qualities. The agent should exhibit cues that allow users to perceive that the 
agent possesses certain desirable qualities (e.g. believability, competence, conversational 
ability, empathy, and personality). 
• Balanced design. Designers should avoid mindless maximization of the sophistication of 
particular components of an agent and instead attempt to keep all aspects of an agent in 
approximate balance with respect to quality. 
• Coherence. All behaviors of the agent (speech, gestures, facial expressions, gaze, postures, 
and locomotion) should fit seamlessly together and into the ongoing flow of the interaction. 
• Consistency. Agents should not exhibit contradictions within and among their appearance, 
behaviors, and capabilities but convey the same general persona through all these aspects. 
• Completeness. A complete agent should integrate all relevant components (including face, 
body, ears, eyes, brain, tongue, heart, and life) into a coherent and consistent whole. 
• Comprehensibility. Users should be able to build an accurate interpretation of the agent’s 
actions, beliefs, personality, etc. from the appearance and behavioral cues displayed by the 
agent. 
• Individuality. The agent should reveal and express its personal and social identity in every 
aspect of its being and behavior, which includes emotional dynamics, personality, back-
story, idiosyncrasies, and signature behaviors. 
• Variability. The agent’s behavior should not seem repetitive but vary incidentally and 
unconsciously with respect to the kind, timing, and manner of the behavior being performed. 
• Communicative ability. The agent should be able to communicate with users and other 
agents. In human-agent interactions, this involves using all available communication modes 
(speech, gestures, facial expressions, etc.) in mixed-initiative multimodal conversations with 
the user. 
• Modularity. The agent and its components should be designed in a way that facilitates their 
reuse in other application domains or in other agents. The design should consist of a system 
of domain-independent and domain-specific modules that are embedded in an overall 
architecture. 
• Teamwork. Agent development is a multidisciplinary team effort involving a wide range of 
human talents that contribute knowledge and techniques ideally covering the entire spectrum 
of academic and other efforts to understand the human nature and condition. 
• Participatory design. The agent should be designed with early and continuous involvement 
of its future users and employers during the development process. 
• Role awareness. The agent should portray its social role (including its skills, capacities, and 
limitations) in a way that helps users to understand the role and to appropriately adapt their 
behavior toward the agent based on its role. 
• Cultural awareness. The agent should be viewed as both a representative and a product of a 
particular culture. Its cultural background should be modeled explicitly by (re-) considering 
the agent’s identity, back-story, appearance, content and manner of speech, manner of 
gesturing, emotional dynamics, social interaction patterns, role, and role dynamics. 
• Relationship building. The agent should be made relational, i.e. equipped with strategies and 
behaviors conducive to building and maintaining long-term social-emotional relationships 
with individual users. 
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8  Agent Design Failures 
The second half of the 1990s saw considerable interest, both academically and commercially, in 
the potential of software agents in general and interface agents (cf. Chapter 3.2.5) in particular. 
As a prominent example, the Microsoft Corporation ([INT 57]) included various embodied 
interactive agents in their products, which were designed as ‘social’ interfaces to assist users in 
their work with Microsoft’s graphical user interface (GUI) and office application software: 
• In March 1995, Microsoft Bob was released as a user-friendly interface layer running on top 
of the graphical desktop Microsoft Windows 3.1. Microsoft Bob was based on the room 
metaphor and featured several interactive assistants. 
• The Office Assistant, also known as Clippy, Clippit, or the Paperclip after its default 
representation, was introduced two years later in Microsoft Office 97 as a social entry point 
to the application’s help system. 
Both systems were much less successful than their designers anticipated, proving neither 
very useful nor very popular with users. Especially the Paperclip came to be loathed by many 
users and was disabled much more often than its assistance was sought. Detailed instructions on 
how to remove (rather than use) this feature were abundantly requested and published in 
computer magazines and on the World Wide Web. In reaction to its unpopularity, the presence 
of the animated Assistant has gradually waned in successive Microsoft Office products, and in 
the latest version, it has even been discontinued altogether in favor of an alternative help 
system. Schaumburg (2001) conducted a questionnaire study in which she asked users of the 
Microsoft Office suite to indicate their use and acceptance of the Office Assistant. Her results 
confirmed users’ negative perception of the Assistant, which was rejected by the majority of 
respondents because they thought that it was neither efficient nor engaging or motivating. 
Why were these character-based systems a failure? While users often were quite emotional 
in their rejection of the characters, simply stating that they were ‘annoying,’ it appears that the 
reasons for the lack of acceptance are more complicated. Certainly, it would be premature to 
conclude from these failure (rather than success) stories that the overall concept of embodied 
interactive agents is misguided. However, studying these design failures can be instructive for 
designing more effective agents. Interestingly, there are very few scientific publications on this 
topic, noteworthy exceptions being Schaumburg’s study and Swartz’s thesis (Swartz 2003), 
which explored reasons why so many people responded negatively to the Office Assistant. 
Coming from the discussion of agent design principles in the previous chapter, it can be 
argued that the failure of both Microsoft Bob and the Paperclip is due to serious flaws in their 
design which result from a violation of several principles of agent design. These violations are 
analyzed in the following two sections, first for Microsoft Bob, then for the Office Assistant. 
Lessons for agent design that can be drawn from this analysis are presented in Section 8.3. The 
chapter concludes with a summary and an outlook on the subsequent chapters on the different 
components of agent design. 
8.1  Microsoft Bob 
The Microsoft Bob environment is based on the “room metaphor.” The whole interface is 
designed as a set of rooms within some house. Each room is furnished with images of 
decorative and functional objects. By clicking on the latter, the user can start different 
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application programs, such as a word processor, a quiz, and a calendar. A screenshot of 
Microsoft Bob is shown in Figure 33. 
The user is not ‘alone’ in this simulated set of rooms. First, there is a ‘general’ interface 
agent, an animated dog by the name of Rover. In addition, particular applications may have 
specialist interface agents associated with them. The purpose of all these agents is to assist the 
user in his or her work within the environment. 
The following principles of agent design were observed only inadequately when designing 
the assistants in Microsoft Bob: 
• Added value. It is doubtful whether the assistants in Microsoft Bob add real value to the 
interaction. They try hard to be helpful while appearing cute and entertaining at the same 
time. However, for regular or experienced users, they quickly become a source of 
distraction. There is no way to open an application program without having one of them 
advertising its help by displaying large balloons full of options. When the agent is idle, the 
balloon persists while the agent is performing various behaviors to enhance its believability 
(cf. Chapter 10.2). Although the agent is always there, users’ possibilities to interact with it 
are fairly limited (see below). It is not possible to dismiss an agent, and the agent itself is 
unable to determine when its assistance is not wanted. 
It could even be argued that most applications supported by Microsoft Bob do not require 
the presence of an agent because they do not depend on social interaction. For example, 
Rover providing interactive assistance in the word processor can more hinder than help the 
user, who may just want to write a letter. The only application where the presence of an 
agent might be justified is the game GeoSafari, which features an agent hosting the quiz. 
• Perceptible qualities. Each agent in Microsoft Bob does its best (given the limitations of the 
technology) to appear life-like and believable (but see the remarks about their individuality 
and variability below). However, it seems that the designers emphasized appearance and 
perceived likeability while neglecting competence and perceived intelligence. None of these 
characters appears overly intelligent (except for the Book-with-Glasses character in the 
checkbook application, perhaps), and their competence is limited to advising the user in 
specific application programs. Only Rover seems to possess broader knowledge of several 
applications, but its competence is still limited to giving advice. 
• Balanced design. The agents in Microsoft Bob exhibit a fairly imbalanced design. The 
emphasis is on animation and sound, which are mainly used to make an agent more 
entertaining, whereas other aspects like adaptiveness and conversation are non-existent or 
underdeveloped. It should be noted that this also makes these agents incomplete. 
• Consistency. There are various inconsistencies in the behavior of agents in Microsoft Bob. 
Rover, for example, delivers text messages in natural language but cannot speak (only bark). 
Furthermore, sometimes, an agent simultaneously delivers a text message and a spoken 
message with different contents. 
• Individuality. Animation and sound are the chief vehicles for agents in Microsoft Bob to 
convey the impression of a unique persona. Each character has unique features and 
characteristic (though repetitive) behaviors. However, they do not possess deep and 
interesting personalities, although Rover tries to add some depth to its persona by telling the 
user about itself as part of the guided tour. In some contexts, the agents display emotion (cf. 
Chapter 13.4.2), but most of the time, they do not clearly portray their emotional state. 
• Variability. The agents have a fairly small inventory of animations and sounds, and they 
always perform them in the same way, regardless of the current context or their internal 
state. Hence, there is little to no variation in their behavior. Rover actually tries to vary its 
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reactions when one clicks on its image, but after a small number of clicks, it has exhausted 
its repertoire and the behaviors repeat themselves. 
• Communicative ability. Interactions between the user and the interface agents in Microsoft 
Bob are limited. The agents’ behaviors are chiefly performed to entertain the user. They 
cannot speak, except for canned recorded messages in some of the characters (Rover can 
only bark), they rarely move, and both their task-related and their communicative gestures 
are sparse. They only accept keyboard and mouse input, with the latter being the prominent 
way to interact with an agent. This limits what the agent can learn about the user. 
• Role awareness. In most applications within Microsoft Bob, Rover assumes the role of the 
assistant and portrays it fairly clearly throughout an interaction. However, was casting a dog 
character for this role the appropriate choice? Would users expect a dog to have competence 
in assisting them to write a letter, manage their calendar, etc.? 
• Relationship building. Rover and the other agents in Microsoft Bob adopt essentially a 
passive strategy for relationship building. They lack explicit behaviors, protocols, and 
strategies for establishing, maintaining, and changing their relationship with the user. In 
addition, they make poor use of language, the primary means used by humans in relationship 
building. 
 
Figure 33. A room in the Microsoft Bob interface featuring several functional objects and the animated 
character Rover the Dog. Screenshot taken on 26 October 2007. 
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8.2  The Microsoft Office Assistant 
In the Microsoft Office environment, the Paperclip (cf. Figure 34) and the other Office 
Assistants play three major roles (Swartz 2003: 5–11): 
• Proactive help system. The Office Assistants suggest ways in which they can help the user to 
accomplish a task easier or with better results. 
• Natural language help query. The user can ask questions in (relatively unrestricted) natural 
language, and the Assistant uses basic statistical inference mechanisms to guess a user’s goal 
given their request for help. 
• Locus of agenthood. The Office Assistant serves to locate agenthood in the environment. For 
example, it voices dialogue alert boxes and performs actions in response to user commands 
(e.g. saving, printing, or sending e-mail) which suggest that the Assistant is the one carrying 
out those commands. 
As the Paperclip and its siblings in Microsoft Office can be seen as descendants of the earlier 
generation of agents in Microsoft Bob, the criticism noted for the latter essentially also applies 
to them, in particular because their behavior and strategies of approaching (or rather disrupting) 
the user are quite similar, although their animations and sound effects are more advanced than 
those used in Microsoft Bob. Some additional points of criticism concern the following 
principles: 
• Added value. The Office Assistants do not add real value to the interaction between the user 
and the office application. The user does not need an Assistant to obtain help because the 
regular help features provide the same service as the Assistant’s search box. The same 
natural language queries can be formulated via the “Answer Wizard,” with the same results. 
Thus, the Assistants do not have anything substantial to offer; they do not possess expertise 
that would make them useful. 
• Balanced design. In contrast to the agents in Microsoft Bob, the Office Assistants have the 
rudimentary capability of understanding a user’s typed query. While the animations and 
sound effects of the Office Assistants are quite sophisticated, their natural language 
‘understanding’ capabilities are only rudimentary. This imbalance can lead users to form 
exaggerated expectations about an Assistant’s competencies, based on their appearance and 
visible behaviors, which the Assistant is unable to meet. 
• Comprehensibility. The Assistants may not be equally comprehensible to all kinds of users. 
For example, beginners, the people who are supposed to gain most from interacting with an 
Office Assistant, have been shown to be somewhat confused about what the Assistants are 
supposed to do. More advanced users seemed to have a clearer mental model (cf. Chapter 
6.3) of the Office Assistant (Swartz 2003: 29). 
• Role awareness. The proactive help feature seems to undermine the Assistant’s supportive 
role. Users may perceive this feature as “challenging their authority” when interacting with 
the office application. They may not want the Assistant/computer to think that they need 
help but may rather wish to ask for it themselves.83 A better strategy for designing help 
                                              
83  Part of the technology for the Office Assistant was derived from prototypes developed in the Lumière 
project at Microsoft Research (Horvitz et al. 1998). The original Lumière prototypes used decision-
theoretic methods (in particular Bayesian networks) to decide when to offer help to a given user, 
considering the user’s background, actions, and queries to infer his or her needs under uncertainty. 
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agents like the Office Assistant might be to refrain from making the Assistant “hold the 
user’s hand” all the time but to increase the user’s feelings of control and self-reliance by 
designing the agent to teach the user a skill, empowering him or her to accomplish a task on 
his or her own the next time (Swartz 2003: 17). 
• Cultural awareness. The Office Assistants ignore the sociocultural conventions regulating 
when and how to interrupt someone. They simply pop up uninvited, which is considered 
impolite and intrusive in many cultures. Furthermore, they persist in displaying their 
proactive letter-writing help feature, despite being dismissed by the user an arbitrary number 
of times, a mistake which is not easily forgiven anywhere. Then, the Office Assistants are 
constantly staring at the user and monitoring his or her work. Not only can this make users 
feel uncomfortable (cf. Chapter 10.4), but in a number of cultures, this is also considered 
unacceptable behavior. 
• Relationship building. The Paperclip and the other Office Assistants adopt a passive strategy 
for relationship building, lacking the relevant behaviors, protocols, and strategies for a more 
active approach. Like the agents in Microsoft Bob, they cannot use language to form a 
                                                                                                                                                
For example, assistance was only offered if the “likelihood that help is needed” by the user exceeded 
a given threshold, which could be raised or lowered by the user for future interventions of the system. 
If the user ignored the help offer, the system would step back with a brief apology (Jameson 2003: 
308). Interestingly, many of the more sophisticated user-adaptive features of the Lumière prototypes 
were not included in the deployed Office Assistant (Horvitz et al. 1998), which may have contributed 
to its lack of success. In fact, one of the Lumière investigators (Eric Horvitz) wrote on his homepage: 
The Office team has employed a relatively simple rule-based system on top of the Bayesian 
query analysis system to bring the agent to the foreground with a variety of tips. We had been 
concerned upon hearing this plan that this system would be distracting to users – and hoped 
that future versions of the Office Assistant would employ our Bayesian approach to guiding 
speculative assistance actions – coupled with designs we had demonstrated for employing non-
modal windows that do not require dismissal when they are not used. ([INT 58], emphasis 
added). 
 
Figure 34. The Paperclip offering its infamous proactive help on writing a letter (Swartz 2003: 5, 
Figure 3). 
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relationship with the user. For example, they are incapable of engaging the user in small talk. 
They cannot even answer simple questions about themselves, such as “Who are you?” 
Schaumburg (2001) conducted a questionnaire study whose results indicate further reasons 
for the Office Assistant’s lack of popularity with the majority of users. Most of the respondents 
in her study rejected the Office Assistant because they perceived it as ‘inefficient’ and “not 
particularly engaging or motivating.” Two variables contributed significantly to the (lack of) 
likeability and use of the Office Assistant: users’ perception of being distracted by the agent 
and their trust in its helpfulness, with distraction being more important than trust. “Only those 
users who felt distracted by the assistant and who did not trust in its capability to solve their 
problems rejected the Office Assistant” (Schaumburg 2001). Interestingly, while most subjects 
did not regard the Office Assistant as a social partner, their responses indicated that there was a 
social dimension to their perception of the agent: they described it as ‘impolite’ or ‘cute’ and 
shared that they got along with ‘him’84 and that they loved or hated “that guy.” Still, as 
Schaumburg noted, the designers of the Office Assistant failed to take advantage of users’ 
“social bias” in order to achieve a more positive perception of the agent. 
8.3  Lessons for Agent Design 
The previous two sections identified a number of shortcomings of the agents in the Microsoft 
Bob and Office Assistant systems with respect to the principles of agent design established in 
Chapter 7. These shortcomings provide several valuable lessons for designers of embodied 
interactive software agents, which can be summarized in the following general design 
guidelines: 
• Do not create agents for applications to which they do not add value. In particular, if social 
interaction is not critical for the task, do not include an animated agent at all but look for less 
obtrusive and time-consuming ways to assist the user (cf. Chapter 3.2.5). The same point 
was made by Fogg with regard to the question when to make social cues more explicit in 
computing products: 
When I buy gas for my car, I choose a station with gas pumps that take credit cards directly. I 
don’t want to deal with a cashier; I’m not looking for a social experience. I believe the 
analogy applies to interactive technologies, such as word processing programs or 
spreadsheets, that people use to perform a task more efficiently. For such tasks, it’s best to 
                                              
84  There are two things worth noting about how respondents referred to the Office Assistant in the 
comments cited in Schaumburg (2001). First, there was a tendency to apply ‘animate’ referring 
expressions to the agent (e.g. he rather than it); second, respondents used masculine rather than 
feminine expressions. While the former suggests that for many subjects (at least subconsciously), the 
Office Assistant was more than a tool or feature, compared, for example, to the spellchecker, the 
latter might indicate that subjects stereotypically associated the role of an expert on technology 
(which is portrayed by the Office Assistant) with a male individual. This hypothesis is consistent 
with results from Baylor et al., who found that female agents were perceived as less competent than 
male agents (e.g. Baylor 2005). Subjects’ responses may have been influenced by the particular 
representation of the Office Assistant that they have experienced; on the other hand, the default 
character for the Assistant is a paper clip (i.e. an object rather than a person), so stereotypical 
expectations about expert gender might have played a role in users’ choice of referring expressions 
for the agent. 
162 Chapter 8: Agent Design Failures 
minimize cues for social presence, as social interactions can slow things down. (Fogg 2003: 
115). 
However, other applications rely much more on social interaction than on efficiency and 
therefore may benefit from enhancing cues in computing technology that suggest the 
presence of a social actor. Examples include products for leisure, entertainment, and, 
important for this thesis, education (Fogg 2003: 115). 
• Balance an agent’s capabilities, so that it does not excel in some areas but disappoint in 
others. Do not be deceived that the agent’s strong points will outshine (or outbalance) its 
weaknesses. 
• Make the agent as likeable and as competent as required for the application, and ensure that 
users clearly perceive both qualities. 
• Help users to form a clear mental model of the agent, which includes its identity, purpose, 
capabilities, actions, and state. 
• Craft a character that is appropriate for its intended role and perceived by users as such, in 
line with the stereotypical expectations and pressures associated with the role. 
• Make the agent behave according to its supportive role; the agent should empower the user, 
not weaken his or her sense of control and self-reliance. 
• Ensure consistency within and across the agent’s behaviors. 
• Develop animated agents as interesting and believable individuals with appropriate physical 
and psychological states, traits, and transitions, who express their unique identity in every 
aspect of their beings and behavior. 
• Create a rich inventory of behaviors for the agent to choose from and give the agent the 
ability to perform the same behavior in different ways, modulated by its internal or external 
situation. 
• Make sure that the agent does its best to avoid behavior that could offend users of a 
particular cultural group. Have the agent observe the sociocultural conventions determining 
when and how to interact with the user. 
• Provide multiple, preferably bidirectional channels for the interaction between user and 
agent. Try to take advantage of verbal and non-verbal communication channels, whose use 
comes naturally to people. 
• Equip the agent with explicit behaviors, protocols, and strategies for building, maintaining, 
and changing the relationship with the user. 
Schaumburg’s study of user responses to the Office Assistant (Schaumburg 2001), whose 
results were reported in the previous section, has two major implications for agent design. First, 
agent interfaces should be designed with a focus on assistance with the user’s task first and 
social mimicry second. Social traits that prevent users from achieving their goals will likely be 
seen as a source of distraction and induce users to reject an agent. The user’s ability to 
understand, predict, and control the agent’s actions is critical (see also the comments on “role 
awareness” in the previous section). 
Second, interfaces that seem human-like but do not adhere to the rules of social conduct are 
annoying to users. In the study, respondents expressed strong negative feelings toward the 
Office Assistant because it displayed behaviors that people regard as irritating or impolite in 
interactions with other humans (see “cultural awareness” above). Therefore, Schaumburg 
recommended that interfaces designed to display social behavior should be subjected to 
thorough long-term field testing with users to probe users’ acceptance of these interfaces over 
time. 
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8.4  Summary and Outlook 
There are countless ingredients that make up the human body and mind, like all the components 
that make up me as an individual with my own personality. Sure, I have a face and voice to 
distinguish myself from others, but my thoughts and memories are unique only to me, and I carry 
a sense of my own destiny. Each of those things are [sic!] just a small part of it. I collect 
information to use in my own way. All of that blends to create a mixture that forms me and gives 
rise to my conscience. (Major Motoko Kusanagi, [INT 59]). 
The previous sections applied the design principles established in Chapter 7 to identify reasons 
for users’ rejection of two earlier, less than successful embodied interface agents, Microsoft 
Bob and the Office Assistant (also known as the Paperclip). For each of these two agents, a 
detailed analysis was provided in Section 8.1 and Section 8.2, respectively, that showed which 
of the principles were violated in their design, and how. Based on the insights from this 
analysis, a number of lessons for agent design were compiled in Section 8.3. This final section 
builds a bridge to the following chapters by identifying the various ingredients (components) 
that have to be designed for embodied interactive software agents. 
Any individual playing a specific social role in a certain group has many facets which define 
him or her as a person, as an occupant of the role, and as a party in various relationships with 
other members of the group, including such diverse aspects as hair style, voice, expertise, and 
interpersonal skills. All these aspects make an impact of their own but also contribute to the 
overall picture formed by others of the individual’s identity, capabilities, and relationship to 
others. Likewise, embodied interactive agents are also social actors which are embedded in 
computer-based environments to serve particular functions or play specific roles in the user’s 
experience, for example roles related to education (cf. Chapter 16). Diverse components have to 
be designed and combined in order to create an agent which, in the user’s perception, is 
competent in its designated role, believable as an individual, and oriented toward building a 
relationship with the user. For pedagogical agents, this means that the finished agent should 
achieve three goals: 
• It effectively functions in its appointed instructional role. 
• It believably creates and maintains an attractive agent persona. 
• It successfully establishes a productive, cooperative relationship with the user. 
While traditional intelligent software agents are concerned with function, characters in films 
and games emphasize persona and virtual pets (cf. Chapter 7.16) focus on the relationship with 
the user. However, either function or persona or relationship alone provides an incomplete 
model for people and for embodied pedagogical agents as well. A complete model (cf. Chapter 
7.6) combines all three aspects but carefully balances them so as not to make the agent seem 
unprofessional, boring, or aloof. “[A]nimate characters must complement function with 
persona – distinctive qualities of individual identity, personality, and psychology” (Hayes-Roth 
& Doyle 1998: 204), as well as with relationship-building behaviors. 
Similarly, Gulz and Haake noted that there is a connection between the function and the 
visual appearance of animated pedagogical agents to the effect that agents with a poor 
visualization fail to engage and motivate learners because of their lack of appeal (Gulz & Haake 
2006: 335). In the same paper (p. 325), they listed the following design elements of animated 
pedagogical agents. One element, expertise, was not discussed and has been added to complete 
the list. For each component, the corresponding chapter of the thesis is provided: 
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• Visual form and look (cf. Chapter 9); 
• Movement characteristics (cf. Chapter 10); 
• Facial expressions (cf. Chapter 10); 
• Voice characteristics (cf. Chapter 10); 
• Dialogue and conversational characteristics (cf. Chapter 11); 
• Expertise (cf. Chapter 12); 
• Emotion modeling, interpretation, and expression (cf. Chapter 13); 
• Personality (cf. Chapter 13). 
Two further chapters will discuss aspects of the implementation and evaluation of embodied 
interactive software agents. Chapter 14 will be concerned with agent architectures and technical 
platforms. The evaluation of embodied interactive agents will be the topic of Chapter 15. 
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9  Embodiment 
For computational systems that are embedded in an environment and interact with people, the 
following issues become important (Cassell 2001: 67): 
• How does the system represent itself in its user interface? 
• How does the interface convey information about the environment and its own internal 
structure and operations to its users? 
• How can users interact with the system through its interface? 
The vision of the ‘disappearing’ or ‘invisible’ computer ([INT 60]; Norman 1998; Cai & 
Abascal 2006) involves doing away with a representation of the system by unobtrusively 
merging computer technology with objects and locations in the real world, up to a degree where 
no point of interaction is visible anymore. However, human beings are equipped for embodied 
interaction, and they rely on it in dealing with a complex and dynamic world (Cassell 2001: 68). 
Hence, they expect to be able to first locate intelligence and then interact naturally with it, i.e. 
without requiring special training or abilities and only relying on the means, experience, and 
knowledge they have regarding interactions with intelligent entities in the real world.85 The best 
example of locatable intelligence that invites natural interaction (Valli 2004) is the (human) 
body (Cassell 2001: 68). By analogy, embodied interactive agents can help users to locate 
intelligence in an interface by providing an easily identifiable place for information and 
assistance. Being portrayed as animated characters, these agents can be perceived as individuals 
and interact with users as such, without evoking the impression of interacting with a machine. 
Articulate virtual bodies enable agents to mimic conversational behaviors from human face-to-
face interaction, including speech, gesture, gaze, posture, intonation, and other verbal and non-
verbal behaviors (cf. Chapter 10). A well-designed embodiment also communicates an agent’s 
identity, giving users a good idea of what sort of person the agent portrays, where it comes 
from, how it might behave, etc. Embodied agents with appealing and interesting attributes and 
features can attract users and make it easier for them to suspend their disbelief. Finally, agent 
embodiments portraying a believable and likeable persona can aid considerably in building user 
affection and trust, which are important for developing long-term friendly relationships with 
users (cf. Chapter 7.16). People have been found to perceive embodied agents as more friendly, 
helpful, and polite (McBreen & Jack 2001), and they seem to enjoy and benefit from the 
experience of learning with them (Lester et al. 1997a; Lester et al. 1997b; Lester et al. 1997c; 
Moreno et al. 2000; Atkinson 2002). Furthermore, natural interaction in general occurs at a 
lower level of abstraction than more artificial forms of interaction. Since higher levels of 
abstraction require more cognitive effort for the interaction as such (Valli 2004: 8), natural 
interaction can help to reduce the user’s cognitive load (cf. Chapter 2.2.2) and thus free 
resources for attention on content (p. 11). 
The digital representation of an embodied interactive agent in its environment is the first 
characteristic that is perceived and interpreted by users. The agent’s embodiment exhibits cues 
                                              
85  Natural interaction relies on perceptions, processing, and actions that (a) humans are “made for,” i.e. 
which are “implicitly written in the structures of minds and bodies” (Valli 2004: 8) (e.g. use of the 
hands to manipulate objects); or (b) are of cultural origin but have become so engraved in the minds 
of people that they are viewed as a part of the human heritage (e.g. deictic gestures, cf. Chapter 
10.1.2). Both types have in common that people apply them all the time in their real lives, without 
thinking and without the need for explicit instruction. 
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that indicate the agent’s availability for interaction, as well as its identity, traits, domain, and 
capabilities. Making the right first impression on the user should thus be a central concern for 
the designers of embodied interactive software agents. Cues conveyed by the agent’s 
appearance and behavior should give users a clear idea of its qualities and limitations (Churchill 
et al. 2000: 74). Designing an appropriate embodiment for a particular agent involves making 
choices from a multi-dimensional space of design options (cf. Figure 35). The various 
dimensions of agent embodiment are discussed in the following sections. 
9.1  Personification 
“The outward appearance is dependent on a robot’s function. My own function requires a very 
manlike appearance, and I have it. Others are different, although all are humanoid. Certainly 
they are more humanoid than the distressingly primitive models I saw at the shoe counter. Are all 
your robots like that?” 
“More or less,” said Baley. “You don’t approve?” 
“Of course not. It is difficult to accept a gross parody of the human form as an intellectual equal. 
Can your factories do no better?” 
“I’m sure they can, Daneel. I think we just prefer to know when we’re dealing with a robot and 
when we’re not.” (Asimov 1997: 54). 
“Why the human form?” 
“Because the human form is the most generalized form in all nature. We are not a specialized 
animal, Mr. Baley, except for our nervous systems and a few odd items. If you want a design 
capable of doing a great many widely various things, all fairly well, you could do no better than 
to imitate the human form. Besides that, our entire technology is based on the human form. (…) It 
is easier to have robots imitate the human shape than to redesign radically the very philosophy of 
our tools.” (Asimov 1997: 134). 
When designing the body for an animated agent, an appropriate representation has to be chosen: 
should the body represent a person, some other living being, or an inanimate object (Ruttkay et 
al. 2002)? Agent embodiments may be more or less similar to humans in appearance (Churchill 
et al. 2000: 75). At one end of the continuum, the agent is portrayed as a virtual human (Badler 
et al. 1993; Badler et al. 2000; Gratch et al. 2002; Swartout et al. 2006) featuring the central 
elements of a humanoid embodiment (Churchill et al. 2000: 75ff.): 
 
Figure 35. Dimensions of agent embodiment. Adapted from Churchill et al. (2000: 76, Figure 3.3). 
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• Face. Facial expressions convey cognitive and affective states (cf. Chapter 10.1.3). 
• Hands. The hands perform conversational and propositional gestures (cf. Chapter 10.1.2). 
• Feet. The feet provide the capability of movement (cf. Chapter 10.1.6) and indicate the 
direction of the agent’s attention. 
• Torso. Body posture can signal involvement and orientation (cf. Chapter 10.1.5). 
However, apart from complete figures (cf. Figure 36a), humanoid embodiments can also be 
partial bodies lacking feet or a torso (cf. Figure 36b).86 At the other end of the continuum, the 
agent may present itself as an alien creature, an inanimate object, or an abstract shape (cf. 
Figure 36c–e) (Churchill et al. 2000: 75). Between these extremes, agent embodiments may 
integrate a variety of human features into a non-human representation. 
Designers may choose to portray embodied agents in the image of humans in order to exploit 
anthropomorphism (or personification), the general tendency of people to attribute human-like 
characteristics (such as emotions and sophisticated planning capabilities) to non-human 
organisms or objects. The anthropomorphic perceptions and ideas of people influence how they 
interact with animals, inanimate objects, and possibly embodied agents. 
Design in general has a long history of imitating the human form in all kinds of artifacts 
([INT 61]), for reasons of usability (cf. Chapter 6.3), attractiveness (cf. Chapter 6.4), and social 
ability (cf. Chapter 6.5). In the design of current everyday products, the anthropomorphic form 
has four distinct uses (DiSalvo & Gemperle 2003): 
• Make things familiar. The anthropomorphic form makes the purpose and functioning of a 
new product transparent and reduces users’ reluctance to use or purchase it. 
• Keep things the same. The anthropomorphic form may have become a defining characteristic 
for a certain class of products, so changing the form may lead to confusion about the 
identity, function, or purpose of the product. 
• Reflect product attributes. The anthropomorphic form indicates the features and limitations 
of the product, thus guiding people in how they can interact with and relate to it. 
• Project human values. The anthropomorphic form is a way to express personal, social, or 
cultural values related to the product or its applications. 
Whether anthropomorphic forms should be used in the design of user interfaces is the topic 
of an ongoing debate (Laurel 1990b; Don et al. 1992; Laurel 1992; Erickson 1997; Morgan 
1995; Shneiderman 1995; Shneiderman 1997; Shneiderman & Maes 1997; Duffy 2003; 
Zimmerman et al. 2005). Proponents of anthropomorphism emphasize that it facilitates 
interaction because people automatically apply their knowledge about face-to-face interactions 
and social relationships with other humans.87 An expressive and sensitive anthropomorphic 
                                              
86  In contrast, the face and hands are critical elements of embodied interactive agents participating in 
face-to-face conversations with the user. Facial displays and gestures help to disambiguate messages, 
structure the conversation, and add information that is not communicated by speech (Cassell 2000a: 
6). Furthermore, both the face and the hands are among the principal carriers of affective information 
(Lester et al. 2000: 141). 
87  It should be noted, though, that Nass and Moon (2000) rejected anthropomorphism as an explanation 
for human social responses to computers. Instead, they argued that people mindlessly (Langer 1989; 
Langer 1992) rather than reasonably apply social rules and expectations to computers. The subjects 
in their experiments did not believe that computers were essentially human and vehemently denied 
that they had responded socially to them during the experiments, which, in fact, they had (Nass & 
Moon 2000: 93). 
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agent is claimed to help users to feel more comfortable with, communicate more effectively 
with, and relate more readily to the agent. Those opposed to the idea have argued that 
anthropomorphism can evoke incorrect expectations of human competencies and establish 
dangerous dependency relationships with machines (cf. Chapter 3.2.5). 
Carefully weighing the pros and cons of using the anthropomorphic form is a crucial 
consideration in the design of effective human-computer interfaces. The following positive 
aspects of anthropomorphic interfaces should be mentioned: 
• Anthropomorphism can elicit social and emotional responses in users, which are 
instrumental in forming a relationship between them and the machine. For example, Brennan 
and Ohaeri (1994) found that users of a (simulated) natural language (NL) interface treated 
the computer more as a social partner when the messages of the NL interface were 
‘anthropomorphic,’ consisting of complete grammatical sentences that used first person 
pronouns whenever possible (cf. the personalization principle in Table 1). Anthropomorphic 
messages also led people to use more indirect requests and conventional politeness in their 
responses. However, they did not attribute greater intelligence to the anthropomorphic 
interface. In contrast, the participants in the study conducted by King and Ohya (1995) rated 
anthropomorphic forms (faces) as possessing a higher degree of agency and intelligence. The 
results of Parise et al. (1999) showed that subjects were more likely to cooperate with a 
computer character if it resembled a person, whereas they tended not to cooperate with and 
keep their promises to a non-human character. But a more likeable character did not lead 
subjects to cooperate with it. Parise et al concluded that “static assessments of character 
attributes (such as attractiveness, likeability, or trustworthiness) are inappropriate and can be 
misleading when people encounter those characters in a social interaction framework” 
(Parise et al. 1999: 140). 
• Anthropomorphism exploits a natural and automatic tendency in humans. People are adept at 
relating to and communicating with other people, and they tend to see human attributes in a 
shape or action appearing in the least bit human-like or intelligent (Heider & Simmel 1944). 
• Anthropomorphism is the application of a metaphor (Laurel 1990b).88 Metaphors provide a 
correspondence or analogy with real-world objects which are familiar to the user, and thus 
                                              
88  It has been argued that anthropomorphic metaphors are very common in the domain of computing 
(Johnson 1994). People commonly relate well-known activities, processes, and states associated with 
human beings to the computer in order to reduce the complexity which they perceive in machines to 
a manageable level (Marakas et al. 2000: 722). The vocabulary used to describe the capabilities, 
 
  
Figure 36a–e. Examples of different personifications, including (from left to right) a full human body, a 
partial human body (head and upper torso), an alien creature, an inanimate object (with human 
features), and an abstract shape (all images taken from the Virtual Linguistics Campus ([INT 3])). 
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help him or her to build a mental model of a system (cf. Chapter 6.3). Anthropomorphism is 
an important element of designing interfaces that invite conversational interaction and allow 
people to apply their existing models and skills of face-to-face conversational interaction. 
Anthropomorphic interfaces exploiting real-world analogies and metaphors can help to 
remove the barrier between the user and the machine. 
• Social interaction may be more effective than direct manipulation in tasks that involve 
delegating complex or redundant actions or accomplishing things beyond the current place 
and time (Don 1992). Conversational interfaces thus have their place in human-computer 
interaction, whether they portray a human-like figure or not. In any case, they should behave 
as coherent (cf. Chapter 7.4) and consistent (cf. Chapter 7.5) interaction partners, which 
make their limitations (cf. Chapter 7.14) transparent. 
However, there are also valid arguments against using the anthropomorphic form in human-
computer interfaces. Some of them are listed below: 
• Anthropomorphic interfaces fail to maintain the user illusion because they are unable to 
support their projected intelligence with real capabilities, which, in turn, leads to user 
disappointment (Kay 1984). Anthropomorphism thus creates a dilemma for human-computer 
interaction: it is meant to improve the interaction with a computer, but the user should not 
attribute intelligence to the machine which it does not (yet) possess. This, however, is a 
natural and automatic response. Current computers are ‘semi-intelligent’ at best, but it is not 
clear how this can be adequately portrayed (Erickson 1997). 
• Human-computer interaction is a partnership in which both users and computers act on and 
respond to each other. However, true social interaction (cf. Chapter 5.4.5) presupposes that 
all parties involved possess sophisticated knowledge and inference capabilities (cf. Chapter 
12) as well as communicative competence (cf. Chapter 10.1 and Chapter 11), all of which 
are still underdeveloped in computers (Erickson 1997). Interfaces suggesting that they could 
hold up their end of a social interaction but fail to do so cause disappointment and 
frustration. 
• Anthropomorphic agents may become so ‘realistic’ (human-like) that users cease to perceive 
them as useful. Instead of trusting in the speed, accuracy, and reliability of the machine, they 
might come to expect it to be slow, inaccurate, and unreliable, just like real people (Foner 
1993; Morgan 1995). 
• Not all users may be comfortable with human-like machines (cf. the first quotation at the 
beginning of this section). Hence, an anthropomorphic interface may appeal to some users 
but create anxiety or confusion for others. 
• People who repeatedly get away with abusing agent assistants, librarians, tutors, etc. that are 
human-like in appearance and behavior might be encouraged to treat real people in the same 
roles in the same way (Laurel 1990b).89 
                                                                                                                                                
operation, and states of computers is full of anthropomorphisms. For example, computers ‘read,’ 
‘think,’ and ‘cheat,’ and they may be ‘friendly,’ ‘intelligent,’ or “infected with a virus.” Marakas et 
al. argued that in constructing this vocabulary, people fall back to what is most familiar to them, 
namely themselves (p. 722). 
89  Bartneck et al. (2005) investigated the question if humans abused a robot to the same extent as they 
abused another human being, by replicating a series of experiments on obedience originally 
performed by Milgram (1974). Subjects were asked to teach a robot student word combinations and 
to punish mistakes made by the robot with an electric shock. As the voltage increased, the robot 
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While the critics of anthropomorphism may be right about these issues, it still seems that the 
advantages of using the human form in the right way outweigh the potential pitfalls: 
• Anthropomorphism is a ubiquitous, inevitable tendency of people, so if one cannot beat it, 
why not join it and make it useful? 
• People have been shown to respond to ordinary computers as if they were social entities, 
even when the machine presented itself only through text messages (cf. Chapter 6.5). From 
this point of view, adding a face and a body to a user interface does not seem revolutionary 
but more like the next logical step.90 
• Designers can effectively make use of anthropomorphism if they understand its strengths and 
weaknesses (Don 1992). On the one hand, it is a fact that at this point, little is known about 
people’s reactions to anthropomorphic interfaces, but if such interfaces are not built, 
deployed, evaluated, and improved in the context of realistic scenarios, their strong and weak 
points will never be understood. 
• Using the anthropomorphic form for the sake of cuteness and entertainment alone is unlikely 
to work in an interface. To actually improve human-computer interaction, anthropomorphic 
interfaces have to show behavior that is functional with regard to the system’s aim (Dehn & 
van Mulken 2000: 20). 
• The true potential of anthropomorphic interfaces lies in the possibility of rendering the 
interaction multimodal. An animated on-screen character can be used to portray certain 
communicative processes, including averting gaze, establishing eye contact, gesturing, and 
posture. Such embodied conversational agents (cf. Chapter 3.3 and Chapter 11.3.4) have the 
same properties as humans in face-to-face interactions (Cassell 2000b: 72): 
• They can interpret the verbal and non-verbal behaviors of others. 
• They can respond with their own verbal and non-verbal behaviors. 
• They can regulate the conversation through turn-taking, feedback, repair mechanisms, etc. 
                                                                                                                                                
would react with displays of increasing pain and eventually beg that the shocks be stopped, 
communicating through facial expressions of emotion and messages delivered using synthetic 
speech. Although the participants showed compassion for the robot, urged on by the experimenter, all 
of them eventually applied the strongest (deadly) electric shock, whereas only 40% did the same in 
Milgram’s original study involving a human actor portraying the effects of the simulated electric 
shocks. Bartneck et al. concluded that people may have fewer concerns abusing robots than they have 
abusing people. Slater et al. (2006) also repeated Milgram’s experiment, but they used a female 
virtual human to play the role of the learner. They found that although all participants knew that 
neither the learner nor the electric shocks were real, a significant number of those who saw and heard 
the virtual human during the experiment showed care for its well-being and felt bad about 
administering the shocks. Slater et al. concluded that humans interacting with virtual characters in an 
extreme social situation tend to respond to the situation at the subjective, behavioral, and 
physiological levels as if it was real. However, most participants who saw and heard the virtual 
human still applied all or almost all of the shocks, despite their misgivings, which confirms the 
results obtained by Bartneck et al. that the threshold for abuse seems to be lower for virtual humans 
than for real humans. 
90  On the other hand, it could be argued that since minimal cues, such as text, are sufficient to induce a 
social response in users, there seems to be no need at all to include (anthropomorphic) embodied 
characters in human-computer interfaces (Dehn & van Mulken 2000: 3). However, character-based 
interfaces can be beneficial to human-computer interaction in various ways (cf. Chapter 3.1.4). 
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• They can indicate the current state of the exchange and contribute new information by 
means of audio-visual cues. 
• Adequately designed embodied anthropomorphic interfaces can benefit human interaction 
with computers in ways that go beyond the capabilities of current keyboard- and mouse-
based user interfaces (Cassell 2000b: 72): 
• They increase the robustness of human-computer dialogues despite the shortcomings of 
speech recognition (cf. Chapter 11.1.1) and natural language understanding (cf. Chapter 
11.1.3) technologies. 
• They add further channels for human-computer interaction, providing a low-cost way to 
increase communication bandwidth between human and machine. 
• They facilitate both human-computer interaction and (avatar-based) interaction between 
humans mediated by technology. 
The decision to include specific human features should depend on the overall embodiment 
chosen, the range of behaviors91 intended for the agent, and how much the agent should appear 
human-like or individual. Zimmerman et al. (2005) suggested that the design choice between a 
human, animal, or iconic form as the embodiment of a specific agent should be influenced by 
the proximity of the agent’s role to real-world social roles played by people, as it is perceived 
by the user. If users lack a clear mental model of a human in the role portrayed by an agent, it is 
more feasible to use a non-human embodiment. This may not be an option for pedagogical 
agents, though. Since most learners have a fairly clear mental model of a human instructor from 
their previous experiences, they may not find a non-human embodiment credible for an agent in 
an instructional role. 
In general, designers of agent-based interfaces must be careful not to create representations 
for agents that are inconsistent with their identity, role, and capabilities (cf. Chapter 7.5). 
Agents should not be personified in such a way that users are misled,92 which could mean 
choosing an obviously non-realistic representation for the agent or even none at all (Wexelblat 
& Maes 1997, cf. Section 9.5). Furthermore, they need to be aware of any stereotypes which a 
particular representation might evoke in the target audience. If a human representation is 
chosen, it could be a well-known real person, represent a category of real persons (defined in 
terms of age, gender, ethnicity, etc.), or a new individual could be created (Ruttkay et al. 2002). 
Each of these options invariably evokes a set of stereotypes associated with the person or group 
portrayed (Haake & Gulz 2008: 2), and users will expect agent behavior (cf. Chapter 10) to be 
consistent with those stereotypes. On the other hand, integrating a few traits that go against 
common stereotypes can be useful in order to build characters that are both intriguing and 
memorable (Isbister 2006: 14). 
                                              
91  For example, a mouth is necessary to speak, hands are needed to grasp objects, etc. 
92  Nowak and Biocca (2003) examined how users’ sense of presence in a virtual environment was 
influenced by the perceived agency of interaction partners (human-controlled avatar or computer-
controlled agent) and the level of anthropomorphism of the image used to represent them. While 
participants responded socially to both human- and computer-controlled entities, the findings of the 
study also indicated that “the more anthropomorphic images set up higher expectations that [led] to 
reduced presence when these expectations were not met” (Nowak & Biocca 2003: 481, cf. Nowak 
2004). Nowak and Biocca recommended that “increasing anthropomorphism (…) should be done 
only when the interface and system can meet higher expectations” (p. 492). This recommendation is 
in line with the principle of balanced design discussed in Chapter 7.3. 
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9.2  Appearance 
Appearance is the one aspect of agent embodiments that attracts the user’s attention first. It 
influences how effectively and credibly an agent can fulfill its role and guides users in their 
interactions with the agent (Maldonado & Hayes-Roth 2004: 155). Toby Gard, designer and 
lead artist of the popular computer game Tomb Raider ([INT 62]) and its main character, Lara 
Croft, argued that 
a person’s first impression of a character will almost certainly come not from what they do, think, 
or say, but what they look like. If the character makes a good first visual impression, players will 
likely stay focused on it, allowing you to further entice them with the character’s personality. 
(Gard 2000: 4f.). 
People tend to form beliefs (cf. Chapter 12.1) about their human interaction partners, 
especially their first impression of a stranger, by interpreting their observable appearance and 
behavior based on stereotypes (cf. Chapter 7.15).93 These beliefs allow them to anticipate the 
behavior of others, which in turn drives their own behavior (Churchill et al. 2000: 74). As 
Haake and Gulz put it, “visual stereotypes frame our expectations” (Haake & Gulz 2008: 4). 
They serve as cognitive aids that help people to navigate complex social environments (p. 4). 
The intuition of folk psychology that “first impressions are lasting impressions” is supported 
by empirical research which found that attraction based on appearance (and personality 
information) both persists and deepens over time (Mathes 1975; Green et al. 2008: 2457). 
Given that people treat computers (and embodied agents) like they treat humans (cf. Chapter 
6.5), the principle of lasting first impressions may also apply to embodied agents (Gulz & 
Haake 2006: 328). Indeed, Buisine et al. (2004) found a main effect of the appearance of an 
embodied presentation agent on the agent’s likeability. This effect was independent of the 
participants’ gender. The results also showed a tendency of appearance to affect recall 
performance, but that effect did not reach statistical significance. The findings of Parise et al. 
provided “strong evidence that the mere appearance of a computer character is sufficient to 
change its social influence” (Parise et al. 1999: 136). 
Embodied interactive agents should therefore be designed to engage users already through 
their appearance, which includes various aspects of an agent’s physical form that are listed in 
Table 12.94 Some guidelines for designing appealing agents include: 
• Help users to immediately understand the agent’s identity, role, and actions (cf. Chapter 7.7). 
• Make the agent as physically attractive as possible for the target audience (Maldonado & 
Hayes-Roth 2004: 155). Consider hair style, cosmetics, and costume as important visual 
clues (Gulz & Haake 2006: 332). But keep in mind that “[e]valuations [of attractiveness] 
                                              
93  Fogg made the same point for computing products, stressing the importance of surface traits for 
helping users to form an initial judgment (of a product’s credibility) based on a quick first-hand 
inspection of these traits (Fogg 2003: 132f.). 
94  Buisine et al. (2004: 233) found anecdotal evidence for the effect of clothing and accessories on 
likeability. One of the agents in their experiment was disliked by some of the participants for wearing 
a white coat which made the agent appear “too strict,” although others thought of the same agent that 
it was nicer and more serious. Another agent wearing glasses elicited negative responses because 
users could not clearly see the agent’s eyes through the glasses. 
Chapter 9: Embodiment 173 
vary from culture to culture, generation to generation, and individual to individual” (Fogg 
2003: 94).95 
• Design the agent with a human-like face as a means of engaging the user. Eyes, mouth, and 
eyebrows are essential for conveying the agent’s cognitive and emotional state (Ekman 1982; 
Wilkinson 2006). Given that state-of-the-art computer graphics and processors are powerful 
enough to render increasingly visible and subtle facial expressions, the design of the faces of 
animated characters requires more attention (Isbister 2006: 143, cf. Chapter 10.1.3). 
• Give the agent an ethnicity that users perceive as similar to their own to increase its 
perceived attractiveness, trustworthiness, and persuasiveness (Nass et al. 2000a). 
• Mind the impact of gender roles, cultural norms, and traditional attires. Role assignment is 
subject to gender stereotypes. Accepted behaviors differ for men, women, and children. 
There are also dress codes for different roles, groups, and occasions (Maldonado & Hayes-
Roth 2004: 155). 
• Prefer neutral representations for cross-cultural agents that do not inspire strong negative 
responses in any culture over representations that are strongly preferred in some cultures but 
strongly rejected in others. But note that agents that are too bland and adaptive have no 
appeal anywhere (Maldonado & Hayes-Roth 2004: 157). 
• Find a balance in design (cf. Chapter 7.3) where members of the represented culture can 
recognize themselves in an agent persona and, at the same time, members of other cultures 
can correctly identify the cultural background portrayed by the agent, without offending 
either group (Maldonado & Hayes-Roth 2004: 152). 
Zimmerman et al. (2005) found that people’s preference for male vs. female agent forms is 
influenced by the gender stereotypes which they have for particular tasks and social roles. For 
example, the participants in their study were affected in their judgment by the gender stereotype 
                                              
95  Still, it seems that some aspects of attractiveness, such as health, symmetry of face and body, and a 
straight profile, are predictable (cf. Chapter 6.4). 
Table 12. Aspects of agents’ appearance. 
Species Demographics 
• Human 
• Animal (e.g. bear, dog, parrot, etc.) 
• Fictitious (e.g. alien, fictional or mythical 
creature) 
• Object (e.g. car, computer, paperclip, plane, 
pencil, etc.) 
• Shape (e.g. square, circle, triangle, etc.) 
• Age (same or different age group as the user) 
• Sex (male, female, or none) 
• Ethnicity (similar to or different from the 
user’s ethnicity) 
Body Features Outfit 
• Build (e.g. tall .. short, fat .. thin, strong .. 
weak, etc.) 
• Eyes (size, shape, and color) 
• Hair (style and color of facial and scalp hair) 
• Skin (pale, mid-toned or dark complexion) 
• Peculiarities (e.g. scars, tattoos, deformed 
body parts, etc.) 
• Clothing (e.g. none, formal .. casual, traditional 
.. modern, professional .. leisure, etc.) 
• Accessories (e.g. bags, glasses, jewelry, tools, 
weapons, etc.) 
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of women playing supporting roles and thus rated female agents higher for the roles of 
receptionist, realtor, and librarian. Moreno et al. (2002) reported that learners applied gender 
stereotypes to animated anthropomorphic tutor agents and that the expectations associated with 
these stereotypes affected their learning. The tendency of people to transfer stereotypical 
expectations with respect to females and males in human relationships to their interactions with 
pedagogical agents is also apparent from results obtained by Baylor and Kim, according to 
which both female and male college students were more motivated by male instructor agents 
than by female instructor agents, perceived the male agents more favorably (Baylor & Kim 
2003b; Baylor & Kim 2004; Kim & Baylor 2005a), and showed higher recall performance after 
working with a male agent (Kim & Baylor 2005b). Likewise, the research by Baylor and Plant 
(2005) showed that consistent with gender stereotypes and the similarity attraction principle 
(people are more attracted to other people who they see as similar to themselves),96 female 
undergraduate students identified most with agents that were female, attractive, young, and 
‘cool;’ thought that the prototypical engineer was represented by a male, old, and ‘uncool’ 
agent; and preferred to learn about engineering from male agents that were attractive but 
uncool. However, further research by Baylor et al. (2006) and Rosenberg-Kima et al. (2008) 
indicated that agent appearance can also be used to change stereotypical beliefs. In the study by 
Baylor et al., an agent with the same gender as the participants (female) and representing itself 
as an engineer (commonly viewed as a less stereotypical role for females) was more influential 
than a male agent for inducing a more positive stereotype of engineering in the young female 
subjects. Still, the male agents in the study were more effective than their female counterparts 
in motivating young women to pursue an engineering career and in changing their views of the 
usefulness of engineering, possibly because they were perceived as the prototypical engineers 
and as the individuals with greater expertise.97 Baylor et al. concluded that in applications 
designed to change attitudes and beliefs (i.e. to persuade, cf. Fogg 2003), it is important to 
employ both agents that are perceived as peer models and agents that are perceived as experts. 
Concerning the impact of the ethnicity portrayed by an agent, Baylor and Kim (2003b) 
reported that college students preferred to interact with agents having the same ethnicity as their 
own. This effect was most apparent with African American learners, who showed a significant 
tendency to choose an agent instructor with an African American ethnicity and to perceive the 
chosen agent instructor more favorably (Baylor et al. 2003). Earlier research by Nass et al. 
(Lee & Nass 1998; Nass et al. 2000a) indicated the same basic preference: an embodied agent 
of the same ethnicity as the user was rated higher in terms of similarity to the user, social 
attractiveness, and trustworthiness than one with a different ethnicity (Nass et al. 2000a: 382). 
An explanation for these results may be that place of origin (ethnicity), like gender and 
personality, can be a strong predictor of the attitudes and behaviors that are likely to be 
displayed by a conversational partner (Nass & Brave 2005: 61). However, it appears that results 
with respect to the ethnicity of agents are not consistent, as Moreno et al. (2002), for example, 
found no effects of the ethnicity of pedagogical tutor agents on learners’ stereotypical 
expectations or learning. In a later paper, Moreno and Flowerday (2006) reported that from 
among the participants in their study, African American, Asian American, Hispanic, and Native 
                                              
96  On similarity attraction in human-computer interaction, see Reeves and Nass (1998: 89–99), Nass 
and Brave (2005: 34–38), and the references cited by these authors. 
97  In general, there are both stereotypically ‘female’ (e.g. cooking, sewing, and child care) and 
stereotypically ‘male’ subjects (e.g. hunting, car repairs, and computer programming), and learners 
tend to think that both female and male teachers are better when they operate within their 
stereotypical domains of expertise (Nass & Brave 2005: 29). 
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American students were significantly more likely to choose a pedagogical presentation agent 
(cf. Chapter 12.3.12) of the same ethnicity as their own than White American students. 
Interestingly, participants who chose a different-ethnicity pedagogical agent outperformed those 
who learned from a same-ethnicity agent because the latter focused more on how the 
pedagogical agent represented them than on the presentation (Moreno & Flowerday 2006: 204). 
9.3  Individuality 
Embodied agents should seem individual (cf. Chapter 7.8), i.e. they should have their own 
unique and distinctive persona, which is revealed and expressed in every aspect of their beings 
and behavior, including their embodiment. Individuality manifests itself in the appearance of an 
agent (cf. Chapter 9.2), on the one hand in relatively stable physiological components (facial 
features, build, deformities, etc.) and on the other hand in variable additions and modifications 
that reflect the style and taste of the individual, including accessories, clothing, hair style and 
color, and makeup. The latter aspects of the agent’s embodiment can (and should) vary in the 
course of a series of encounters between the agent and users (cf. Chapter 16.3.1). 
An individual embodiment cannot be designed without knowing the identity of the agent it 
will portray (Thomas & Johnston 1984: 247). So the first task of agent designers, similar to the 
one of writers, is to create a profile of the character which they intend to develop. The 
character profile describes various aspects of the character, including the following ([INT 63]): 
• Demographic. Name, age, sex, nationality, residence, occupation, income, etc.; 
• Physical. Build, eye/hair/skin color, disabilities, health, etc.; 
• Intellectual. Educational background and intelligence level; 
• Mental. Mental strength, mental stability, mental illnesses, etc.; 
• Talents/skills. Artistic, manual, social, technical, etc.; 
• Personality. Introvert or extrovert, qualities and flaws, self-perception and self-confidence, 
short-term and long-term goals; etc.; 
• Habitual. Dependencies (smoking, drinking, etc.); idiosyncratic speech patterns, gestures, 
and other behaviors; 
• Emotional. Causes of anger, fear, happiness, etc. and ways of handling these emotions; 
• Spiritual. Nature and role of the character’s spiritual beliefs; 
• Style. Elegant .. shabby, casual .. formal, conventional .. unconventional, etc.; 
• Experience. Formative events and influences in the character’s life. 
Rowe et al. (2008) suggested the use of character archetypes as blueprints for character 
profiles. A character archetype defines a set of traits (including fears, goals, motivations, and 
personality characteristics, among others) that are associated with a given character and role. 
Rowe et al. argued that archetypes can be used to create characters with consistent sets of traits 
that are both familiar and believable to users. 
One of the most important sources of inspiration for character designers is the real world 
with its wide diversity of people. Designers should train themselves to constantly watch out for 
the unusual, interesting, and entertaining in the people around them (Thomas & Johnston 1984: 
247). However, they also need to pay attention to the requirements imposed by the targeted role 
(e.g. advisor, guide, opponent, teacher, or salesperson), environment (e.g. corporate identity, 
technical platform, etc.), and audience (gender, age, culture, education, social class, occupation, 
176 Chapter 9: Embodiment 
organizations, limitations, skills, goals, needs, expectations, experiences, and preferences, cf. 
Chapter 6.1). 
Embodied agents can be designed to portray different degrees of individuality. Since people 
commonly draw on stereotypes about groups of people to form opinions and expectations about 
others, agent embodiments can purposefully evoke these stereotypes to guide users’ behavior. 
For example, a motherly figure gives rise to expectations of a warm and nurturing caretaker 
while a persona with ‘typical’ Asiatic features would appear to be from an Asian culture. Here, 
stereotypes are positive constructs that describe patterns of diversity in human characteristics 
which facilitate interaction, with no intention to offend the represented culture (Maldonado & 
Hayes-Roth 2004: 152). 
9.4  Movement 
A central consideration for the design of embodied agents concerns the extent to which a 
chosen embodiment can move (Churchill et al. 2000: 77) in order to act on and communicate 
with other entities. The continuum ranges from static images that do not move at all to fully 
animated figures capable of expression, gesture, and locomotion. While non-living objects can 
use movement to communicate messages, many current embodied agents possess an animated 
humanoid embodiment (cf. Figure 17a to Figure 17d) to take advantage of the fact that the 
human body and embodiments with similar configuration and capabilities are well equipped for 
multimodal embodied communication and thus leverage users’ natural skills in interpreting and 
generating body movements (Churchill et al. 2000: 77; Cassell 2000a; Cassell 2001, cf. Chapter 
3.1.4). 
Movement of embodied agents is implemented through animation, the art of creating the 
illusion of motion by displaying a series of slightly shifted images (‘frames’) in rapid 
succession. While in traditional animation the frames are hand-drawn, today, animations are 
commonly created and displayed by using computers.98 Character animation (Thomas & 
Johnston 1984; Maestri 1996; Maestri 1999; Maestri 2001) is the subfield of animation that 
builds the behaviors of artificial characters to make them come alive for the audience. 
Embodied agents may perform animations in interactions with users to support their particular 
role, enhance their own persona, and facilitate relationship building with the user (cf. Chapter 
8.4). The first type of animations serves users in their current task, the second type serves the 
agent’s believability (cf. Chapter 10.2), and the third type serves the user-agent relationship (cf. 
Chapter 10.3). 
Baylor & Ryu (2003) tested the impact of static image and animation on how pedagogical 
agents were perceived in terms of various personal characteristics (person-like, engaging, 
credible, and instructor-like, cf. Chapter 4.2). From the results of their study, the authors 
recommended animation as (one of) the most effective ways to implement all investigated 
characteristics.99 Neither positive nor negative effects of animation on performance were found, 
which may help to reassure those who fear that animated agents might distract the learner. 
                                              
98  Bétrancourt and Tversky defined computer animation as “any application which generates a series of 
frames, so that each frame appears as an alteration of the previous one, and where the sequence of 
frames is determined either by the designer or the user” (Bétrancourt & Tversky 2000: 313). 
99  However, Baylor and Ryu also stressed the importance of voice (cf. Chapter 10.1.1) for agent-based 
learning environments (on the benefits of the presence of voice, see also Reeves and Nass (1998), 
Moreno et al. (2001), and Atkinson (2002)). Later research by Rosenberg-Kima et al. (2007; 2008) 
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9.5  Realism 
The options for the visual rendering of embodied agents differ with respect to their degree of 
realism and the ‘depth’ of the created images. The two extremes of the realism dimension are 
marked by photorealistic embodiments, which are indistinguishable from individuals portrayed 
in photographs or movies, and simple line drawings. Other ways to define this dimension 
include (Badler 1997): 
• Realistic .. artistic representations; 
• Physiologically accurate models .. cartoon shapes; 
• Human limitations .. cartoon actions. 
The field of computer animation is making rapid progress, as demonstrated by an increasing 
number of commercially successful movies that are completely computer-generated, such as 
Toy Story ([INT 64]), Antz ([INT 65]), and Shrek ([INT 66]), in addition to movies where 
computer-generated imagery (CGI) techniques are used to create animated characters playing 
opposite human actors (e.g. Jurassic Park ([INT 67]), Star Wars Episodes I-III ([INT 68]; [INT 
69]; [INT 70]), and The Lord of the Rings ([INT 71]; [INT 72]; [INT 73])). Some of these 
characters, such as Gollum from The Lord of the Rings, have become very popular with their 
audience and have even won awards of their own while others, like Jar Jar Binks from Star 
Wars Episodes I-III, have stirred up considerable controversy and have even come to be widely 
rejected by moviegoers. All these movies have in common that their stories and/or characters 
are obviously fantastic, not from our world, or not from our time (Dautenhahn 2004: 51). 
But what if computer-generated movies were created with the explicit goal to look as 
realistic as possible, featuring CGI humans whose very skin and hair look almost real? A recent 
example of a serious attempt at computer-generated photorealism, including photorealistic 
people, is the movie Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within ([INT 74]). Unfortunately, the movie 
disappointed audiences and critics alike because of the overuse of special effects, the one-
dimensional characters, the emphasis of spectacle over plot, and, last but not least, the use of 
CGI to simulate live actors, which was criticized as an overly expensive gimmick. The virtual 
humans acting in the movie were advertized as photorealistic, but their movements and 
expressions were described as stiff and unexpressive. Particular shortcomings included a doll-
eyed stare, rigid character postures and gaits, and the lack of visible perspiration and skin and 
tissue deformation during character movement. Finally, the characters looked like painted 
statues due to limitations of the lighting models used for skin and hair ([INT 75]). Overall, 
Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within nicely illustrates the tension between realism and 
believability in (character) animation: more realistic animations are not necessarily more 
believable (Dautenhahn 2004: 51). 
Another illustration of the negative effects of a design aiming to be as realistically human-
like as possible on people comes from the science fiction literature. In Isaac Asimov’s classic 
robot novels The Caves of Steel (Asimov 1997), The Naked Sun (Asimov 1991), The Robots of 
Dawn (Asimov 1994), and Robots and Empire (Asimov 1996), one of the protagonists is 
R. Daneel Olivaw, where ‘R’ stands for ‘Robot.’ R. Daneel is a robot created in the human 
image, down to the smallest detail and with the highest level of realism that is technologically 
possible: 
                                                                                                                                                
found evidence for the importance of the visual presence of an anthropomorphic interface agent in 
addition to voice. 
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[Robot] Daneel’s skin texture was perfect, the individual hair on head and body had been 
lovingly and intricately manufactured and placed. The muscle movement under the skin was most 
realistic. No pains, however extravagant, had been spared. Yet [Plainclothesman Elijah] Baley 
knew, from personal knowledge, that limbs and chest could be split open along invisible seams so 
that repairs might be made. He knew there was metal and silicone under that realistic skin. He 
knew a positronic brain, most advanced but only positronic, nestled in the hollow of the skull. He 
knew that Daneel’s “thoughts” were only short-lived positronic currents flowing along paths 
rigidly designed and foreordained by the manufacturer. (Asimov 1991: 27). 
At first (and even second) glance, this robot passed for a human being, deceiving various 
human characters in The Caves of Steel (Asimov 1997: 25f, 79–89, 132–135). However, 
R. Daneel’s human façade crumbled under closer scrutiny. Its literal-mindedness, unnatural 
manner of speech, posture and body movement, unemotional gravity, and even the very 
perfection of its human appearance100 gave it away, albeit only to the more careful human 
observer: 
Baley ate industriously but without the relaxation that allows complete enjoyment. Carefully, he 
flicked an occasional glance at R. Daneel. The robot ate with precise motions of his jaws. Too 
precise. It didn’t look quite natural. 
Strange! Now that Baley knew for a fact that R. Daneel was in truth a robot, all sorts of little 
items showed up clearly. For instance, there was no movement in an Adam’s apple when R. 
Daneel swallowed. (Asimov 1997: 112). 
“Humaniform robots are quite like human beings in appearance, Partner Elijah, down to the 
hairs and pores in our skin. Our voices are thoroughly natural, we can go through the motions of 
eating, and so on. And yet, in our behavior there are noticeable differences. There may be fewer 
such differences with time and with refinement of technique, but as yet they are many. You – and 
other Earthmen not used to humaniform robots – may not easily note these differences, but 
Aurorans would. No Auroran would mistake Jander – or me [R. Daneel] for a human being, not 
for a moment.” (Asimov 1994: 39). 
Those who eventually found out that R. Daneel was in fact a robot reacted with surprise, 
discomfort, fear, fascination, and repulsion: 
“It’s just, you see, that you don’t look like a robot,” said Baley, desperately. 
“And that disturbs you?” 
“It shouldn’t, I suppose, Da – Daneel. Are they all like you in your world?” 
“There are individual differences, Elijah, as with men.” 
“Our own robots… Well, you can tell they’re robots, you understand. You look like a Spacer.”101 
“Oh, I see. You expected a rather crude model and were surprised. Yet it is only logical that our 
people use a robot of pronounced humanoid characteristics in this cause if we expect to avoid 
unpleasantness. Is that not so?” (Asimov 1997: 26f.). 
Jessie lifted her eyes to R. Daneel’s face, staring at it earnestly. (…) “I think you are a robot, 
Daneel.” 
And R. Daneel replied, in a voice as calm as ever, “I am.” (…) 
                                              
100  In fact, Turkle found in her study of children’s interactions with social robots the prominent idea 
among participants that “people are special because of their imperfections” (Turkle 2006a) in 
comparison to robots, which were regarded as superior and therefore could not become “best friends” 
with humans. 
101  In Asimov’s robot novels, the Spacers are humans whose ancestors were the first to leave Earth in 
order to colonize space. They live together with a large number of robot servants on the fifty Outer 
Worlds out in space. 
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Baley’s voice returned to its whisper. “How did you find out? Won’t you tell me?” (…) 
“Can he hear us? That thing?” 
“Not if we whisper.” 
“How do you know? Maybe he has special ears to pick up tiny sounds. Spacer robots can do all 
sorts of things.” (…) 
“Not Daneel. They made him human-type on purpose. They wanted him to be accepted as a 
human being, so he must have only human senses.” 
“How do you know?” 
“If he had extra senses, there would be too much danger of his giving himself away as non-human 
by accident. He would do too much, know too much.” (…) 
“I’m scared; I’m scared clean to death.” (…) 
“Why, Jessie? There’s nothing to be worried about. He’s harmless. I swear he is.” 
“Can’t you get rid of him, Lije?” (Asimov 1997: 60–62). 
“Dear me,” said Dr. Gerrigel, with what was almost a sob in his voice, “you are a robot.” 
“It took you a long time to realize that,” said Baley, dryly. 
“I wasn’t expecting it. I never saw one like this. Outer World manufacture?” 
“Yes,” said Baley. 
“It’s obvious now. The way he holds himself. The manner of his speaking. It is not a perfect 
imitation, Mr. Baley.” 
“It’s pretty good though, isn’t it?” 
“Oh, it’s marvelous. I doubt that anyone could recognize the imposture at sight. I am very 
grateful to you for having me brought face to face with him. May I examine him?” The roboticist 
was on his feet, eager. (Asimov 1997: 135). 
Clousarr yelled, “Keep that thing off me.” 
“That’s no way to speak,” said Baley with equanimity. “The man’s my partner.” 
“You mean he’s a damned robot,” shrieked Clousarr. (…) 
Baley said, “All right, smart boy. What makes you think Daneel’s a robot?” 
“Anyone can tell!” (Asimov 1997: 168). 
While the fictional R. Daneel could deceive most casual observers, the ‘imposture’ of a 
“realistically humanoid” robot (i.e. an android102) built with state-of-the-art technology (Fong et 
al. 2003; Ishiguro 2005) is much more easily recognizable but not less disturbing for people. 
One of several examples is ‘EveR-2 Muse’ (shown in Figure 37), the world’s first “robot 
entertainer” ([INT 76]; Rötzer 2006), which was built by Baeg Moon-hong and his team at the 
Korea Institute of Industrial Technology (KITECH) and made its debut appearance at the Robot 
World Conference in Seoul in October 2006. EveR-2 Muse is a fully embodied humanoid robot 
that is designed to portray an attractive Korean female in her early twenties. The robot is a good 
five feet tall and weighs 60 kg. Its whole body is covered by an artificial skin made of synthetic 
pliable silicone jelly. The body has 60 degrees of freedom (DOFs), i.e. it can perform 60 
independent movements with its eyes, face, neck, arms, hands, torso, and lower body. Thus 
equipped, EveR-2 can portray various facial expressions (including emotions like joy, anger, 
sorrow, boredom, etc.) and even a number of dance moves. However, it can only sit down and 
stand up, not walk, because the necessary mechanical components would make its legs too big 
for a robot that is intended to look like a human being ([INT 77]; [INT 78]). In addition, 
EveR-2 uses speech recognition and speech synthesis (including lip synchronization), the 
ability to perform hand gestures, computer vision, and other technologies in its performances. 
                                              
102  An android is a robot created in the human image with respect to appearance and behavior. 
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Being a robot for entertainment, part of EveR-2’s public demonstration was the singing of a 
song, although at its debut, it was unable to finish its song due to a technical defect ([INT 80]). 
The EveR-2 robot was designed to look “like a real, flesh and blood human being” ([INT 
77]), but it was widely rejected by the public. Commentators disliked its face ([INT 80]),103 its 
“glazed, nightmarish glare” ([INT 81]), and it having “the bearing and presentation of an 
embalmed corpse” ([INT 81]). A number of (anonymized) comments on an entry about EveR-2 
on the Wired Blog Network from 3 January 2007 ([INT 81]) illustrate how uncomfortable 
many104 people are with things that manage to look only “almost human:” 
I feel bad for those researchers having done all that work to have that as a result – that thing 
looks freaky. 
The characteristic of a ‘life-like’ robot that makes it creepy or freaky is its resemblance to an 
actual human body. Stick figures are not nightmarish because they are merely a suggestion of 
human form in its most basic components (legs, arms, torso), but do not closely imitate the actual 
appearance of a human. In other words, something only becomes scary when it is a replica which 
closely resembles the subject they intend to imitate. Ergo, the fact that this robot is ‘freaky’ and 
‘nightmarish’ is a testament to how closely they have reproduced the features of a human body. 
That scariness will be removed when ‘looks almost like’ becomes ‘looks exactly like.’ 
                                              
103  In reaction to criticism of the robot’s appearance, Baeg Moon-hong said in a recent interview that his 
team would work to replace EveR-2’s skin with a better one and maybe change its facial skeleton as 
well. He predicted that EveR-2 would be a ‘beauty’ after the successful “plastic surgery” ([INT 82]). 
104  There were also several positive (and some suggestive) comments about the robot. 
 
Figure 37. Human and machine performing together at the 2006 Robot World Conference ([INT 79]). 
The reader is invited to decide for himself or herself who is who. 
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 (…) I think the eyes are an issue more than anything else physical. Based on the eyes, we sense 
the mind (or mindlessness) behind them. Eyes that don’t quite look at you and don’t move right, 
etc. will always be freaky. 
(…) I’d rather have human-like responsiveness vs. semi-human looks. 
(…) Talk about totally not marketable. The more human an android gets, the creepier it is. 
Androids should be human-shaped but look different from humans; otherwise they are scary and 
offensive… 
In an experiment on human-robot interaction, Minato et al. (2004) investigated human 
reactions to the appearance and behavior of an android girl named ‘Repliee R1,’ by studying 
subjects’ eye gaze behavior. The subjects had brief conversations with a human girl; the 
android performing eye, mouth, and neck movements; and the motionless android. Minato et al. 
found that subjects looked at the eyes of the android more frequently than at those of the human 
girl, despite the general tendency in Japanese culture to avoid eye contact. Many subjects 
commented on the artificiality of the android’s appearance and behavior (especially its eye 
movements), as well as on an imbalance (cf. Chapter 7.3) between the two aspects. Hence, this 
experiment provides some evidence that people tend to show negative reactions to robots which 
try to, but fall short of, appearing and behaving completely human. “Illusions [of human-
likeness], to be believed, must not only look, but act ‘real’” (Tognazzini 1993). 
All these examples from movies, the science-fiction literature, and robotics indicate that the 
relationship between the increasing realism of animated characters or robots and the emotional 
response of humans toward them may not be linear (Dautenhahn 2004: 51), in the sense that 
more realistic is automatically better. In 1970, the Japanese robot scientist Masahiro Mori 
(1970; 1982) proposed the principle of the uncanny valley for life-like robots (cf. Figure 38), 
which more recently has also been applied to computer-animated characters in movies (Ebert 
2004) and computers (e.g. Dautenhahn 2004; Romano 2007; Valvoda 2007; Aylett et al. 2008). 
Mori’s principle predicts that as a robot is made more human-like in terms of appearance and 
movement, it becomes more and more familiar (or believable) to humans, resulting in an 
increasingly positive human emotional response, until a local minimum is reached at which the 
response suddenly becomes strongly repulsive. At this minimum (the uncanny valley), the 
robot’s design blurs the line between human and non-human and the robot might be mistaken 
for real (as R. Daneel in Asimov’s novels); however, slight but noticeable differences can 
quickly destroy this impression and create a disturbing feeling in humans that results in rapidly 
declining approval rates. Dautenhahn calls this experience the Zombie effect (Dautenhahn 2004: 
51). An uncanny robot or agent is like one of the living dead: it looks human-like to observers 
until they examine it more closely and are horrified by the discovery that it is not human. As 
Tognazzini put it, “[t]he better the illusion, the more shocking is any flaw” (Tognazzini 1993). 
In the context of facial animation, Parke wrote earlier: 
The quest for realism runs headlong into the fact that a ‘realistic’ face which is just a little wrong, 
receives strong critical reaction from most viewers. (Parke 1991: 229). 
Sundar (1994) reported the same effect for computers that are made more and more human-
like to facilitate the interaction with the user: at a certain point, users reject these “almost 
human” computers because they fail to live up to the heightened expectations (of human-like 
interaction capabilities) which they raise. The problem is that “[a] human being will always 
suppose that, the more human a robot [or computer] is, the more advanced, complicated, and 
intelligent he [sic!] will be” (Asimov 1994: 428). In sum, it appears that the closer designers 
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come to achieving human-likeness, the closer they move to the abyss and the more likely their 
design is to fail. 
However, Mori’s model predicts that it is possible to escape from the uncanny valley by 
increasing the anthropomorphism (cf. Chapter 9.1) of the robot’s appearance and movement 
until the robot is truly indistinguishable from a healthy human being (100% similarity) and the 
human emotional response has reached its maximum after another steep rise.105 It should be 
noted, though, that the rightmost part of the chart (i.e. the rise out of the uncanny valley by 
making robots completely human-like) is problematic because Mori had no basis for that 
prediction when he developed the chart more than thirty years ago, as human-like robots are 
technologically possible only today (and still only partially). 
The general lesson of the uncanny-valley model for designers of embodied interactive agents 
is one of self-limitation, i.e. to aim for less than they might be able to accomplish in terms of 
realism with the current state of technology, which is not sophisticated enough to create 100% 
                                              
105  At this point, one can only speculate about what might happen after this second maximum, as 
embodied agents are improved even further and eventually become ‘super-human.’ Humans are not 
perfect, neither in appearance nor in behavior. If embodied agents become superior to humans in one 
or both of these aspects some day, how will people react? In the case of R. Daneel, the very 
perfection of its physical appearance betrayed its non-humanness, amplified by the contrasting 
imperfection of its behavior. Overall, people’s reactions to R. Daneel were not favorable. In Turkle’s 
study (2006a), children regarded social robots as superior and therefore thought that they could not 
become “best friends” to humans, who they regarded as special because of their imperfections. This 
might indicate that humans possibly will not appreciate such ‘super-human’ agents. 
 
Figure 38. Masahiro Mori’s uncanny valley (Mori 1970). Adapted from MacDorman (2005, Figure 1). 
The diagram plots the familiarity (believability) of a robot against its human-likeness (realism). The 
uncanny valley is the sudden dip in emotional response of humans to near-human robots. As the dotted 
curve shows, the emotional response is amplified by movement. 
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human-likeness of artificial agents.106 Stepping down from the goal of highly realistic agent 
representations is necessary because 
both research and experience suggest that a mismatch between realism in appearance and the 
apparent knowledge level of the agent can have a deleterious effect on credibility [(cf. Chapter 
7.3)]. In other words, the more visually realistic the representation, the higher the expectations of 
the user in relation to the appropriateness and ‘intelligence’ of utterances and actions. Agents 
that ‘look’ smart and ‘act’ or ‘talk’ dumb are poorly perceived by many users, who express a 
higher tolerance for the limitations of a ‘character’ more sketchily represented, for instance 
through cartoon-like graphics. (Dowling 2002, emphasis added). 
To prevent their agents from falling into the abyss of the uncanny valley (very human-like 
but still falling short), designers should content themselves with reaching the first peak in 
Figure 38 (human-like but less ambitious) rather than the second (completely human-like but 
unattainable) (MacDorman 2005). Human emotional responses reach their first local maximum 
at the first peak, which may be a sufficient criterion of success for many applications involving 
embodied interactive agents. 
Arguments for aiming at less than photorealism in agent design also come from McCloud’s 
work on how people compose, read, and understand comics (McCloud 1993). According to 
McCloud, simplifying and reducing representations of characters, making them iconic rather 
than realistic, can increase audience involvement because the mental concept and image which 
the reader has of himself or herself is highly iconic (in contrast to his or her mental image of 
other people). Therefore, users may find it easier to relate to embodied agents with an iconic 
(simplified and reduced) representation. Thus, these agents can make a stronger impact on users 
(Gulz & Haake 2006: 330). However, for any given agent, the appropriate design with respect 
to the iconic-realistic dimension depends on both the target group of users (cf. Chapter 6.1) and 
the agent’s role (cf. Chapter 7.14). Different cultures and subcultures may respond in different 
ways to agents that are more realistic vs. more iconic. Furthermore, for a pedagogical agent in 
the role of tutor, a higher level of realism may be appropriate because, playing a different role 
than the learner, it portrays “the other” more than an agent acting as a learning companion (a 
role closer to the learner) (p. 331). 
While the first peak in Figure 38 might represent an appropriate goal level for agent realism, 
the question arises whether there is also a low-end level of human-likeness that is just enough to 
make people believe that the illusion portrayed by an agent is real. Tognazzini (1993) called 
this point the threshold of believability. He suggested that with careful design and attention to 
detail, a point or threshold can be reached beyond which disbelief turns into belief in the reality 
of the illusion that has been created. Since the exact threshold is subjective, depending on the 
person and his or her mood, designers “must exceed it sufficiently to ensure believability” 
(Tognazzini 1993). A similar idea was mentioned by Nowak (2004). She speculated that “there 
may be a sufficiency threshold where an intelligent other begins to be perceived as intelligent, 
or human enough, for the purposes of interaction. (…) [I]f there is a sufficiency threshold, it is 
                                              
106  However, there is optimism among developers that they will be able to create artifacts which are 
indistinguishable from humans soon. For example, in an interview with the BBC published online on 
20 February 2007 ([INT 83]), a producer of computer games admitted that “games are currently in an 
‘uncanny valley.’ They look strange – they’re too close to real, but not quite real.” However, he 
added: “Give us another year or two, and we’ll be able to completely get across that uncanny valley.” 
On the other side of the valley, developers hope to achieve ‘super-realism,’ i.e. (game) characters that 
demonstrate all the naturalness and subtleties of human appearance and body language which they 
currently still lack ([INT 83]). 
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likely that the standard for social interactions would be higher than the standard for task-based 
interactions.” (Nowak 2004, emphasis added). 
The challenge for agent design is to create the right level of realism. Both Mori’s model, 
which suggests that movement amplifies the impact on the user (cf. Figure 38), and empirical 
studies indicate that behavior in context seems to be more important than appearance 
(Dautenhahn 2004: 52f.).107 As a result, not only the agent’s embodiment but importantly also 
its behaviors (speech, locomotion, gestures, and facial expressions) require an appropriate 
degree of realism in order to enhance believability and support the agent’s tasks.108 In general, a 
body should exhibit the behaviors which users expect from this kind of embodiment, observing 
the relevant restrictions. For example, exaggerated facial expressions or gesturing may be 
acceptable for a cartoon figure but would undermine users’ perception of an agent with a 
photorealistic human-like appearance (McBreen & Jack 2001: 404). Other research found that 
the more anthropomorphically-realistic a character becomes, the more human-like it is expected 
to act (Vinayagamoorthy et al. 2005). 
Agent embodiments can be rendered as two-dimensional (2D) or three-dimensional (3D) 
representations (Churchill et al. 2000: 77). The 2D graphics are easier to draw and process and 
allow greater levels of detail. The 3D models can be viewed from any angle and can be created 
and animated on the fly using well-defined rules. McBreen and Jack (2000; 2001) found that 
the participants in their study preferred the 3D agents to 2D agents and the 2D and 3D fully 
embodied agents to 2D and 3D talking heads. 
Whether an embodied agent is designed as a stick figure or a more realistic image, in 2D or 
in 3D, is a trade-off between task and context parameters, the constraints of rendering 
(Churchill et al. 2000: 77), and the need to avoid the pitfall of the uncanny valley. Portraying an 
agent with rough strokes might be sufficient to make a first impression, but the finer details are 
necessary to complete the picture, and their presence (or absence) becomes more and more 
apparent with increasing exposure of users to the agent (Loyall & Bates 1997: 106; Shaw et al. 
1999: 288). 
                                              
107  Cassell and Tartaro (2007) made essentially the same point by arguing that rather than attempting to 
impress the user through the agent’s realistic or life-like appearance, agent designers should seek to 
achieve intersubjectivity in human-agent interaction by making their agent behaviorally realistic, in 
particular with respect to its verbal and non-verbal communicative behaviors (cf. Chapter 10.1 and 
Chapter 11), thus inducing the user to unconsciously respond to the agent as if it was like a human 
partner in the conversation. Along the same line, experimental results of Iacobelli and Cassell (2007) 
suggest that perceptions of agent ethnicity can be influenced by changing verbal and non-verbal 
behaviors of an embodied conversational agent (cf. Chapter 11.3.4) rather than its physical traits. 
108  Bailenson et al. (2005) examined how assessments of copresence (or social presence) with embodied 
agents in immersive virtual reality (measured in terms of both participants’ perceptions of and 
responses to the agents) were influenced by the degree to which each agent resembled a human being 
in appearance and behavior. Copresence was found to be lowest when the appearance and behavioral 
realism of an embodied agent were highly inconsistent (cf. Chapter 7.5) with each other. Similarly, 
Garau et al. (2003) demonstrated that increasing the photorealism (i.e. the appearance) of an avatar 
(the virtual representation of a human being, cf. Chapter 3.1.4) without also improving its behavioral 
realism (they investigated eye gaze behavior) can reduce the perceived quality of communication 
(operationalized in terms of copresence, among other indicators). 
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9.6  Complete vs. Partial Bodies 
Agent embodiments do not always have to be complete (humanoid) bodies but may range on 
the completeness scale from just a head to a head and neck to a head, neck, arms, and torso to a 
fully articulate body. In general, partial embodiments are easier to create and animate but have 
a limited potential for action and interaction. 
The extent of completeness required for an agent embodiment depends on the expressive, 
gestural, and locomotive capabilities necessary to support the agent’s role, persona, and 
relationship-building efforts (cf. Chapter 8.4). Full bodies are suitable for agents whose role 
involves moving around in the environment and gesturing at or manipulating things. If the 
agent is meant to remain stationary (e.g. appear in a window), it can be enough to model the 
upper half of the body. However, designers should make sure that both the face and the hands 
are visible since they are important communicative devices. To focus the user’s attention on the 
head region, the agent’s embodiment can be restricted to a talking head. This focus can help 
users to better understand the agent’s verbal messages because auditory and visual speech 
contain complementary information (Massaro 1998, cf. Chapter 10.1.3). In language learning 
and speech training, talking heads can become transparent for a physiologically accurate and 
pedagogically useful display of speech production (Massaro et al. 2000; Massaro 2005). 
9.7  Stability 
Agents may not remain in the same body all the time but change their representation during the 
course of an interaction or across a number of interactions (Churchill et al. 2000: 75). Reasons 
for an agent to choose a different embodiment include: 
• Changes in the environment. For example, if the user switches from a regular computer to a 
mobile device, the agent may have to change to a simpler embodiment (cf. Chapter 14.3). 
• Changes in task requirements. For example, an agent for language training can switch from a 
full body to a talking head in order to illustrate articulatory patterns (cf. Section 9.6). 
• Changes in user preferences. The user may like a different embodiment better than the 
current one. 
The possibility of an agent to change its embodiment over time is at odds with the design 
principle of consistency (cf. Chapter 7.5) because variable embodiments contribute to different 
overall impressions, making it difficult for the agent to maintain its identity. It may also not be 
what users prefer because people in the real world generally do not change from a human being 
to a bouncing ball to a paperclip to whatever during or across interactions. 
No matter what embodiment an agent may currently assume, designers must ensure that the 
chosen body does not block the user’s view or access to applications and information. There are 
even contexts where a voice without a body may be preferable (Churchill et al. 2000: 75). 
9.8  Summary 
This chapter was concerned with the design of the digital representation through which an 
embodied interactive agent appears in and acts on its environment. The embodiment has to be 
designed with care because it is the first characteristic of the agent that is perceived by users, 
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indicating the agent’s availability for interaction, its traits, capabilities, and limitations. Crafting 
an appropriate embodiment for an agent requires designers to make choices from a multi-
dimensional space of design options, which were discussed in separate sections of the chapter. 
The first dimension (cf. Section 9.1) concerns the degree to which an embodied agent should 
resemble a human being in appearance. Arguments for and against using anthropomorphic 
forms in user interfaces were presented, followed by an elaboration of the author’s own view in 
favor of a carefully considered use of human-like features in ways that serve a function beyond 
entertainment and render the interaction multimodal. 
The design of the appearance of embodied interactive agents was the topic of Section 9.2. 
The discussion stressed the importance of appearance for agents to make a (preferably positive) 
first impression on users, as well as its impact on how effective and credible the agent appears 
in its role and on the ways users interact with it. A list of guidelines for designing agents that 
appeal to users from different cultures was presented. 
Embodied agents should not only appear attractive but also individual, i.e. they should reveal 
and express a unique and distinctive persona in every possible way, which includes their 
embodiment. In Section 9.3, it was argued that the design of an individual embodiment should 
be based on an intimate knowledge of the character, which is captured in a character profile. 
Agent embodiments differ with respect to their capability of movement (cf. Section 9.4), 
with design options ranging from static images to fully animated, expressive figures. Movement 
is a prerequisite for embodied communication and can support the agent’s role or enhance its 
persona. 
Embodied agents can be portrayed with different degrees of realism and with different 
depths of the images portraying the agent. The realism dimension was discussed in detail in 
Section 9.5. Using Mori’s principle of the uncanny valley, the case was made against creating 
agent images that portray virtual humans as (photo-) realistically as possible because such 
images tend to provoke strong negative reactions from observers if they are not completely 
indistinguishable from images of real people. 
The embodiments of agents are more or less complete (cf. Section 9.6). The decision to use a 
representation consisting of the head, the head and neck, the upper half of the body, or a fully 
articulate body involves a trade-off between the effort required to create and animate the 
embodiment and the range of actions and interactions that have to be supported. 
The final aspect of agent embodiments that was covered in the chapter is the stability of the 
agent’s representation (cf. Section 9.7). Agents may switch to a different body to accommodate 
changes in the environment, task requirements, or user preferences, but it was argued that doing 
so is at odds with the design principle of consistency (cf. Chapter 7.5) and with the preferences 
of users. 
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10 Behavior 
Behavior is a collective term for the actions and reactions of humans, animals, and inanimate 
entities in a given situation, usually in relation to their environment which includes other 
animate and inanimate entities of the same or a different kind. All behaviors involve to some 
extent the use of a natural or artificial body with certain capabilities and limitations (cf. 
Chapter 9), especially those behaviors performed to produce an observable and interpretable 
effect on the environment through physical movement. Particular behaviors can be described in 
terms of multiple dimensions (cf. Figure 39): 
• Unconscious .. conscious. Unaware vs. deliberate and intentional behavior; 
• Covert .. overt. Hidden vs. observable behavior; 
• Involuntary .. voluntary. Uncontrollable vs. controlled behavior; 
• Simple .. complex. Elementary (or atomic) vs. composite behavior; 
• Unacceptable .. acceptable. (Not) satisfactory or allowable behavior; 
• Innate .. learned. ‘Built-in’ vs. acquired behavior; 
• Stereotypic .. individual. Conforming vs. idiosyncratic behavior; 
• Non-human .. humanoid. Behavior that is (un-) characteristic of the human species; 
• Unrealistic .. realistic. Behavior that does (not) observe physical restrictions. 
Behaviors are influenced by many factors. In the case of human behavior, these factors 
include: 
• Culture. The set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional features of 
society or a social group ([INT 52]), “a theory for interpreting the world and knowing how to 
behave” (Gudykunst & Kim 1992); 
• Attitude. A complex long-term mental state that has semantic content and is directed at 
particular instances or whole categories of events, individuals, objects, or situations and is 
reflected in a person’s behavior; 
• Emotional state. The current internal dynamics of an individual (including aspects of both 
mental and physical state) in response to internal and/or external stimuli deemed relevant to 
his or her needs, goals, or concerns (cf. Chapter 13.1); 
• Personality. The complex of psychological traits that uniquely characterize an individual 
(Hayes-Roth et al. 1997, cf. Chapter 13.5); 
• Values. Individual principles and standards of behavior and one’s priorities in life; 
• Ethics. Moral principles that govern a person’s behavior or the conducting of an activity, 
helping to distinguish right from wrong; 
• Authority. The power or right (of others or oneself) to give orders, make decisions, and 
enforce obedience; 
• Rapport. A relation of mutual understanding or trust and agreement with others; 
• Hypnosis. An induced state of consciousness in which an individual is highly susceptible to 
suggestions or directions from another person that alter his or her perception, thinking, and 
behavior; 
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• Persuasion. (1) The intentional effort to change someone’s attitudes or behaviors or both, 
without using coercion or deception (Fogg 2003: 15);109 (2) a personal belief or judgment of 
an individual that is not founded on proof or certainty; 
• Coercion. Exertion of force or threats to make an unwilling person do something. 
Social behavior is meaningful behavior that takes place in a social context and results from 
the interaction between and among individuals. The purpose of many social behaviors is 
communication. Humans can use language and the special characteristics of their bodies to 
engage in conversations with one another (Cassell 2000b). Furthermore, social behaviors serve 
to sustain the image of a person as a unique individual, and they are instrumental in building 
social relationships with other people (cf. Chapter 7.16). Likewise, embodied agents that exhibit 
affordances (cf. Chapter 6.1) similar to those of the human body can emulate types of human 
social behavior that facilitate communication with the user, enhance the agent’s believability, 
and help to establish human-agent relationships. These three aspects are discussed in Section 
10.1, Section 10.2, and Section 10.3, respectively. Section 10.4 is concerned with the level of 
presence (high or low profile) that should be maintained by embodied interactive agents in their 
environment. The chapter concludes with a summary in Section 10.5. 
10.1  Communication 
Agents with the ability to speak and virtual bodies that integrate some or all of the central 
elements of a humanoid embodiment (including a face, hands, feet, and a torso, cf. Chapter 9.1) 
can be designed to keep up their side of a multimodal dialogue with the user, which involves 
displaying interdependent verbal and non-verbal behaviors. An embodied conversational agent 
                                              
109  Not only people have the power to induce changes of attitudes and behaviors in other people but also 
technology. Computers as persuasive technologies are the focus of captology, an emerging field of 
research concerned with the “design, research, and analysis of interactive computing products created 
for the purpose of changing people’s attitudes or behaviors” (Fogg 2003: 5). Given that education at 
its heart is about changing the attitudes and/or behaviors of those being educated, this research 
becomes immediately relevant for the design of e-learning technologies in general and pedagogical 
software agents in particular. 
 
Figure 39. Dimensions of behavior. 
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(cf. Chapter 11.3.4) has the ability to coordinate verbal and non-verbal means (eyes, face, 
hands, voice, posture, and movement) during its interactions with the user in order to (Cassell 
2000b; Cassell 2001): 
• Regulate the conversation process (e.g. contrast, emphasis, feedback, and turn-taking); 
• Contribute content to the ongoing conversation (e.g. use of the hands to indicate the size, 
distance, position, etc. of something referred to verbally); 
• Convey emotional and cognitive states (e.g. confusion, sadness, or thinking). 
Although face-to-face human-human interaction is rich in non-verbal communicative 
behaviors, until recently, only emblematic gestures (cf. Section 10.1.2) and emotional facial 
displays (cf. Section 10.1.3) have been integrated to computer interfaces (Cassell 2000a: 5). 
However, Cassell and Thórisson argued that: 
The importance of embodiment in computer interfaces lies first and foremost in its power as a 
unifying concept for representing the processes and behaviors surrounding conversation. (Cassell 
& Thórisson 1999: 521). 
In other words, emulating human non-verbal communicative behavior may be more 
important for an embodied agent than providing emotional feedback because it allows users to 
apply their knowledge about how to participate in human-human conversation and gives them 
confidence that the interaction is proceeding smoothly since the agent’s non-verbal behaviors 
keep them updated about the process of conversation throughout the interaction. Cassell and 
Thórisson found in their study that agents showing non-verbal behavior related to the process of 
conversation were rated as more helpful, more life-like, and smoother in their interaction style 
than agents lacking non-verbal behaviors or agents giving emotional feedback and that users 
interacting with agents exhibiting non-verbal cues required fewer utterances to accomplish the 
task. 
The communicative content portrayed by an embodied agent is a function of all the behavior 
channels which its embodiment provides and which are used in the interaction, including both 
verbal and non-verbal channels. Users’ perception of the agent’s internal state depends on the 
content of each of these channels and their relationships. For the design of embodied interactive 
agents, non-verbal communicative behaviors can be conveniently grouped into the categories of 
gesture, face, gaze, posture, and locomotion, to be discussed below. The design of a voice for 
an embodied interactive software agent is the topic of the next section. 
10.1.1  Voice 
Speech is behavior that creates linguistic acts by means of voice to communicate messages from 
a sender to a recipient. Voice is sound that is characterized by features including pitch, intensity, 
quality, and condition. Humans produce voice by modifying and modulating an incoming or 
outgoing air stream with the vocal cords (vibration) and the articulators of the vocal tract. 
People convey rich messages not only through the content of their speech (cf. Chapter 7.15.4) 
but also through their manner of speaking (cf. Chapter 7.15.5), i.e. through how they say things 
(Isbister 2006: 183). The voice conveys paralinguistic cues which provide information over and 
above the words of the spoken message. Some of these cues arise from the physical qualities of 
a speaker or their body’s involuntary reactions to circumstances (p. 184). For one, voice 
conveys cues that automatically and efficiently indicate the identity of an individual. Listeners 
use the pitch of a voice to make assumptions about the age, biological sex, and other aspects of 
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the speaker. Pitch range, loudness, and range of loudness can also help listeners to identify 
people, but like pitch, these aspects may change depending on the situation. In addition, 
listeners analyze the timbre of voices and use this information to describe a voice as smoky, 
nasal, breathy, raspy, shrill, etc. (Nass & Brave 2005: 98). Accent (i.e. the characteristics of 
pronunciation inherent in the speech of a particular group of people) is present in the voice of 
any speaker and, along with word choice, serves as an important indicator of place of origin 
(Nass et al. 2006: 380): “everyone sounds like they were brought up somewhere” (Nass & 
Brave 2005: 62). A person’s voice can also betray mood and emotion since vocal production is 
affected by the physiological responses associated with affective states (cf. Chapter 13.1.1). 
Furthermore, a person can alter the prosodic features (i.e. pitch, intensity, and timing) of his or 
her speech (cf. Chapter 11.1.2.1) to adopt a pacifying, pleading, arrogant, or neutral tone of 
voice. Different emotions have their own signatures in terms of vocal cues (cf. Chapter 13.4.2). 
The vocal style is also influenced by the speaker’s personality (cf. Chapter 13.5). For example, 
the voice of a dominant person exhibits low pitch, limited pitch range, and loudness (Nass & 
Brave 2005: 43). Personality is also a predictor of language style. Dominant speakers construct 
shorter utterances but still take more turns and set both the tone and the topics of a 
conversation. In contrast, submissiveness is signaled by a softer voice at a higher pitch, longer 
utterances, and following the other’s lead in conversation (Isbister 2006: 31f. + 188). The same 
speaker can adopt different voice (and language) patterns depending on his or her addressees 
(friends, children, teachers, superiors, subordinates, etc.). In other words, voice also reflects 
social roles and relationships (p. 188). 
Voice has been consistently identified as a central feature for making an agent seem person-
like (Reeves & Nass 1998; Moreno et al. 2001; Atkinson 2002). However, the positive effects 
of voice extend beyond believability to include user motivation and performance. For 
pedagogical software agents, voice was found to strongly indicate a social presence, resulting in 
increased learner interest and interaction with the agent (Baylor & Ryu 2003). Nass and Lee 
(2001) presented both extrovert and introvert people with unambiguously computer-generated 
voices (extrovert or introvert) reading book reviews and found that their subjects not only 
accurately recognized personality cues in the computer-synthesized speech but also showed 
similarity attraction in their evaluation of the computer voice, the book reviews, and the 
reviewers, preferring the voice, reviews, and reviewers they perceived as matching their own 
personality. In a later study, Lee and Nass (2005) demonstrated that users feel stronger social 
presence (cf. Chapter 5.4.5) in e-commerce contexts (cf. Chapter 3.2.2) when they hear a 
computer-generated voice that manifests a personality which is similar to the user (especially to 
the extrovert user), is consistent with the personality conveyed by the phrasing of descriptions, 
and is extroverted rather than introverted. 
With respect to the impact of accent, Nass and Brave (2005: 65ff.) described an experiment 
in which participants socially identified with agents based on the cultural background that was 
evident in the paralinguistic cues of accent manifest in the voice of an agent but not based on 
the racial background evident in the photograph of an agent (i.e. the agent’s appearance). They 
concluded that “accent, which reflects the culture in which the person grew up, is critical for 
responses to interfaces, even when knowledge of an agent’s (or person’s) ancestry is readily 
apparent” (Nass & Brave 2005: 67). In addition to social identification, the accents in agents’ 
voices may also elicit stereotypes (about degrees of intelligence, elitism vs. egalitarianism, 
etc.), much in the same way as gender of voice (p. 68). Furthermore, the participants in the 
study preferred consistency between the race of an agent portrayed in its photograph and the 
accent of the agent’s voice. They felt disturbed when there was a discrepancy between the way 
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the agent looked and the way it sounded. Therefore, “[t]he race of the face should ‘match’ the 
accent of the voice” (Nass & Brave 2005: 139). 
Regarding performance of learners, Moreno and Mayer (2000) found that students who 
communicated with a pedagogical agent via speech rated a multimedia science lesson more 
favorably, recalled more, and showed better ability to apply what they had learned in problem 
solving than students who learned the same verbal materials as on-screen text. Along the same 
line, experimental results obtained by Moreno et al. (2001) indicate that a pedagogical agent 
coaching via spoken narration rather than on-screen text when students are learning from visual 
presentations can promote meaningful learning in multimedia lessons because the dual mode of 
presenting information aurally and visually makes more effective use of working memory and 
creates deeper understanding than the combination of verbal and non-verbal visual materials 
(Moreno & Mayer 1999: 366). Hence, the ability to communicate via speech is essential for an 
effective pedagogical agent, both to convey its persona and to support its instructional 
interactions (cf. Chapter 12.3). 
For any speech-enabled application, a voice has to be chosen that meets at least two 
requirements: intelligibility and naturalness. The voice is intelligible if human listeners can 
understand the sounds and words produced, even under bad conditions (e.g. noise). It sounds 
natural if it as easy to listen to as a human voice, in particular when it is used to deliver longer 
messages. This does not imply that the voice has to sound like a real human voice. 
In addition to clarity and tonal quality, expressiveness is another criterion, i.e. the extent to 
which a voice exhibits cues (intensity, pitch, pitch range, speech rate, etc.) that indicate the 
speaker’s emotional, mental, and physical state; personality; attitudes; and relationship with the 
listeners. The voice selected for an embodied interactive agent should consistently convey the 
agent’s personality and its current emotional state. People have a preference for consistency 
between the emotional tone carried by the voice and the emotional information implicitly 
conveyed by the words of a message, the only exception being clear cases of sarcasm. 
Inconsistency between verbal and vocal emotions is interpreted as a sign of insincerity, 
instability, or deception (Nass & Brave 2005: 86). In general, designers should take care to 
ensure consistency of the voice with the behaviors, attitude, and language of the agent to which 
it will be attached (Reeves & Nass 1998: 177). Since voices also activate stereotypes associated 
with age, ethnicity, gender, personality, etc. (Nass et al. 2000a), selecting a voice that is 
acceptable for the target audience becomes even more important. 
Designers can realize the voice of an agent using a human voice talent, a voice produced by 
a speech synthesizer (cf. Chapter 11.1.2), or a combination of both. Using a human voice in an 
agent is the most expressive and natural sounding but also the least flexible solution because all 
utterances have to be recorded beforehand. Additions or changes to the agent’s messages make 
further recordings necessary. In addition, voice design becomes dependent on the availability of 
a particular speaker. As a result, the ability of agents with recorded human voices to participate 
flexibly in (open-ended) instructional conversations with the learner is obviously limited. 
Recorded human speech is thus an option for embodied interactive software agents which: 
• Require high-quality speech output (e.g. in foreign language learning); 
• Deliver only a fixed number of messages; 
• Do not have to participate in open-ended conversations with the learner. 
Synthetic speech (Dutoit 1997; Holmes & Holmes 2001; Dutoit & Stylianou 2003; Tatham 
& Morton 2005) is generated by computers either from text (text-to-speech) or from an internal 
representation of information (concept-to-speech). These two approaches will be reviewed in 
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Chapter 11.1.2. Using speech synthesis in embodied interactive agents has the following 
advantages: 
• The agent’s messages can be generated dynamically. 
• The output of a speech synthesizer can be controlled to realize different voices or speaking 
styles. 
• State-of-the-art speech synthesis systems can produce highly intelligible output, which 
sounds quite natural for short, simple utterances. 
However, the ability of current speech synthesis technology to produce natural-sounding and 
expressive speech is limited (see Chapter 11.1.2.4 for a discussion of the state of the art in 
speech synthesis). Currently, synthetic speech is an option for agents which: 
• Must deliver messages of unpredictable number and content; 
• Do not require speech output of the highest quality; 
• Can get by with default (neutral) prosody; 
• Can keep their contributions short. 
While from a developer’s perspective, the advantages and disadvantages of recorded vs. 
synthetic speech and the resulting guidelines for their application are clear, it is also necessary 
to consider the preferences of users. Here, the experimental evidence suggests that users prefer 
natural-sounding human voices. For example, based on the results of two experiments involving 
learners listening to the same narrated animation delivered by a human voice with a standard 
accent, a human voice with a foreign accent, and a machine-generated voice, Mayer et al. 
formulated a voice principle for the design of multimedia instructional messages, which states 
that “students learn more deeply when the narration in a multimedia lesson is spoken by a 
standard-accented human voice rather than a foreign-accented human voice or a machine voice” 
(Mayer et al. 2003: 424, cf. Table 1). The findings of Mayer et al. were later replicated and 
extended by Atkinson et al. (2005). Along the same line, Huang et al. (2000) found that an 
interface using recorded human speech was perceived as more useful and enjoyable than the 
same interface using a synthetic voice (although the performance of the interface was identical 
in both conditions) because the synthetic speech, while fully intelligible, was less fluent and 
more difficult to listen to than natural speech, which made the interface seem less competent 
and enjoyable than the recorded-speech version (Nass & Brave 2005: 120). However, the 
participants in Huang et al.’s study did not have an absolute preference for ‘human-like’ or 
‘machine-like’ interfaces; rather, consistency between voice and use of first-person language 
was important. The study investigated the question when voice user interfaces should use the 
first person singular and when they should avoid the use of ‘I,’ in other words, under what 
conditions they should position themselves as human or non-human. The experiment used 
recorded-speech and synthetic-speech voices that did or did not use the pronoun ‘I.’ The results 
suggested that recorded-speech voice user interfaces should say ‘I,’ whereas synthetic-speech 
voice user interfaces should not say ‘I’ (Nass & Brave 2005: 119), although both can be 
regarded as social actors because they receive some human attributions (p. 123). Interfaces with 
a synthetic voice were felt to be not human enough to use the language of personhood, due to 
the perceived mismatch between the non-human voice of the machine and the use of ‘I.’ In the 
words of Nass and Brave, “it is not acceptable for non-humans to say ‘I’” (Nass & Brave 2005: 
120). Huang et al. (2000) recommended that 
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designers should pair human-like voices with human-like, personal scripts (after all, most humans 
use “I” and “me” quite often), while they should combine machine-like voices (i.e., synthesized 
speech) with less human-like, passive scripts (Huang et al. 2000: 4). 
Two things are worth noting about this experiment. First, the interface was voice-only and 
did not involve an on-screen character with a face and a body. Other experimental studies used 
talking agents with faces and voices. These studies showed that participants preferred consistent 
face-voice combinations (human face/human voice or synthetic face/synthetic voice) over 
interfaces mixing synthetic and human faces and voices (see Section 10.1.3 for a detailed 
discussion), thus lending further empirical support to the design principle of consistency (cf. 
Chapter 7.5). Second, due to continuing efforts to improve speech synthesis technology (cf. 
Chapter 11.1.2), the gap between natural human voices and synthetic computer-generated 
voices is closing. Therefore, it is possible that synthetic voices may sound human-like enough 
to deserve the ‘right’ to deliver first-person language in the near future. 
Mullennix et al. (2003) conducted an experiment which addressed the question whether 
gender of voice and gender of listener affect the social perception of human speech and 
synthetic speech in a task which presents listeners with a persuasive argument delivered in 
either male or female human or synthetic speech. Participants preferred female human speech to 
female synthetic speech and male synthetic speech to female synthetic speech. (Two previous 
studies (Stern et al. 1999; Stern et al. 2002) found that a male human voice presenting a 
persuasive argument was rated more favorably than a male synthetic voice delivering the same 
argument.) Similar patterns of ratings by female and male listeners across human and synthetic 
speech suggested that people stereotype both human and computer-generated voices for gender 
in a similar way. Hence, for computer-based applications with the intent to persuade, i.e. to 
change people’s attitudes or behaviors (Fogg 2003: 15), a human voice is the best choice, at 
least until synthetic speech has caught up in quality. If synthetic speech is used, a male rather 
than a female voice should be chosen. 
A combination of human and synthetic speech is currently used in voice-based systems that 
deliver the fixed part of a message in recorded speech and employ speech synthesis to fill slots 
with variable information. However, several studies (Nass et al. 2000b; Gong & Lai 2001; 
Gong et al. 2001) found that homogeneity of voice (i.e. use of synthetic speech for all 
messages) in an interface inspired more trust, liking, and perceptions of competence than a mix 
of a recorded voice and a synthetic voice. This suggests that mixing a human voice and 
synthetic speech in the same application may be ineffective because users expect consistency in 
the voices they hear. Users may find it easier to concentrate on their task if they do not 
constantly have to adapt to a different voice. Therefore, an embodied interactive agent should 
use either recorded human speech or synthetic speech but not mix both: 
[I]nterfaces do better when they speak uniformly in synthetic speech, even if the speech is of 
poorer quality, rather than shifting back and forth between synthetic and higher-quality recorded 
speech. (Nass & Brave 2005: 184). 
10.1.2  Gesture 
The term ‘gesture’ includes both volitional and non-volitional movements of different parts of 
the body, although gestures are often associated with hand movements. In communication, 
gestures serve to emphasize, clarify, or amplify what a participant is saying. In addition, 
gestures help people to regulate conversational exchanges and to express emotions (Allbeck & 
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Badler 2004: 111). Gestures used in face-to-face interactions include emblematic, propositional, 
and spontaneous gestures (Cassell 2000a: 6–11). 
Emblematic gestures are stereotypical patterns with understood semantics, which are 
performed consciously by speakers to symbolize something abstract. For example, the good-
bye wave signals ‘farewell,’ the fingers forming a ‘V’ stand for ‘victory,’ the stretched-out 
palm of the hand means ‘stop,’ the “thumbs up” gesture shows that things are ‘good’ or ‘Ok,’ 
and a nod or shake of the head indicates assent or dissent. These and other emblematic gestures 
are ‘coded,’ i.e. represented in memory with a direct link between a gesture and its meaning. 
However, the interpretation of emblematic gestures is subject to cross-cultural variation. The 
same meaning may be expressed by different emblematic gestures in different cultures, and a 
given emblem may have different interpretations across cultures. Gestures indicating assent and 
dissent are particularly dangerous in this way. For example, the ring gesture involving the 
thumb and forefinger forming a circle and the remaining fingers extended will be interpreted by 
Americans as ‘OK’ but will be insulting for Germans, Russians, and a wide range of other 
cultures (Allbeck & Badler 2004: 112). A simple head nod can indicate agreement or attentive 
listening, confirm turn-taking, or express denial (Maldonado & Hayes-Roth 2004: 163). 
Embodied interactive agents thus need to carefully adapt their culturally coded emblematic 
gestures to the culture of their target audience. Other emblematic gestures are biologically 
coded (e.g. raised fists expressing elation, and other ritualized body movements) and might be 
the same across cultures (de Rosis et al. 2004: 84). 
While cultures differ in the number of emblematic gestures in their communicative 
repertoire,110 these gestures form only a minor portion of the gestures produced in everyday 
communication (Cassell 2000a: 7f.). Despite their minor role, interface designers tended to 
focus only on emblematic gestures at one point. For embodied agents designed to emulate face-
to-face conversation, the priority should rather be to integrate those gestures that co-occur with 
speech in face-to-face dialogue (p. 8). 
Propositional gestures are conscious gestures that complement or elaborate on speech 
content in a conversation, indicating direction, simultaneity, size, spatial relationships, and so 
on. Examples of propositional gestures include: 
• Indicating the size of an object being described while saying “It was this big;” 
• Pointing at an object and then pointing at a destination and saying “Put that there.” 
Propositional gestures are typically found in situations where the conversation is about the 
physical location of the exchange. However, like emblematic gestures, they are not the most 
frequent gestures in spontaneous conversation (Cassell 2000a: 8). Embodied agents require 
propositional gestures to engage in conversations with the user that deal with a shared task. 
Such task-oriented dialogues (cf. Chapter 3.2.1) require both parties to make reference to 
objects in the environment, for example when giving instructions. 
The vast majority of gestures occurring in face-to-face dialogue are spontaneous gestures. 
While unconscious and unintentional (in contrast to emblematic and propositional gestures), 
they are important devices for conveying communicative intent when co-occurring with speech. 
The different types of spontaneous gestures include the following (Cassell 2000a: 8–11): 
• Iconic gestures have a form that depicts some physical aspect of an action or event, such as 
the shape and size of an object or the way a described action is performed. 
                                              
110  For example, French and Italian cultures have more emblematic gestures than American culture 
(Kendon 1995). 
Chapter 10: Behavior 195 
• Metaphoric gestures represent by their form an abstract feature of the subject matter (e.g. 
exchange, emergence, or use). Process metaphors (e.g. a rolling gesture) indicate an ongoing 
process. The conduit metaphor (e.g. a box gesture accompanying the introduction of a new 
topic) represents an abstract idea as a bounded container that can be held and passed between 
interlocutors. 
• Deictic gestures represent or locate both abstract and physical entities referred to in the 
current conversation in physical space (e.g. pointing to an object while saying “this one 
wasn’t here last time”). 
• Beat gestures are small hand movements that occur with accented spoken words and speaker 
turn-taking. For example, a beat accompanying the word ‘blue’ in “I would take the [blue] 
pill” stresses which pill should be taken. 
The manner (or style) in which an embodied interactive agent performs emblematic, 
propositional, and spontaneous gestures provides important cues as to the agent’s personality, 
cultural background, cognitive and emotional state, relationship to the interlocutor (e.g. 
boss/assistant), and the conversational setting (e.g. formal vs. informal) (Noot & Ruttkay 2005: 
213).111 The observation that an agent performs such non-verbal communicative behaviors in 
human-like ways with some individuality (cf. Chapter 7.8) conveys the impression of the 
presence of a mind, which may enhance the agent’s believability more than any idiosyncratic 
behavior (cf. Section 10.2). 
Concerning the interplay between speech (cf. Section 10.1.1) and gestures in discourse, 
Buisine et al. (2004: 219) listed three ways in which these two modes may cooperate in the 
behavior of an agent to convey meaning in a presentation context, which they extracted from 
the taxonomy of types of cooperation between communication modes developed by Martin et 
al. (2001): 
• Redundancy. The agent provides verbal information and repeats the same information non-
verbally by performing either an iconic gesture or deictic gesture. 
• Complementarity. Speech and gesture provide not the same but different pieces of 
information which have to be merged into an interpretation. For example, the agent may talk 
about an object and indicate its size or shape with an iconic hand gesture. 
• Specialization. The entire content of a presentation is conveyed using either speech or 
gesture. The former happens when the agent consists only of a talking head (cf. Chapter 9.6); 
an example of the latter situation is an agent who gives its presentation through sign 
language. 
Buisine et al. (2004) conducted an empirical study involving three embodied presentation 
agents to determine whether these three multimodal strategies, when performed by the agents, 
would be perceived by human observers and what strategy (if any) would make the most 
impact. They found (pp. 232f.) that while the majority of participants did not consciously notice 
the different multimodal strategies, both redundant and complementary strategies were more 
effective with respect to the perceived quality of the explanation provided by an agent than the 
specialized condition in which the explanation was given only using speech. No difference in 
ratings was found between complementary and redundant multimodal strategies. Interestingly, 
only ratings of male participants produced this main effect of the study; the female participants 
did not seem to prefer any of the three strategies. The same kind of interaction between agents’ 
                                              
111  In fact, style is a broad concept that manifests itself not only in the agent’s manner of gesturing but 
also in its appearance, choice of language, way of speaking, etc. 
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multimodal strategy and participants’ gender was found in the ratings of trust in the agent 
(effect for males but not for females). No effects of the multimodal strategy were found for 
likeability, personality and expressiveness, and recall performance. Overall, the results of the 
study suggest that complementary and redundant multimodal strategies lead to more favorable 
perceptions of the quality of a presentation than relying on speech only. As the subjects’ 
performance did not seem to be affected by the multimodal strategy chosen, this study lends 
support to the hypothesis that embodied agents tend to affect subjective rather than objective 
variables (van Mulken et al. 1998). 
10.1.3  Face 
Anatomically, the face is the front part of the head of a human being or an animal, which 
extends from the forehead to the chin and from one ear to the other. The components of the 
human face include hair, forehead, eyebrows, eyes, nose, cheeks, mouth, lips, teeth, skin, and 
chin. These features combine to convey various aspects of a person’s appearance, identity, and 
expression, which distinguish the individual from other people and help others to identify, 
categorize, and understand that person in social interactions (Donath 2000; Donath 2001; Pantic 
2005). The face communicates essential social information about who someone is and how 
attractive he or she is112 (through facial features113), what is on his or her mind at the moment 
(through facial expressions), and where his or her attention lies (through direction of eye gaze, 
cf. Section 10.1.4). 
The face provides a unique representation of a person’s individual identity. Humans are 
adept at recognizing and remembering faces. They have the cognitive machinery to identify 
other people by their face, at a distance, in crowds, from various viewpoints, when the face 
shows different expressions, and as the face changes with age (Zebrowitz 1997). The close tie 
between the face and individual identity has become manifest even in language. According to 
dictionaries, to be faceless is to be “anonymous, without character or identity” (Donath 2001). 
The face is not only important for recognizing others as individuals but also for classifying 
them “at a glance” in terms of social categories including age,114 sex,115 race and ethnicity,116 
                                              
112  It is common wisdom that the face plays a central role in judging attractiveness, one’s own and that 
of others (Green et al. 2008). Branham pointed out that “one would be hard-pressed to name one 
culture that did not in some way encourage its members to alter the appearance of their faces” 
(Branham 2001) in order to enhance their aesthetic appeal. She quoted Liggett, who observed that 
“[b]eauty must be pursued at whatever price, because it confers on its possessor profound social 
influence, power and respect” (Liggett 1974: 46). 
113  While cheek width, eye separation, face height, and jaw width play a central role in attractiveness 
judgments of female faces, face height and jaw width are important proportions for judging the 
attractiveness of male faces (Green et al. 2008: 2460). 
114  Progressing age leaves its marks on a person’s face. Especially around the forehead, the mouth, and 
the eyes, the facial skin shows more wrinkles, increased dryness, and reduced elasticity. The eyes and 
the mouth droop as a result of the lower part of the face growing forward and downward. Therefore, 
older people may appear less attractive to observers (Nass & Brave 2005: 139). 
115  In comparison to men, female faces are typically wider with a smoother skin, a sharper ridge above 
the eyes, thinner and higher eyebrows, a larger distance between the eyebrows and eyes, larger 
pupils, and rounder (tapering) foreheads, jaws, and chins (Nass & Brave 2005: 137). Using these 
facial cues (as well as additional cues provided by the body), people can reliably identify biological 
sex very shortly after seeing an unknown person. They also prefer consistency in the facial indicators 
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(sub-) culture, etc., as well as for making judgments about their personality117 (Donath 2001). 
This quick categorization influences one’s expectations about and behavior toward other 
people, and the interpretation of their actions and language. However, such classifications are 
usually subjective and often based on stereotypes associated with different groups or ‘types’ of 
people rather than deeper knowledge about the individual, resulting in significant biases toward 
the other in the interaction. For example, someone with foreign-looking facial features is often 
assumed to have a different native language and to be less competent in one’s own language 
than oneself. Likewise, a baby-faced adult will be stereotyped as being trusting, naïve, kind, 
and weak, in short, child-like in nature (Zebrowitz 1997). Many physiognomic judgments of 
personality (like this one) are based on people’s strong responses to certain visible attributes 
and emotions (e.g. age, health, anger, etc.), which are overgeneralized to individuals with faces 
that exhibit some resemblance to such an attribute or emotion (Zebrowitz 1997; Isbister 2006: 
10ff.). 
In face-to-face interactions, facial displays are synchronized to one’s own speech or to the 
speech of others. They can both replace sequences of words and accompany them (Cassell 
2000a: 5). People use facial cues (gaze and expression) from other parties to time and modulate 
their contributions to an ongoing conversation (Donath 2001). Isbister wrote that 
“[i]ntentionally displayed facial expressions help convey intentions and relationships to others 
and fulfill social obligations to have certain feelings at certain times (for example, the persistent 
smile of the flight attendant)” (Isbister 2006: 152). She also provided some examples of 
expressions that communicate social intent: friendly or suspicious expressions, dominant or 
submissive facial reactions, and ongoing facial reactions to shared experiences and stories 
(p. 153). 
Facial displays can also help interlocutors to disambiguate the verbal message when the 
acoustic signal is degraded, due to the complementary nature of auditory and visual information 
in speech (Cassell 2000a: 5). The visible articulation of speech, involving observable 
coordinated movements of the lips, tongue, teeth, and jaw displayed on the face, provides 
essential information for both normal and hearing-impaired individuals (Massaro 1998). 
Animated agents with the ability to analyze auditory and visual speech and to produce realistic 
audio-visual speech using a talking head (cf. Chapter 9.6) can help learners with hearing 
impairment to improve their speech perception and production skills. 
Furthermore, the face is the primary vehicle for the visual communication of an individual’s 
emotional state. The mouth, eyes, and eyebrows are the central elements for portraying 
emotional messages on the face. A set of basic emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, 
sadness, surprise, and embarrassment, cf. Chapter 7.15.7) has been identified, which are 
                                                                                                                                                
of sex: faces (and voices) that are clearly male or female are considered more attractive than mixed 
faces (p. 138). 
116  Skin color is arguably the most obvious indicator of the place of origin of a person’s ancestors, but 
there are other relevant facial cues, such as hair color and the shape of the eyes and the nose (Brown 
et al. 1998). Concerning the relationship between race and ethnicity, it should be noted that while the 
two are related concepts, ethnicity is related to the notion of social grouping, whereas race is rooted 
in the idea of biological classification ([INT 84]). 
117  For example, people with baby-face features (large eyes and pupils, small chin, high eyebrows and 
forehead, small nose, and full lips and cheeks) are commonly perceived as warmer and more 
trustworthy but also as more dependent, less responsible, and more submissive and manipulable than 
people with a more biologically mature face. This is because humans tend to overgeneralize 
stereotypical attributes of children to adults with child-like features (Isbister 2006: 10). 
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recognized across cultures. However, people in different cultures do not always show their 
emotions in the same way. Display rules (Ekman & Friesen 1969; Ekman & Friesen 1975) are 
cultural conventions that “influence how, when, what, and with whom certain expressions 
should be displayed and suppressed” (Allbeck & Badler 2004: 110). For example, Japanese 
people tend to conceal negative expressions with a smile when a person of authority is present 
(Ekman & Friesen 1969). In general, facial expressions are the most visible but also the easiest 
controllable expressions of all (cf. Chapter 13.4.1). Therefore, having recognized a certain 
facial expression does not necessarily mean that the individual’s emotional state has been 
recognized accurately as well (Picard 2000: 175). Furthermore, the correct interpretation of 
facial displays typically requires human observers to take contextual information into account, 
including both the broad cultural context and the immediate context of the interaction since 
facial expressions carry multiple meanings and have to be interpreted in context (Fernández-
Dols & Carroll 1997). For example, a smile may be happy, sad, nasty, false, forced, etc., 
depending on the context; it may be directed at the interlocutor, or the person may smile to 
himself or herself about some private matter. 
People behave socially not only toward real faces but also toward mediated faces (Walker et 
al. 1994; Koda & Maes 1996; Sproull et al. 1996; Nass et al. 1998). Nass and Brave argued that 
“[f]aces are the most anthropomorphic features that any interface can have because no other 
part of the body can reveal as much information about the person being observed” (Nass & 
Brave 2005: 125). Hence, users will also look for and read social information in the faces of 
embodied agents. 
Creating the right expression and impression with an animated face, in the sense of 
communicating social messages that are contextually appropriate and consistent with the 
agent’s role and public image, is a complex task, given the expressiveness, subtlety, and 
meaningfulness of faces (Donath 2001). Three aspects of the face convey social information (by 
themselves and through their interplay) and thus have to be modeled in the design of faces for 
embodied interactive software agents: structure, dynamics, and decorations (Zebrowitz 1997; 
Donath 2001; Pantic 2005). 
Structural qualities of the face allow people to recognize and socially categorize others, as 
well as assess their personality. Structural cues of the face include both static and slowly 
changing aspects (cf. Table 13). 
Dynamic qualities of the face enable people to determine others’ emotional expressions and 
direction of attention. They include gaze direction, pupil dilation, blushing, nose wrinkling, and 
different shapes of the eyes, mouth, and eyebrows that produce smiling, squinting, frowning, 
pouting, wincing, and other expressions. Finally, eyeglasses, makeup, hair style, jewelry, and 
other decorations added to a face indicate group affiliation, class distinctions, subculture 
membership, and the person’s individual style. 
Facial structure, dynamics, and decorations convey messages not only by themselves but 
also through their interplay (Donath 2001). For example, haircuts can cause a person to be 
assessed as younger or older. Categorizing someone as female or male based on structural cues 
influences the cultural interpretation of decorations like very short (or long) hair or use of 
makeup. Both structural features and decorations can modify the production and interpretation 
of facial displays of emotion (e.g. a smile on an attractive vs. unattractive face, hiding one’s 
eyes (and emotions) behind dark sunglasses, etc.). 
The human brain processes faces (and voices) differently than all other objects (and sounds) 
(Nass & Brave 2005: 127). This biased processing seems to give humans the instinctive ability 
to see faces in all kinds of shapes. The observation that simple line drawings and many non-
human objects can manifest human faces is the foundation of Topffer’s Law (Gombrich 1972), 
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which goes back to the artist, designer, and amateur psychologist Rodolphe Topffer  
(1799–1846), who some regard as the father of the modern comic book (Mishra et al. 2001). 
Topffer’s Law states that “[a]ny human face, however poorly and childishly drawn, possesses 
necessarily, by the mere fact of existing, some perfectly definite expression. In other words, any 
squiggle which we can interpret as a face will have a distinct individual personality” (Mishra et 
al. 2001). The most important elements signaling the presence of a face are “a clearly defined 
head, eyes and eyebrows (or the equivalent) at the top, and a mouth at the bottom” (Nass & 
Brave 2005: 137). 
While humans have a very liberal definition of what a face (or voice) is, do they distinguish 
between natural human and synthetic (or humanoid, i.e. human-like, but clearly artificial) faces 
in the same way as they do between human and synthetic voices (cf. Section 10.1.1)? Nass and 
Brave described an experiment conducted by Gong (2000) to test the effects of consistent vs. 
inconsistent humanness of face and voice (Nass & Brave 2005: 131ff.). The experiment used 
four agents representing different combinations of human or humanoid face and voice: 
• Human face with human voice; 
• Human face with synthesized voice; 
• Synthesized face with synthesized voice; 
• Synthesized face with human voice. 
The results (pp. 133f.) demonstrated that faces are categorized as either human or humanoid 
by people. Both a human face with a human voice and a synthetic face with a synthetic voice 
were regarded as significantly more consistent than the mixed face/voice combinations, leading 
to the disclosure of more information and ratings of the consistent combinations of face and 
voice as more trustworthy. In contrast, participants felt uncomfortable with the inconsistent 
face/voice combinations used in the experiment. Female participants tended to be considerably 
more influenced by (lack of) consistency between face and voice than male participants. The 
negative inconsistency effects from mismatching categories of face and voice were replicated in 
a later study by Gong and Nass (2007), suggesting that people treat humanoid entities 
differently from natural human ones. 
These findings should not be interpreted as a recommendation to avoid synthetic faces (and 
voices) altogether in the design of embodied interactive agents (Nass & Brave 2005: 136f.). 
After all, many successful and compelling characters have already been created which are 
clearly not human, such as Bugs Bunny ([INT 50]) and Mickey Mouse ([INT 51]). However, 
the faces of all of these characters possess the key features of a human face: eyes, eyebrows,118 
                                              
118  According to Ekman (1979), eyebrow movements serve as emotional and conversational signals in 
human communication. In conversation, eyebrow movements can emphasize both individual words 
and sequences of words as they are spoken. However, the exact role of eyebrow movements in 
communication remains unknown. As a result, developers of embodied conversational agents have 
different views about when and how often the eyebrows of their agents should move (Pelachaud et al. 
 
Table 13. Static and slowly changing structural aspects of the face. Compiled from Donath (2001). 
Static Slowly Changing 
• The overall head shape 
• The size and placement of the eyes and other 
features 
• The lines and texture of the skin 
• The color and quantity of scalp and facial hair 
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and a mouth, embedded in a clearly defined head (see above). In addition, each of these 
characters has a unique voice, although the voices are not human sounding. The lesson from 
these characters and the studies above is that what matters is consistency between the face and 
the voice of an agent (Nass & Brave 2005: 137). A human face speaking with a synthetic voice 
and a human voice attached to a synthetic face both disturb people, whereas consistent pairings 
of face and voice categories are preferred. From the perspective of voice interfaces, Nass and 
Brave summarized the need for consistency as follows: 
[I]nterfaces should present a consistent social ‘face’ to users: voices that talk, behave, and look 
like they sound are much more desirable, intelligent, and comfortable interaction partners. (Nass 
& Brave 2005: 183). 
10.1.4  Gaze 
Eye gaze, the direction where an individual is looking with his or her eyes, provides a rich 
source of social information in face-to-face interactions between humans as well as between 
humans and embodied interactive agents (Argyle & Cook 1976; Kleinke 1986; Cassell et al. 
1994; Torres et al. 1997; Cassell 2000a; Colburn et al. 2000; Poggi et al. 2000; Donath 2001; 
Knapp & Hall 2005), which human observers can perceive and interpret proficiently. In social 
interactions, interlocutors process gaze as both output and input (Donath 2001),119 using gaze 
patterns to serve various coordinating, regulating and signaling functions. 
First, gaze can help to clarify the verbal message by accompanying ambiguous references 
(e.g. “I am talking to you.”, “What is that?”, “Put it there.”) (Rutter 1984). Using deictic gaze, 
speakers can point at objects or persons in the current spatial context. Likewise, embodied 
interactive software agents can use a combination of deictic gaze and gesture to direct the user’s 
attention to particular objects in the shared environment. As an agent interacts with objects and 
users, its gaze may need to shift back and forth between them (Rickel & Johnson 2000: 97f.). 
Furthermore, the eyes can indicate properties of objects. For example, narrow eyes may occur 
during references to small objects, whereas wide eyes can indicate large objects (Poggi & 
Pelachaud 2002). 
Second, both speakers and listeners use gaze to send social signals (Donath 2001; Lee et al. 
2002: 638): 
Speakers 
• Add emphasis to words, phrases, and utterances by glancing at listeners; 
• Direct their gaze at the recipients of their verbal messages; 
• May look at listeners to demand their attention or with the intention to persuade them; 
• May look away from the listener because they are embarrassed or uncomfortable; 
                                                                                                                                                
1996; Cassell et al. 2001b). Furthermore, it is not clear whether or not the communicative role of 
eyebrow movements differs from one language to another. Krahmer and Swerts (2004) conducted an 
experimental study to investigate the role of eyebrow movements for the perception of focus and 
whether this role is the same across languages (in particular Dutch and Italian). They found that the 
role of eyebrow movements for the perception of focus is secondary to the one of pitch accents and 
that the placement and function of eyebrow movements are language-dependent. 
119  People look at interesting persons or things, and the visible direction of their gaze indicates their 
current focus of interest (Donath 2001). 
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• Avert gaze when they engage in complex cognitive processing (e.g. remembering 
information or thinking about what to say next). 
Listeners 
• Glance at the speaker to show their continuing attention, interest, or involvement (Knapp & 
Hall 2005); 
• Can communicate a high level of concentration, but also indifference or dislike, through 
averted gaze. 
Third, gaze is used to set up a channel in order to obtain information from other parties in the 
face-to-face interaction (Argyle & Cook 1976). Speakers direct their gaze at listeners during 
pauses to determine the extent to which the listeners understand and agree with them while 
listeners continuously observe the speaker’s face and the direction of his or her gaze (Donath 
2001; Lee et al. 2002: 638). 
The fourth communicative function of gaze is to assist in managing conversational flow 
(Duncan 1974; Goodwin 1981; Argyle 1988; Cassell et al. 1994; Torres et al. 1997; Poggi et al. 
2000; Lee et al. 2002: 638; Poggi & Pelachaud 2002): 
Speakers 
• Avert gaze when beginning a long utterance and look at the listener when they are done; 
• Look away from the listener at the beginning of the thematic part of an utterance and look 
toward the hearer at the beginning of the rhematic part of the utterance (Cassell 2000a: 20f.); 
• Establish mutual gaze with the listener during short conversational turns; 
• Look at listeners to signal that they have finished speaking and are willing to turn the floor 
over to someone else; 
• May use gaze to suggest the next speaker. 
Listeners 
• May direct their gaze at the speaker to indicate that they wish to take the floor; 
• May look at one of the participants (including the previous speaker) to encourage him or her 
to speak next. 
Fifth, gaze can communicate emotional state (Cassell 2000a: 5), including both ‘social’ 
emotions felt toward others (e.g. admiration, anger, or love) and ‘individual’ emotions not 
directed at another person (e.g. fear, joy, or sadness) (Poggi & Pelachaud 2002). Examples 
include staring at someone in anger or casting one’s eyes downward when feeling sad. Finally, 
gaze is an indicator of personality characteristics (Duncan 1974). For example, a shy person 
may tend to avoid eye contact with an interlocutor, whereas an extrovert individual may 
actually seek it. 
Gaze is combined with speech (cf. Section 10.1.1), gestures (cf. Section 10.1.2), and facial 
expressions (cf. Section 10.1.3) to negotiate turn-taking, establish social control, reflect levels 
of intimacy,120 and indicate understanding and attention (Donath 2001). Gaze can be unilateral 
or mutual. The latter occurs when two individuals look into each other’s eyes at the same time. 
                                              
120  Mutual gaze between strangers is briefer and less frequent than between friends. Prolonged mutual 
gaze can signal intimacy (Donath 2001). 
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The length of mutual gaze depends on various factors, including age (longer in adults than 
young children), gender (longer in women than men), the distance between speakers (longer 
with more widely separated interlocutors), and culture (e.g. 1–2 seconds for adults in Western 
cultures) (Argyle & Cook 1976; Colburn et al. 2000). 
The use of gaze in communication is governed by complex and culturally dependent rules. 
Direction, duration, and frequency of gaze patterns differ between contact (e.g. Arabic, French, 
and Latin American) and non-contact (e.g. German, Japanese, and North American) cultures. In 
general, members of contact cultures “tend to face one another more directly, interact closer to 
one another, touch one another more, look another in the eye more, and speak in a louder voice” 
(Allbeck & Badler 2004: 113). Examples of the use of gaze patterns in contact and non-contact 
cultures include the following (pp. 113f.): 
• Swedes hold eye contact less frequently but longer than the English. 
• Hispanic women tend to look directly at others while direct eye contact is typically avoided 
by Asians, Africans, and West Indians. 
• People from Japan, Korea, Thailand, and other Asian countries regard staring as impolite and 
intimidating. In contrast, looking the interlocutor directly in the eye signals confidence in 
most Western cultures. 
• In Saudi Arabia, interlocutors prefer direct eye contact, but the eyes are usually dull and 
appear disinterested. 
• African Americans have an inclination to look at their interlocutors while speaking and look 
away when listening, whereas Euro-Americans tend to do the opposite (Ting-Toomey 1999: 
126). 
Some common patterns of the use of eye gaze seem to exist as well. Too much gaze is 
usually perceived as a sign of anger or threat, whereas too little gaze can signal shyness but also 
carelessness. 
10.1.5  Posture 
Posture is the position or arrangement of the body and its extremities. The term also refers to an 
individual’s characteristic way of bearing his or her body. When they are not moving, human 
beings may stand, sit, kneel, lie, be on all fours, or hang somewhere. Each of these positions 
can be classified in further detail. Other, non-humanoid embodiments may share some of these 
positions and also add their own characteristic postures. 
In face-to-face communication, posture signals an individual’s degree of involvement, liking 
for the other participants, and his or her status relative to them (Badler & Allbeck 2001). For 
example, in interactions among (half-) strangers, an interlocutor may lean forward to convey 
higher involvement, increased liking, and lower status (Allbeck & Badler 2004: 113). 
Communicators who have established or are trying to build rapport tend to reflect each other’s 
posture (Knapp & Hall 2005). 
Posture is important for conveying the intensity of a number of emotional states (Badler & 
Allbeck 2001). For example, the perception of sadness or anger in an individual is intensified 
by a drooping or a rigid, tense body posture, respectively. Then, postures also play a role in 
attributing credibility or social influence power to members of different cultures. People from 
the United States tend to link displays of relaxed expressions and postures to credibility and 
positive impressions of others, whereas restrained facial expressions (cf. Section 10.1.3) and 
rigid postures are characteristic features of influential people in South Korea and Japan (Ting-
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Toomey 1999: 127). Some postures may even be regarded as insulting in certain cultures. For 
example, in the Thai culture, postures involving a foot pointed at the interlocutor are considered 
offensive because the feet are regarded as the lowest, most revolting part of the body (Allbeck 
& Badler 2004: 113). 
A well-balanced or erect posture is commonly regarded as an integral part of physical 
attractiveness. Most cultures view erect posture as an indicator of a well-balanced and adaptable 
personality. Young boys and men are expected to have erect postures, and women tend to prefer 
and strive for erect postures themselves as well. 
Given the diversity of information communicated by something as deceptively simple as 
body posture, the different positions of an agent’s embodiment, as well as the shifts occurring 
between them in the course of an interaction, deserve close attention in design. Cassell et al. 
(2001a) found in their study that posture shifts were correlated with shifts in conversational 
topic and shifts in whose turn it was to talk. 
10.1.6  Locomotion 
Locomotion is the event of, or capacity for, self-propelled body movement of a living organism 
or other entity by which it (typically) transfers itself from one location to another. Depending 
on the specific capabilities of its body and the requirements of the situation, an individual may 
perform different kinds of locomotion, including crawling, walking, running, climbing, 
swimming, flying, jumping, etc. Animated embodied agents can use these locomotive behaviors 
as well, and others not found in nature, such as rolling around on wheels or teleporting 
themselves to a different location. 
For some applications, it may be appropriate to design embodied interactive software agents 
as stationary elements in an interface because the agent is expected to remain at a particular 
location in order to provide a reliable place for assistance and information. Examples include 
embodied interactive agents in the roles of librarians, newsreaders, and receptionists. Yet, the 
ability of an agent to move from one place in the environment to another becomes critical for 
other applications that require the agent to: 
• Perform its operations at different locations during the course of an interaction; 
• Get out of the user’s way in order not to block access to devices or information; 
• Move toward objects of interest for manipulation or unambiguous reference; 
• Move away from objects that are dangerous or no longer in focus; 
• Demonstrate how to perform a particular kind of locomotion. 
It might seem enough that an agent is capable of locomotion at all. However, designers 
should also pay attention to the way in which the agent performs actions that change its location 
because these behaviors can be performed with different degrees of realism (cf. Chapter 9.5), 
individuality (cf. Chapter 7.8 and Chapter 9.3), and variability (cf. Chapter 7.9). Locomotion is 
modulated by various individual and situational factors, including: 
• The agent’s personality (e.g. arrogance, confidence, shyness, etc.); 
• The agent’s current emotional state (e.g. bouncing with happiness, weighed down by 
sadness, shaking with grief, etc.); 
• The agent’s physical constitution (e.g. athletic, overweight, sick, tired, etc.); 
• The current state of the environment (e.g. distance, obstacles, terrain, etc.); 
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• Cultural differences (e.g. it is acceptable for Latin male friends to walk arm in arm but not 
for American men. In the Far East, women traditionally follow one or two steps behind men. 
Women from Western cultures walk with a longer pace and hold their body more upright, 
which members of other cultures may perceive as aggressive behavior (Allbeck & Badler 
2004: 112)). 
It appears that while locomotive movements of the body normally are not performed to 
convey information (unlike gestures or facial expressions), they do reveal something about the 
personality, emotional state, physical condition, and cultural background of an individual. In 
addition, locomotion has been used by people on television to create the illusion of narrowing 
the distance between themselves and the viewers by walking toward the camera, in order to 
induce a favorable viewer response (Reeves & Nass 1998: 3f.). Agents could use locomotion to 
create similar effects. 
10.2  Believability-Enhancing Behaviors 
Apart from behaviors that facilitate communication, the repertoire of embodied agents often 
includes another class of behaviors which have no direct relation to the ongoing interaction or 
the current task but are directed at the agent’s persona, aiming to make it appear more life-like 
and believable. Behaviors intended to enhance the agent’s persona are commonly performed 
when the agent is idle, i.e. not interacting with the user or the environment (Johnson et al. 
2000). However, they may also be interwoven with the agent’s conversational and task-related 
behaviors. 
Some of these behaviors are reflexive in nature: they serve a biological need and are 
performed automatically, without volition or conscious control, such as breathing, blinking, or 
wetting the lips (Cassell 2000a: 19). Agents should perform these reflexive behaviors in a 
similar fashion, with their natural regularity, to strengthen users’ impression of interacting with 
a living being. Other behaviors are trademarks of the agent’s personality (especially 
idiosyncrasies and signature behaviors, cf. Chapter 7.8) and should therefore occur with 
sufficient frequency and clarity to be recognizable as such in order to enhance the agent’s 
believability. 
While idiosyncrasies and signature behaviors can help to effectively convey an agent’s 
unique identity (Hayes-Roth 2004: 456), which make the agent attractive to users, it is 
dangerous to overestimate and oversell the effects of these behaviors. Cute can quickly become 
annoying if it is ill-timed and used excessively, without being backed up by sophisticated 
communicative and task-related competencies (cf. Chapter 7.1). Care has to be taken to keep a 
balance between task-related and extraneous behaviors in order to avoid unnecessarily adding 
to the user’s cognitive load. Based on the results of their study, Moreno and Flowerday warned 
that: 
Despite the fact that students may prefer to learn with visual APAs [(animated pedagogical 
agents)] and that designers possess the technology to create them, these representations are not 
neutral and thus should be made with caution. The most straightforward practical implication of 
our study is that multimedia programs should carefully limit the amount of social cues 
presented in software agents rather than add them for reasons of appeal or entertainment. 
(Moreno & Flowerday 2006: 204, emphasis added). 
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10.3  Relationship-Building Behaviors 
People usually do not only talk business when they engage in conversations with one another. 
In fact, a significant portion of human-human dialogues is small talk about topics that have no 
overt relationship with the current task but help the interlocutors to get to know each other 
better (Bickmore & Cassell 2005). This social dialogue is instrumental in deepening the 
relationship between the interaction partners (cf. Chapter 5.4.5). 
Non-verbal behavior plays a crucial role in social dialogue. It is used to express emotions, to 
accompany and support speech, to engage in rituals, for self-presentation, and to display 
interpersonal attitude (Argyle 1988). In particular, the decision to approach a person or an 
embodied agent and the first impression of them after initial contact has been established are 
influenced by the positive or negative attitude displayed by the person or agent (Bickmore & 
Cassell 2005). Both people and agents may signal their attitude through their face, body, and 
voice. Table 14 lists facial, bodily, and vocal cues which, when displayed by an individual, will 
show others their hostility, friendliness, or indifference. 
Hence, embodied interactive agents that are working to build long-term social-emotional 
relationships with their users should display non-verbal behaviors that communicate a positive 
interpersonal attitude, including the following types (Bickmore & Cassell 2005): 
• Immediacy. Close conversational distance, direct body and facial orientation, forward lean, 
increased and direct gaze, smiling, friendly facial displays, pleasant facial animation, 
nodding, frequent gesturing and open body postures; 
• Kinesic. Head tilts, relaxed body, no random movement, open body positions, mirroring the 
interlocutor’s body posture; 
• Vocalic. More variation in pitch, amplitude, duration and tempo, reinforcing backchannel 
feedback (uh-huh, mm-hmmm), greater clarity, expressiveness, fluency, pleasantness, and 
warmth of speech, smoother turn-taking. 
In the remainder of this section, the role of immediacy in relationship building is discussed 
in more detail (cf. Section 10.3.1). Furthermore, applications of humor in relationship building 
between humans and agents are explored in Section 10.3.2. 
10.3.1  Immediacy 
Immediacy has been defined as the extent to which communicative behaviors reduce perceived 
distance between individuals and enhance physical or psychological closeness in interpersonal 
communication (Mehrabian 1967; Thweatt & McCroskey 1996). Both verbal and non-verbal 
communicative behaviors contribute to immediacy. Non-verbal immediacy is closeness 
produced through the non-verbal behaviors listed above (see also the discussion of agents’ non-
verbal communicative behaviors in Section 10.1). Verbal immediacy is created when speakers 
express themselves linguistically in ways that reveal their liking to their addressees (Mehrabian 
1971; Gorham 1988). Verbal behaviors that contribute to immediacy include asking questions, 
using humor (cf. Section 10.3.2), addressing individuals by their name, initiating conversation, 
and sharing personal experiences, among others (Woods & Baker 2004). The perceived 
characteristics of immediate individuals and their impact on their environment are summarized 
by Andersen: 
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The more immediate a person is, the more likely he/she is to communicate at close distances, 
smile, engage in eye contact, use direct body orientations, use overall body movement and 
gestures, touch others, relax, and be vocally expressive. In other words, we might say that an 
immediate person is perceived as overtly friendly and warm. (Andersen 1979: 545). 
For many roles, especially those with a supporting character, it is useful for embodied 
interactive software agents to exhibit verbal and non-verbal behaviors that allow users to 
perceive them as immediate persons, whose friendliness and warmth makes users’ experience 
of the interaction more enjoyable and satisfactory. 
10.3.2  Humor 
Relationships between users and agents can also benefit from the use of humor, i.e. of stimuli 
that produce the experience of amusement and tend to elicit the laughter reflex in other 
individuals; in other words, which have the quality of being ‘funny’ in the eyes of a particular 
audience. Humor is a phenomenon of considerable extensiveness and complexity, which 
depends on culture as well as the individual and has many different manifestations (puns, jokes, 
sarcasm, slapstick, pranks, etc.) (Ritchie 2001). Humorous stimuli may be expressed verbally 
and/or non-verbally, using language, (moving) images, sound, actions, smell, and touch, but 
certain objects or situations can amuse people as well. Someone’s sense of humor is his or her 
trait of being able to perceive, appreciate, and express the humorous. The extent to which an 
individual will find a humorous offering amusing or comic depends on factors including 
cultural background, period taste, personal preference, maturity and education, and the style and 
technique of delivering the humor. In general, people regard sense of humor as a highly valued 
characteristic of themselves and others (Nijholt 2003: 7). They are also likely to be attracted to 
someone who appears to have a similar sense of humor. Cann et al. (1997) conducted an 
experiment in which subjects interacted with an unseen stranger who, as they were led to 
believe, shared many, or very few, attitudes with them. The participants told the stranger a 
favorite joke, and the stranger responded positively or neutrally to the joke. The results of the 
experiment indicated that while both attitude similarity and response to the joke contributed to 
interpersonal attraction, it was the positive response to the joke that had sufficient power to 
overcome attitude dissimilarity. A dissimilar stranger who responded positively to the joke was 
rated as more attractive than a stranger who responded neutrally. Cann et al. concluded that 
humor appreciation is a critical dimension of interpersonal attraction. 
Although humor plays an important role in the interactions and relationships which people 
have with other people, it is a widely underutilized concept in the design of human interactions 
and relationships with computers. The computer is stereotypically rational, reliable, and serious, 
Table 14. Cues of friendliness, hostility, and indifference (Isbister 2006: 29). 
 Friendly Hostile Indifferent 
Face Smile; steady but not 
overly intense eye 
contact 
No smile; intense eye 
contact 
No smile; not much eye 
contact 
Body Open, relaxed stance; 
closer in and may lean 
toward 
Tense stance; may be 
closer in and lean 
toward 
Closed, relaxed stance; 
may stay further away 
and lean away 
Voice Warm, energetic Cold, energetic Cold, less energetic 
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so “humorous computer” is an oxymoron, a conjunction of contradictory terms (Nass & Brave 
2005: 145). In the minds of many developers and theorists, humor and computers, like 
entertainment and “serious work,” are separate – and the twain shall never meet. However, 
humor does have facilitating functions in everyday human communication that go way beyond 
idle entertainment (Binsted 1995). People use humor “to criticize without alienating, to defuse 
tension or anxiety, to introduce new ideas, to bond teams, ease relationships, and elicit 
cooperation” (Barsoux 1993). Non-offensive humor has been shown to facilitate work, improve 
socialization, bond employees together, create rapport, and boost morale (Clouse & Spurgeon 
1995). Given that humans make use of humor to mitigate all kinds of communication problems, 
and also given that some of these issues, including patronizing or intimidating advice, irritating 
ignorance, and repetitive apologies, can arise in human-computer interaction as well, it has been 
suggested that the judicious incorporation of humorous mechanisms into the user interface can 
make computers appear less alien, less intimidating, and less patronizing, in short, more user-
friendly (Binsted 1995; Nijholt 2006: 62). Binsted proposed that the careful use of certain types 
of humor in conversational interfaces (cf. Chapter 11.3) can help to mitigate some of their 
shortcomings (limited coverage of the language, insufficient domain knowledge, and irritating 
conversational behavior): clarification requests become less repetitive, acknowledgement of 
gaps in knowledge more acceptable, and error messages less condescending when they are 
delivered with the proper dose of humor. A growing number of researchers are convinced that 
“[i]f computers are ever going to communicate naturally and effectively with humans, they 
must be able to use humor” (Binsted et al. 2006: 59). 
Morkes et al. (1999) studied the effects of humor in task-oriented human-computer 
interaction (HCI) and computer-mediated communication (CMC). Participants were told that 
they were interacting with another person (CMC) or with a computer (HCI) in another room, 
via a networked computer; however, all of them received pre-programmed comments which 
differed only in whether they contained humor or not. People receiving task-related humorous 
comments during the interaction rated the ‘person’ or ‘computer’ they worked with as more 
likeable and competent, reported greater cooperation, contributed a larger number of jokes, 
responded in a more sociable (i.e. polite and friendly) manner, and smiled and laughed more. In 
contrast, the participants interacting with the computer were less sociable, smiled and laughed 
less, thought that they were less similar to their interaction partner, and spent less time on the 
task than those interacting with another person through the computer. In general, humor did not 
distract people from the task at hand, neither in the HCI nor the CMC condition. Consequently, 
use of humor may enhance the likeability of an interface without affecting users’ performance, 
contrary to the widespread belief that humor in HCI is a source of distraction, a waste of time, 
and a cause of slackness. However, the quality of the humor requires attention. Participants in 
the Morkes et al. study who received unsuccessful humor (i.e. jokes seen as unfunny) responded 
more unsociably than those who were told successful (funny) jokes. 
Humor does not only alleviate communication problems and facilitate social interaction but 
may also have positive effects on cognition. Stock and Strapparava noted that humor facilitates 
getting and keeping people’s attention (due to its potential to provide varied stimulation) and 
helps them to remember information (because people can link new information to humorous 
experiences) (Stock & Strapparava 2006: 65). In general, humor can induce emotional states 
which, in turn, affect cognitive processing (cf. Chapter 6.4 and Chapter 13.2.1). Furthermore, 
humor acts on people’s beliefs, expectations, and opinions, by challenging and changing their 
perspective on things. Humorous situations that ridicule established ideas and viewpoints can 
open people for new ways of thinking; in other words, humor also encourages creativity (Stock 
& Strapparava 2006: 65). Finally, it is assumed that an interface using humor motivates users to 
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interact with the computer longer and more often and to contribute more to the interaction. The 
findings of Morkes et al. described above lend some support to this hypothesis, but it should be 
noted that the positive effects of humor were smaller when users thought that they were 
interacting with a computer. It would be interesting to see how adding more anthropomorphic 
attributes (i.e. face, body, voice, and language) to the representation of a human or artificial 
interlocutor interacts with the use of humor. 
The previous paragraphs have shown that speakers make use of humor to achieve important 
social ends, although it is also true that humor often happens spontaneously rather than as a 
result of deliberation. Education is another domain in which humor can demonstrate its 
strengths. Nijholt summarized the positive effects of humor in teaching and learning as follows: 
Humor contributes to motivation, attention, comprehension and retention of information, and the 
development of affective feelings toward content. It helps create a more pleasurable learning 
experience, fosters creative thinking, reduces anxiety, and so on. (Nijholt 2006: 62). 
Based on the conjecture that the positive effects of humor in interactions between learners 
and human educators can also be realized in the exchanges between learners and computer-
based tutors, some researchers have begun to embed mechanisms for the detection, 
interpretation, generation, and prediction of humor into pedagogical agents that participate in 
instructional conversations with learners in subject areas such as second language learning 
(Binsted et al. 2003) and stock markets (Laufer & Tatai 2004). In these applications, humor 
facilitates learners’ interaction with the agent, but it is also useful for motivating learners and to 
help them to understand the subject matter better. For example, Binsted et al. discussed several 
types of linguistic humor, i.e. humor based on and transmitted through language, that can be 
used in second language learning: puns illustrate the relationship between spelling and 
pronunciation; jokes based on idioms provide contexts that facilitate memorizing these 
constructions; and scalar humor (“X is so Y that Z”) introduces learners to comparison 
structures in the target language (Bergen & Binsted 2004). Finally, studying and practicing the 
humorous forms of the target culture can enable learners to gain deeper understanding of and 
higher proficiency in communicating in that culture. 
However, humor in human-computer interaction can do at least as much harm as it can do 
good. Designers should be very careful with respect to what types of humor they include in an 
interface. Examples of appropriate and inappropriate humor are summarized in the following 
(Nass & Brave 2005: 153). If the humor is aggressive, disparaging, irreverent, or sarcastic, it 
may be perceived as hostile, especially when a female voice delivers it. Jokes with ethnic, 
racial, or sexual content should be avoided in general because they are likely to be perceived as 
offensive and may cause legal problems for both content and interaction designers. Some kinds 
of humor (intellectual, satirical, and word-play) may be too hard to grasp for users and, as a 
result, increase their cognitive load (which could be problematic when users are in the middle 
of some task) and make them feel left out of the joke. On the other hand, there is also plenty of 
sick, toilet, and vulgar humor which may be too crude and distasteful for the users’ comfort. 
Only light and non-provocative humor is ‘innocent’ enough to be consistently effective. Self-
deprecatory humor is also quite safe (although it lowers the perceived status of the speaker), 
whereas making the user or a third party the target of humor is a dangerous strategy most of the 
time because of the risk of causing offense (Binsted 1995). Furthermore, it should be noted that 
jokes of whatever kind come with an “expiration date;” therefore, they should be replaced with 
new ones from time to time before they become too old (Nass & Brave 2005: 154). 
When an embodied agent is designed to use humor, it is necessary to consider the context in 
which the humor will be delivered, which includes the agent, the audience (mostly, the user), 
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the situation, and the cultural context (Nass & Brave 2005: 154f.). Jokes have to be consistent 
with the personality (cf. Chapter 13.5) of the individual that tells them. People tend to assume 
that extrovert rather than introvert persons tell jokes, and someone with a particular personality 
is commonly associated with a certain type of humor (p. 154). Jokes have to be consistent with 
the culture of both the teller and the audience because it is not possible to translate jokes in the 
same way between languages and cultures as other types of messages (p. 155). The effects of 
some jokes are tied to a particular situation, and it may be hard to recreate the same effects 
outside that situation. Furthermore, some domains and circumstances are more conducive to or 
appropriate for (different kinds of) humor than others (p. 155). Sometimes, use of humor can 
even be counterproductive because it suggests a lack of involvement, professionalism, or 
sincerity (as the character Q from the James Bond movies once said, “I never joke about my 
work”). Agents should also steer clear of humor when the user has a reason to be upset, for 
example when he or she (or the agent) has made a critical mistake, has missed an important 
deadline, or has lost something (or someone) valuable to him or her. Humor is both positive and 
arousing, and unfortunately, the arousal part makes a considerably greater impact on the 
addressee than the (positive) valence. Therefore, the humor coming from an agent tends to 
intensify whatever positive or negative affective state the user is currently experiencing, making 
him or her even more upset if the timing is flawed (p. 155). Following Binsted (1995), humor 
from conversational agents should be reserved for the appropriate contexts, and it should be 
tailored to the individual user if he or she interacts with the agent on a regular basis. 
Humor is a multidisciplinary field of research which traces many of its ideas back to the 
Greek philosophers Plato and Aristotle (Attardo 1994). Contributions to the field have come 
chiefly from philosophy, psychology, linguistics, sociology, and literature. Work on 
computational models of humor, whether as test beds for theories of humor or for use in 
computer-based systems, has begun only recently and is still in its infancy (for discussions of 
computational humor research, see Binsted 1995, Binsted 1996, Stock 1996, Ritchie 1998, 
Ritchie 2001, Mulder & Nijholt 2002, Nass & Braves 2005: 145–155, and the various short 
papers in Binsted et al. 2006). The major obstacle to building models of humor which enable 
computers to interpret and generate humor when interacting with people is that the processing 
of humorous phenomena beyond the simplest types is not possible without substantial 
knowledge of the world and advanced reasoning capabilities (cf. Chapter 12). Similar to the 
situation in most of natural language processing and artificial intelligence, 
[w]orking programs will be possible, for the present, only where the designer can isolate some 
limited style of humorous phenomenon which is manifested in some manageable medium (e.g. 
text), and in which the regularities appear to depend on relatively simple knowledge that can be 
coded up in some tractable fashion, ideally using existing resources (such as lexical databases). 
(Ritchie 2001: 131). 
Still, the advantages of having workable computational models of humor, for both human-
computer interaction and theoretical research, make research on computational humor a 
worthwhile enterprise. But designers and researchers should keep in mind that they start from a 
meager foundation and have to face significant challenges (Ritchie 2001: 131). 
10.4  High vs. Low Profile 
It could be argued that an embodied interactive software agent which is idle for longer periods 
of time serves no apparent purpose, wasting cognitive resources of the user and computational 
resources of the system, and therefore might as well step into the background until its services 
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are needed again. This raises the general issue of whether embodied agents should always be 
visibly and audibly present in an interface or not. On the one hand, an agent maintaining a high 
profile provides a known place for assistance and information (cf. Chapter 3.1.4), and users, in 
particular those studying by themselves in web-based learning environments, may draw 
encouragement and reassurance from knowing that there is always someone available who 
cares and can offer help. On the other hand, it is also possible that the user will be annoyed or 
troubled by the feeling of being watched (all the time). The pressure experienced by the user 
may be intensified if the agent seems to be openly monitoring his or her every move. 
Rickenberg and Reeves (2000) performed an experimental study to investigate the effects of 
different character presentations on user anxiety, task performance, and subjective evaluations 
of user interfaces. They found that monitoring by animated characters increased subjects’ levels 
of anxiety and negatively impacted their task performance, in particular for users with an 
external control orientation, i.e. those who thought that their success was controlled by others. 
However, monitoring characters also increased users’ trust in content. Rickenberg and Reeves 
suggested that beyond their mere presence or absence, the effects of characters in interfaces 
depend on their actions, messages, and social presentation. They interpreted the relationship 
between anxiety and increased trustworthiness as indicating that anxiety (a kind of arousal) can 
also have positive effects. Arousal can determine memory and focus of attention (Lang 1995). 
Hence, the right level of arousal in an interface can make users pay attention and remember. 
According to Rickenberg and Reeves, well-designed animated characters in interfaces can have 
these effects, increasing interest (and a little anxiety) in ways that enhance desirable social 
responses. Concerning locus of control, they recommended that animated characters should be 
avoided when designing an interface for users who are confident that they can accomplish tasks 
on their own (internal locus of control). However, when users lack this confidence (external 
locus of control), animated characters can make the interaction more robust. Finally, 
Rickenberg and Reeves noted that locus of control is a relatively stable disposition of people 
rather than a fleeting reaction to a specific task, so decisions concerning the use of animated 
characters in interfaces should depend on characteristics of the user, not the task at hand. 
10.5  Summary 
This chapter was concerned with the behavior of embodied interactive software agents. The 
discussion focused on social behavior, which takes place in a social context and results from the 
interaction between and among individuals. Three functions of social behavior were identified 
(communication, believability enhancement, and relationship building) and discussed in detail. 
The communicative behaviors of embodied interactive agents involve the coordinated use of 
verbal and non-verbal means provided by the agent’s body to regulate the conversation process, 
contribute content to the ongoing conversation, and convey emotional and cognitive states. In 
Section 10.1, the design of the following communicative behaviors for embodied interactive 
agents was discussed: voice, gesture, face, gaze, posture, and locomotion. 
Section 10.2 focused on behaviors performed by an agent with the explicit intention to make 
its persona more life-like and believable. These idle behaviors include reflexive actions as well 
as idiosyncratic and signature behaviors. It was argued that extraneous behaviors should be kept 
in balance with task-related behaviors and should not be used in an ill-timed or excessive way. 
Section 10.3 discussed verbal and non-verbal communicative behaviors that can be used by 
embodied interactive agents in social dialogues to facilitate building long-term social-emotional 
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relationships with users. The roles of immediacy behaviors and humor in relationship building 
between agents and users were given closer attention in this discussion. 
Finally, Section 10.4 was concerned with the level of presence that an embodied interactive 
agent should maintain in its environment. Pros and cons of the constant audible and visible 
presence of agents were discussed, including experimental evidence obtained by Rickenberg 
and Reeves (2000). 
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11 Conversation 
Agents with an articulate embodiment (cf. Chapter 9) can perform a wide range of behaviors 
(cf. Chapter 10) that affect the user and the environment. Furthermore, they can be equipped 
with appropriate sensory and software components to perceive and interpret changes in the 
environment and actions of the user, which, in turn, affect their own internal states and 
behavior. The capacity for mutual action, or ‘inter-action’ (cf. Chapter 5), is critical for agent-
user relationships in general and the relationships between learners and pedagogical agents in 
particular. In fact, experimental evidence (Moreno & Mayer 2000; Moreno et al. 2000; 
Atkinson 2002) suggests that pedagogical agents equipped with an articulate body and language 
skills add value to the learner’s experience through their ability to participate verbally and non-
verbally in instructional conversations with the learner (cf. Chapter 7.1). Conversational agents 
have to be able to recognize and interpret, generate and express spoken or (type- or hand-) 
written messages in one or multiple human languages. Therefore, technologies for processing 
natural language in these ways are reviewed in Section 11.1. However, human-human 
communication naturally combines language with other modes of communication, including 
gesture, gaze, facial expressions, posture, and locomotion (cf. Chapter 10.1), as well as tactile 
(touch), gustatory (taste), olfactory (smell), and other modes. Multimodal interfaces, discussed 
in Section 11.2, allow people to interact with machines through combinations of language and 
behavior captured from at least two input modes, to which the machine responds with 
multimedia output (Oviatt 2003: 287). The review of component technologies in the first two 
sections provides the background for the ensuing discussion of different types of conversational 
agents (cf. Chapter 3.2.1), which integrate technologies for processing natural language and 
other input and output modes to be able to participate in (embodied) conversations with users. 
After a review of principles of conversation in Section 11.3.1, chatbots are introduced in 
Section 11.3.2 as the first, rudimentary type of conversational agents that is seeing widespread 
use, especially on the World Wide Web. Dialogue agents (cf. Section 11.3.3) incorporate more 
sophisticated language and dialogue processing techniques to enable more flexible and goal-
directed human-agent conversations. Finally, embodied conversational agents increase the 
communication bandwidth of dialogue agents with their ability to process a variety of input 
modes and to perform meaningful conversational and other actions using their animated face 
and body (cf. Section 11.3.4). The chapter concludes with a summary in Section 11.4. 
11.1  Human Language Technologies 
Pedagogical agents with language skills can communicate with learners in a way that is familiar 
to them from the world outside the computer, namely by engaging them in a natural language 
instructional dialogue. To keep up their end of a natural language conversation with the learner, 
pedagogical agents require human language technologies (HLT), i.e. information processing 
technologies that make use of knowledge about the structure of natural human languages and 
the world to enable or improve intelligent processing of these languages (Allen 1994; Cole et al. 
1997; Atwell 1999; Dale et al. 2000; Jurafsky & Martin 2000; Uszkoreit 2001; Mitkov 2003; 
Coleman 2005; Jurafsky & Martin 2008). Intelligent processing of natural language invariably 
requires that a computational model of language (Allen 1994: 1) lie at the heart of a computer 
system. The system then uses this model to: 
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• Transform natural language into an internal representation (understanding) and/or 
• Transform an internal representation into natural language (generation). 
Conversational agents, which were introduced in Chapter 3.2.1, are a special kind of system 
based on human language technologies that interprets and responds to users’ natural language 
inputs occurring in the context and course of a spoken or written dialogue, possibly combined 
with other input and output modes (Sidner 2002; Lester et al. 2004; McTear 2004). The most 
important human language technologies involved in building conversational agents are listed 
below and shown in Figure 40. The following sections summarize the state of the art in these 
technologies. 
• Speech technologies. Since speech is a central carrier of meaning in human-human face-to-
face interactions, conversational agents require at least the ability to identify the words in the 
user’s speech and to deliver their own messages using speech. 
• Speech recognition converts spoken words captured through a microphone to a written 
representation. An understanding of the spoken message is not implied. Speech 
recognition is reviewed in Section 11.1.1. 
• Speech synthesis (cf. Section 11.1.2) converts input consisting of text or some internal 
representation of information to spoken language output (text-to-speech vs. concept-to-
speech). 
• Language technologies. To make sense of the user’s contributions and to be able to respond 
with meaningful contributions of their own, conversational agents require natural language 
processing (NLP) technologies, which extract information from and convey information 
using natural language. 
• Natural language understanding (NLU) translates a natural language input into a formal 
representation of its meaning, which can be used for further processing. NLU is reviewed 
in Section 11.1.3. 
• Natural language generation (NLG) generates natural language text from a formal 
representation of content. This technology is discussed in Section 11.1.4. 
• Knowledge management. Like software agents in general, conversational agents add value to 
users’ experience (cf. Chapter 7.1) by possessing and communicating some form of expertise 
which users perceive and make use of (cf. Chapter 7.2). Expertise presupposes the ability to 
manage knowledge about domain concepts and tasks, which includes its acquisition, 
representation, and use to solve problems that are the focus of or occur during the interaction 
with the user. Expertise is the topic of Chapter 12. 
• Dialogue management. The ability to sustain an effective, goal-directed conversation with 
the user is critical for a conversational agent. The dialogue manager carefully orchestrates 
the agent-user exchange across multiple turns toward a successful and satisfactory 
conclusion. Dialogue management is discussed in Section 11.3.3.2. 
Traditionally, conversational systems have only used a single medium (text or audio) and a 
single communication channel (typing or speaking). But the environments of conversational 
agents are becoming more complex, requiring agents to handle both multiple media and 
multiple modes of input and output. In these environments, conversational agents also need: 
• Multimedia technologies. State-of-the-art multimedia environments, like the Virtual 
Linguistics Campus (cf. Chapter 2.4), provide content that integrates multiple media, 
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including text, graphics, video, animation, and sound, in various ways (cf. Chapter 2.3.7). 
Agents situated in these environments may have to deal with multimedia content as input, 
output, or source of knowledge. Hence, they should be able to interpret, manipulate, 
generate, and refer to multimedia content in the context of their ongoing interaction with the 
user. 
• Multimodality technologies. The ability of conversational agents to integrate and coordinate 
several combined input modes (speech, pen, mouse, facial expressions, gaze, gesture, 
presence, posture, etc.) and multimedia outputs (combinations of images, text, speech, video, 
animations, etc.) can increase the bandwidth of human-agent communications substantially 
and allows agents to compensate for shortcomings of the component technologies involved. 
Embodied conversational agents (cf. Section 11.3.4) with the appropriate multimodal 
interface technologies can both interpret and perform multimodal communicative actions 
that combine spoken natural language with the non-verbal behaviors discussed in Chapter 
10.1. 
11.1.1  Speech Recognition 
Automatic speech recognition (ASR) is the computer-based process of mapping from an 
acoustic speech signal, which has been obtained by means of a microphone or a telephone, to a 
string of words in a particular natural language (Rabiner & Juang 1993; Rudnicky et al. 1994; 
Zue et al. 1997; Holmes & Holmes 2001; Huang et al. 2001; Lamel & Gauvain 2003; Coleman 
2005). People can recognize (and understand) the speech of many different individuals across a 
wide variety of situations with relative ease; hence, it is not surprising that ASR research and 
development try to achieve this ideal by building machines which can: 
• Recognize the speech of any individual without prior training on a voice; 
• Recognize any word of one or several languages; 
• Handle users’ speaking at any pace; 
• Distinguish between commands, dictation, and non-machine-directed speech; 
• Perform robustly in any situation, especially under unfavorable conditions (e.g. background 
noise, low signal quality, etc.). 
Speech recognition systems that possess these capabilities to the same degree as an average 
human being have not been built yet. The same task that people perform so well with different 
 
Figure 40. Component technologies of a conversational agent. 
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speakers in different contexts every day is much more difficult to handle for the average 
computer, due to the inherent complexity of the speech recognition task, which arises from the 
nature of the speech signal as an analog, continuous sound wave with high levels of redundancy 
and noise, and from various task-related issues: 
• Segmentation is the problem of extracting speech sounds, syllables, and words from the 
speech signal. Normal fluent speech only rarely marks the boundaries between speech units 
unambiguously. 
• Variability in the speech signal means that the pronunciation of speech units is not constant 
but highly dependent on (Zue et al. 1997: 4ff.): 
• The acoustic/phonetic context121 of speech sounds (phonetic variabilities); 
• The environment (background noise, other speakers’ talking, echoes in the room, etc.) 
and the communication channel (problems with the microphone, poor transmission 
quality, etc.) (acoustic variabilities); 
• The individual speaker, including such aspects as speaking rate, stress, pitch, loudness, 
intonation, clarity of pronunciation, and disfluencies (e.g. false starts, gap fillers, throat 
clearing) (within-speaker variabilities); 
• Differences between individual speakers and between groups of speakers, including sex, 
age, dialect, social background, size and shape of the vocal tract (across-speaker 
variabilities). 
• Task-related issues include people talking over system prompts (barge-in effects), their use 
of words outside the system’s vocabulary, the need to separate task-related speech from 
irrelevant input, the difficulty to distinguish between commands and data in the input, and 
the user’s fleeting awareness and resulting negligent correction of recognition errors. 
11.1.1.1 Design Parameters 
A number of design parameters can be controlled to make the speech recognition task easier for 
machines (Kay et al. 1994: 116f.; Holmes & Holmes 2001: 235ff.). One parameter concerns the 
user’s way of speaking to the speech recognition system. Speakers can help the system to 
identify their words by inserting a significant pause after each word. This is called isolated 
word or discrete speech. However, discrete speech is unnatural for humans and therefore 
difficult to produce and annoying for listeners. Furthermore, discrete speech input is also slow. 
While discrete speech is sufficient for simple tasks like voice command, more sophisticated 
applications, such as dictation and spoken dialogue, require continuous speech recognition, 
which handles speech as a continuous stream of words without artificial pauses. 
Another major parameter that distinguishes speech recognition systems concerns the range 
of speakers that can be handled, in other words the degree of speaker dependence: 
• Speaker-dependent systems are tuned to the speech patterns of an individual speaker and can 
only recognize his or her speech with acceptable accuracy. 
                                              
121  The articulation of adjacent speech sounds (within a word or across word boundaries) is not strictly 
sequential but overlaps to some extent because the configurations of the tongue and other articulators 
are influenced by neighboring speech sounds (Holmes & Holmes 2001: 4). For example, the initial 
consonant /k/ in key is pronounced differently than in caw, influenced by the following front vs. back 
vowel. This pervasive phenomenon is referred to as coarticulation (Ladefoged 2001). 
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• Speaker-adaptive systems adapt to the speech of individual users through additional training 
and thus can increase their recognition accuracy. 
• Speaker-independent systems accept spoken input from many different people without prior 
training for each speaker. 
Speaker-dependent speech recognizers are easier to develop and perform better than speaker-
independent systems, but they are also much less flexible. Speaker-adaptive programs seek to 
combine the advantages of both extremes; however, the user still has to familiarize the system 
with his or her voice to improve performance. 
A third parameter for classifying speech recognition systems is vocabulary size. The number 
of words a speech recognizer needs to know depends on its task, ranging from two to three 
words for simple voice command applications to hundreds of thousands of words for current 
dictation systems. Restricting the vocabulary can make the recognition task easier because there 
are less potential word candidates to choose from. Controlling for similar-sounding words can 
also help to improve recognition accuracy (Holmes & Holmes 2001: 236). 
Finally, it is possible to control the task and the language that the speech recognizer has to 
deal with. A task-related measure of the complexity of a recognition problem is its perplexity, 
i.e. the average number of word alternatives the speech recognizer has to consider at any one 
point in the recognition process (Kay et al. 1994: 119; Holmes & Holmes 2001: 197f.). A lower 
perplexity means that searching for the correct word is easier and hence more efficient and 
accurate (Holmes & Holmes 2001: 198). 
Restricting the application domain of a speech recognition system can help to keep 
perplexity low and the vocabulary small because it constrains the language (words and 
constructions) that the system can reasonably expect from users. In fact, early success stories of 
speech recognition were systems for generating standardized legal or medical reports. 
Conversational agents should accept continuous input from a wide range of speakers, 
without requiring (extensive) prior training for each speaker; in other words, they should be 
speaker-independent or at least speaker-adaptive. The vocabulary size and perplexity depend on 
the agent’s domain; for most conversational tasks, they will be moderate to high. 
11.1.1.2 Speech Recognition Techniques 
Most state-of-the-art speech recognition systems adopt a pattern recognition approach (cf. 
Figure 41). Pattern-matching speech recognizers use the output of an initial signal processing 
stage (typically a sequence of feature vectors) to search a database of reference patterns for the 
best match, using language-specific constraints on the occurrence of words in different contexts 
provided by a language model to decide what sequence of words has most likely generated the 
feature vectors observed in the input.122 The approach is data-driven: both the reference patterns 
and the language models are derived by automated training procedures from representative sets 
of spoken and written language data. 
                                              
122  The various sources of uncertainty associated with the input speech in combination with their own 
inferior comprehension capabilities make it very difficult for ASR systems to be as confident about 
what the user said as another human might be. 
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Reference patterns have been represented as templates,123 stochastic models, connectionist 
networks, or hybrids of stochastic and connectionist models (Kay et al. 1994: 124–138). Of 
these, stochastic models have enjoyed the greatest success so far, being used in virtually every 
modern speech recognizer. Stochastic-based approaches define a probabilistic model for each 
word or other unit to be recognized, which can produce sequences of feature vectors that 
represent different examples of uttering the word or unit. Given an observed sequence of 
feature vectors in the input speech, the recognition task then involves computing for each word 
model the probability that it could have generated that sequence, based on the known properties 
of the model, and picking the model/word with the highest probability (Holmes & Holmes 
2001: 128). The most commonly used stochastic formalism is the hidden Markov model (HMM) 
(Rabiner & Juang 1993: Chapter 6; Kay et al. 1994: 131–136; Holmes & Holmes 2001: Chapter 
9; Huang et al. 2001: Chapter 8; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: Chapter 9), which represents models 
of speech patterns as a network of states connected by transitions, in which each state is 
associated with probabilities that determine the next state (transition probabilities) and what 
feature vector to emit in the current state (emission probabilities). Both transitions and 
emissions are picked randomly as the HMM progresses from one state to another over a series 
of discrete time steps, governed by the current distribution of the transition and emission 
probabilities, respectively (Tebelskis 1995: 16). The performance of hidden Markov models 
depends on the quality of both sets of probabilities. The values of these parameters are 
automatically generated in a training process from a set of speech data obtained from a variety 
of human speakers. 
Connectionist approaches apply artificial neural networks (ANN) (Rabiner & Juang 1993: 
54–65; Tebelskis 1995: 51–71; Holmes & Holmes 2001: Chapter 13; Huang et al. 2001: 457ff.) 
to the recognition of input speech patterns. ANNs are networks consisting of a large number of 
highly interconnected simple processing units capable of operating together in parallel to 
                                              
123  Template-based speech recognition systems use stored sequences of feature-encoded speech frames 
(so-called templates) for each word in the vocabulary (Kay et al. 1994: 126ff.; Fellbaum 1997; 
Holmes & Holmes 2001: Chapter 8). Templates are only used in older systems with limited 
capabilities (Rudnicky et al. 1994) because of several serious shortcomings, including their speaker-
dependent nature, their inability to handle continuous speech, and their unsuitability for large 
vocabularies. 
 
Figure 41. A block diagram of pattern-matching speech recognition. Adapted from Brewer (1996). 
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achieve complex behaviors or tasks. The connections between units are associated with weights 
that determine the behavior of the network. These weights can be adapted by learning the 
underlying patterns of training data (Cawsey 1998: 156f.; Holmes & Holmes 2001: 214). 
Connectionist models have been successfully used to classify short, isolated speech units 
(especially phonemes and words) (Bourlard & Morgan 1997: 358), but they have significant 
difficulties with modeling the speech signal over time. Thus, ANNs do not scale up easily to the 
recognition of continuous speech in phrases or sentences. 
Hybrid approaches to speech recognition combine stochastic models, in particular hidden 
Markov models (HMM), and connectionist networks (Tebelskis 1995: 57ff.; Holmes & Holmes 
2001: 217f.; Huang et al. 2001: 457ff.), in a way that exploits the strengths of each approach. 
HMMs are used to model the speech signal over time while neural networks are used for signal 
classification. Hybrid ASR systems have proven superior to classical HMM-based approaches 
in a number of cases. 
The language models used in most current speech recognition systems are statistical models 
consisting of probabilities of words to occur in contexts of one or two preceding words (bigram 
or trigram models) (Holmes & Holmes 2001: 196f.). Using a trigram model, the overall 
likelihood P(W) of a recognized word sequence W is obtained by multiplying the probabilities 
P(wx|wx-2 wx-1)124 of the trigrams in that sequence (p. 197). The string with the highest computed 
probability wins. Statistical language models are derived from the frequencies of occurrence of 
bigrams or trigrams in a representative and typically very large machine-readable text collection 
(corpus), which are estimated and used to compute the probabilities of the word sequences 
during a training process (pp. 185, 197 + 199). Since no corpus covers all possible bigrams or 
trigrams of the language, many probabilities will be zero, which means that word sequences 
containing the corresponding bigrams or trigrams cannot be recognized. Hence, smoothing 
techniques are used to raise the zero or low non-zero probabilities and to lower the high 
probabilities, yielding more uniform (‘smoother’) probability distributions for the language 
model (p. 199). 
11.1.1.3 State of the Art 
Automatic speech recognition is among the fastest growing and commercially most promising 
human language technologies. It is being used in an increasing number of applications, 
including command-and-control, dictation, data entry and retrieval, toys and games, and 
telecommunications (Holmes & Holmes 2001: 239–242). In education, speech recognition 
technology has a number of useful applications in the field of (foreign-) language learning. It 
offers learners interactive speaking practice, assessing both what they are saying and how they 
are pronouncing it. Promising applications of speech recognition for language learning include 
pronunciation training (Eskenazi 1999), conversational interaction (Ehsani & Knodt 1998), and 
reading tuition (Mostow & Aist 2001; Mostow & Beck 2007). In a broader context, ASR could 
also assist learners by automatically transcribing lectures and speech data when learners find 
this difficult for cognitive, physical, or sensory reasons; help them to manage and search 
collections of digital multimedia content; and caption speech for hearing-impaired learners or 
when speech is not available, convenient, or audible (Wald 2006). Another emerging 
application of speech recognition is in (embodied) conversational agents (e.g. Ball et al. 1997; 
                                              
124  That is the probability of seeing word wx given the sequence of the two previous words wx-2 and wx-1 
(Holmes & Holmes 2001: 197). 
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Cassell et al. 2000b; Gratch et al. 2002; Cole et al. 2003; Johnson et al. 2004b), where it 
facilitates symmetric multimodal human-agent interaction (cf. Chapter 11.3), giving agents the 
ability to listen to users in addition to talking to them. 
The best modern speech recognizers are capable of large vocabulary continuous speech 
recognition (LVCSR) with near-100% word-recognition rates under good conditions (quiet 
environment; appropriately positioned, high-quality microphone; same speaker), without the 
need for (extensive) speaker-specific training. However, some limitations of speech recognition 
technology still need to be removed: 
• ASR systems must be able to maintain good performance when input conditions are less 
than optimal. Changes in the acoustic environment, transmission channel, speaker identity, 
speaking style, etc. still often lead to sudden and significant degradation in performance. 
• Speech recognition technology has to be integrated with other human language technologies 
because future speech applications, including conversational agents, will require capabilities 
of understanding beyond the recognition of the spoken words. 
• Interactive applications require the ability to handle spontaneous speech (rather than read 
speech), so the speech recognizer must be able to deal with disfluencies like gap fillers, 
hesitations, self-corrections, coughs, tongue and lip clicks, etc. (cf. Chapter 11.3.3.1). 
• Speech recognition uses long-established techniques for acoustic and language modeling. 
However, it appears that hidden Markov models and bigram/trigram statistics are reaching 
their limits, so substantial innovations beyond these methods are needed. 
11.1.2  Speech Synthesis 
Speech synthesis is the process of generating spoken utterances from symbolic input. 
Depending on the nature of the input, two major types of speech synthesis can be identified. 
Text-to-speech (TTS) synthesis systems (Dutoit 1997; Sproat 1998; Holmes & Holmes 2001; 
Huang et al. 2001; Dutoit & Stylianou 2003; Tatham & Morton 2005) interpret text in 
orthographic form (from a computer file or from printed text) and convert it to speech. Concept-
to-speech (CTS) synthesis starts from some representation of the ideas or concepts to be 
communicated and expresses them in spoken language (cf. Section 11.1.2.3). 
The gold standard for speech synthesis is a system that can deliver arbitrary messages in real 
time and in a synthetic voice which is at least acceptable to human listeners. The quality of 
synthetic speech can be assessed along the dimensions of intelligibility, naturalness, and 
expressiveness, which were discussed in Chapter 10.1.1. 
11.1.2.1 The TTS Problem 
The majority of current speech synthesizers are text-to-speech systems. To produce a highly 
intelligible and natural-sounding rendering of a text, a TTS system must deal with both aspects 
of the input text and desired qualities of the spoken output. Problems with text processing arise 
from the fact that input texts are neither unambiguous nor give away all necessary information 
(Sproat et al. 1999: 17ff. + 22ff.; Holmes & Holmes 2001: 97ff.). White spaces, punctuation, 
and formatting typically do not consistently indicate the boundaries of words, sentences, 
paragraphs, and other structures. Abbreviations, numbers, symbols, dates, times, and 
combinations of these have to be expanded into sets of pronounceable words. The 
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pronunciation of proper names, foreign-language terms, scientific and technical terms, word 
creations, and homographs125 can only be guessed in many cases or depends on the context. 
Stress assignment at the word and the sentence level is determined by a variety of linguistic 
factors, including lexical category, the semantic relations between words, the pragmatic 
function of a word, and the properties of the discourse (Sproat et al. 1999: 22f.). Longer 
sentences need to be split into smaller intonational units (prosodic phrases), and the sentence 
type has to be identified. Finally, to convey the author’s message properly, the TTS system 
would have to be able to understand the meaning of the text prior to reading it to the user (cf. 
Section 11.1.3). 
Speech generation is difficult because machines lack both the fully-developed vocal tract and 
the spoken language processing capabilities of human beings. First, synthetic speech has to 
incorporate the contextual variation of speech sounds arising from coarticulation. While a 
considerable problem for speech recognition systems (cf. Section 11.1.1), coarticulation effects 
are indispensable for achieving intelligible synthetic speech (see Hess (1996: 3f.) for a detailed 
discussion). Speech generation does not work by simply stringing phonemes126 together (Portele 
1997: 59) but requires further manipulation of the speech signal to account for the articulatory 
transitions between speech sounds. 
When humans speak a message, it does not only matter what they say but also how they say 
it. In addition to information about the identities of the speech segments, intelligible and natural 
speech also contains information about prosodic features, including (Holmes & Holmes 2001: 
6f.): 
• Pitch. The output speech should exhibit patterns of pitch variation that distinguish words in 
tone languages (e.g. Chinese) and indicate sentence type, prominence of words, speaker 
mood, etc. 
• Intensity. Changes in perceived loudness create the impression of variation of vocal effort by 
the synthetic talker, help to identify stressed syllables, and indicate boundaries of 
intonational phrases. 
• Timing. The speech synthesizer has to determine the duration of each speech segment such 
that the output speech mimics the temporal structure of human utterances. 
The prosodic structure of an utterance should further indicate the overall voice quality (e.g. 
breathiness, creakiness, softness, and loudness) and voice identity (i.e. the unique vocal 
characteristics of the speaker). 
11.1.2.2 The TTS Process 
The generation of synthetic speech from text is typically implemented as a process consisting of 
two major steps (cf. Figure 42). The text analysis stage determines the underlying linguistic 
structure of the input text, which is used as a basis for speech generation. It identifies the 
boundaries of paragraphs, sentences, and words in the input text; expands non-word items into 
sequences of pronounceable words; determines word pronunciations using a pronunciation 
                                              
125  Homographs are words with the same graphemic shape but different pronunciations and meanings. 
Examples include read (present tense vs. past tense), bass (musical range or instrument vs. fish), and 
bow (weapon vs. to bend one’s knee or body). 
126  The phoneme is the smallest unit in the sound system of a language that, when replaced with another 
unit of the same kind, causes a change in meaning, as in the minimal pair pin vs. bin. 
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lexicon, letter-to-sound rules,127 and morphological analysis (cf. Section 11.1.3.3); analyzes the 
syntactic structure of the input text to resolve pronunciation ambiguities, identify the sentence 
type, and locate accents and prosodic phrases; and, finally, assigns word-level (lexical) and 
sentence-level stress to the relevant parts of the words and sentences in the input (Holmes & 
Holmes 2001: 97–102). The final result is a string of discrete sound symbols annotated with 
information that may influence the way the text is to be spoken. 
From this representation, the speech generation component produces the output synthetic 
waveform. First, information in the abstract linguistic description about lexical stress, sentence-
level stress, and phrasing is used to generate the prosody for the synthesized speech. Speech 
synthesis systems use a set of rules to model various acoustic correlates of prosody in the 
synthetic speech signal, including the timing pattern, the overall intensity level, and the 
fundamental frequency (pitch) contour (Holmes & Holmes 2001: 102–106). 
Second, the speech waveform is synthesized by selecting the appropriate synthesis units and 
then using them together with the prosodic information to produce the spoken output. Speech 
synthesizers have taken three major approaches to speech waveform generation (Dutoit 1997: 
Chapter 7; Holmes & Holmes 2001: Chapters 5 + 6; Huang et al. 2001: Chapter 16; Dutoit & 
Stylianou 2003: 333–336): 
• Use of an articulatory model (not relevant for practical systems);128 
                                              
127  Letter-to-sound rules specify how a sequence of letters is to be mapped to a sequence of sound 
symbols, either abstract linguistic units (phonemes) or acoustic-phonetic units (phones, diphones, or 
demi-syllables). 
128  For a discussion of articulatory speech synthesis, see Kröger (1996) and Huang et al. (2001: 803f.). 
Arguments against using articulatory synthesis are provided by Holmes and Holmes (2001: 81f.). 
 
Figure 42. A block diagram of the text-to-speech synthesis process. While the preprocessing of the input 
text is fairly similar across TTS systems, there are three major approaches to speech waveform 
generation: articulatory, formant, and concatenative synthesis. 
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• Synthesis by rule (formant synthesis); 
• Concatenation of speech segments (concatenative synthesis). 
Formant synthesis of speech involves modeling the main acoustic features of the speech 
signal (d’Alessandro & Liénard 1997: 173). It is based on the source-filter model of speech 
production, where a signal generator (the source) provides the input signal to a parameterized 
filter that models the vocal tract. Both source and filter are controlled by a large set of heuristic 
rules (p. 173). 
The most important filter parameters are the resonances, or formants, which are specified in 
terms of their frequencies, bandwidths, and amplitudes. Further parameters are necessary to 
realize voiceless and nasal sounds (Zboril 1995; Holmes & Holmes 2001: 28–31; Huang et al. 
2001: 799). Generating the speech waveform involves first specifying a series of acoustic target 
values to be achieved during the phonetic units making up the utterance and then applying the 
rules to interpolate between these targets in order to produce an output speech signal that 
emulates the dynamic aspects of the human voice (Rudnicky et al. 1994: 55; Isard 2001: 793). 
Since formant synthesis is based on rules and parameters, it is quite flexible when it comes 
to realizing different voices or speaking styles (e.g. whispering) (Huang et al. 2001: 803). 
However, the downside is that the rules for controlling the synthesizer have to be hand-coded 
and iteratively refined by human experts (Sproat et al. 1999: 27), and a large number of them 
are required. Furthermore, there is the general problem that no model or rule system has been 
able to achieve the quality of a human voice so far (Hess 1996: 2; Holmes & Holmes 2001: 
107). 
Concatenative synthesis techniques join together chunks of stored natural speech available 
either as waveforms or in some coded format and apply signal processing techniques to smooth 
the joins between the segments and to modify the prosody of the concatenated sequence of 
elements in order to match a desired prosodic scheme (Rudnicky et al. 1994: 55; d’Alessandro 
& Liénard 1997: 174; Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 275f.; Holmes & Holmes 2001: 283; Huang et 
al. 2001: 818). The units used for concatenation vary in size but are typically larger than 
isolated speech sounds (phones) to capture the transitions between adjacent speech sounds. 
Many systems have used diphones, which extend from the invariable part of a phone to the 
invariable part of the next (Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 274f.; Holmes & Holmes 2001: 71). Others 
draw on demi-syllables, syllables, words, phrases, or an inventory of segments of different size 
(Portele 1997; Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 276f.; Huang et al. 2001: 805–809). 
A concatenative synthesizer splices only slightly modified chunks obtained from recordings 
of a single human speaker; hence, much of the quality of natural speech can be preserved in the 
output (Hess 1996: 2). Not surprisingly, most of today’s commercially available speech 
synthesis systems are concatenative. However, concatenative synthesizers are less flexible than 
rule-based systems since they are bound to the characteristics of a specific human voice (p. 2). 
To generate a variety of voices and speaking styles, additional data from the same or from other 
speakers may be required. In addition, it takes much time and effort to build the database of 
speech segments for a voice (Hess 1996: 2; Holmes & Holmes 2001: 72f.). 
11.1.2.3 Concept-to-Speech Synthesis 
Concept-to-speech (CTS) synthesis (Alter et al. 1997; Taylor 2000; Holmes & Holmes 2001: 
107f.; Huang et al. 2001: 899ff.; Pan 2002; Tatham & Morton 2005: 321f.) differs from text-to-
speech synthesis in that it does not start from unrestricted text input but from a controlled 
formal representation of ideas or concepts to be expressed in speech (Holmes & Holmes 2001: 
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107). Usually, such a concept consists of information and a communicative goal, i.e. a 
specification of both what should be communicated and what this communication is intended to 
achieve (cf. Section 11.1.4). 
Like text-to-speech synthesis, the process of converting concepts into spoken utterances is a 
two-stage process, which is shown in Figure 43. The first step, message generation, involves 
the production of an enriched linguistic description of the message to be communicated, which 
specifies in detail what (content selection) is to be said and how (discourse planning, sentence 
planning, and surface realization). The second step, speech generation, synthesizes an output 
speech signal from that linguistic description, subdivided into prosody generation and speech 
waveform generation, just like the corresponding stage in a TTS system (Pan 2002: 3–7). 
The traditional approach to concept-to-speech synthesis is to have a natural language 
generation (NLG) component (cf. Section 11.1.4) produce a text from some non-linguistic 
input, which is then sent to a text-to-speech synthesis system to generate the spoken message 
(Taylor 2000; Pan 2002: 7). While this approach is simple and convenient, it discards valuable 
linguistic information after text generation, which has to be recomputed by the TTS system 
from the text (Zue 1997). As a result, with this approach, nothing is gained for the speech 
generation stage. The only difference is that the input text is dynamically generated rather than 
provided directly as input. In contrast, enriching the intermediate description with syntactic, 
semantic, and discourse information from message generation could facilitate the task of 
producing output speech with appropriate prosody (Huang et al. 2001: 899ff.; Pan 2002: 9). 
11.1.2.4 State of the Art 
We have reached the point where we can deliver systems that are quite intelligible, so speech 
system design goals are now shifting to make voice systems sound more like people and less like 
machines. (Andy Aaron, quoted in Korzeniowski 2008). 
Speech synthesis technology enables interactive systems, including conversational agents, to 
respond to the user with dynamically generated messages instead of canned (pre-recorded) 
speech. There are various applications that benefit from the flexibility offered by synthetic 
speech in comparison to pre-recorded speech, including reading machines and synthetic voices 
for the disabled; flexible message generation for software systems, devices, and vehicles; 
speaking toys and game characters; and telephone-based services (Holmes & Holmes 2001: 
233ff.). In (foreign-) language learning, speech synthesis could be used for modeling 
pronunciation, illustrating intonation, and spoken conversation. Further opportunities exist in 
 
Figure 43. A block diagram of the concept-to-speech process. Adapted from Pan (2002: 7, Figure 1.2). 
Message generation involves the same sequence of steps as a generic natural language generation 
system (cf. Figure 45). The stages of speech generation are those found in a text-to-speech system. 
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literacy tuition (Mostow & Aist 2001; Mostow & Beck 2007) and speech therapy (Massaro et 
al. 2000; Massaro 2005, cf. Chapter 9.6 and Chapter 10.1.3). Since educational applications 
commonly require high-quality output, recorded human speech is still widely preferred for 
practical systems. However, as soon as systems have to participate in open-ended spoken 
interactions with learners, flexible speech generation mechanisms become a necessity. This is 
certainly true of conversational pedagogical agents (cf. Chapter 10.1.1). 
Most state-of-the-art synthesizers generate speech using concatenative techniques. The best 
systems can produce output of high intelligibility and acceptable naturalness for short, simple 
utterances (Holmes & Holmes 2001: 107). Depending on the system, the spoken messages can 
be delivered in different voices and speaking styles. However, even the most sophisticated 
synthesizers currently available will not pass for a natural (human) speaker for too long because 
their voices still lack in naturalness and expressiveness, which becomes quite apparent when 
messages are longer (p. 107). In fact, the perceived quality of synthetic speech can decline 
rapidly for longer utterances (p. 232), due to its artificial- and neutral-sounding prosody. Wrong 
pauses, incorrect stress placement, ill-timed pitch changes, occasional mispronunciations of 
known words, and other lapses all suggest to human listeners that the machine does not 
understand the messages it delivers, unlike humans (Nass & Brave 2005: 134). Hence, speech 
synthesis technology is currently most successful in domains in which the utterances are short 
and have simple prosodic patterns, or in applications that involve more complex utterances but 
tolerate lower speech quality (Holmes & Holmes 2001: 232f.). 
The intelligibility of synthetic speech at the segmental level is largely considered a solved 
problem: state-of-the-art speech synthesizers can render the speech segments making up the 
words of the output with sufficient quality for humans to correctly recognize those words 
(Tatham & Morton 2005: 1). However, improving the prosody of synthetic speech still has high 
priority on the research agenda. The challenge has been summarized as follows: 
Many researchers agree that the major remaining obstacle to fully acceptable synthetic speech is 
that it continues to be insufficiently natural. Progress at the segmental level, which involves the 
perceptually acceptable rendering of individual segments and how they conjoin, has been very 
successful, but prosody is the focus of concern at the moment: the rendering of suprasegmental 
phenomena – elements that span multiple segments – is less than satisfactory and appears to be 
the primary source of perceptual unease. (Tatham & Morton 2005: 2). 
The synthesis of expressive speech which conveys both emotions (cf. Chapter 13.4.2) and 
personality (cf. Chapter 13.5) in a believable way is another insufficiently addressed issue. 
Machines also need to improve their ability to adopt the appropriate tone of voice for messages 
with different emotional content because inconsistent verbal and vocal emotions suggest 
insincerity, instability, or deception on the part of the speaker (cf. Chapter 10.1.1). Synthetic 
speech may also sound odd if it does not follow cultural norms determining the pronunciation 
of lengthy numbers and other items (Nass & Brave 2005: 134f.). Machines that can produce 
their own messages have additional problems related to making appropriate choices with 
respect to content selection and organization, grammar, vocabulary, and style (cf. Section 
11.1.4). 
While most current synthesizers use a text-to-speech approach, more complex applications, 
such as speech-to-speech translation (Wahlster 2000), spoken dialogue systems (McTear 2004), 
and (embodied) conversational agents (cf. Section 11.3), will require the system to generate its 
own messages and therefore will need to use a concept-to-speech rather than a text-to-speech 
approach to speech synthesis. 
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11.1.3  Natural Language Understanding 
The term natural language understanding (NLU) refers to the process of translating a natural 
language input into a non-linguistic representation of the information that the machine was able 
to extract from the input about its content (or meaning) and the underlying communicative 
goals of the speaker or writer. Natural language input is provided in spoken or written form in 
one or multiple languages as chunks ranging in size from single utterances to multi-sentence 
texts and can occur in both interactive and non-interactive settings. The concrete form of the 
internal representation depends on the requirements of the application. Conversational agents 
must be able to capture the content and function of the user’s utterance at the stage at which it 
occurs and interpret it with respect to previous exchanges and the goal of the interaction (cf. 
Section 11.3). 
11.1.3.1 The NLU Problem 
As in other areas of speech and language processing, humans serve as the model for NLU 
research and development, the goal being systems with a language understanding capacity 
which is at least as comprehensive, flexible, and robust as the human mind. However, the 
interpretation of natural language input is a complex task, due to a number of inherent 
properties of human language: 
• Ambiguity. One of the most serious issues for NLU is that units and constructions in natural 
languages are often ambiguous, i.e. several linguistic structures can be computed for them, 
which correspond to alternative interpretations. These ambiguities need to be resolved 
(disambiguation) (Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 4f.). 
• Vagueness. Many expressions in natural languages are vague, i.e. unspecified with regard to 
their meaning. For example, their applicability to a particular object or situation may not be 
clear or their meaning may not be clearly or only generally specified. Contextual information 
can help to clarify vague expressions. 
• Figurative language. Literature, rhetoric, and especially everyday language are rich in 
metaphor (Lakoff & Johnson 1980), metonymy, idioms, and other expressions whose 
meaning is different from the sum of the meanings of their parts. To be able to interpret them 
properly (i.e. not literally), knowledge of many “categories of shared human experience” is 
required (Kurzweil 1990: 307), including common sense, current events, history, literature, 
politics, etc. 
• Context dependency. The meaning of extended discourses (texts and dialogues) can only be 
derived from the interaction of their components because the meaning of a text or exchange 
is more than the sum of the meanings of the individual sentences or utterances making it up 
(Schank & Abelson 1977: 22), and the discourse context129 of an utterance affects its 
meaning (Grosz 1997: 199). In addition, natural language understanding has to consider 
other aspects of context, including speaker and hearer, the current situation, and the real 
world. 
                                              
129  The discourse context is the set of circumstances that affects the interpretation and production of a 
given discourse. It includes the surrounding text or talk of a language unit (word, utterance, turn, etc.) 
and the relevant dimensions of the communicative situation (participants, setting, and the real world). 
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• Ill-formed input. In real-world applications, particularly those involving real-time human-
machine interaction, the input may contain various anomalies, including incorrect spellings, 
unknown and misrecognized words, speaker self-corrections, fragmentary utterances, 
spurious phrases, unusual and wrong word order, and missing words. 
11.1.3.2 Resources for NLU 
The wide range of difficulties shows that natural language understanding is a much harder 
problem than perhaps many people would expect. The failure of early systems soon led to the 
insight that understanding language requires substantial knowledge about natural languages and 
about the world. This knowledge can be organized in terms of five principal resources: 
grammar, lexicon, discourse or dialogue model, domain model, and user model. 
11.1.3.2.1 Grammar 
Language analysis requires knowledge about the possible organizations of words in sentences 
to determine the syntactic structure(s) of sentences, which is instrumental in computing their 
meanings. Grammars are finite formal specifications of the legal syntactic structures in a 
natural language (Charniak 1996: 4). They provide a set of basic categories and rules for 
combining words into well-formed phrases and sentences. 
A natural language grammar is written in a formal language, which for the purposes of 
processing must be highly expressive, flexible, and computationally effective (Keller 1992: 
378). Current grammar formalisms are typically declarative in nature (p. 378), i.e. they provide 
the means for specifying objects, their legal combinations, and the properties of the resulting 
objects, but do not prescribe technical procedures for the combination of objects into larger 
units (Gazdar & Mellish 1989). As a result, declarative formalisms become independent of 
particular processing strategies. 
The remainder of this section identifies a number of influential grammar formalisms in the 
history of natural understanding and summarizes their major properties: 
• Augmented transition network (ATN) grammars (Woods 1970; Winograd 1983) define each 
phrasal category (e.g. noun phrase, verb phrase, sentence, etc.) that can appear in the 
syntactic structure of a sentence in terms of a finite-state transition network.130 Transitions in 
such a network can have phrasal category labels, which activate the ATN for that phrasal 
category. If a path through the subordinate network can be found, the transition arc in the 
parent network may be followed. Every ATN has a set of registers for storing partial 
syntactic structures. Operations associated with each transition arc set the values of registers 
and retrieve them on later transitions for comparison with items encountered further on in the 
input. This makes it possible to implement subject-verb agreement and other dependencies 
(Kaplan 2003: 84f.). 
• Context-free grammars (CFG) (Chomsky 1956; Chomsky 1957; Backus 1959; Kaplan 2003: 
78–81; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: Chapter 12) are an essential component of many computer 
systems for language understanding. A context-free grammar consists of (a) a finite set of 
non-terminal symbols (lexical and phrasal categories); (b) a finite set of terminal symbols 
                                              
130  Finite-state transition networks consist of states connected by links (the transitions). A transition 
network is traversed from an initial state through a sequence of intermediate states to a final state. 
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(the words of the language);131 and (c) a finite set of rewrite rules (facts about sentence 
structure or about the lexicon) that replace a non-terminal symbol with (or rewrite it as) a 
string of terminal and/or non-terminal symbols. The rewriting of a non-terminal symbol is 
independent of the context surrounding it (hence the label ‘context-free’), as opposed to 
context-sensitive grammars, where the rewriting is contingent on the context of the non-
terminal symbol. 
• Unification-based grammars (Shieber 1986; Knight 1989; Keller 1992; Kaplan 2003: 85–88; 
Jurafsky & Martin 2008: Chapter 15) use feature structures as their central type of data 
structure. A feature structure is a partially specified, record-like representation of linguistic 
objects consisting of attribute-value pairs that provide syntactic, semantic, or phonological 
information (Keller 1992: 371). The second central concept is the unification operation, 
which derives feature structures of larger units by putting together (unifying) compatible 
feature structures, which are partial specifications of the same linguistic object (p. 371). 
Unification-based grammars are also called constraint-based grammars because they impose 
constraints on features and values to define well-formedness criteria for linguistic 
constructions (p. 376), such as number agreement between subject and verb. 
• Semantic grammars (Burton & Brown 1977; Allen 1994: 332ff.; Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 
573–577) take advantage of the fact that language understanding systems are often designed 
for limited domains where words and phrases have well-defined meanings. The rules in a 
semantic grammar contain semantically motivated categories corresponding to entities and 
relationships of the domain and define how these entities and relationships can be expressed 
(Allen 1994: 333; Pereira 1997: 118; Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 575). 
11.1.3.2.2 Lexicon 
Lexical knowledge, i.e. knowledge about individual words in particular natural languages, is 
crucial for language understanding. The resource that stores lexical information in a systematic 
and accessible way is called the lexicon (Handke 1995). Computational lexicons for realistic 
applications are large, complex repositories of lexical information which require an effective 
organization, both of the global structure of the lexicon and at the level of single lexical entries 
(Pustejovsky 2001: 160f.). While the exact content of lexical entries is controversial, they are 
commonly assumed to contain at least132 information about the following aspects (Handke 1995: 
68–108 + 237–241; Pustejovsky 2001: 161): 
• Morphology. The morphological specification contains information about the lexical 
category (word class), spelling, and possible word forms of a lexical item. 
• Syntax. The syntactic specification defines the context of a lexical item in terms of other 
categories (subcategorization). 
• Semantics. The semantic specification of a lexical item contains the basic word sense, the 
thematic role structure133 of an item, selectional restrictions,134 and finally the semantic 
                                              
131  In other accounts, lexical categories are the terminal nodes and information about words is not 
encoded in the grammar. 
132  Computational lexicons for spoken language processing additionally require information about the 
phonological aspects of words, including their sound sequence, syllable structure, stress patterns, etc. 
133  The thematic role structure displays the arguments of lexical items together with their associated 
thematic (semantic) roles (e.g. Agent, Theme, and Goal) (Handke 1995: 83). 
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relationships between the lexeme and other items in the lexicon (e.g. synonymy, hyponymy, 
and antonymy). 
11.1.3.2.3 Discourse Model 
The discourse model is dynamically constructed while processing an input text or in the course 
of a dialogue with the human user, capturing the structure of the discourse as it unfolds. Three 
interdependent components of discourse structure have to be captured by a discourse model 
(Grosz & Sidner 1986; Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 744f.): 
• The linguistic structure organizes the discourse into a hierarchy of segments. Each segment 
is a coherent stretch of discourse consisting of one or more (not necessarily adjacent) 
utterances. 
• The intentional structure models the purposes (or intentions) of the participants in different 
discourse segments and in the overall discourse. 
• The attentional state is a dynamically updated record of the objects, properties, and relations 
that are salient (in focus) at any given point in the discourse. 
In interactive settings, the discourse model is referred to as the dialogue model. More 
information about dialogue modeling is provided in Section 11.3.3.2.2. 
11.1.3.2.4 Domain Model 
Sophisticated language processing presupposes a great deal of knowledge about the context, the 
participants, and the world. Some aspects of this knowledge may be derived during processing, 
but many others have to be encoded beforehand, in particular those that represent general or 
expert background knowledge about the world. The component which models the information 
that a system has about its world (or domain) is called the knowledge base or domain model. 
Domain modeling for agents is discussed in Chapter 12.1. 
11.1.3.2.5 User Model 
For machines that participate in a natural language dialogue with a human user (cf. Section 
11.3), it becomes crucial to maintain a user model, which contains explicit assumptions about 
all aspects of the user (cf. Chapter 6.1) that may help the system to understand the user better 
and to adapt its own behavior to him or her in non-trivial ways (Wahlster 1988: 102; Jameson 
2003: 305). User modeling in general and for educational purposes in particular (commonly 
referred to as student modeling) are covered in Chapter 12.2. 
                                                                                                                                                
134  Selectional restrictions constrain the range of possible fillers for the argument positions of a lexical 
item by specifying each argument in terms of semantic features (e.g. +animate, +visible, -male) 
(Handke 1995: 83; Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 614). 
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11.1.3.3 The NLU Process 
Machines approach the problem of natural language understanding by passing the input through 
a multi-stage process that draws on the linguistic and non-linguistic resources outlined in the 
previous section. While the nature and arrangement of stages varies across applications, it is 
possible to identify a number of component processes that are found in many systems. These 
processes can be integrated into a five-stage architecture for natural language understanding, 
which is shown in Figure 44. The stages of this architecture are summarized below: 
• Morphological analysis. After the necessary preprocessing steps (speech recognition (cf. 
Section 11.1.1), spelling correction, text segmentation and normalization, etc.) have been 
performed, producing a string of words for each utterance in the input, the NLU process first 
has to derive linguistic information about each word-form (word class, number, gender, 
tense, aspect, etc.) by decomposing word-forms into their component parts and/or looking up 
(parts of) word-forms in the lexicon (cf. Section 11.1.3.2.2). The most widely used 
formalization to relate the surface level of the actual word-forms (e.g. carries) to the level of 
lexical representations (e.g. CARRY+S) makes use of finite-state transition networks (FSTN)135 
(Karttunen 2003; Trost 2003: 39–44; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 26–41 + Chapter 3). 
Phonological or graphemic alternation is handled by an extension to this approach referred to 
as two-level morphology (Koskenniemi 1983; Karttunen 1983; Beesley & Karttunen 2003; 
Karttunen & Beesley 2005). 
• Syntactic analysis. The task of the syntactic analysis stage is to assign a structural 
description to each morphologically analyzed word string of the input, using the lexical and 
syntactic knowledge provided by the grammar (cf. Section 11.1.3.2.1) and the lexicon in 
efficient algorithms136 to analyze the strings. The process of recognizing an input string and 
building some kind of structure for it is commonly referred to as parsing (Jurafsky & Martin 
2000: 57);137 its output is a hierarchical, labeled structure showing the decomposition of the 
string of words into different syntactic constituents, such as noun_phrase or verb_phrase, 
which is called a parse tree (Cawsey 1998: 107 + 111). The level of detail required for the 
syntactic analysis depends on the task and the particular approach chosen, ranging from 
partial or ‘shallow’ to complete or ‘deep’ parses (Charniak 1996; Cole et al. 1997: Chapter 3; 
Carroll 2003; Coleman 2005: Chapters 8–9; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: Chapters 13–15): 
• Shallow parsing. This approach tries to extract enough information from the input to 
serve the purposes of the application, even if this means producing only a partial analysis. 
• Dependency parsing. Dependency parsing schemes derive dependency structures within 
sentences. The assumption is that in a syntactic relationship between two elements one is 
the governing, the other the dependent element. 
• Context-free parsing. Parsing with context-free grammars requires the parsing process to 
search through all possible structures generated by the rules of the grammar to find one 
                                              
135  In the literature, finite-state transition networks are also known by various other names, including 
finite-state automaton (FSA) and finite-state machine, among others. In morphological parsing, the 
term finite-state transducer (FST) is often used (Jurafsky & Martin 2008: Chapter 3). 
136  An algorithm consists of a finite, logical sequence of well-defined steps or instructions that, when 
completely executed by a human or a computer, solves a specific problem in a finite amount of time. 
137  In some approaches, the term ‘parsing’ takes a wider scope, also subsuming morphological analysis 
or semantic interpretation. Sometimes even the entire NLU process is referred to as ‘parsing.’ 
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(or several) fitting the input string (Cawsey 1998: 110), starting from the words (bottom-
up) or with the most general rule of the grammar (top-down) and using backtracking and 
look-ahead techniques138 to mitigate the effects of incorrect decisions. 
• Chart parsing. Chart parsers aim to increase the efficiency of the parsing process by 
storing intermediate results in a well-formed substring table (the chart), thus making them 
available for later reference and reducing the need for reanalysis (Charniak 1996: 9–16; 
Carroll 2003: 236). 
• Unification-based parsing. This approach represents linguistic information uniformly in 
terms of feature structures consisting of attribute-value pairs. Feature structures of larger 
units are derived by merging compatible feature structures using the unification operation 
(cf. Section 11.1.3.2.1). 
                                              
138  Backtracking is a technique that involves remembering alternative analysis paths and going back to 
try a different path after running into a dead-end. Look-ahead means that an extended context within 
the word string ahead of the current position is considered before making a decision. 
 
Figure 44. The architecture of a complete generic natural language understanding system. Adapted 
from Barros and Robin (1997). 
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• Probabilistic parsing. These parsing algorithms use probabilistic context-free grammars 
(PCFG), which augment every rule in the grammar with the probability of its application 
(estimated from a corpus of hand-parsed text called a treebank) and compute the product 
of the probabilities of the rules in a parse tree to identify the parse with the highest overall 
probability (Charniak 1997; Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 448–453). 
• Semantic analysis. The main task of semantic analysis is to provide a precise account of the 
meaning of each sentence (Handke 1995: 30) in the input in terms of a representation in a 
formal language. First, the syntactic description of the sentence is mapped into a logical 
form, which contains information from the sentence structure as well as the linguistic 
meanings of the individual words and how they relate to one another in the sentence (Allen 
1994: 14). The second stage of semantic analysis involves translating the logical form into a 
conceptual structure, which expresses the meaning of the sentence in a way that is language-
independent and allows the machine to make inferences which are not possible on purely 
linguistic-semantic grounds (Handke 1995: 30ff.). 
• Discourse analysis. This stage translates the set of conceptual sentence structures obtained 
from semantic analysis into a more comprehensive formal representation of the meaning of 
the input text or dialogue. This involves three subtasks: 
• Building a model of the unfolding discourse (cf. Section 11.3.3.2.2); 
• Resolving the referents of pronouns and other referring expressions; 
• Making bridging inferences to link explicitly mentioned discourse entities (objects, states, 
or events) via implicit entities (Smith 1991: 380ff.). 
Discourse analysis maintains three interrelated data structures: a stack of discourse segments 
that represents the linguistic structure, a stack of focus spaces for modeling the attentional 
state, and a script or plan139 to capture the intentional structure reflecting the developing 
understanding of the discourse (Grosz & Sidner 1986; Allen 1994: Chapter 16, cf. Section 
11.1.3.2.3). 
• Pragmatic analysis. The final stage of the NLU process interprets the input with respect to 
its interpersonal (or participatory) context consisting of speaker/writer and hearer/reader. 
The output of this stage is a formal structure that captures the complete meaning of the input, 
including in particular the communicative goals (or intentions) of the speaker. Interpreting 
the intention behind an utterance involves identifying the speech act (Austin 1962; Searle 
1979) performed with this utterance (e.g. request, warning, or promise). The interpretation of 
speech acts is often viewed as an application of plan recognition (cf. Section 11.3.3.2.2 and 
Chapter 12.2.1). 
11.1.3.4 Approaches to NLU 
To develop the processing steps and resources for natural language understanding outlined in 
the previous sections, many different techniques have been developed over the years, as 
documented in several comprehensive reviews and textbooks (e.g. Allen 1994; Cole et al. 1997; 
Jurafsky & Martin 2000; Mitkov 2003; Jurafsky & Martin 2008). The various techniques differ 
in the extent to which they try to solve the NLU problem (cf. Section 11.1.3.1) by mimicking 
human language processing or by adopting cognitively less plausible but computationally more 
                                              
139  Scripts and plans are discussed in Section 11.3.3.2.2, in Chapter 12.1.2.3, and in Chapter 12.2.1. 
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feasible strategies. Recent years have seen a considerable increase of interest in techniques of 
the latter kind, which take an engineering view of the NLU problem, focusing on the results 
rather than the process of natural language understanding and computing various kinds of 
statistics from large amounts of linguistic data to achieve those results, as discussed below (e.g. 
Charniak 1996; Manning & Schütze 1999; Coleman 2005). 
Allen (2001) discussed three broad classes of approaches to natural language understanding, 
which are summarized below. He noted that these categories are not mutually exclusive; in fact, 
the most comprehensive models for NLU combine techniques from all three categories to take 
advantage of their relative strengths (Allan 2001: 593): 
• Statistical approaches achieve language understanding by relying on information extracted 
from large corpora, i.e. bodies of machine-readable (annotated) linguistic data, both spoken 
and written. Typically, the information extracted from a corpus consists of statistics and is 
often processed further into rules, lexical entries, and various other forms (Charniak 2001: 
801). An important feature of statistical models is that they can be acquired (trained) 
automatically from a corpus, whereas the rules of structural frameworks have to be crafted 
by hand. Statistical NLU systems can handle a wide range of inputs, in particular incomplete 
or incorrect ones, but their analyses tend to be shallow rather than deep and may be less than 
completely accurate (p. 801). However, statistical methods have already proven effective in 
several tasks, such as speech recognition (Jelinek 1998), syntactic parsing (Charniak 1997), 
word-sense disambiguation (Charniak 1996: Chapter 10), and machine translation ([INT 
85]). 
• Structural approaches to natural language understanding are based on formal models of the 
structure of natural languages. They are concerned with the design of expressive grammar 
formalisms with good computational properties, and of efficient parsing algorithms that 
assign structural descriptions to sentences according to a grammar (cf. Section 11.1.3.3). 
Many practical systems have used semantic rather than syntactic grammars (cf. Section 
11.1.3.2.1), exploiting the fact that in their (often limited) domain, words and phrases have 
well-defined meanings. Other systems forego a complete analysis of sentence structure and 
instead attempt to match patterns of lexical, syntactic, and semantic information against 
fragments of the input. Overall, structural models can be used to produce in-depth analyses 
of natural language inputs, but deeper levels of analysis can only be achieved with hand-
crafted rules rather than with rules automatically trained from a corpus. 
• Reasoning-based approaches view the interpretation of natural language as a highly context-
dependent process. Hence, they equip computer programs with knowledge available to 
humans in different situations and use this knowledge in reasoning processes to address 
problems of contextual interpretation, including disambiguation of words and sentences, 
resolution of referring expressions, and identification of speakers’ or writers’ intentions 
underlying their contributions. Plan-based techniques play a key role in reasoning-based 
NLU systems. While knowledge-based reasoning allows the interpretation of language in 
context, the (computational) complexity and limited coverage of the models involved is a 
major shortcoming of this approach. 
11.1.3.5 State of the Art 
NLU technology has reached a level of development that allows its use in a small but growing 
number of limited practical applications. But complete understanding of unrestricted natural 
language input remains elusive even after more than half a century of intense research and 
Chapter 11: Conversation 233 
development. Success stories involve either very small domains or relatively easy tasks. Many 
programs aim to support human expertise rather than attempt to replace it with a fully automatic 
solution. Applications where techniques for natural language understanding are already useful 
include authoring aids (spelling correction, thesauri, hyphenation, grammar and style checking), 
information extraction (Cowie & Wilks 2000; Grishman 2003; Cunningham 2006; Sarawagi 
2008), information retrieval (Baeza-Yates & Ribeiro-Neto 1999; Tzoukermann et al. 2003; 
Grossman & Frieder 2004), question answering (Harabagiu & Moldovan 2003; Maybury 2004), 
text categorization and summarization (Mani 2001; Hovy 2003; Das & Martins 2007), machine 
translation (Hutchins & Somers 1992; Arnold et al. 1994; Trujillo 1999), intelligent computer-
assisted language learning (ICALL) (Nerbonne 2003), natural language database interfaces 
(Androutsopoulos & Aretoulaki 2003: 630–635), spoken dialogue systems (McTear 2004), 
chatbots (cf. Section 11.3.2), dialogue agents (cf. Section 11.3.3), and embodied conversational 
agents (cf. Section 11.3.4). 
While many early NLU programs were ‘toy systems’ with very limited coverage of natural 
language phenomena (Gazdar 1993: 164), in the early 1990s the field began to move from 
restricted experiments to large-scale, practical, and evaluable applications, shifting the 
emphasis from academics to language engineering. The most progress has been made in the 
areas of morphological and syntactic analysis, where ready-to-use techniques and software are 
now available. Furthermore, there are a number of engines for natural language interpretation 
that generate semantic analyses of sentences (e.g. Alshawi 1992). However, substantial 
problems persist at the contextual level of the NLU process (cf. Figure 44). There is yet no 
program that can interpret a discourse and the goals of its participants in a sophisticated way. 
Future research not only needs to close many remaining gaps in our scientific understanding of 
natural language but also has to address practical issues: 
• Robustness. Develop techniques that maintain good performance when faced with distorted 
or unknown input. 
• Broad coverage. Find ways to overcome the knowledge acquisition bottleneck (created by 
the need to code knowledge for natural language understanding by hand) and build large-
scale linguistic and non-linguistic resources for NLU. 
• Reference architecture. Build a generic framework for NLU systems that can serve as a 
reference for research and development. 
• Evaluation. Provide general tools and frameworks to assess the performance of NLU 
systems (Sparck Jones & Galliers 1996). 
11.1.4  Natural Language Generation 
Natural language generation (NLG) is the computer-based process of constructing outputs in 
natural language from inputs provided in some kind of non-linguistic format in order to achieve 
specified communicative goals (McDonald 1992; Reiter & Dale 1997; Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 
Chapter 20; Reiter & Dale 2000; Hovy 2001; Bateman 2002; Bateman & Zock 2003). In other 
words, the problem of natural language generation is to enable computers to express their own 
messages using appropriate linguistic means. NLG produces messages ranging in length from 
single phrases or sentences through multi-sentence paragraphs to whole documents consisting 
of multiple paragraphs. The messages originate in both interactive and non-interactive settings, 
are generated in spoken or written form in one or several languages, and may be aimed at an 
individual user or a broader target audience. 
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11.1.4.1 The NLG Problem 
Systems for natural language generation should be able to produce linguistic outputs that are 
meaningful, eloquent, and contextually appropriate. The traditional approach to the problem 
involves two major tasks: content selection (determining what to say) and content expression 
(finding a way how to say it) (Hovy 2001: 589). Both tasks are by no means trivial, given that 
natural languages have the expressive power to communicate information in many different 
ways (Cole et al. 1995). Hence, the machine has to make choices at many levels (Jurafsky & 
Martin 2000: 766), from planning the overall structure of the output down to finding an 
appropriate word or phrase to express a specific concept. The major problems involved in the 
generation of natural language output are summarized below (Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 765f.; 
Hovy 2001): 
• The nature of the input. NLG systems for different applications need to deal with a wide 
variety of input specifications (Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 765), including such diverse sources 
as numerical data, results of database queries, formal models, log files, images, charts, 
graphs, meaning representations produced by NLU (cf. Section 11.1.3), and knowledge 
bases. The format of these representations is often application-specific, but they are also 
more structured, less ambiguous, and more explicit compared to the linguistic input of 
natural language understanding systems (p. 766). 
• Content selection. The generation system must decide which of the information available to 
present in the output. Content selection involves a number of difficult tasks, such as picking 
only the relevant content items, determining the amount of detail required, uncovering and 
filling gaps in the input, and identifying material that can be inferred from the context and 
thus need not be mentioned explicitly. Presenting the right amount of relevant information to 
the user is essential. Therefore, NLG systems require at least some default assumptions 
about the previous knowledge and expectations of the addressees of their outputs, or, in 
applications involving regular or longer interactions with particular people, a dynamically 
constructed model of the individual user (cf. Section 11.3.3.2.3). 
• Lexical selection. NLG systems require the ability to make appropriate choices of words and 
phrases in a given context of generation (Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 790). Lexical selection is 
influenced by many interacting linguistic and non-linguistic factors (Stede 1996), including 
the discourse history and context, the language level, the intended stylistic effect, 
collocational and selectional restrictions,140 dialectal variation, and the beliefs, expertise, and 
views of the user (cf. Chapter 12.2.1). 
• Sentence structure. At the level of the individual sentences making up the output, the 
generation system has to make many decisions concerning the number and length of 
sentences and their sequence, the information to express in each sentence and the 
organization of the material inside a sentence, the generation of referring expressions 
(pronouns, proper names, etc.) and discourse markers (e.g. all in all, consequently, however, 
etc.), and the specification of syntactic parameters (tense, mood, sentence type, etc.) for each 
sentence (Hovy 2001: 590). 
• Discourse structure. The structure of the natural language output has to be carefully planned 
to create a coherent and fluent text or dialogue move that communicates the information in 
the intended way. NLG systems must be able to identify the discourse relations between the 
                                              
140  These are restrictions on what words are conventionally or can be meaningfully used together. 
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different pieces of information, and they have to observe the conventions for different types 
of natural language output (Schmitz 1992: 186f.). 
• Stylistic consistency. Generators with the ability to express the same thing in a variety of 
ways have to be guided through the multiple options that may be available at the different 
stages of the generation process to ensure that consistent choices of words and constructions 
are made in order for the output to have a uniform and appropriate style (Hovy 1997: 144; 
Hovy 2001: 591; Bateman & Zock 2003: 300). 
11.1.4.2 The NLG Process 
Natural language generation cannot be accomplished without substantial knowledge of different 
kinds (Reiter et al. 2003: 493), including knowledge of the application domain (content 
material, relevance of individual pieces of information, and connections between information 
units), knowledge of the target language for generation (discourse, grammar, lexicon, 
morphology, and orthography), rhetorical knowledge (communication strategies, presentation 
techniques, text types, style, etc.), engineering knowledge about how to break down, represent, 
and organize the NLG process, and finally knowledge of the target audience of users (cf. 
Chapter 12.2.1) (Bateman & Zock 2003: 285). Natural language generation has been described 
as a planning task (Hovy & Wanner 1996), a process of progressive refinement (McDonald 
1992: 984), which transforms a communicative goal and non-linguistic information into an 
output in a particular natural language. 
The modern view of the natural language generation process is a three-stage pipeline (Reiter 
& Dale 1997) consisting of discourse planning, sentence planning, and surface realization, all 
three being guided by a stylistic control module (cf. Figure 45). The components of this 
architecture are discussed below (Reiter & Dale 1997; Hovy 2001): 
• Discourse planning. This stage accepts a communicative goal and information from the host 
program141 and performs the following language-independent operations (Reiter & Dale 
1997: 9f.; Hovy 2001: 590): 
• Content selection. Choose the information to be expressed in the output, by filtering, 
summarizing, and otherwise processing the input data. 
• Discourse structuring. Create a coherent structure for the selected content by determining 
the conceptual groupings and discourse relationships among the items (p. 17). 
The output of this process is a fully specified discourse plan that reflects all the choices 
made about the content and structure of the planned communication as a whole by specifying 
the content items to be expressed and how they are grouped together and related to each 
other (Reiter & Dale 1997: 17; Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 767). 
• Sentence planning. The sentence planner converts the discourse plan into a sequence of 
sentence plans, each of which corresponds to a sentence in the output. It combines 
(aggregates) appropriate content items into phrases, clauses, and sentences, choosing from a 
set of syntactic mechanisms including conjunction, ellipsis, set formation, and embedding 
(Reiter & Dale 1997: 20f.). Furthermore, the sentence planner selects specific words and 
phrases for expressing concepts, events, and the relationships between them and for referring 
                                              
141  The host program is an external process that initiates the NLG process, e.g. a database management 
system, a machine translation engine, or the dialogue manager of a conversational agent. 
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to the entities being discussed (pp. 11f.). In addition, this stage makes various decisions 
about the structure of the output sentence, which include assigning syntactic functions 
(subject, object, etc.) to constituents, determining the clause structure, and specifying 
syntactic parameters like tense, mood, active or passive voice, etc. (Hovy 2001: 590). 
Finally, the sentence planner devises ways to convey discourse relationships to other 
sentences (e.g. by using discourse markers). 
• Surface realization. This stage transforms each sentence plan into a sequence of words 
which is syntactically, morphologically, and orthographically well-formed, as constrained by 
the lexicon, the grammar, and the set of morphological and orthographic rules of the target 
language (Reiter & Dale 1997; Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 767). In particular, it determines 
word order, function words, inflections, punctuation, upper and lower case, representation of 
numbers, and so on (Hovy 2001: 590). 
• Stylistic control. Stylistic control guides the generation process from beginning to end to 
ensure that the choices made at the individual processing levels yield a natural language 
output with a consistent style. The preferred option at each choice point in the generation 
process is determined by a pre-defined set of pragmatic parameters for the application 
specifying the degree of formality, time frame, user language level, genre, etc. of the 
communication (Hovy 2001: 591). 
 
Figure 45. The architecture of a complete generic natural language generation system. Adapted from 
Hovy (2001: 590, Figure 1). 
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11.1.4.3 Generation Techniques 
To perform the tasks of the generation process, many different techniques have been developed 
that range from the inflexible and simplistic to the extremely flexible and sophisticated, most of 
them for surface realization. However, almost all NLG systems have used at least one of the 
following basic generation techniques (Reiter & Dale 1997; Jurafsky & Martin 2000: Chapter 
20; Hovy 2001): 
• Canned text. In very simple applications, the generation system selects pre-defined strings of 
words and delivers them unchanged. Canned output may consist of single or multiple 
sentences. While simple to implement, the chief disadvantage of this method is lack of 
flexibility: because the messages are fixed, new situations or languages require the extension 
or modification of the system’s string database by a programmer (Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 
763). 
• Templates. More flexible than canned text are systems that use pre-defined structures which 
combine static and variable components (so-called templates). The variable parts of a 
template are blank spaces (slots) whose fillers are specified by the content to be expressed 
(Hovy 2001: 591). Slots can be associated with constraints on the information that may fill 
them. Furthermore, the slot-fillers may be modified by additional linguistic processing to 
achieve number agreement or inflection, for example (Reiter & Dale 1997). While lack of 
flexibility is a shortcoming that applies to templates as well (though less so than to canned 
text), templates have been successfully used for both planning and realization tasks. Chatbots 
(cf. Section 11.3.2), for example, generate their answers by filling templates with pieces of 
information which they extract from user inputs. Furthermore, it has been argued that recent 
template-based NLG systems actually perform better than the general bad reputation of these 
systems suggests (van Deemter et al. 2005). 
• Cascaded patterns. This approach starts from an abstract pattern that matches the input and 
recursively expands this pattern by replacing its components with more specific patterns, 
which are selected according to the content to be conveyed. The cascading process stops 
when the desired target elements have been reached. The resulting hierarchy is conveniently 
represented as a tree structure (Hovy 2001: 591). Cascaded patterns have applications in 
surface realization, where rules of the grammar serve as patterns for creating syntactic tree 
structures whose leaves are the words of the sentence (p. 591). In discourse planning, 
cascaded patterns are used to generate the overall structure of the natural language output 
(Reiter & Dale 1997). 
• Text schemata. Text schemata (McKeown 1985) are pre-defined patterns detailing how 
discourse plans can be built from smaller schemata or atomic units of content that are linked 
by discourse relations (e.g. contrast, elaboration, purpose, etc.) (Reiter & Dale 1997). 
Planning the structure of the discourse is then a matter of selecting and combining the 
required schemata, and of filling in the information to be presented. Text schemata are the 
simplest and most popular discourse structuring method. They have proven useful for 
producing texts in limited domains, which follow a small number of consistent structural 
patterns. While the advantage of using text schemata is in their simplicity, the fixed structure 
of the schemata makes them unsuitable for generating outputs with more varied expressions 
and less stereotypical structures (Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 782). 
More flexibility than by pre-defined text schemata is offered by approaches that make use 
of planning methods developed in the field of artificial intelligence to dynamically construct 
discourse plans by recursively decomposing some top-level communicative goal into more 
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specific subgoals, using operationalized discourse relations as plan operators (Hovy 1993; 
Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 785–788; Bateman & Zock 2003: 292–296, cf. Section 11.3.3.2.2). 
The resulting plan is both a representation of discourse structure and a plan of action for 
achieving the communicative goal (Hovy 1993: 355). The set of discourse relations provided 
by Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) (Mann & Thompson 1988) has been widely adopted in 
the NLG community (Reiter & Dale 1997). RST defines a set of 23 rhetorical relations that 
link a central segment of text (the nucleus) to a more peripheral segment (the satellite), e.g. 
ELABORATION and PURPOSE, or connect several nuclei, e.g. CONTRAST and SEQUENCE. RST 
relations combine into a hierarchy to describe the rhetorical structure of a given text 
(Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 782–785). Reiter and Dale (1997) pointed out that at present, 
scientific understanding of the different discourse relations, their precise effects, and the 
conditions of their application is fairly limited. Furthermore, planning-based approaches are 
computationally expensive and require extensive knowledge. As a result, they are not as 
popular in current practical NLG systems as text schemata (Reiter & Dale 1997). 
• Features. Feature-based systems are the currently most advanced approach to surface 
realization. Based on the simple idea that “any distinction in language can be added to the 
system as a feature” (Hovy 1997: 134), they uniformly represent the generation grammar, 
the lexicon, and the input specification as feature structures. Each sentence to be produced is 
characterized in terms of a distinct collection of features (e.g. POSITIVE, STATEMENT, PAST, 
etc.), which are eventually transformed into a sequence of words. Feature specifications, or 
functional descriptions (FDs), of sentences are built incrementally through unification (cf. 
Section 11.1.3.2.1). The resulting, fully unified FDs are then used to produce a grammatical 
string of words in each case (Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 774–778). While feature-based 
systems are built on a simple yet powerful concept, it is difficult to maintain relationships 
between features and to control their selection (a larger number of available features means 
higher input complexity) (Hovy 1997: 134). To date, feature-based techniques have been 
used only rarely for discourse or sentence planning. 
11.1.4.4 State of the Art 
Natural language generation technology enables computers to convey information to users in a 
way that is familiar and easily comprehensible to them (Reiter & Dale 1997). Current practical 
NLG systems can generate outputs of usable quality from a variety of input specifications for 
tasks such as summarization of database or spreadsheet content, production of customized 
information, explanation of expert system behavior and rules, question answering about objects 
in a knowledge base, authoring of routine letters and reports, crafting textual descriptions of 
graphical presentations of data, automatic generation of multimedia documents and 
presentations, and building interactive game characters and self-explaining virtual worlds. For 
an older survey of applied NLG systems, see Paiva (1998). Theune (2003) reviewed natural 
language generators with respect to their suitability for dialogue-based systems. 
However, current systems operate successfully only in small, well-defined domains and 
possess limited expressive capabilities, which are also often tuned to the needs of specific 
applications. The most advanced solutions exist for surface realization, on which much work in 
the field seems to have focused. But generation grammars and lexicons are still too small to be 
useful for large-scale, real-world applications. Sentence planners and discourse planners are 
even more restricted. In general, knowledge acquisition for natural language generation 
systems, whether manually by knowledge engineers or automatically using machine learning 
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techniques (cf. Chapter 12.1.1), remains a difficult challenge, with the need to ensure consistent 
quality of the knowledge acquired being the major problem to be solved (Reiter et al. 2003). 
In summary, natural language generation technology must be developed further to be useful 
in realistic domains (Hovy 1997: 144). The following issues need to be addressed by ongoing 
research: 
• Robustness. Develop techniques that enable natural language generators to operate well even 
when information is inaccurate or missing. 
• Improved output quality. Enable NLG systems to produce more fluent, natural, and varied 
output that comes closer in quality to human authoring. 
• Broad coverage. Build large-scale, well-structured linguistic and non-linguistic resources for 
NLG, including lexicons, grammars, general-purpose knowledge bases, and plan libraries 
(Hovy 1997: 144f.; Reiter et al. 2003). 
• Utterance vs. text generation. Develop generators that do not produce longer texts like most 
traditional NLG systems (Theune 2003: 3) but rather concise contributions to a spoken 
dialogue that are contextually, culturally and individually appropriate (cf. Section 11.3.3.3). 
• Reference architecture. Build an “end-to-end” model of the NLG process, which comprises a 
set of principal processing modules and data interfaces between modules and can serve as a 
reference for research and development. For a recent proposal, see the report by Mellish et 
al. (2006). 
• Evaluation. Provide general tools and frameworks to assess the performance of natural 
language generation systems. 
11.2  Multimodal Interfaces 
The problem, in my opinion, is that our current computers are both deaf and blind: they 
experience the world only by way of a keyboard and mouse. Even multimedia machines, those that 
handle audiovisual signals as well as text, simply transport strings of data. They do not 
understand the meaning behind the characters, sounds and pictures they convey. I believe 
computers must be able to see and hear what we do before they can prove truly helpful. What is 
more, they must be able to recognize who we are and, as much as another person or even a dog 
would, make sense of what we are thinking. (Pentland 1996: 54). 
While natural language is one of the most important vehicles for humans to express their 
thoughts, emotions, and intentions and to learn about those of others, communication is not 
restricted to the use of language. In fact, communication between people combines language 
with facial, gestural, and a variety of other cues to convey messages (Maybury 2002). Humans 
naturally make use of multiple channels or modalities142 (visual, auditory, tactile, gustatory, 
                                              
142  Three concepts are fundamental to an understanding of multimodal interfaces: medium, modality, 
and mode. The term medium denotes a container for information to be transmitted, presented, or 
stored ([INT 86]). Examples of media include text, video, graphics, animation, and audio. A modality 
is a communication path between a human being and a computer, which is characterized by a human 
sense (vision, audition, tactition, gustation, olfaction, etc.) for receiving output of the computer and a 
corresponding sensor or device (e.g. camera, microphone, pen, keyboard, mouse, heat or pressure 
sensors) of the computer for receiving input from the user ([INT 87]). The mode of communication is 
the means by which messages are transmitted between communication partners through a modality. 
Examples include speech, writing, facial expressions, gestures, and touch. 
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olfactory, etc.) through which information may pass between the participants in an interaction. 
The information communicated through the channels is partly complementary (completing the 
information provided by the other channels), partly redundant (providing the same information 
in a different format), or it may contribute new items to the interaction that are not conveyed by 
the other channels. The resulting increased communication bandwidth allows people to transmit 
and process more information, to use information provided by one modality to disambiguate 
inputs from other modalities (e.g. watch the interlocutor’s lip movements to identify words 
spoken against background noise or follow a deictic gesture (cf. Chapter 10.1.2) to pick out the 
referent of a pronoun), and to select the contextually most appropriate way to express certain 
information (e.g. by speaking, gesturing, or drawing). 
Multimodal user interfaces (Maybury 1993; Waibel et al. 1996; Cassell et al. 2000b; Oviatt 
& Cohen 2000; Turk 2001; Maybury 2002; Oviatt 2003; Jaimes & Sebe 2005; Pantic et al. 
2007) aim to emulate the ways in which humans make use of multiple communication channels 
(modalities) in their interactions with other people, with the goal of increasing the efficiency, 
naturalness, and robustness of exchanges between humans and machines. According to Oviatt 
(2003: 287), multimodal interfaces accept combined user actions from two or more input 
modes, using at least one recognition-based technology (e.g. speech, pen, or vision), process 
them in a coordinated way, and generate multimedia outputs to respond to the user. Depending 
on the degree of user awareness and involvement, input modes can be classified as active or 
passive (Oviatt 2003: 290).143 Active input modes capture explicit commands to a multimodal 
system that are formulated by means of intentional user actions, such as gesturing, pointing, 
drawing, writing, typing, speaking, and combinations of these. In contrast, passive input modes 
involve the multimodal system unobtrusively monitoring natural user behaviors, such as facial 
expressions, gaze, spontaneous gestures, posture, and presence, which are not intended as 
commands to the machine. Passive input modes have the advantage that they can collect 
information without disrupting the user; however, active input modes provide more reliable 
information about what the user wants to achieve (p. 290). Hybrid or blended multimodal 
interfaces combine both active and passive input modes to exploit their respective strengths 
while compensating for the weaknesses of each. On the one hand, the active input modes can 
help to clarify the user’s intention if the results of passive monitoring are ambiguous. On the 
other hand, advance information from a passive input mode (e.g. gaze) can help the system to 
predict and interpret inputs from a following active mode (e.g. speech) (Oviatt & Cohen 2000: 
51). One example of such a blended multimodal system are embodied conversational agents (cf. 
Section 11.3.4), which accept combined inputs in the auditory and visual modalities, such as 
speech (active mode) accompanied by facial expressions (passive mode). 
The outputs generated by a multimodal user interface may consist of combinations of 
images, text, speech, sound, video, and animations. In embodied conversational agent systems, 
the responses are delivered by an animated character (cf. Chapter 9) that performs both verbal 
and non-verbal behaviors, as described in Chapter 10, using its virtual body like a human being 
does in face-to-face conversations with other individuals. 
                                              
143  The distinction between active and passive input modes can also be made in terms of control versus 
awareness. Control means explicit communication of users with a multimodal system through active 
input modes, whereas awareness involves the use of passive input modes by the system to collect 
information about the user without explicit communication (Turk 2001: 45). Awareness thus adds 
context to the multimodal interface or the application (p. 45), i.e. information about the who, where, 
what, how, when, and why of the interaction with humans (Pantic et al. 2007: 52f.). 
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Figure 46 shows an abstract architecture of a multimodal user interface. Maybury (2002) 
described the input and output processing in this architecture as summarized in the following. 
User input can be obtained by means of various input devices, such as mouse, pen, keyboard, 
microphone, and equipment for tracking body, face and eye movements.144 Processors for 
speech, facial expressions, gestures, etc. then analyze the different input modes separately. The 
next step is to integrate (fuse) the information extracted from the different input modes into an 
overall meaning representation (see below). Next, an interaction manager performs tasks such 
as recognizing the user’s intention, planning the next move of the system, and maintaining 
models of the user, dialogue, context, and task. Furthermore, it interacts with one or more back-
end application systems to obtain information or carry out user commands. To produce the 
multimedia output, the system goes through the steps of generating a coherent and consistent 
response that includes the items selected for communication; synthesizing the necessary media 
elements (speech, graphics, character performances, etc.); and finally rendering the output for 
various presentation technologies, such as display screens, audio devices, and animated agents. 
All stages of input and output processing in the architecture are informed by (and build) models 
for the recognition of speech, facial displays, pen-based input, etc. and for the production of 
audio, text, character behavior, and so on, as well as elaborate models of the user, dialogue, 
context, domain, task, and application systems. 
Multimodal systems vary in the degree to which they intend to enable the machine to interact 
with people in human-like ways. One kind of multimodal interface that explicitly aims to 
“make human-computer interaction more like how people interact with each other and with the 
world” (Turk 2001: 39) are the so-called perceptual user interfaces (PUIs) (Turk & Robertson 
2000; Turk 2001). PUIs combine perceptual, multimodal, and multimedia elements to model 
the modalities, mechanisms, and competencies involved in natural human-human interaction, 
with the goal of “creating more natural and more intuitive interfaces” (Turk & Robertson 2000: 
34), freeing users from the constraints of current graphical user interfaces (GUIs) by offering 
them multiple ways to interact with machines. Perceptual interfaces leverage users’ natural 
skills in perceiving their environment, as well as their early-acquired social skills that facilitate 
their interactions with other individuals (Turk 2001: 43). 
Perceptual user interfaces require at least the ability to hear, see, and model the individual 
user and to respond to him or her with multimedia system output (including performances by 
animated characters145) that takes advantage of human perceptual capabilities (Turk 2001: 43). 
PUIs may also include further human modalities, such as sense of touch, possibly enhanced in 
comparison to people (e.g. infrared vision). Other sensory equipment of PUIs may collect data 
that is not directly accessible to human senses (e.g. data about blood pressure, muscle action 
potentials, perspiration, etc.), enabling perceptual user interfaces to more accurately recognize 
physiological indicators of different emotions, for example (cf. Chapter 13.1.1). Embodied 
conversational agents, to be discussed in Section 11.3.4, are one kind of perceptual user 
                                              
144  See Hinckley et al. (2004) for a review of various input and output devices as well as interaction 
techniques involving those devices. 
145  Given the ongoing debate about the effectiveness of anthropomorphic interfaces (cf. Chapter 9.1), 
one proponent of PUIs has been careful to point out that “[p]erceptual interfaces do not necessarily 
imply anthropomorphic interfaces” (Turk 2001: 49). However, he continued: “It is likely that, as 
computers are seen less as tools for specific tasks and more as part of our communication and 
information infrastructure, combining perceptual interfaces with anthropomorphic characteristics will 
become commonplace” (p. 49). 
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interface, which are explicitly equipped to participate in face-to-face conversations with human 
beings. 
The chief motivation for research and development of multimodal user interfaces lies in their 
potential to make interactions between humans and machines more natural, efficient, and 
robust. The specific advantages of multimodal interfaces over others that rely only on a single 
modality are summarized below (Oviatt 1999; Oviatt & Cohen 2000; Oviatt 2003: 290–293): 
• Multimodal interfaces allow the flexible selection, combination and switching of input and 
output modes, according to each user’s abilities, constraints, convenience, and preferences. 
• Multimodal interaction can adapt to different user characteristics, including age, skill level, 
cognitive style, sensory and motor impairments, native language, temporary illnesses, and 
permanent handicaps, thus increasing the accessibility of computer systems for a wider range 
of non-expert users. 
• Switching modes reduces the risk of overuse of and resulting physical damage to individual 
modes (e.g. repetitive strain injury from typing). 
• Multimodal interaction can increase efficiency in a number of applications, especially when 
manipulation of graphical information is involved. 
• Users choose multimodal over unimodal interaction for a wide variety of tasks, particularly 
in spatial domains (e.g. interaction with maps). 
• In mobile applications, users can flexibly switch to a different input or output mode when 
environmental conditions change. 
• Multimodal systems can use partial information provided by one input mode to solve 
problems resulting from ambiguous, imprecise, or incorrect input or processing errors in 
another mode. This ability to recover from unimodal recognition errors reduces the overall 
number of errors experienced by the user (Oviatt 2000). 
 
Figure 46. An abstract multimodal interface architecture. Adapted from Maybury (2002, Figure 1) and 
Oviatt (2003: 299, Figure 14.4). 
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• Multimodal interfaces allow for the selection, combination, and switching of input and 
output modes to create a synergistic blend (Oviatt 2000: 45) which takes advantage of the 
strengths of each mode and compensates for its weaknesses. Hence, multimodal interfaces 
can perform more robustly and under less favorable conditions than unimodal systems. 
While this is an impressive list of arguments in favor of designing user interfaces for 
multimodal interaction, developers considering the integration of multiple modalities into their 
applications should be aware of a number of common misconceptions, or myths, about 
multimodal interaction. Table 15 lists ten myths of multimodal interaction (compiled by Oviatt 
1999), contrary empirical evidence (the reality), and implications for the design of multimodal 
systems. In general, while research has identified a number of recurring multimodal interaction 
patterns (e.g. gesture precedes speech), when and how a particular user chooses to interact 
unimodally and multimodally depends on the task to be accomplished and his or her preferred 
interaction style (Buisine & Martin 2005). 
One major challenge in multimodal interface development concerns the integration and 
coordination of multiple input and output modalities during the interaction. On the input side, 
incoming information from several input channels has to be integrated and synchronized to 
compute a representation that shows how the meanings contributed by each of the input modes 
combine into the user’s intended message. The integration (or fusion) of modes can happen at 
an early or at a later point during input processing (Stork 1997b: 252f.). Early integration (or 
early fusion) means that the input data from the different modes are fused following minimal 
processing (or none at all). By contrast, in late integration, each input mode is processed 
separately in some depth first, and the resulting partial meaning representations are combined 
into a final interpretation (p. 253). Hence, late integration fuses information extracted from 
parallel input modes at a higher, semantic level, whereas early integration fuses low-level 
feature information (p. 252; Oviatt 2003: 298). Early feature fusion is typically used in systems 
that deal with closely synchronized input modes, such as speech and lip movements, whereas 
late semantic-level fusion processes the complementary information provided by less 
temporally coupled input modes like combined speech and gesture (Oviatt 2003: 298). 
Semantic fusion relies on a framework for creating (partial) meaning representations that is 
shared among the modalities and on an operation for fusing semantic information from different 
input modes. One approach, frame-based integration, recursively combines attribute-value 
structures (‘frames’) into a final meaning representation. Another applies the unification 
operation (cf. Section 11.1.3.2.1 and Section 11.1.4.3) to typed feature structures specifying the 
contribution of each input mode to the meaning of the multimodal input (Oviatt et al. 2000: 
278f.). 
Synchronization is required to accommodate patterns of temporal (co-) occurrence of input 
events from different modes. As Table 15 indicates, the common assumption that input signals 
will happen simultaneously is not supported by the reality of multimodal interaction. In fact, 
multimodal input often shows no temporal overlap between the modes (Oviatt 2003: 295). For 
example, pen-based and spoken input were found to occur sequentially about half of the time in 
a multimodal interface, with speech input typically lagging 1–2 seconds behind pen-based input 
(Oviatt et al. 1997). Even speech and lip movements lack perfect temporal synchrony, the latter 
preceding the former by the fraction of a second (Abry et al. 1996; Benoît 2000). 
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Table 15. Multimodal interaction: myths, empirical reality, and implications for the design of 
multimodal systems. Adapted from Oviatt (1999). 
Myths Reality Implications 
If you build a multimodal 
system, users will interact 
multimodally. 
Users communicate naturally by 
combining unimodal and 
multimodal expressions. 
Multimodal systems have to 
distinguish between users’ unimodal 
and multimodal communication. 
Speech and pointing is the 
dominant multimodal 
integration pattern. 
Only a minority of multimodal 
interactions involve a speak-and-
point integration pattern. 
Other input modes and their 
integration patterns have to be 
considered. 
Multimodal input involves 
simultaneous signals. 
While two input modes may be 
highly interdependent and 
synchronized, they often do not 
occur together in time. 
Developers should not rely on a 
convenient overlapping of input 
signals. 
Speech is the primary input 
mode in any multimodal 
system that includes it. 
Important information is also 
communicated by modes other 
than speech, and speech typically 
does not occur before other input 
modes. 
The contributions of other input 
modes should not be neglected. 
Multimodal language does 
not differ linguistically from 
unimodal language. 
Multimodal language is different 
from unimodal language. In many 
respects, it is much simpler. 
Processing multimodal language 
may be less difficult than processing 
language alone. 
Multimodal integration 
involves redundancy of 
content between modes. 
Multimodal inputs contain much 
more complementary than 
redundant information. 
Processing of multimodal input 
should not assume that different 
input modes will provide the same 
information. 
Individual error-prone 
recognition technologies 
combine multimodally to 
produce even greater 
unreliability. 
Recognition can be more robust 
because (a) users select input 
modes to avoid or resolve errors; 
and (b) the synergistic blend of 
input modes facilitates mutual 
disambiguation. 
Multimodal interfaces can perform 
better than other kinds of interfaces 
because of their superior error-
handling capabilities resulting from 
the selectability and synergy of input 
modes. 
All users’ multimodal 
commands are integrated in a 
uniform way. 
Users may differ considerably  
with respect to their preferred 
multimodal integration patterns. 
Multimodal systems should be able 
to identify the prominent integration 
pattern of each user and adapt to it. 
Different input modes are 
capable of transmitting 
comparable content. 
Input modes differ with respect to 
the type of information that can be 
conveyed through them, the way 
they function in communication, 
their integration with other modes, 
and their suitability for different 
types of interfaces. 
Developers have to consider the 
capabilities and limitations of each 
input mode in a multimodal system. 
Enhanced efficiency is the 
main advantage of 
multimodal systems. 
Multimodal systems have many 
other performance advantages, 
including reduced error rates 
during multimodal interaction, 
user preference, flexibility of 
mode selection and alternation, 
improved error avoidance and 
recovery, and better accessibility. 
Efficiency is only one advantage of 
multimodal interfaces among many 
others and may not be the most 
important one for the application 
being designed. 
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For the generation of multimedia output, it is necessary to decide what media to use, what 
information to express in each medium, and how to combine the media into a coherent 
multimedia response that is contextually appropriate and tailored to the user’s abilities, 
preferences, and task (Maybury 1995: 109–117). If the multimodal interface involves an 
embodied character, all the aspects related to the embodiment and behavior of animated agents 
that were discussed in the previous two chapters have to be considered. 
Multimodal interfaces involve various component technologies which are in constant need of 
further development and innovation. In addition to the human language technologies reviewed 
in the previous section, multimodal interfaces require technologies for processing non-linguistic 
modes of communication. A number of technologies based on computer vision (Forsyth & 
Ponce 2003) which are relevant for perceptual user interfaces and embodied conversational 
agents (cf. Section 11.3.4) are described below: 
• Face detection is the problem of identifying all regions in a digital image that contain a 
human face, regardless of clutter, occlusions, variations in head pose and lighting conditions, 
facial movements, and different sizes, colors, and textures of faces (Pantic et al. 2007: 54). 
The majority of the face detection techniques developed so far is based on statistical learning 
and makes use of appearance features (p. 54), like for example the popular real-time 
detection algorithm developed by Viola and Jones (2001). The most severe restriction of 
current face detection techniques is that they work reliably only for (near-) upright faces in 
(near-) frontal view (Pantic et al. 2007: 54). 
• Tracking involves finding and following the changing location of one or several moving 
objects, in particular the face, head, hands, or body, within a video sequence captured by a 
camera. Image features such as points, lines, or blobs are used in an analysis of the video 
frames to determine the location of a moving target object within each frame of the 
sequence. Locating the image of a target object in successive frames is quite difficult, in 
particular for objects that move fast with respect to the frame rate of the video ([INT 88]). 
Problems arising from occlusion, clutter, and changes in lighting conditions also need to be 
addressed (Pantic et al. 2007: 54). Different tracking methods include model-based tracking, 
which represents the geometric structure of the human body as a stick figure (i.e. line 
segments connected by joints), 2D contour (ribbon or blob), or volumetric model (consisting 
of e.g. cylinders, cones, spheres, etc.); region-based tracking, which identifies connected 
regions in an image that correspond to moving objects and tracks these regions over time by 
computing their cross-correlation; active contour-based tracking, which extracts a 
representation of the bounding contour (shape) of an object and dynamically updates this 
representation over time; and feature-based tracking, which, rather than tracking objects as a 
whole, extracts and matches features of an object, such as distinctive points, lines, or blobs 
(see Wang et al. (2003) for a detailed discussion of these methods). Surveys of vision-based 
techniques for human motion analysis have been contributed by Gavrila (1999) and Wang et 
al. (2003), among others. 
• Eye tracking measures eye positions and eye movements to estimate (changes in) gaze 
direction ([INT 89]). Infrared-based systems exploit the red-eye effect that occurs because 
the cornea and the pupil reflect incident infrared light differently. In contrast, appearance-
based systems apply computer vision techniques to the task of first locating the eyes and 
then determining the orientation of the irises (Jaimes & Sebe 2005; Pantic et al. 2007: 55). 
Jaimes and Sebe (2005) pointed out that the advantage of infrared-based eye tracking 
systems over appearance-based trackers is the greater accuracy of the former; however, 
infrared-based systems may be dangerous for the user’s health due to the necessary 
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prolonged exposure to infrared radiation. Both wearable and non-wearable eye tracking 
systems have been constructed. The former are more accurate (because head position and 
direction become available as additional information) but also more intrusive, whereas the 
latter typically have to be calibrated for each user, which is often a complicated procedure 
(Jaimes & Sebe 2005). 
• Lip reading or speech reading is the process of observing the visible articulatory movements 
of a speaker to recognize the words he or she is forming. Recognition may be based on the 
visual signal alone, or the visual speech information may be used together with the acoustic 
speech signal, which may be degraded (e.g. in noisy rooms or due to hearing impairment). In 
computer-based applications, automatic speech reading obtains information about the visual 
component of the spoken input to improve146 the performance of automatic speech 
recognition (cf. Section 11.1.1) in combined audio-visual automatic speech recognition 
(AV-ASR) systems (Potamianos et al. 2003; Potamianos et al. 2009). AV-ASR systems use a 
visual front-end to extract visual cues of the auditory speech from a video showing the 
speaker’s face (Potamianos et al. 2003: 1307). Three main types of visual speech features 
have been used in AV-ASR systems (Potamianos et al. 2009). Appearance-based features 
are extracted by analyzing the video pixels in a certain region of interest (ROI), typically the 
part of the facial image that contains the speaker’s mouth region or larger portions of the 
lower face (Potamianos et al. 2003: 1308f.). The view of shape-based feature extraction is 
that the contours (shape) of the speaker’s lips, alone or in combination with facial contours 
(e.g. of the jaw and cheeks), provide the most relevant information about the visual 
articulation of speech. This approach has used geometric features, such as mouth height, 
width, and area, or various parametric models for lip- and face-shape tracking, like the 
statistical active shape model (ASM) (p. 1308). The third approach involves combining 
appearance- and shape-based features into a joint feature vector that represents both low-
level (appearance) and high-level information (shape) about face and lip movements 
(Potamianos et al. 2009). In general, visual feature extraction requires techniques for 
locating and tracking the speaker’s face, lips, or lower face region that are robust to 
variations in speakers, pose, lighting, and environment, which still presents considerable 
problems (Potamianos et al. 2003: 1322). Audio-visual fusion, i.e. the integration of the 
information obtained from the auditory and the visual speech input streams, poses further 
challenges for research (p. 1307). Current information fusion algorithms can be categorized 
into feature fusion methods, which use a single classifier trained on the combined vector of 
auditory and visual features; decision fusion methods, which recognize audio-visual speech 
by bringing together the outputs of two modality-specific classifiers for auditory and visual 
information, respectively; and, finally, hybrid fusion methods, which combine characteristics 
of both feature and decision fusion (p. 1311ff.). 
• Facial expression analysis (Lisetti & Schiano 2000; Pantic & Rothkrantz 2000; Bartlett et al. 
2005; Tian et al. 2005; Cohn & Kanade 2007; Pantic & Bartlett 2007) has largely been based 
on Ekman and Friesen’s Facial Action Coding System (FACS), which defines a set of atomic 
facial muscular actions called action units (AUs) that can be combined to describe different 
facial expressions (Pantic & Bartlett 2007: 379–383, cf. Chapter 13.4.2). Facial expressions 
are assigned to different pre-defined categories (often the basic emotions, cf. Chapter 7.15.7 
                                              
146  The visual input channel provides support for speaker localization; supplementary information about 
speech segments; and complementary information about place of articulation for disambiguation 
(Potamianos et al. 2003: 1306). 
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and Chapter 10.1.3), depending on the AUs detected in the facial image (Jaimes & Sebe 
2005). A number of prototype systems can already recognize a subset of the AUs defined in 
the FACS from either (near-) frontal views or profile views of a face in an image (sequence) 
(Pantic et al. 2007: 56). Some approaches are based on detecting and tracking geometric 
features like facial points or shapes of facial components (e.g. the mouth, the eyes, and the 
eyebrows). Others are appearance-based, i.e. they apply image filters either to the whole face 
or to specific regions of the face in order to extract a vector of features corresponding to 
facial appearance changes that are manifested in the skin texture of the face (e.g. wrinkles, 
bulges, and furrows) (Tian et al. 2005; Pantic et al. 2007: 56). Still other approaches have 
used both geometric and appearance-based features, sometimes with better results. Schemes 
for the classification of facial expressions are static (e.g. Bayesian networks) or dynamic 
(e.g. hidden Markov models). Static classifiers analyze the information of a single video 
frame to make a classification, whereas dynamic classifiers consider several video frames, 
analyzing the temporal patterns of specific facial regions or features. It is easier to train static 
classifiers, but they also perform less reliably when applied to continuous video sequences. 
Dynamic classifiers are sensitive to variations in the portrayal of facial expressions across 
individuals and thus more suitable for person-dependent applications (Jaimes & Sebe 2005). 
A major shortcoming of current approaches is that they are more suitable for analyzing 
elicited, slightly exaggerated expressions of the face under laboratory conditions than for 
naturally occurring, more subtle facial displays in real-world situations. In response, research 
has begun on the automatic recognition of AUs in spontaneous facial expressions (Pantic et 
al. 2007: 56). Furthermore, current techniques commonly assume fairly constrained input 
conditions and are not robust against variations in face orientation, occlusions, presence of 
other people, and dynamic backgrounds (Pantic & Bartlett 2007: 408). 
• Gesture recognition is the process of analyzing human gestures, i.e. volitional or non-
volitional movements of different parts of the body that serve a range of communicative 
functions (cf. Chapter 10.1.2). Gesture recognition requires a mathematical model of the 
spatial and temporal characteristics of body parts and their movements, techniques for 
computing the model parameters (representing pose, trajectory, etc.) from the gestural input, 
and procedures for the classification and interpretation of the gestures portrayed based on the 
computed model parameters (Jaimes & Sebe 2005). Most gesture recognition techniques fall 
into one of four categories. Model-based approaches build representations of the head, torso, 
limbs, and fingers from a set of primitive geometric forms including cones, spheres, and 
cylinders. Appearance-based methods track the body and parts of the body using acquired 
information about color or texture (Pantic et al. 2007: 57). Models using spatio-temporal 
salient points are based on the idea that the content of a scene can be described by acquiring 
and tracking the rich information in the areas around certain points of interest (e.g. corners 
and edges) across space and time (Oikonomopoulos et al. 2006). Finally, models based on 
spatio-temporal shapes treat human actions in video sequences as generating shapes in space 
and time that provide information about the location, orientation, and deformation of the 
body and its parts at any point in time, as well as dynamic information about bodily 
movements (Blank et al. 2005). As a whole, the field of human action recognition is still at 
an early stage. Unconstrained detection and tracking of the hands and the body is not feasible 
at this point (Pantic et al. 2007: 57), and existing techniques are usually not computationally 
efficient and highly accurate at the same time (Wang et al. 2003). For a review of vision-
based gesture recognition techniques, see the paper by Wu and Huang (1999). 
Since Bolt’s classic “Put that there” system, which accepted combined inputs consisting of 
speech and touch-pad pointing gestures (Bolt 1980), more general, more robust, and more 
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natural multimodal interfaces have emerged, in particular in the period since the early 1990s, 
which has seen considerable progress in the hardware, component technologies, and fusion 
techniques required for multimodal systems (Oviatt 2003: 287). The majority of multimodal 
user interfaces that have been developed so far are bimodal systems which are capable of 
processing two parallel input modes, using one or two recognition-based technologies (p. 288). 
The current state of bimodal interfaces is represented by systems that process either speech and 
pen-based input (Oviatt & Cohen 2000) or speech and lip movements (Potamianos et al. 2009) 
in a coordinated fashion (Oviatt 2003: 288). Researchers have also begun to explore the use of 
vision-based tracking and interpretation of the user’s gaze, head position, body location and 
posture, facial expressions, and manual gestures in multimodal interfaces, which enables 
monitoring from the background without disturbing the user (Oviatt et al. 2000: 303). However, 
other sensory modalities besides audition and vision, such as the olfactory and tactile channels, 
remain largely underexplored in current multimodal systems (Sarter 2006: 441), as are 
combinations of three or more qualitatively different input modes (Oviatt 2003: 290). In 
addition, many open research questions remain with respect to both the processing of the 
individual input modes and their integration. According to a recent article (Reeves et al. 2004), 
the design of future multimodal interfaces should: 
• Accommodate as many and diverse users (cf. Chapter 6.1) and contexts of use (cf. Chapter 
6.2) as possible; 
• Ensure user privacy and security in the interaction; 
• Make the most of each user’s cognitive and physical abilities; 
• Integrate modalities according to the user’s preferences, the context of use, and the desired 
functionality of the system; 
• Minimize user errors and provide effective error handling. 
Future multimodal user interfaces will benefit from insights contributed by cognitive science 
on intersensory perception and intermodal coordination in humans (Oviatt 2003: 293). Another 
challenge concerns the development of multimodal interfaces with the ability to adapt to the 
current user, task, dialogue, environmental context, and input modes being used (p. 300). 
Adaptiveness involves the capacity for flexible incorporation and reconfiguration as additional 
sources of information become available or adverse input conditions or performance failures 
occur. 
11.3  Conversational Agents 
Conversational agents were introduced in Chapter 3.2.1 as software agents with the ability to 
both interpret and respond with spoken or written natural language messages in a contextually 
and socioculturally appropriate manner in the course of a dialogue with human users, drawing 
on the human language technologies for speech recognition and synthesis and natural language 
understanding and generation reviewed in the previous sections. Dialogues with conversational 
agents are social and/or task-oriented in nature and may integrate other input and output modes 
besides natural language (cf. Section 11.2), in particular embodied communicative actions (cf. 
Chapter 10.1) that are interpreted and performed both by the agent and the user. The first 
(comparatively primitive) instances of these social agents (De Angeli et al. 2001b), so-called 
chatbots, are the topic of Section 11.3.2. While chatbots are already widely available in web 
sites and other applications, most of the more advanced conversational agents and embodied 
conversational agents still have prototype status. These agents are discussed in Section 11.3.3 
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and Section 11.3.4, respectively. Section 11.3.1 below summarizes a number of fundamental 
principles that govern conversations between humans and between humans and agents. 
11.3.1  Principles of Conversation 
Conversation is a highly contextualized, goal-directed, and cooperative form of linguistic 
interaction (Levelt 1995: 29f.) involving the coordinated use of language and paralinguistic 
(non-verbal) cues (facial expressions, gestures, gaze, posture, and locomotion, cf. Chapter 
10.1). There are a number of rules and principles that regulate conversations and allow them to 
be conducted properly (p. 30). First, for the most part, the participants in a conversation do not 
speak at the same time but adhere to rules of turn-taking (cf. Figure 47). A turn is a unit within 
an ongoing conversation that can be attributed to one of its participants and follows and/or is 
followed by a turn uttered by another participant. Speakers are said to “take turns” during 
conversation, governed by specific turn-assignment rules which ensure that every participant 
can contribute to the exchange, that at most one speaker contributes at a time, and that starting, 
maintaining, and withdrawing from a conversation is performed in an orderly fashion (pp. 31f.). 
The parties in a conversation normally observe these principles of conduct (p. 37), but there are 
also often instances where turns overlap, one speaker dominates the exchange, communication 
breaks down, and so on. 
During conversations, interlocutors commonly make reference to (“point at”) people, places, 
points or periods of time, and elements of the discourse, from their own perspective and relative 
to the current context, by means of deixis, which, in face-to-face conversations, involves the use 
of natural and unambiguous combinations of speech, gestures, and locomotion (Lester et al. 
1999b). Four types of deixis are commonly distinguished (Levinson 1983: 62f.; Levelt 1995: 
44–58; Cruse 2000: 319–324): 
• Person deixis. Realized in language by personal pronouns, this type of deixis enables the 
speaker to refer to himself or herself (the first person), the addressee(s) (the second person), 
and other individuals and objects (the third person) that are neither speaker nor addressee. 
• Place deixis. Speakers use expressions that locate people and objects in space relative to the 
parties in the conversation, in order to identify those entities through their location, inform 
addressees about their whereabouts, or acknowledge the location of an entity. 
• Time deixis. Deictic reference to time locates points and spans on the time axis relative to the 
time of speaking. Speakers may refer to times before, at, or after the time of their utterance. 
• Discourse deixis. Utterances in an ongoing conversation may include deictic expressions that 
relate them to elements of the previous, current or future discourse, which facilitates hearers’ 
orientation within the exchange. 
Conversations are generally characterized by a tacit mutual assumption of cooperativeness 
among their participants. In other words, the parties in a conversation usually expect that the 
contributions of other interlocutors will pertain to their own utterances and to the overall goal of 
the exchange (Cruse 2000: 355). All contributions are implicitly assumed to be governed by a 
cooperative principle, which has been formulated as follows: 
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. (Grice 1975: 45). 
What it means to be ‘cooperative’ in conversation according to this general principle is 
spelled out by four more specific subprinciples, the so-called conversational maxims, which 
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cooperative speakers follow in designing their contributions (Grice 1975; Levinson 1983: 101f.; 
Cruse 2000: 355ff.): 
• The maxim of quantity. Be sufficiently informative. Do not provide more or less information 
than is required. 
• The maxim of quality. Be truthful. Do not make knowingly false or unsupported statements. 
• The maxim of relation. Be relevant. Do not say things that are unrelated to the current 
conversation. 
• The maxim of manner. Be perspicuous. Avoid obscurity and ambiguity (in context). Be brief 
(not wordy) and orderly (i.e. relate events in the order of their occurrence). 
These maxims are not strict rules in the sense of rules of grammar (cf. Section 11.1.3.2.1). 
They are better thought of as flexible guidelines (Cruse 2000: 357), which may be violated or 
flouted by speakers. When speakers violate maxims, the lies, omissions, ambiguity, irrelevance, 
or obscurity in their utterances will not be obvious to hearers. As a result, communication might 
be impaired. In contrast, a hearer will notice when a speaker flouts, i.e. deliberately and openly 
departs from, one or several maxims in his or her utterance to achieve a certain communicative 
effect (Peccei 1999: 27f.; Cruse 2000: 360). Based on the assumption that the speaker adheres 
to the cooperative principle, the hearer will try to infer what the speaker attempts to 
communicate beyond the semantic content of his or her contribution. The resulting inferences, 
which allow the hearer to relate the speaker’s utterance to the ongoing conversation in a 
meaningful way, are referred to as conversational implicatures. For example, if a lecturer asks a 
college student “Why didn’t you do your homework?” and the student replies “There was a 
party in our dorm,” the student flouts the maxim of relation. However, the lecturer can still 
 
Figure 47. A model of turn-taking. Adapted from ([INT 90]). 
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relate the response to his or her question on the basis of the implicature that participating in the 
party (and getting drunk) kept the student from doing his or her homework. 
While the cooperative principle offers an explanation of how implicatures arise, it fails to 
account for why people commonly choose to convey what they mean in an indirect way, in 
other words, why speakers are normally polite (Cruse 2000: 361). Politeness is instrumental in 
staying on good terms with others, even when it is necessary to communicate things that may 
be unpleasant for the hearer (p. 362). In particular, politeness plays an important role in helping 
to preserve the hearer’s public self-image (his or her social ‘face’) (Goffman 1955; Goffman 
1967, cf. Chapter 7.14). The notion of face refers to the mask created and maintained by people 
to present themselves to others in social situations. People wear different masks for different 
audiences and social interactions (Goffman 1967). Face can be subdivided into two categories: 
positive face is the desire to have the appreciation, approval, and respect of others, whereas 
negative face is the want for autonomy, i.e. for freedom from imposition or impediment from 
others (Goffman 1967; Brown & Levinson 1987). In conversation, certain communicative acts, 
such as criticism, suggestions, and requests, can threaten the positive and/or negative face of the 
other party, although they may be necessary to achieve the speaker’s communicative goals 
(Mayer et al. 2006: 36; Wang et al. 2008: 99). Acts of a speaker that may pose a threat to the 
addressee’s face are called face-threatening acts (FTAs). For example, criticism may threaten a 
person’s positive face because it suggests that the speaker does not appreciate or approve of the 
addressee. Threats to negative face can occur when, for example, advice is perceived as 
impeding the addressee’s freedom to decide for himself or herself (Mayer et al. 2006: 36f.). In 
Brown and Levinson’s theory of politeness (Brown & Levinson 1987), model speakers modify 
their language to design messages that attempt to maintain the face of others while achieving 
the speaker’s goals at the same time. Politeness thus signals that the speaker intends to reduce 
threats to the hearer’s face posed by particular face threatening acts (Mills 2003: 6). Brown and 
Levinson (1987) described four politeness strategies for handling potential face threats in 
conversation: 
• Bald on record. Make no attempt to mitigate threats to the addressee’s face. Use direct 
language; do not hedge opinions, minimize imposition, or attempt to avoid disagreement. 
• Positive politeness. Minimize threats to positive face by respecting the addressee’s want for 
the appreciation and understanding of others. Strengthen the effect of commands, offers, 
requests, etc. that involve a benefit to the hearer by making them more direct or less optional 
(Cruse 2000: 363f.). 
• Negative politeness. Minimize threats to negative face by honoring the addressee’s wish to 
maintain his or her autonomy. Weaken the effect of commands, offers, requests, etc. that 
involve a cost to the hearer, by making them more indirect or optional (Cruse 2000: 363f.). 
• Off-record (indirect) strategies. Do not impose directly on the addressee. Use indirect 
language (e.g. hints, vague statements, sarcasm, etc.) to insinuate your intent without directly 
stating it. 
The politeness principle requires speakers to phrase their utterances in a way that minimizes 
the expression of impolite beliefs (Leech 1983: 81), i.e. disparages the hearer’s status as little as 
possible (Cruse 2000: 362). If possible, they should avoid bossing, slander, Schadenfreude, 
disagreement, and self-praise when they talk to the hearer (p. 362). 
In the absence of cues to the contrary, the participants in a conversation implicitly assume 
mutual cooperativeness and politeness by default. In other words, the general tacit agreement 
between conversation partners is that they will make an effort to understand each other and to 
avoid hurting each other’s feelings (Nass & Brave 2005: 182). This effort involves speaking 
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intelligibly, being an attentive and sensitive listener, adhering to the mechanisms of turn-taking, 
and respecting both the cooperative and the politeness principle when formulating responses to 
the contributions, thoughts, and feelings of the other participants (p. 182). But communication 
can still fail at some point during a conversation. In this case, cooperation either may come to 
an end or it can be revived by a joint effort of the participants who hold on to the mutual 
assumption that the other’s contribution was cooperative (p. 182). 
The conversation principles discussed in the previous paragraphs have often been neglected 
in the design of dialogues involving the computer as an interaction partner because knowledge 
of proper conduct in conversations is tacit rather than explicit and thus tends to escape the 
attention of conversational (in particular voice) interface designers (Nass & Brave 2005: 179). 
Hence, it is not surprising that the resulting interfaces, while using language, are not perceived 
as overly conversational and often leave the user frustrated and the dialogue unfinished 
(p. 179). Nass and Brave discussed three conversational maxims that many current voice 
interfaces fail to observe: quantity, relation, and manner (pp. 179–182). Unnecessarily verbose 
or insufficiently detailed prompts as well as overly general questions (e.g. “How can I help 
you?”147) are examples of violations of the maxim of quantity. Voice interfaces depart from the 
maxim of relation when they ask for information (e.g. about the user’s credit card) before the 
user deems it relevant for advancing the conversation. Finally, they become hard to understand 
(thus violating the maxim of manner) when they assume too little or too much background 
knowledge of users and the complexity of their messages is therefore not appropriate for the 
current user. 
Viewing human-agent dialogues as respectful cooperation and designing conversational 
agents accordingly to make meaningful use of turn-taking, deictic behaviors, and cooperative 
and polite language can facilitate the process of achieving mutual understanding in interactions 
between agents and users. Humans have a preference for cooperativeness and politeness in their 
interlocutors, and they are likely to look for these qualities in conversational agents as well. 
11.3.2  Chatbots 
The first generation of conversational agents is beginning to spread throughout the World Wide 
Web as chatbots,148 software systems that simulate conversation, or chat, with human visitors in 
chat rooms or on web sites (De Angeli 2005). Chatbots are designed to imitate human 
conversational behavior as closely as possible, often in order to induce the belief in users that 
they are talking to another human being and in this way to pass the Turing Test. This is an 
empirical test proposed by the British mathematician Alan Turing (1912–1954), in which a 
machine’s ability to think is assessed based on its use of language (Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 7). 
The test is an imitation game with three players, two of which are human while the third is a 
computer. One of the two people and the computer are hidden from the view of the second 
                                              
147  Unless a conversational interface can handle unrestricted user input (which is beyond the capabilities 
of any system currently available), this question does not provide enough information for users to 
understand what inputs the interface can handle. Nass and Brave suggested using a more specific 
question which makes the options (exemplified by A, B, and C) available to the user explicit: “Do 
you need help with A, B, or C?” (Nass & Brave 2005: 181). 
148  The term ‘chatbot’ is a shortened form of “chat robot.” Alternative labels for these conversational 
programs include ‘chatterbot’ or just ‘bot.’ The term ‘chatterbot’ first appeared in a 1994 conference 
paper by Michael Mauldin (Mauldin 1994). 
Chapter 11: Conversation 253 
human who interrogates them via a teletype149 to determine from their written replies which one 
is the computer. The goal of the machine is to make the interrogator think that it is the human 
by answering his or her questions like a real person would (to the best of its abilities), whereas 
the hidden human being attempts to convince the questioner that he or she is human and that the 
other player is the machine (p. 7). While the Turing Test as an empirical method to assess 
machine intelligence was proposed already in 1950 (Turing 1950), it still inspires debate and 
experiment (Copeland 2000; Saygin et al. 2000) more than fifty years later. Turing himself 
expressed confidence that machines would be able to think one day (Turing 1950). 
Based on the absence or presence of deception in the interaction between a user and a 
chatbot and the user’s (un-) awareness of it, De Angeli (2005) proposed a taxonomy of chatbots 
that is shown in Table 16. Explicit chatbots make no pretence of their status as artificial entities, 
portraying themselves in a way that helps the user to understand that he or she is talking to a 
machine, which may include explicit instructions for conversation. These bots do not try to 
deceive but rather cooperate with the user in building a virtual persona. In contrast, deceptive 
chatbots are designed to fool unaware users into accepting them as humans. A famous example 
from the early 1990s is Julia (Foner 1993; Mauldin 1994; Turkle 1995: Chapter 3; Murray 
1998: Chapter 8), a chatbot that lives on MUDs,150 chats with users, answers questions about the 
MUD (and other topics), plays the card game Hearts, keeps track of other users, relays 
messages, remembers things, sings songs, and gossips (Murray 1998: 215f.). As a female 
impersonator, Julia was a success. It has been reported that one user even tried to seduce the bot 
into a sexual relationship (pp. 216f.). Finally, competitive chatbots make the explicit claim to be 
human and invite their human interaction partners to prove them liars, usually in the context of 
some online community or competition dedicated to the purpose, such as the Loebner Prize 
([INT 91]), an annual contest since 1990 in which several candidates compete for the title of 
“most human-like chatbot” in a Turing Test setup. When talking to a competitive chatbot, the 
user is aware that his or her conversation partner is a computer program which will do its best 
to substantiate the claim that it is human. The user’s task is to trick the chatbot into betraying 
itself by eliciting a response during the conversation showing that the bot is not human as it 
claims to be. 
De Angeli pointed out that there are no fixed boundaries between these categories. The same 
chatbot may embody different types in different contexts of interaction. It often happens that 
signals from chatbots are inconsistent (cf. Chapter 7.5). At times, they may pretend to be human 
and at others to be an artificial creature, or they may show a photorealistic human embodiment 
(cf. Chapter 9.5) while telling the user that they are machines. The user’s awareness of the 
status of a chatbot can also shift during an interaction (usually because he or she realizes the 
bot’s deception) (De Angeli 2005). 
One of the oldest and best-known chatbots is ELIZA (Weizenbaum 1966), which showed 
quite impressively how a computer program can be designed to be perceived as understanding 
while in fact it does not understand at all. Playing the role of a Rogerian psychotherapist, in 
                                              
149  A teletype is a typewriter-like device for sending and receiving typed text messages through an 
electric communication channel. Teletypes, or teleprinters, as they are also called, were widely used 
for the larger part of the 20th century but are nowadays obsolete ([INT 92]). 
150  A MUD (multi-user domain/dungeon/dimension) is a multiplayer networked computer game 
environment created and maintained through textual descriptions of rooms, objects, events, player 
and non-player characters as well as the interaction of distributed players with each other and their 
surroundings using text messages and commands sent over the network (usually the Internet) (Bartle 
1990; Bartle 2003; [INT 93]). 
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conversations with the user, ELIZA applied pattern matching techniques to produce responses 
that often involved the transformation of an input statement into a question to which the user 
responded with another statement, thus restarting the cycle.151 Most current chatbots ([INT 94]; 
[INT 95]; [INT 96]) are essentially only slightly improved variants of ELIZA’s original 
approach (De Angeli et al. 2001a). 
Figure 48 shows the architecture of a chatbot. While the underlying algorithms of chatbots 
vary in complexity (De Angeli 2005), most bot programs associate a stimulus (i.e. a user input) 
with a response (i.e. a pre-scripted statement, or template, which may have both variable and 
functional parts) (e.g. Wallace 2008). Stimuli typically consist of words and sentences typed by 
the user; responses are delivered as text ([INT 97]). 
After an initial stage performing spelling correction, input normalization, and other pre-
processing operations, an efficient search algorithm is used to compare the pre-processed input 
against a database of response categories (hierarchically nested pattern-template (i.e. question-
answer) pairs) (Wallace 2008: 193f.) in order to find a matching pattern (a keyword, phrase, or 
whole sentence) ([INT 97]). The template associated with the found pattern is returned as the 
chatbot’s response, possibly after filling in missing information with values from a model of the 
user (e.g. the user’s name), or updating the user model with information derived from the input 
(e.g. sex, age, favorite color, etc.). More sophisticated chatbots have the ability to enhance their 
response capabilities by automatically detecting new input patterns in log files of user-bot 
conversations and having a human developer author appropriate response templates (Wallace 
2008: 182). Schumaker et al. (2006) described a chatbot system that included a module which 
allowed users to rate the bot’s responses and suggest corrections. 
In web sites, chatbots are often portrayed as animated characters with at least a partial body 
(cf. Chapter 9.6), which allows them to accompany their messages with rudimentary non-verbal 
communicative (cf. Chapter 10.1) and believability-enhancing (cf. Chapter 10.2) behaviors. 
Today, many interactions with chatbots are still text-based (Coniam 2008: 100), in particular on 
the World Wide Web, where the feasibility of other input modes apart from keyboard and 
mouse input is still limited (cf. Chapter 7.10). However, speech recognition (cf. Section 11.1.1) 
and speech synthesis (cf. Section 11.1.2) are beginning to be used in chatbots (Atwell 2005; 
Coniam 2008: 100). 
Chatbots are the first step toward achieving the old dream of building technology-based 
artificial companions for people (Bledsoe 1986; De Angeli et al. 2001a). While chatbots are 
often used to provide some kind of service to users, their major purpose is social rather than 
                                              
151  Despite its simplicity, ELIZA was surprisingly successful with users. Some of them responded to the 
program in the same way as they would to a human therapist (Fogg 2003: 111). The implications of 
these reactions for human-computer relationships deeply troubled Joseph Weizenbaum (1923–2008), 
ELIZA’s creator. In an influential book (Weizenbaum 1976), he argued that there should be limits on 
what humans allow computers to do because even a machine with artificial intelligence will never 
have compassion, wisdom, and other qualities that humans possess by virtue of having been raised in 
a family ([INT 98]). 
Table 16. A taxonomy of chatbots. Adapted from De Angeli (2005, Table 1). 
Chatbot Type Deception User 
Explicit Absent Aware 
Deceptive Present Unaware 
Competitive Present Aware 
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task-related in nature (De Angeli et al. 2001b). Being social agents (De Angeli et al. 2001b), 
chatbots need to satisfy requirements beyond usability (cf. Chapter 6.3). In particular, they have 
to be designed to facilitate establishing and maintaining relationships with users (cf. Chapter 
7.16). On the World Wide Web, these social agents can be constantly available in chat rooms or 
on web sites to answer the questions of users and keep them company. Since both profit and 
non-profit organizations are under more pressure than ever to deal more effectively with users’ 
inquiries and to ensure their loyalty (De Angeli et al. 2001a; De Angeli et al. 2001b), these 
features of chatbots invite their use as virtual assistants, guides, salespeople, and entertainers in 
order to form long-term social relationships with users (Morel 2004: 179ff.; see Abu Shawar & 
Atwell 2007 for a discussion of applications of chatbots). In particular, the hope is to achieve 
cost reductions by using chatbots to automate routine tasks (e.g. providing information about 
products, responding to frequently-asked questions), and to increase brand or product 
awareness and customer loyalty by creating a more enjoyable experience for the user. Finally, 
chatbots can elicit valuable personal information from their human interaction partners by 
casually asking questions during a conversation (De Angeli et al. 2001a). 
To serve these functions well, chatbots must be competent, eloquent, and interesting to users. 
However, developing or customizing even a moderately sophisticated chatbot can be quite 
expensive as its behavior and identity depend on its database of response categories, and 
building or changing this database may require considerable effort. The response categories 
play such a central role because a chatbot essentially defines itself through its responses, 
revealing who it is, what it thinks, and how it feels by way of its reactions to user inputs.152 
Therefore, the chatbot’s responses should adhere to the design principles of consistency, 
coherence, individuality, and variability introduced in Chapter 7. For embodied chatbots, the 
body and its non-verbal behaviors are additional design elements to be considered, which may 
complement or clash with the chatbot’s verbally created persona, so there is also the need to 
reconcile linguistic responses with the appearance and behaviors of the chatbot’s body. As the 
                                              
152  Russell (2002) described an experiment involving a chatbot that portrayed two different personality 
types (extrovert and introvert, cf. Chapter 13.5) through linguistic properties of its responses, 
including style (utterance length, use of tag questions, and hedging) and lexical selection (number of 
intensifiers and emotion words) (cf. Section 11.1.4). Results indicated that “personality effects, in 
such an interface, are more complex and subtle than previous research has suggested and that to 
produce ‘real’ synthetic personalities, the interaction style as a whole must be considered” ([INT 
99]). 
 
Figure 48. The architecture of a chatbot. 
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set of response categories of a state-of-the-art chatbot is typically poorly structured, consisting 
of a collection of large text files, it becomes difficult to stay on top of all the aspects of the 
content and wording that contribute to the consistency, coherence, individuality, and variability 
of responses. 
Practitioners suggest that creating a chatbot for a business or other organization should 
proceed in analogy to recruiting a new employee through a series of three stages (Morel 2004: 
191): 
• Head hunting. Identify objective and subjective aspects making up the character profile (cf. 
Chapter 9.3) of the chatbot to be recruited. Determine the bot’s function, required expertise, 
and future workplace. Design a chatbot that meets these requirements. 
• Training. Teach the chatbot how to play its role competently and convincingly for the target 
group of users, which especially includes giving appropriate responses to user inputs in one 
or several languages. 
• Contract. Deploy the new chatbot in its work environment. Make the necessary adjustments 
and improvements. The bot may have a short-term (e.g. for a special campaign) or a long-
term contract (e.g. a permanent position in customer support) with its employer. 
Carefully designed chatbots can successfully create (at least temporarily) the illusion of 
intelligence and make the user suspend his or her disbelief (De Angeli et al. 2001a). While 
some users quickly identify the limitations of a chatbot, others will continue to chat with the bot 
for hours without even noticing that they are talking to a machine. Overall, chatbots are a viable 
option for designers of interactive systems if the application involves answering simple 
questions or engaging the user in small talk (cf. Chapter 10.3). Coniam reviewed five current 
chatbots and concluded: 
[T]he chatbots examined are still a long way from passing the Turing Test. The current 
generation of chatbots cope best when presented with one-clause questions or statements 
embracing straightforward propositions with minimal cohesive linkage to previous utterances. 
(Coniam 2008: 115). 
However, today’s chatbots are less suitable for more complex tasks, such as counseling or 
tutoring, because they lack everything beyond the most basic dialogue processing capabilities. 
A chatbot is generally unable to carry on a structured, goal-directed dialogue with the user. 
More often than not, after only a few turns, it becomes obvious that the conversation is going 
nowhere. As a result, chatbots are not appropriate for educational applications in particular, 
given that dialogues with learners should be both structured and directed toward a well-defined 
instructional goal (cf. Chapter 12.3.9). Usually, they also tend to last longer than a few turns. 
Conversational agents for education need more sophisticated dialogue capabilities than current 
chatbot engines can offer (Coniam 2008). As a side note, developers of (embodied) 
conversational agents have used chatbot engines, despite their limitations, to implement the 
dialogue component of their agents (e.g. De Angeli et al. 2001a; De Angeli et al. 2001b; Tatai 
et al. 2003; Abbattista et al. 2004; Laufer & Tatai 2004; De Angeli 2005; Goh et al. 2006), 
mainly for two reasons: (1) a large number of chatbots with quite sophisticated category 
databases are freely available (e.g. [INT 94]); (2) chatbots provide a quick off-the-shelf solution 
for dialogue processing in agents when this capability is required but not a focus of the 
research. However, such compromises tend to lead to an imbalanced design (cf. Chapter 7.3). 
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11.3.3  Dialogue Agents 
Conversational agents using more sophisticated speech and language processing than chatbots 
to enable more flexible and purposeful interactions are increasingly finding their way from 
research laboratories into practical applications (McTear 2004). These dialogue agents include 
more advanced technologies for interpretation and response generation and, importantly, feature 
a central component for managing the dialogue with the user. The diagram in Figure 49 shows 
the architecture of a dialogue agent, which consists of three major processing stages (Lester et 
al. 2004: 10-4ff.): 
• The interpreter identifies and interprets the sequence of words provided by the user and 
computes a representation of the meaning of the input. 
• The dialogue manager processes the meaning representation and decides on an appropriate 
reaction, interacting with data stores and external applications. 
• The response generator produces the response and delivers the output. 
Four major resources support dialogue processing at all stages: the dialogue strategy, the 
dialogue model, the user model, and mechanisms for error handling. The processing stages and 
resources of a dialogue agent are discussed in the following sections. 
11.3.3.1 Interpreter 
The first processing step for a dialogue agent is to interpret the user’s utterance. This requires 
natural language understanding technology (cf. Section 11.1.3), which transforms the input 
string of words into a meaning representation for use by the dialogue manager (McTear 2002: 
103). If the agent accepts spoken input, NLU has to interact closely with a speech recognition 
component (cf. Section 11.1.1), which maps from the user’s spoken utterance to a string of 
words. A simple way to integrate speech recognition and natural language understanding in 
spoken dialogue agents is to sequence two independent systems, with the recognition module 
sending the word-string with the best recognition score to language understanding (Price 1997: 
45; McTear 2002: 109). Since this strategy can easily miss the actual sequence of words, 
alternative approaches to the integration of speech recognition and natural language 
understanding have been used (Holmes & Holmes 2001: 204f.; Huang et al. 2001: 664–670; 
McTear 2002: 109f.; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 337f.): 
• Word lattice parsing. The speech recognizer outputs a network of possible word sequences 
(called a “word lattice” by convention) that can be visualized as a directed graph in which 
nodes represent points in time and arcs represent scored word hypotheses. The NLU module 
then tries to determine the best-scoring grammatical utterance that covers the entire spoken 
input. 
• N-best filtering. In this approach, the speech recognizer sends a rank-ordered list of its n-best 
(n = 10 .. 100) sentence hypotheses to language understanding. The NLU module then uses 
more sophisticated knowledge sources to re-score and re-rank the n-best hypotheses in order 
to find the “1-best utterance” with the highest score. 
Traditional NLU techniques cannot be easily used to interpret spoken language because they 
have been designed to process text input consisting of grammatical sentences of unmistakably 
identifiable words. In contrast, an agent for spoken conversation has to deal with unknown 
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words and constructions, recognition errors, and, most importantly, instances of spontaneous 
speech (Zue 1997). 
Spontaneous speech consists of utterances created by speakers “ad lib” (rather than based on 
careful advance preparation) in a particular context as they are trying to communicate messages 
to others. Spontaneous utterances are commonplace in everyday conversation, whether face-to-
face or over the telephone. Their generation is subject to constraints imposed by the limited 
time and cognitive resources available to the speaker (Androutsopoulos & Aretoulaki 2003: 
636). As a result, they contain many disfluencies153 (Brennan & Schober 2001; Eklund 2004). 
Examples of these disruptions to the normal flow of utterances include filled pauses (e.g. Erm, 
Eh154), full or partial word repetitions (e.g. NoNo, aFlightaFlight), false starts (e.g. WhatD’You-
I’dLike) and self-repairs (e.g. FromGa-FromLondonGatwick), coughs, tongue and lip clicks, 
etc. Ellipsis (i.e. omission of sentence parts, e.g. NotAachenAthens) and anaphora (i.e. back 
references by means of e.g. pronouns) are further common elements of spontaneous utterances. 
The input speech signal may also be distorted by background noise and channel distortions (e.g. 
over the telephone) (Androutsopoulos & Aretoulaki 2003: 635f.). Previous research has tended 
to focus largely on read speech and written text; hence, understanding of spontaneous speech 
phenomena is still limited. 
Dialogue agents that are confronted with spontaneous user utterances have to work with the 
(most likely incomplete and/or incorrect) sequence of words that they were able to recognize in 
the continuous stream of input speech. Since it would be futile to attempt an in-depth analysis 
of every utterance, in practice, robust parsing techniques (Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 450–456, 
Chapter 14) are employed to extract all useful bits and pieces of information from the input 
while disregarding the rest. In particular for elliptical or ungrammatical input utterances, this 
involves parsing constituents (i.e. words and phrases) by themselves rather than trying to 
integrate them into an overall sentence structure (Androutsopoulos & Aretoulaki 2003: 637f.). 
Approaches to robust parsing make use of probabilistic context-free grammars, semantic 
grammars, and shallow parsing (cf. Section 11.1.3). 
                                              
153  An in-depth account of disfluency from a wide range of perspectives can be found in Eklund (2004). 
154  All examples were adapted from Androutsopoulos and Aretoulaki (2003: 635f.). 
 
Figure 49. The architecture of a dialogue agent. Based on Aust and Schröer (1998, Figure 1) and Lester 
et al. (2004: 10-5, Figure 10.2). 
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11.3.3.2 Dialogue Manager 
The ability of dialogue agents to effectively manage their exchanges with users is the key to 
successful human-agent conversations. If the dialogue is conducted carefully, user satisfaction 
increases (thanks to a larger number of successfully completed interactions), and it becomes 
possible to compensate for shortcomings of the human language technologies involved (cf. 
Section 11.1), in particular recognition and understanding errors (Mangold 1994: 98). Hence, 
dialogue management is generally regarded as an enabling technology for dialogue agents (e.g. 
Cole et al. 1995). 
Dialogue agents typically have a central module, the dialogue manager, which controls the 
interaction with the user and coordinates the other system components (McTear 2002: 103) to 
ensure that the conversation flows effectively and naturally over several dialogue turns between 
human and agent toward a valid and satisfactory conclusion (Giachin 1997: 210). This involves 
the following tasks: 
• Detecting errors in recognition and understanding and recovering from them; 
• Preventing conversational breakdowns and failure; 
• Interpreting user utterances in the context of the dialogue and task; 
• Initiating appropriate clarification and confirmation subdialogues if necessary; 
• Predicting what the user can say in the next dialogue turn; 
• Interacting with the application back-end in service of the user’s needs; 
• Determining the relevant information to be conveyed to the user; 
• Coordinating understanding and response generation components. 
To fulfill these tasks, the dialogue manager interacts with four major resources, including a 
strategy driving the conversation, an evolving model of the dialogue, a set of assumptions about 
the user, and strategies for detecting and handling errors in the interaction. These resources are 
discussed below. 
11.3.3.2.1 Dialogue Strategy 
Dialogue agents should manage conversations with the user according to a dialogue strategy 
that steers the conversation (Giachin 1997: 211) and determines the allocation of the initiative 
(i.e. which of the participants is in control of the exchange at any point in time during the 
dialogue). Dialogue strategies differ mainly with respect to the degree of user control vs. system 
control in the conversation (Huang et al. 2001: 860; Androutsopoulos & Aretoulaki 2003: 
641f.; McTear 2004: 108ff.; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 828f.): 
• System initiative. The agent is completely in charge of the exchange. It asks the user a series 
of questions in order to elicit the information necessary to complete the task, and expects the 
user to only answer the current question at every step of the dialogue. The possible dialogue 
states and conversation paths are pre-defined in a network (cf. Figure 50). Each dialogue 
state consists of a prompt and an associated set of allowed user responses. On the one hand, 
constraining user inputs this way facilitates dialogue processing considerably. On the other 
hand, the inflexibility of such structured human-machine dialogues may quickly lead to user 
dissatisfaction with the interaction and hence the agent. 
• User initiative. The agent is responsive but never proactive in the course of the dialogue (cf. 
Chapter 3.1), i.e. it only responds to the inquiries of the user, who controls the exchange. 
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This strategy is typical for agents that respond to users’ requests for information or carry out 
their commands. While letting the user lead the dialogue is an attractive option in general, it 
becomes difficult to successfully complete the interaction in the event of communication 
problems or missing information since the agent cannot take control to initiate a subdialogue 
that clarifies misunderstandings or asks for the required items. Furthermore, users may feel 
uncertain about the agent’s exact range of capabilities and become frustrated when their 
expectations are not met (cf. Chapter 7.3). 
• Mixed initiative. Mixed or variable initiative dialogues are characterized by shared control 
between the user and the agent. In the course of a dialogue, the initiative may shift from the 
one to the other (and back again) according to the requirements of the current state of the 
interaction. The user remains in control for as long as he or she does not seem confused and 
the agent is able to determine his or her intention. However, the agent is always ready to 
guide the user or engage him or her in a clarification subdialogue if necessary. 
 
Figure 50. Simple dialogue-state network for a conversational registration agent adopting a system-
initiative dialogue strategy. Adapted from McTear (2002: 129, Figure 11). 
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In addition to strategies for handling the dialogue with the user, dialogue agents also require 
ways to deal with situations where they detect a potential misrecognition or misinterpretation of 
the user’s utterance and need to verify, or confirm, by consulting the user that they understood 
him or her correctly (Androutsopoulos & Aretoulaki 2003: 642f.; McTear 2002: 117ff.; McTear 
2004: 118–121; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 831f.). Explicit verification involves asking the user 
directly for confirmation of a particular piece of information acquired, typically in the form of a 
yes-no question to restrict what the user can say in response (Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 831). 
This is a robust verification strategy, but the dialogue becomes longer and more awkward, 
which has a negative effect on user satisfaction (McTear 2002: 117; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 
831). Implicit verification is an alternative approach in which the agent phrases its next question 
in a way that repeats the agent’s understanding of the user’s previous utterance(s). The repeated 
information is implicitly confirmed if the user’s follow-up response contains no corrections 
(McTear 2004: 120). This strategy is more natural than explicit verification, but it presupposes 
a certain level of confidence in the results of the recognition and understanding stages (McTear 
2002: 117f.). Furthermore, the range of possible user utterances in response to an implicit 
verification request is larger, which increases the complexity of the interpreter module (p. 118). 
In addition, such requests combine old items to be confirmed with new items to be elicited. The 
number of possible combinations can quickly grow to such an extent that dynamic generation of 
the verification questions (cf. Section 11.1.4) is the only feasible option (p. 118). 
11.3.3.2.2 Dialogue Model 
The dialogue model provides a continuously updated representation of the structure of the 
ongoing agent-user dialogue, which contains information about the dialogue history, indicates 
the current dialogue state (i.e. the state of the interaction with respect to the goal of the 
exchange), and allows predictions about future interactions (i.e. about what both the user and 
the agent can possibly say in the next dialogue turn) (Cole et al. 1995; Cohen 1997; McTear 
2002). 
The dialogue history keeps track of what has happened before in a given dialogue, indicating 
the objects, actors, and events mentioned by the participants and providing information about 
their relationships to one another (McTear 2002: 95). This information is useful for identifying 
the referents of anaphoric expressions (including pronouns, possessive determiners, and definite 
noun phrases) (p. 95). Furthermore, for every user utterance and agent response, the dialogue 
history may indicate the dialogue act155 performed plus associated task parameters and their 
values. Using this information, elliptical user utterances can be interpreted by anchoring them 
in the context of the previous exchange (Androutsopoulos & Aretoulaki 2003: 639). 
Agents that model the evolving structure of dialogues with the user can act more flexibly and 
robustly in the course of an interaction. Cole et al. (1995) identified several benefits of dialogue 
modeling. First, access to the previous context makes it easier for the agent to recover from 
recognition and understanding errors. Second, expectations about the contents of incoming 
utterances based on the agent’s model can even help to avoid such errors in the first place. 
Third, dialogue modeling helps the agent to keep the conversation on track towards the goal 
despite more or less severe errors. Fourth, the interaction becomes more efficient because 
                                              
155  A dialogue act is a kind of speech act performed in a contribution to a dialogue in order to further a 
particular (sub-) goal of the exchange. See Jurafsky and Martin (2000: 727–744; 2008: 840–846) for 
a discussion of dialogue acts and their automatic interpretation. 
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shorter and simpler user utterances and fewer dialogue turns are required. The agent’s outputs 
can be tailored to present only information that is important for the conversation to progress 
effectively. 
Three major approaches have been used to model dialogue structure (Jurafsky & Martin 
2000: 750–757; Huang et al. 2001: 886–894; McTear 2002: 92ff.; Leech & Weisser 2003: 
152f.; McTear 2004: 111–117; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 827–831). The first, finite-state based 
dialogue modeling has been used in many (in particular commercial) systems (McTear 2002: 
92; Androutsopoulos & Aretoulaki 2003: 639; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 827). This method 
makes use of dialogue grammars which impose a fixed structure on dialogue that is represented 
as a finite-state transition network (cf. Section 11.1.3.2.1) whose states correspond to dialogue 
acts, such as greeting, request_date, and list_flights (cf. Figure 51) (Leech & Weisser 
2003: 153). The network is organized based on the concept of adjacency pairs (e.g. question–
answer, greeting–greeting, challenge–rejection, etc.) (Huang et al. 2001: 887). Transitions 
between states occur on the basis of tests that check if the representation derived from the user’s 
utterance contains the required information. The system controls the interaction, prompting the 
user to provide information for the current dialogue state and proceeding to another state based 
on the user’s response (McTear 2002: 93). Finite-state models continue to be popular because 
of their simplicity. They are suitable for modeling structured task-oriented dialogues directed 
by the agent (system initiative, cf. Section 11.3.3.2.1) that involve eliciting information from 
the user in a pre-defined sequence (McTear 2004: 111f.). However, they are too restricted to be 
able to support flexible and natural human-machine dialogues that allow freedom of expression, 
shift of initiative, and deviations from pre-specified dialogue paths (McTear 2002: 128; McTear 
2004: 112). 
Frame-based dialogue agents complete (or fill in) a pre-set frame (or template) with pieces 
of information obtained from the user during the conversation (McTear 2002: 93f. + 131–134; 
McTear 2004: 113–116; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 829f.). This frame functions as a dialogue 
model that keeps track of missing items (McTear 2002: 131). Properties of interactions with a 
frame-based agent include the following (McTear 2002: 93f. + 131–134; Jurafsky & Martin 
2008: 829): 
• Information does not have to be elicited in a pre-determined order. 
• Mixed initiative is possible. The dialogue is driven by the information provided by the user 
and required by the agent. 
• The agent can integrate pieces of information that were supplied by the user before the agent 
explicitly asked for them. 
• The agent does not ask more questions than necessary because it knows what values are still 
required to fill the frame. 
• Questions and other prompts will only be produced if their pre-conditions are fulfilled. 
• The agent’s input analysis focuses on extracting task-relevant information from the user’s 
utterance (shallow parsing, cf. Section 11.1.3). 
The usefulness of frame-based dialogue models is limited to well-defined tasks involving a 
homogeneous range of users, a static world, and a collection of recurring, precisely specified 
operations (e.g. database queries) (McTear 2002: 134). 
The basic idea of plan-based dialogue modeling (Allen 1994: 480–483; Huang et al. 2001: 
888–892; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 850–855) is that communicative actions of (both human and 
artificial) agents which can be observed in a dialogue are not performed randomly but are part 
of the agent’s plan (cf. Figure 52) to achieve some goal (Cohen 1997: 207; Huang et al. 2001: 
888). Speakers generate contributions to the dialogue based on their plan (cf. Section 11.1.4) 
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while listeners have to infer this plan from what they hear (and see), i.e. from the speaker’s 
utterances and his or her non-verbal (communicative) actions (Cawsey 1998: 116f.; Jurafsky & 
Martin 2008: 850). The user’s dialogue acts (e.g. a learner’s request for the agent’s assistance 
with drawing a syntactic tree diagram) are integrated into the evolving plan underlying the 
interaction, which may also involve physical actions in the domain (e.g. the agent draws a part 
of the tree and the user finishes it) (McTear 2002: 136). If a particular dialogue act is observed 
in the user’s input, a plan or subplan underlying this act is constructed to identify possible goals 
of the user which he or she is trying to achieve by performing the act (cf. Chapter 12.2.1) (Allen 
1994: 481–490; Carberry 2001: 32ff.; Huang et al. 2001: 890f.; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 
851ff.). 
Plans show a hierarchical decomposition of actions into subactions and indicate the temporal 
ordering of the actions to be carried out to achieve goals and subgoals on each level of the 
hierarchy (Allen 1994: 481ff.; Tate 2001: 653; Russell & Norvig 2003: 422f.). The actions in a 
plan are conceived of as plan operators with associated pre-conditions and effects (Cawsey 
1998: 88; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 851f.). Some example operators corresponding to plan 
actions at different levels of detail in Figure 52 are provided below: 
TAKE-TRIP(Actor,Vehicle,Dest) 
Preconditions: DESTINATION(Vehicle,Dest) 
Effects: IN(Actor,Dest) 
 
BUY-TICKET(Actor,Ticket-office,Ticket-for(Vehicle)) 
Preconditions: HAS(Actor,Price(Ticket-for(Vehicle))) 
Effects: HAS(Actor,Ticket-for(Vehicle)) 
 
PAY(Actor,Clerk,Price(Ticket-for(Vehicle))) 
Preconditions: HAS(Actor,Price(Ticket-for(Vehicle))) 
Effects: HAS(Clerk,Price(Ticket-for(Vehicle))) 
Plan-based dialogue modeling is useful for collaborative problem solving (Ferguson & Allen 
1998; Allen et al. 2001b; Ferguson & Allen 2007), which, among other things, involves the 
constant exchange of information between the participating agents (both artificial and human) 
in order to report on the current state of the joint problem solving and to supply information 
 
Figure 51. A finite-state model of a dialogue structure for flight inquiries (Androutsopoulos & 
Aretoulaki 2003: 640, Figure 35.3). 
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required by the other agent.156 However, if a dialogue agent fails to identify the communicative 
act performed by the user, it may misconstrue his or her plan (McTear 2002: 136f.). With 
respect to system performance, it should be noted that plan generation and recognition are both 
computationally expensive processes (Cohen 1997: 209; Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 738; McTear 
2002: 137). 
While both the complexity of the models and the flexibility of the interaction increase from 
the finite-state through frame-based to plan-based approaches to dialogue modeling (Allen et al. 
2001a), none of them covers the full range of human dialogue behavior. Therefore, human-
machine dialogues in (spoken) natural language remain fairly restricted, with respect to both 
topics and language. 
11.3.3.2.3 User Model 
The idea that computers should adapt to the characteristics of their human users has become a 
major concern in human-computer interaction (HCI) as well as AI [(artificial intelligence)] 
research (…). It has been suggested that computers might be able to behave more co-operatively 
– and thus more usefully – if they had knowledge of the characteristics of their users and could 
use this knowledge to adapt their dialogues accordingly. (McTear 1993: 158). 
Dialogue agents require knowledge about the user to support their internal processing and to be 
able to participate effectively in agent-user conversations. This knowledge is collected in a 
process called user modeling,157 represented and accumulated in a user model,158 and applied to 
adapt the agent’s communicative and other behaviors to a particular user, often dynamically 
while he or she is interacting with the agent (Wahlster 1988; McTear 1993; Zukerman & 
Litman 2001; Jameson 2003; Johnson & Taatgen 2005). 
                                              
156  An elaborate list of activities of agents involved in collaborative problem solving was provided by 
Ferguson and Allen (2007). 
157  User modeling will be discussed in detail in Chapter 12.2.1. 
158  The equivalent component of a pedagogical agent is the student model (cf. Chapter 12.2). 
 
Figure 52. A plan showing the hierarchical decomposition of the high-level action/goal TAKE TRIP into 
successively more specific subactions/subgoals. Adapted from Allen (1994: 481, Figure 15.7). The 
numbers in the diagram indicate the temporal ordering of the actions on each level. 
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The information in a user model may both remain fairly stable across interactions (e.g. age, 
gender, personality, skills, and vocabulary) and change as the dialogue progresses (e.g. goals, 
beliefs, preferences, emotions, and task parameters) (Cole et al. 1995; McTear 2004: 124).159 
User models may range in sophistication from a broad conception of a prototypical or 
stereotypical user of the agent through separate models for different classes of users (e.g. users 
with different expertise levels or from different age groups or sociocultural backgrounds) to 
personalized models of individual users which are dynamically built and incrementally refined 
over a history of conversations between the user and the agent (McTear 1993: 160ff.). 
Dialogue agents can use the information in the user model to adapt their behavior and 
improve their linguistic processing when dealing with a particular user. For example, speech 
recognition and language understanding can exploit knowledge about how users with different 
backgrounds and (levels of) expertise express themselves (word choice and constructions) and 
what meanings they typically (intend to) convey (Cole et al. 1995). In dialogue management, a 
different, more restrictive dialogue strategy tending toward system initiative may be adopted if 
information collected about the performance of the interpreter on the spoken input of a 
particular user consistently indicates poor performance within and across dialogues (Zukerman 
& Litman 2001: 148; Jameson 2003: 308). The response generator (cf. Section 11.3.3.3) may 
use information in the user model to generate and deliver responses that are suitable (with 
respect to content, terminology, and complexity of constructions) for users with a certain 
background, domain knowledge, goals, preferences, misconceptions (cf. Chapter 12.2.3.2), and 
technological literacy (McKeown & Moore 1997: 184). For delivery of the message, the user 
model could guide the process of selecting and modulating a (synthetic) voice that the user 
finds familiar or pleasant and that provides an articulation of the message which is appropriate 
for the content of the message and the communicative context. 
11.3.3.2.4 Error Handling 
Given the many possibilities for non-understanding and misunderstanding in human-computer 
dialogues, the problem of failure must be dealt with on a regular basis at all levels of dialogue 
processing, from recognizing the spoken words up to interpreting the speaker’s communicative 
intentions behind his or her utterance (McTear et al. 2005: 249f.). As a result, intelligent error 
handling strategies become a key factor for successful dialogue-based interaction (Huang et al. 
2001: 937–941; McTear 2004: 353–362; McTear et al. 2005).160 Effective error handling 
involves three stages. Error prevention is the task of anticipating potential errors in interactions 
with users while the dialogue agent is being developed, and designing the agent to prevent these 
errors in the first place, for example by phrasing its prompts in a way that limits the range of 
possible user responses or by guiding the dialogue along paths that are within the agent’s 
capabilities (McTear et al. 2005: 250). Error detection is the process of constantly monitoring 
the exchange over time to pick up any signs of problems in the dialogue. Errors may be 
detected immediately when they occur (early detection) or only later during the dialogue (late 
detection) (p. 250). The former happens with non-understandings, whereas the latter takes place 
                                              
159  For examples of information that may be included in user models of agents, see Chapter 12.2.1. 
160  McTear et al. argued that “errors are a natural occurrence in spoken communication, both in human-
machine dialogues as well as [sic!] in human-human communication. (…) [W]hat is required is an 
approach that treats errors, at whatever level, as unavoidable and that has methods for detecting and 
dealing with miscommunication when it occurs” (McTear et al. 2005: 249f., emphasis added). 
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when an utterance has been misunderstood (Skantze 2003). The results of monitoring the 
dialogue can also be used for error prediction, i.e. for anticipating and preventing potential 
future problems in the ongoing exchange based on observations made up to the present point 
(McTear 2004: 360f.). Finally, error recovery involves deciding on an appropriate course of 
action to respond to and recover from errors that have been detected in a dialogue. In general, 
there may be several options (McTear et al. 2005: 252): 
• Ignore the error and hope for the best. 
• Ask the user to repeat or rephrase his or her query. 
• Perform explicit or implicit verification of what the agent thinks it understood. 
• Try to correct the error alone using internal knowledge and knowledge of the context. 
• Switch to another input channel (cf. Section 11.2).161 
The best way for an agent to handle a given non-understanding or misunderstanding depends 
on the nature and severity of the error, the situation in which it occurred, the user involved, and 
other factors. In general, dialogue agents should be careful who they blame for problems in the 
conversation. Nass and Brave (2005: 173f.) reported on an experiment in which simulated 
misrecognition errors occurred during the interaction of the participants with a (fake) voice 
interface. The system either blamed itself or the user for the errors. In both conditions, the 
target of the blame (the system or the user) was apparent from the wording of the error 
messages. The results showed that blame for speech recognition errors was not well received by 
participants: as suggested by their ratings, they perceived the system which blamed them as less 
likeable and the interaction as more frustrating compared to the self-blaming interface. Hence, 
use of modest (self-blaming) language contributes to positive user attitudes toward an interface. 
But like people with a strong tendency to blame themselves for errors, a self-blaming interface 
is also seen as less competent. When an interface criticizes its own performance, users take this 
self-blame at “face value,” without looking deeper (Nass & Brave 2005: 174). 
If a conversational agent that blames the user is perceived as less likeable and a self-blaming 
agent as less competent, are there other alternatives? One possibility is to use neutral messages 
that do not blame anyone. However, people commonly have a self-serving bias, i.e. a tendency 
to claim success for themselves and hold others responsible for failure. Therefore, they would 
perceive the agent as blaming itself or, worse, interpret the agent’s behavior as an attempt to 
sneak out of responsibility (Nass & Brave 2005: 175). Another possibility mentioned by Nass 
and Brave is for the agent to put the blame on an acceptable scapegoat, such as the high level of 
background noise or the low-quality microphone in the event of speech recognition errors. But 
scapegoating can backfire on the agent as well because people tend to think that any individual 
apart from themselves is to blame for his or her own failures, rather than someone or something 
in the environment, and therefore may regard scapegoating as an obvious attempt to escape 
from responsibility (p. 175). However, when users perceive that they form a team with the 
agent and depend on their agent partner (as the agent does on them) for the success of the team, 
they may extend the self-serving bias to include the agent. As a result, they may blame neither 
themselves nor the agent for failure but may be more willing to accept a scapegoat outside the 
                                              
161  For example, the agent could ask the user to type rather than speak difficult-to-pronounce words, 
including proper names, foreign-language terms, word creations, scientific and technical terms, or the 
user could use pointing gestures to disambiguate a spoken command, as in the famous “Put that 
there” system (Bolt 1980). 
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team (p. 175). This idea was supported by an experimental study conducted with a voice-based 
car interface (Jonsson et al. 2004). 
While sophisticated error handling is important, preventing interaction problems is generally 
preferable to having to recover from them (Nass & Brave 2005: 177). One way to achieve this 
takes advantage of the human tendency toward entrainment or mirroring, i.e. toward adopting 
elements and patterns of the behavior of others ([INT 100]). Over time, people will gradually 
take up both the words and the grammatical structures which they hear from their interlocutors 
in dialogue, without thinking or even being aware of it (Nass & Brave 2005: 177f.). These 
principles of lexical162 and syntactic alignment have been shown to apply not only when the 
interlocutor is human but also when it is a machine (Branigan et al. 2003; Pearson et al. 2006). 
Conversational agents can take advantage of these alignment tendencies to guide the user 
toward using words and constructions which the agent can handle (Nass & Brave 2005: 177f.). 
Pearson et al. (2006) demonstrated that the language of users in human-computer dialogues 
is influenced by what they believe about and expect from the machine. Thus, if a conversational 
agent insinuates limited linguistic ability (for example by using a non-human embodiment (cf. 
Chapter 9.1), the user may be inclined to adapt his or her language behaviors to match the 
language of the agent (Nass & Brave 2005: 178). Pearson et al. found that this inclination is 
indeed stronger when users deem a system unsophisticated and less capable than when they 
think that it is sophisticated and capable (Pearson et al. 2006). Low sophistication or capability 
is suggested by cues including use of synthetic speech, slowness of speech, low-fidelity speech, 
ungrammatical speech, lack of multisyllabic words, simple sentence constructions, and self-
blaming for failure (see above). When users perceive these cues, they are likely to simplify their 
language and to articulate their speech more clearly, much like they do when talking to foreign 
speakers or children (Nass & Brave 2005: 178). However, portraying an agent as ‘stupid’ is not 
always appropriate. In particular, this strategy will not be effective when the agent’s role relies 
on users’ perceptions of the agent’s competence. For example, pedagogical agents as coaches 
(cf. Chapter 16.2.3) or presenters of information (cf. Chapter 12.3) will not be taken seriously if 
learners think that these agents are not knowledgeable about their subjects (cf. Chapter 7.2). 
The willingness of users to adapt to the limitations of a conversational agent can also be 
influenced by social identification. Given that humans generally tend to socially identify with 
both people and technologies which they perceive as similar to themselves, agents can be 
designed with matching gender, personality, accent, and so on in order to induce users to make 
more of an effort to adapt to the agent’s limitations (Nass & Brave 2005: 178). Another strong 
incentive for users is reciprocity (pp. 178f.): the perceived effort of an agent to understand the 
user makes the latter willing to reciprocate by making it easier for the agent to understand them 
(Fogg 1997; Moon 1998; Katagiri et al. 2001). The perception of effort can be supported by 
signaling to the user that he or she has the agent’s full attention. Embodied conversational 
agents (cf. Section 11.3.4) can use eye gaze to indicate that they are paying attention to the user 
(cf. Chapter 10.1.4). Furthermore, they can mirror the user’s choice of words and phrases in 
their responses. Finally, conversational agents can perceptibly pause to ‘think’ about a complex 
or important user request before they answer, thus showing the user that they deem the request 
worthy of their attention and effort (Nass et al. 2004; Nass & Brave 2005: 179). 
                                              
162  Nass and Brave used the term “semantic alignment” (Nass & Brave 2005: 177). 
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11.3.3.3 Response Generator 
Apart from the performance of the interpreter and the dialogue manager, the effectiveness of a 
dialogue agent depends critically on its capability to respond to the user with a meaningful and 
intelligible spoken or textual message. The component of a dialogue agent that generates and 
delivers the agent’s contributions to the dialogue is called the response generator (McKeown & 
Moore 1997; Huang et al. 2001: 894–901; McTear 2002: 124–127; McTear 2004: 99–104; 
Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 825ff.). 
The response generator uses a natural language generation (NLG) component (cf. Section 
11.1.4),163 which generates linguistic outputs from a representation built by the dialogue 
manager (Huang et al. 2001: 895–899; McTear 2004: 99; Jurafsky & Martin 2008: 825f.). If the 
agent delivers its messages using speech, the generation stage must be coupled with a text-to-
speech or concept-to-speech synthesizer (cf. Section 11.1.2), which produces the spoken output 
either from a text or from an enriched linguistic description of the message (Huang et al. 2001: 
899; McTear 2004: 102). Response generation involves carefully selecting, organizing, and 
expressing content in a way that is tuned to the context (including the current dialogue context 
as well as the larger sociocultural context) (McTear 2002: 124) and conveys the agent’s state, 
its personality, and its status and relationship with respect to the user. 
Virtually all NLG systems described in the literature generate longer passages of text rather 
than utterances for a spoken dialogue (Theune 2003: 3). However, spoken language generation 
in a dialogue goes beyond the production of written monologues in several ways. First, the 
agent has to determine what to say, how to say it, and how to pronounce it (i.e. generate the 
prosodic structure of the utterance) (McKeown & Moore 1997: 183). As discussed in Section 
11.1.2.3, this calls for a closer integration of language generation and speech synthesis in a 
concept-to-speech approach (Huang et al. 2001: 899). Furthermore, the selection, organization, 
and expression of content must be tuned to the larger context of the dialogue, which includes 
the history of previous interactions, the current dialogue state, and information about the user 
(McKeown & Moore: 1997: 183f.; McTear 2002: 124). In particular, the following guidelines 
need to be observed (Cole et al. 1995; Theune 2003: 4): 
• Communicate only information that pertains to the user’s goals and knowledge. 
• Relate new to previously communicated information. 
• Select appropriate expressions for referring to the entities under discussion. 
• Avoid unnecessary repetitions. 
• Use vocabulary and constructions that are comprehensible and fit the spoken context. 
• Tune the wording of messages to those of the human dialogue partner (entrainment). 
• Consider the user’s cognitive and emotional state as well as his or her individual and 
sociocultural background. 
In general, the appropriate form of language for spoken dialogue settings, including aspects 
like utterance length, complexity of constructions, and choice of words, is a problem that 
requires further research. However, the properties of spoken utterances generated for a dialogue 
will certainly differ from those of sentences produced for a text. For example, spoken messages 
will have to be shorter and less complex to facilitate comprehension (McKeown & Moore 1997: 
187). Furthermore, they should communicate the agent’s emotional, mental and physical state, 
its personality (through message structure, wording, voice identity, etc.), and its status (lower, 
                                              
163  See Theune (2003) for a review of NLG systems for response generation in dialogue. 
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equal, or higher) and relationship with respect to the user (for example, strangers and close 
friends should be addressed in different ways). Finally, for embodied conversational agents (cf. 
Section 11.3.4), the spoken-response generator has to be extended to a multimodal response 
generator, which additionally produces instructions for the facial and body movements that 
should accompany the agent’s verbal message. 
Until recently, research and development have largely focused on the input side of dialogue 
agents (McTear 2004: 102). Many practical dialogue systems have adopted a simple approach 
to response generation, drawing their outputs from a database of canned text strings that may 
contain empty slots to be filled in with information to be presented (Theune 2003: iii). While 
canned responses or, slightly more advanced, filled templates (cf. Section 11.1.4.3) are suitable 
for applications in which a dialogue agent can respond with short and simple messages whose 
wording is relatively fixed, others, such as tutoring (cf. Chapter 12.3.9), require more flexible 
language generation that is sensitive to the context (Theune 2003: iii + 4; McTear 2004: 102). 
11.3.3.4 State of the Art 
Dialogue agents have reached a state of development that allows their deployment for limited 
practical tasks in small and well-defined domains. Doyle (1999) argued that the nature of the 
interaction between user and computer determines the success of dialogue agents. He identified 
the following scenarios in which dialogue agents can be successful (Doyle 1999): 
• Uncertain vs. decisive. Dialogue agents can assist users who are uncertain about particular 
choices with suggestions, advice, and information. 
• Satisfying vs. correct. Dialogue agents can increase user satisfaction by making tasks more 
pleasant (e.g. providing verbal scaffolding in a foreign language learning task) or by 
convincing the user of the quality of an outcome (e.g. praising a learner who has successfully 
completed a difficult task). 
• Dialogue vs. command-driven. Dialogue agents can engage users in conversations that help 
them to clarify their thoughts, gain insights, acquire skills, etc., facilitated by explanations, 
clarifications, suggestions, and instructions provided by the agent (cf. Chapter 12.3.9). 
• Social vs. natural. Dialogue agents can build relationships with users by enriching task-
related dialogues with exchanges of a social nature, such as small talk (cf. Chapter 10.3). 
However, dialogue agents still have considerable failure rates, not only in recognition and 
understanding but also when it comes to the successful completion of interactions. Some 
challenges for research on dialogue agents include (McTear 2002: 161f.): 
• More robust speech recognition (cf. Section 11.1.1.3); 
• More natural and expressive synthetic speech (cf. Section 11.1.2.4); 
• Closer integration and symbiosis of processing components; 
• More sophisticated approaches to dialogue management; 
• Use of statistical methods and machine learning techniques (cf. Chapter 12.1.1.2); 
• Support for conversations in multiple languages; 
• Enabling spoken dialogue in web-based applications; 
• Move from disembodied to embodied conversation. 
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11.3.4  Embodied Conversational Agents 
Interaction between people is the sum of the activities of the involved subjects, like speaking, 
gesturing, listening, watching. If a system simulates physical objects or characters, and is able to 
perceive human actions and intentions, people can interact with them [(i.e. the physical objects 
and characters)] using the ordinary schemes that they use in real life, and this is the key to a new 
level of satisfaction. (Valli 2004: 9). 
Human-human face-to-face conversations are ‘embodied,’ combining appropriately modulated 
speech with gaze, gestures, facial expressions, body posture and movement (cf. Chapter 10.1). 
Embodied conversational agents (Cassell et al. 2000a; Cassell 2001) with animated humanoid 
bodies (cf. Chapter 9.1) and equipped at least with auditory and visual input channels, i.e. the 
ability to process inputs combining speech, gestures, facial expressions, gaze patterns, etc., are 
perceptual multimodal interfaces (cf. Section 11.2) with the ability to engage users in 
multimodal dialogues involving synchronized verbal and non-verbal behaviors that realize 
different conversational functions (Bente et al. 2000; Bickmore 2004): 
• Modeling functions serve to demonstrate a sequence of motor actions when the dialogue is 
concerned with particular motor skills. 
• Propositional functions represent information related to the content of the conversation by 
means of meaningful speech as well as non-verbal behaviors that complement, supplement, 
or substitute for aspects of the speech content. 
• Interactional (or ‘envelope’) functions include turn-taking, initiation and termination, 
engagement (to check if the other interlocutors are still “on board”), and framing functions 
(to signal shifts from e.g. task-related talk to small talk), among others. Their purpose is to 
regulate the flow of the dialogue. 
• Attitudinal functions indicate what the communicator164 thinks of the other participants in the 
conversation. A positive attitude can be conveyed by non-verbal immediacy behaviors (cf. 
Chapter 10.3.1). 
• Affective display functions convey the communicator’s affective state, including mood and 
emotion (cf. Chapter 13.1). Affective displays can be spontaneous expressions of internal 
state, or they may be used deliberately to achieve certain ends (cf. Chapter 13.2). 
• Relational functions serve two purposes: they either signal how the communicator currently 
views his or her relationship with the other participants, or they are involved in giving this 
relationship a particular (desired) direction. Relational behaviors can make users feel good 
and more motivated, which has positive effects on task performance (cf. Chapter 7.16). 
The components of an embodied conversational agent are shown in Figure 53 (Cassell et al. 
2000b: 40–46; Cassell 2001: 74f.; Cassell 2007: 359f.).165 The agent accepts user inputs as 
combinations of speech, facial expressions, gaze, gestures, postures, and locomotion via its 
input devices. Cameras are used to watch the user’s face, gestures, postures, and movement 
while microphones capture his or her speech (Cassell 2007: 359). This stage involves a speech 
                                              
164  The term ‘communicator’ is used here and in the following in a more comprehensive sense than 
‘speaker’ to refer to an individual that makes use of speech as well as non-verbal communicative 
behaviors to communicate messages. 
165  The architecture of an embodied interactive software agent, which was presented in Figure 16, is 
both more general and more comprehensive than this architecture and the architecture of a dialogue 
agent (cf. Figure 49), although it includes elements of both. 
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recognizer as well as technologies for the recognition and tracking of faces, facial expressions, 
lip, eye and head movements, gestures, postures, and locomotion. The data collected by all 
available input devices is sent to the input manager, which transforms it into a representation 
that can be used in further processing, and determines the necessity of an immediate response 
vs. additional multimodal dialogue processing (Cassell et al. 2000b: 42f.). Certain unimodal 
inputs, for example when the user is moving in front of the camera or entering or leaving the 
agent’ field of view, trigger instant responses (e.g. tracking the user’s locomotion with the eyes) 
from the agent that are handled by a hardwired reactions module (p. 43). The task of the 
multimodal interpreter is to integrate the information obtained from the different input channels 
into an overall interpretation of the user’s verbal and non-verbal actions, which may consist of 
both interactional and propositional communicative acts (p. 44, cf. Section 11.2).166 At the heart 
of the architecture is the multimodal dialogue manager, which processes interactional and 
propositional communicative acts in relation to the situation and content of the conversation, 
respectively, handling errors, updating the dialogue model and the user model, and deciding on 
an appropriate response in line with the agent’s dialogue strategy (p. 44). This response is 
designed by the multimodal response generator as a sequence of actions (speech, gesture, etc.) 
to be performed by the embodied agent in order to achieve goals related to the communication 
or the task (pp. 44f.). Low-level output actions are scheduled by the agent’s motor controller, 
which is called the action scheduler (p. 45). Finally, the output devices of the architecture 
render the agent’s verbal and non-verbal behaviors as combinations of animation and recorded 
or synthetic speech. The processing modules of the architecture draw on a set of resources 
(shown at the bottom of Figure 53), including recognition and production models for speech, 
faces and facial displays, gaze patterns, and different kinds of gestures, body postures, and 
movement; a dialogue strategy which determines the allocation of control in the conversation; a 
continuously updated model of the ongoing dialogue; a profile of the user; and strategies for 
dealing with errors in the interaction. 
Although the architecture in Figure 53 shows a sequence of processing steps from perception 
to production, Cole et al. argued that embodied conversational agents actually have to be 
                                              
166  Propositional communicative acts add content to the conversation while interactional communicative 
acts are responsible for regulating the conversational process (Cassell et al. 2000b: 44). 
 
Figure 53. The architecture of an embodied conversational agent. Based on the architecture presented 
by Cassell et al. (1999, Figure 1; 2000b: 43, Figure 2.2) and Cassell (2000b: 75, Figure 2; 2001: 75, 
Figure 3; 2007: 359, Figure 17.6). 
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capable of real-time, simultaneous interpretation and production of auditory and visual 
conversational signals (Cole et al. 2003: 1401). While making its contribution to the dialogue, 
the agent must monitor and interpret the user’s behavior through both the auditory and visual 
channels to pick up indicators of the user’s reaction (e.g. agreement, confusion, or wish to 
interrupt), and while the user has the floor, the agent must interpret the combined verbal and 
non-verbal input from the user and at the same time respond with appropriate audio-visual 
feedback through its animated persona (p. 1402). 
Embodied conversational agents were originally used as a scientific instrument to study 
phenomena of face-to-face conversation, but they are also increasingly designed and deployed 
as tools for everyday people to interface with computers (Cassell 2007: 368), facilitating access 
to information and services, serving as advisors or representatives, or playing various roles in 
interactive learning environments (Johnson et al. 2000; Ryokai et al. 2003; Massaro 2005; Wise 
et al. 2007), among other things. One of the most faithful simulations of human face-to-face 
conversational behavior (given the current state of technology) has been implemented in REA 
(for “Real Estate Agent”), a female humanoid embodied conversational agent in the role of a 
realtor that engages its human interlocutors in a face-to-face house-selling dialogue (Cassell 
2000b; Cassell et al. 2000b; Cassell 2001; Cassell 2007). 
11.4  Summary 
This chapter discussed the design of the conversational capabilities of embodied interactive 
software agents. The major theme was the (embodied) conversational agent, which has the 
ability to participate verbally (and non-verbally) in dialogues with the user that rely on language 
or integrate it with modes of non-verbal communication, which were discussed in Chapter 10.1. 
Conversational agents have to be able to recognize and interpret, generate and express spoken 
or written messages in one or multiple languages. Hence, Section 11.1 reviewed the state of the 
art in different human language technologies, including speech recognition (cf. Section 11.1.1), 
speech synthesis (cf. Section 11.1.2), natural language understanding (cf. Section 11.1.3), and 
natural language generation (cf. Section 11.1.4). In addition, agent-user conversations may 
involve several channels (modalities) through which the participants may exchange messages. 
Multimodal interfaces, discussed in Section 11.2, provide the technologies for processing 
combined user inputs from at least two input modes in a coordinated fashion and for producing 
multimedia responses as output. 
Equipped with the necessary background on the technologies for processing natural language 
and multimodal inputs, several types of increasingly sophisticated conversational agents were 
discussed in Section 11.3. First, a summary of several fundamental principles (turn-taking, 
deixis, cooperativeness, and politeness) that allow human-human (and, by analogy, human-
agent) conversations to be conducted smoothly and effectively was provided in Section 11.3.1. 
Next, chatbots were introduced, i.e. computer programs that simulate text-based conversation, 
or chat, applying pattern-matching techniques to associate a given user input with a pre-scripted 
response (cf. Section 11.3.2). Dialogue agents (cf. Section 11.3.3) use more sophisticated 
speech and language processing technologies to enable more flexible and purposeful agent-user 
dialogues. These agents consist of an interpreter, a dialogue manager, and a response generator, 
which are supported by a set of resources for dialogue processing, including the dialogue 
strategy, the dialogue model, the user model, and mechanisms for error handling. Issues, 
options, and techniques involved in designing these processing stages and resources were 
reviewed in Section 11.3.3. Finally, Section 11.3.4 discussed embodied conversational agents, 
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which integrate multimodal input processing technologies and an articulate face and body to 
enable conversations between agents and users in which both parties can use combined verbal 
and non-verbal communicative behaviors that serve various functions in conversations. The 
architecture of an embodied conversational agent was presented and its elements were 
discussed. 
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12 Expertise 
People will be motivated to interact with agents which they perceive as being able to give them 
something useful. Often, these perceptible qualities of an agent (cf. Chapter 7.2) include some 
form of task-oriented or social expertise that may help the user in his or her current situation 
(Hayes-Roth 2004: 454). Expertise can be defined as a quality of individuals or systems that 
possess substantial knowledge or ability in a certain area, or domain, which enable them to 
make pertinent contributions to a situation, including advice, information, judgment, and action 
(Karlsen & Karlsen 2007, [INT 101]). Hence, agents communicating that they have some kind 
of expertise must be able to justify users’ perception of that expertise by delivering results and 
performance which the users expect. The expertise of agents may be of various kinds: 
• Encyclopedic. The agent can provide relevant information in sufficient breadth and depth 
when needed or requested. 
• Instructional. The agent can design and implement instruction for both human and agent 
learners that is challenging, understandable, comprehensive, and in line with principles and 
best practices of instructional design (cf. Chapter 2.2). 
• Problem-solving. The agent has the ability to find solutions to problems which are presented 
to it or which it identifies or creates on its own. 
• Social. The agent has competencies in (embodied) communication and relationship building. 
Pedagogical agents add value (cf. Chapter 7.1) to learners’ experience if they not only 
possess these kinds of expertise but also advertize them in such a way that learners perceive and 
make use of them. Depending on their instructional role (cf. Chapter 16), pedagogical agents 
rely on their encyclopedic, instructional, problem-solving, and/or social expertise to: 
• Provide information about the subject matter; 
• Create problems for the learner to solve; 
• Solve problems on their own and walk the learner through their solutions; 
• Analyze the learner’s behaviors and mistakes; 
• Determine the learner’s understanding of a topic; 
• Adapt subject matters and instructional methods to the learner; 
• Communicate effectively with the learner; 
• Build productive and lasting relationships with the learner. 
This list is a superset of the arsenal of instructional activities that is available to traditional 
(intelligent) computer-based tutors (cf. Chapter 2.3). Each of these activities poses considerable 
challenges for human instructors, and even more so for pedagogical agents, since they require 
capabilities including logical deduction and inference, creativity, learning, decision making, 
social and emotional intelligence (cf. Chapter 13.4), and language processing (cf. Chapter 11), 
which have been developed for intelligent machines in the field of artificial intelligence since 
the 1950s. 
The expertise of pedagogical agents is represented by a set of both pre-built and dynamically 
constructed knowledge sources, including a domain model representing an agent’s knowledge 
of its subject domain, a student model capturing the agent’s evolving view of the learner and his 
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or her development, and an instructor model embodying the agent’s instructional expertise.167 
Each of the highlighted models is covered in a separate section of this chapter, starting below 
with the domain model. 
12.1  The Domain Model 
One of the fundamental insights of artificial intelligence research is that intelligent behavior of 
any kind presupposes substantial knowledge (Cawsey 1998: 3). While the term ‘knowledge’ is 
commonplace and seems intuitively clear, a conclusive definition has eluded philosophers since 
the ancient Greeks (Brachman & Levesque 2004: 2), when Plato first postulated that for 
statements to become knowledge they have to be ‘justified,’ ‘true,’ and ‘believed’ ([INT 
102]).168 It is neither possible nor intended here to provide the final definition. For the purpose 
of the present work, knowledge can be defined as “information combined with experience, 
context, interpretation, and reflection (…) that is ready to apply to decisions and actions” 
(Davenport et al. 1998: 43). Knowledge can be classified along several dimensions, which are 
described in Table 17. 
It is important to distinguish knowledge from another related notion, belief, which concerns 
the individual’s mental perspective on reality, in particular the propositions that he or she holds 
to be true ([INT 103]; [INT 104]). Given Plato’s definition of knowledge as “justified true 
belief,” at least two conditions have to be fulfilled for a belief to become knowledge: it must be 
consistent with reality (i.e. true), and there must be a plausible reason (or justification) for the 
belief (e.g. empirical evidence or a sound argument) (Russell & Norvig 2003: 343; [INT 103]; 
[INT 104]). 
Knowledge is the key ingredient when developing the cognitive component169 of pedagogical 
agents and other intelligent systems. The cognitive component or ‘brain’ consists of the set of 
computational models and procedures which through their interplay enable behavior that 
manifests the expertise of the agent or system. All agents require some sort of representation 
that accumulates, structures, and encodes the knowledge which the agent has about its area of 
expertise (or domain). The agent’s domain model contains (expert) knowledge about: 
• Objects (physical entities and abstract concepts); 
• Facts (relationships between or among concepts or entities); 
                                              
167  While these components are similar to those found in an intelligent tutoring system (cf. Chapter 
2.3.3), this is not intended to suggest that ‘tutor’ is the only role that pedagogical agents can play in 
interactions with learners (although tutor agents have been built in many research projects). In fact, 
there are various other roles for pedagogical agents, and some examples will be discussed in Chapter 
16. To avoid confusion, the term “instructor model” will be used instead of “tutor model” in this 
chapter. 
168  For a long time, Plato’s view of knowledge as “justified true belief” enjoyed considerable popularity. 
However, in the 1960s, it was challenged by the American philosopher Edmund Gettier, who gave 
several counterexamples illustrating beliefs that, while true and justified, intuitively would not be 
regarded as knowledge (Gettier 1963, [INT 103]). 
169  Cognition is not the only mental information processing system that is vital to the functioning of an 
intelligent agent. As argued in Chapter 6.4, cognition is both influenced by and influences another 
system, affect, which provides rapid and continuous positive or negative assessments of events and 
situations. Emotion and personality are two central elements of the affective system of an agent. 
They will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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• Events (things that happen in a certain place at a certain time and for a certain period); 
• Procedures (knowledge about how to do different things); 
• Knowledge (metaknowledge about the amount, reliability, sources, etc. of knowledge). 
All of these aspects pertain to the agent itself, its environment, or its task (role). To be able 
to navigate in a learning environment and manipulate or refer to its objects, a pedagogical agent 
has to know about the objects in the environment, their attributes and spatial properties. Task 
knowledge includes both know-how for performing tasks in the domain and knowledge that 
allows the agent to explain, give hints, and answer learners’ questions about the steps involved 
in the relevant procedures (Rickel & Johnson 1999). Thus, the knowledge of a pedagogical 
agent has to be deeper than the knowledge of agents that only have to carry out domain tasks 
Table 17. Dimensions of knowledge. 
Declarative ÅÆ Procedural
Declarative (or Propositional) Knowledge Procedural Knowledge (or Know-How) 
Knowledge about the truth (or falsehood) of a 
given statement (or proposition) ([INT 105]) 
Knowledge about how to perform an activity or 
accomplish a task ([INT 106]) 
A Priori ÅÆ A Posteriori
A Priori Knowledge A Posteriori (or Empirical) Knowledge 
Knowledge acquired independently of 
experience in the world ([INT 103]) 
Knowledge acquired from experience in the world 
(e.g. through experimentation, observation, etc.) 
([INT 103]) 
Factual ÅÆ Inferential
Factual Knowledge (or Know-What) Inferential Knowledge 
Knowledge consisting of verified statements 
about things that are the case or have occurred 
(i.e. facts) 
Knowledge derived by reasoning about existing 
facts or other inferred knowledge ([INT 105]) 
Domain(-Specific) ÅÆ Domain-Independent
Domain(-Specific) Knowledge Domain-Independent Knowledge 
Knowledge particular to a pre-determined 
subject area (or domain) ([INT 107]) 
Knowledge that can be applied across domains 
([INT 107]) 
Expert ÅÆ Common Sense
Expert Knowledge Common Sense Knowledge 
Knowledge extracted from individuals with 
special knowledge and skills in a particular 
domain (“domain experts”) ([INT 101]) 
Knowledge that (almost) every human being is 
supposed to have ([INT 108]) 
Situated ÅÆ General
Situated Knowledge General Knowledge 
Knowledge that pertains to a specific situation; 
often part of language, culture, or traditions 
([INT 102]) 
Knowledge that can be used in various situations 
Explicit ÅÆ Tacit
Explicit (or Codified) Knowledge Tacit Knowledge 
Knowledge that can be articulated, formalized, 
stored, and transmitted to others ([INT 109]) 
Knowledge that cannot be articulated or recorded 
but has to be acquired through training or personal 
experience ([INT 110]) 
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because it additionally has to be able to make the principles and relationships underlying its 
actions explicit to the learner (Johnson 1998; Johnson et al. 2000). 
The construction of domain models for agents requires careful consideration and application 
of effective techniques for several knowledge-related activities, which are discussed in the 
subsections below: 
• Acquisition. How to extract knowledge from individuals, data, and experience; 
• Representation. How to organize, structure, and encode knowledge in order to facilitate 
acquisition and use; 
• Use. How to apply the represented knowledge in problem solving. 
12.1.1  Knowledge Acquisition 
Building domain models is among the more challenging aspects of agent development. The 
desired knowledge is typically not available in a form which agents can use directly. In fact, it 
is normally buried in the minds of human domain experts, in textbooks, in databases or corpora, 
and has to be elicited, collected, analyzed, modeled, and validated ([INT 111]) so that it can be 
represented in a knowledge base170 and used by artificial agents. This is the realm of knowledge 
acquisition (Marcus 2001; Potter 2001; Milton 2007), which has been defined as 
the process of acquiring (either directly from a human or from some other source) that 
information, and its formalized structure, that will allow some particular task to be performed by 
a computer system. In AI [(artificial intelligence)], structured information of this sort is 
commonly termed ‘knowledge’ (…) (Potter 2001: 1). 
12.1.1.1 Knowledge Engineering 
Traditionally, knowledge acquisition has been the task of knowledge engineers, professionals 
who extract domain knowledge from human experts and translate it into a knowledge base for 
an agent or other intelligent system (Cawsey 1998: 40–44; Studer et al. 1998; Russell & Norvig 
2003: 260–266; Kendal & Creen 2007). Based on his or her inquiry into a particular domain, a 
knowledge engineer identifies important domain concepts and develops a formal model of the 
domain that captures the discovered concepts and their relationships (Russell & Norvig 2003: 
260). Eventually, this model is implemented as the knowledge base of the agent or system.171 A 
number of issues tend to make the knowledge engineering process difficult ([INT 111]): 
                                              
170  A knowledge base is a database in which domain knowledge can be collected and organized for later 
retrieval by humans and/or machines ([INT 112]). In the present work, the term is synonymous with 
“domain model” (cf. Chapter 11.1.3.2.4). 
171  Originally, knowledge engineers were specialists in the field of artificial intelligence concerned with 
the development of expert systems (Cawsey 1998: Chapter 3; Jackson 1999), i.e. software systems 
designed to aid in problem solving or decision making in a particular area of human expertise, such 
as medicine, business, and education, by making inferences from the knowledge of domain experts 
represented in the system’s knowledge base as an extensive collection of IF-THEN rules (cf. Section 
12.1.2.4) and (in some systems) frames (cf. Section 12.1.2.3) (Cawsey 1998: 41; Kleinedler 2001: 
100f.; [INT 113]). 
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• Knowledge in the minds of experts is not directly accessible. 
• Experts know a lot about their domain. How broad and deep should this knowledge be 
modeled for the target application? 
• Much expert knowledge is tacit in nature, i.e. experts are not aware of everything they know. 
In general, tacit knowledge is very difficult to make explicit and to formalize. 
• Expert time is valuable and expensive, but extracting knowledge from an expert can be a 
time-consuming process. 
• The knowledge of individual experts about a given domain may be vast, but it is still 
incomplete. How does a knowledge engineer know what pieces are missing and where he or 
she can obtain them? 
• Knowledge tends to move from current to out-dated to obsolete at an ever faster rate. Hence, 
regular updates of the knowledge base become essential. 
Knowledge engineering processes typically involve the following steps (Russell & Norvig 
2003: 261f.): 
1. Identify the task. Different tasks require the representation of different knowledge in order 
for the agent or system to be able to produce solutions to specific problems with the help of 
the knowledge base. 
2. Assemble the relevant knowledge. The knowledge engineer extracts knowledge about the 
domain from external sources (human experts, scientific publications, operating manuals, the 
World Wide Web, etc.) or from his or her own expertise. 
3. Decide on a representation vocabulary. The knowledge engineer develops a vocabulary 
(ontology) of terms and constructs for describing the concepts, attributes, relationships, and 
constraints in the domain (cf. Section 12.1.2.5). 
4. Encode general knowledge of the domain. The knowledge engineer codifies the basic rules 
of the domain, specifying the meaning of all the terms in the ontology. Domain experts can 
then check this specification to uncover misconceptions or gaps that need to be addressed by 
going back to the previous step. 
5. Encode a specific problem instance. The knowledge engineer provides a description of a 
particular problem from the domain, about which the system will be queried. 
6. Pose queries to the inference procedure. The knowledge base is tested by sending queries to 
the inference procedure, which works with the general domain knowledge and the particular 
facts of the problem to produce an answer. 
7. Debug the knowledge base. Responses based on a given state of the knowledge base will be 
mechanically correct but may indicate gaps and errors in the represented knowledge that 
have to be corrected by the knowledge engineer. 
A wide range of knowledge acquisition techniques have been developed to help knowledge 
engineers to elicit knowledge from an expert. The most common techniques are shown in 
Figure 54 and described below ([INT 111]): 
• Interviews are one-to-one social interactions between an expert and a knowledge engineer in 
which the engineer asks the expert questions about his or her area of expertise (Potter 2001: 
2f.; [INT 114], cf. Chapter 15.4.5.2). The interview can be unstructured (following some 
general themes but lacking a pre-defined structure), semi-structured (combining a pre-
determined schedule with the possibility to explore topics outside the schedule that emerge 
during the interview), or structured (working through a pre-defined catalogue of questions). 
• Laddering constructs, modifies, and validates ladders, i.e. hierarchical network diagrams 
(tree structures), such as taxonomies ([INT 115]; [INT 116]). 
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• Process mapping constructs networks that capture the tasks involved in a process plus their 
associated inputs, outputs, resources, roles, and decisions ([INT 115]; [INT 117]). 
• State diagram mapping builds, manipulates, and validates network diagrams that consist of 
nodes corresponding to different states of a domain concept, and links indicating events or 
processes that lead to a change of state ([INT 115]; [INT 117]). 
• Teach back has the expert comment on descriptions of previously acquired knowledge given 
by the knowledge engineer in order to detect misunderstandings ([INT 114]). 
• Concept mapping creates semantic-network-like structures (cf. Section 12.1.2.2) that capture 
domain concepts (nodes) and their relationships (labeled links) ([INT 115]; [INT 117]). 
• Constrained tasks. The expert performs one of his or her daily tasks, but the time and/or 
information available for the task are restricted ([INT 118]). 
• 20-questions. The expert asks the knowledge engineer a series of yes-no questions to find 
out what domain-related concept the engineer is thinking about. The experts’ questions and 
the order in which they appear reveal important concepts and properties of the domain in a 
prioritized order ([INT 118]). 
• Observation. The knowledge engineer watches and documents the expert’s performance of 
his or her daily tasks (cf. Chapter 15.4.5.3). It is also possible to make a video recording of 
the performance ([INT 114]). 
• Commentary. The expert accompanies his or her own or someone else’s performance of a 
domain task with a running commentary ([INT 114]). 
• Repertory grid. This matrix-based technique involves representing a set of domain concepts 
and a set of attributes that differentiate between them in a two-dimensional grid; rating all 
concepts against all attributes on a scale; and grouping similar concepts and attributes based 
on cluster analysis. The resulting focus grid is explained to the domain expert in order to 
obtain feedback and further information about the groupings and correlations displayed in 
the grid (Crowther et al. 1995; [INT 119]). 
• Triadic elicitation involves randomly selecting three domain concepts and asking the expert 
to pick two of them that he or she considers very similar and to articulate what makes them 
similar and what distinguishes them from the third concept. The goal of this technique is to 
elicit attributes that are otherwise difficult to obtain from the expert ([INT 120]). 
 
Figure 54. Knowledge acquisition techniques and the types of knowledge they are intended to elicit. 
Adapted from ([INT 111]). 
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• Card sorting. The expert is asked to repeatedly sort cards labeled with domain concepts into 
piles of cards that share certain properties. When asked to label each pile, the expert uses 
attributes and values that make up the properties of domain concepts ([INT 120]). 
Despite support provided by automated tools (Marcus 2001: 429), knowledge engineering is 
still a time-consuming and error-prone, largely manual process, which may not be feasible for 
domains involving knowledge that is extensive, ill-defined, unknown, or dynamically changing. 
An alternative to crafting knowledge bases by hand is to enable agents and other systems to 
acquire or enhance their knowledge and capabilities on their own, with or without human 
supervision, by using machine learning algorithms. 
12.1.1.2 Machine Learning 
Machine learning (Langley 1996; Nilsson 1996; Mitchell 1997; Cawsey 1998: Chapter 7; 
Mooney 2003; Alpaydin 2004) is a field of study within artificial intelligence whose goal is to 
give artificial agents and other computer-based machines the ability to learn, i.e. to make 
changes to their internal structure, program, or data as they acquire knowledge and experience, 
which enable them to perform better in the same or similar situations in the future (Nilsson 
1996: 1). ‘Change’ can either mean that existing systems or components are improved or that 
new ones with better capabilities are synthesized (p. 2). Paraphrasing Nilsson, machine learning 
techniques may be used to enhance the performance of all components of an artificial agent, 
including perception, environment modeling, planning and reasoning, and action computation 
(p. 2). Various reasons for exploring machine learning in agents and other intelligent systems 
can be identified (p. 3): 
• The only way to define some tasks satisfactorily is by giving many examples pairing inputs 
and desired outputs. By learning the patterns implicit in these examples, agents can produce 
expected results for whole classes of inputs, including instances that were not part of the 
initial set of examples. 
• Machine learning methods can uncover hidden relationships and correlations in data in 
processes called data mining (Hand et al. 2001; Hearst 2003) or knowledge discovery in 
databases (Frawley et al. 1992; Fayyad et al. 1996). 
• It may not be possible to anticipate all aspects of the target environment while an agent is 
being designed. Machine learning can help agents to improve themselves “on the job.” 
• It may not be feasible to acquire the vast amounts of knowledge available or relevant in a 
particular domain by means of knowledge engineering. Equipping agents to learn this 
knowledge piece by piece on their own through automatic processing would be a more 
effective and efficient alternative to human encoding. 
• Agents may be situated in environments that change with the progression of time. If they 
could adapt to such dynamic changes in their environment, there would be less need for 
developers to constantly modify their design. 
• In realistic scenarios, both knowledge and the vocabularies (ontologies) for its description 
are growing and changing all the time. Constant hand-encoded updates to accommodate new 
or changed knowledge and vocabulary are not practical. The hope is that machine learning 
techniques can help agents to stay up-to-date. 
Machine learning subsumes a wide range of computational techniques that have the common 
goal of improving the future performance of computer-based systems on particular tasks by 
acquiring knowledge from previous cases, experience, or exploration, among other sources 
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(Cawsey 1998: 181; Mooney 2003: 376). The acquired knowledge is represented in terms of 
various kinds of computational formalisms, including functions (relations mapping from inputs 
to desired outputs), logic programs and sets of rules, finite-state transition networks, grammars 
(cf. Chapter 11.1.3), and problem-solving systems (cf. Section 12.1.3) (Nilsson 1996: 5). Often, 
the term “machine learning” is reserved for techniques that use such declarative, symbolic 
formats to represent the results of learning, which excludes statistical or neural-network training 
algorithms that produce numerical output, like those used, for example, in speech recognition 
(cf. Chapter 11.1.1.2) (Mooney 2003: 376). However, the following list summarizes both 
symbolic and non-symbolic techniques for machine learning: 
• Rote learning (“learning by memorization”). Learning that memorizes (i.e. organizes and 
stores) information obtained from the environment to retrieve it later, without processing this 
information further. 
• Induction. Learning that generalizes from examples in order to be able to correctly process 
unseen future examples (Russell & Norvig 2003: Chapter 18). Inductive learning has been 
the focus of most efforts in the field of machine learning so far (Cawsey 1998: 144). 
Often, there will be multiple possible generalizations, or hypotheses, to choose from, that 
are all consistent with the example data. Therefore, inductive machine learning algorithms 
require a basis for making a choice among these alternative hypotheses. The term bias is 
commonly used to refer to a priori information that enables a learning agent to select one 
generalization over another if a choice cannot be made on other grounds (Dietterich & Kong 
1995; Nilsson 1996: 10–13). 
All inductive learning algorithms depend on the size and the quality of the input data used 
for learning (the training set). To achieve good results in inductive learning, as demonstrated 
by the system’s performance on a test set of unseen examples, the learning algorithm needs a 
large and representative collection of training data plus appropriate predictive features (i.e. 
features which are particularly suitable as indicators of desirable results). In other words, in 
practical learning situations, the particular machine learning technique chosen may be less 
important than the quality of the data available for training (Cawsey 1998: 164f.). 
• Deduction. Learning that reasons about existing knowledge to derive ‘new’ facts that can be 
concluded from it based on principles of logic. For example, if both A = B and B = C are 
known, A = C can be deduced (transitivity). 
• Supervised learning. Learning an unknown function from a set of examples (supplied by a 
‘teacher’) that pair inputs with desired outputs of the function (Russell & Norvig 2003: 650). 
• Unsupervised learning. Learning an unknown function from a set of input patterns but 
without information about which outputs are desirable or correct. Agents learning entirely 
without supervision do not know which actions are ‘correct’ or which states are ‘desirable’ 
and thus are unable to learn which actions to take or which states to achieve (Russell & 
Norvig 2003: 650). 
• Reinforcement learning. Learning in which the agent is not explicitly taught what to do but 
receives (positive or negative) feedback on its performance that serves to reinforce desired 
outputs (reward) and to inhibit undesired ones (punishment) (Russell & Norvig 2003: 650, 
cf. Chapter 2.2.1). 
• Speedup learning. Learning how to perform a previously mastered task more efficiently 
(faster) from experience, by remembering and analyzing previous performances of the task 
(Tadepalli & Natarjan 1996; Dietterich 2003; Fern 2007). 
• Analogy. Learning in which knowledge from one domain is transferred to another based on 
the observation that there are certain structural similarities between the two domains. 
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• Clustering. Learning that assigns the items of a data set to subsets (clusters) whose members 
share certain properties, such as similarity or proximity according to some distance measure. 
Clustering is a form of unsupervised, inductive learning ([INT 121]). 
• Decision tree induction. Learning that induces the simplest decision tree (cf. Section 12.2.1) 
which represents the relevant generalizations from the example data and allows the correct 
classification of both old and new examples (Cawsey 1998: 150–153; Mooney 2003: 379ff.). 
• Discovery. Learning without supervision or a pre-defined goal, that combines deductive and 
inductive methods. 
• Genetic algorithms. Learning that is based on the ideas of “natural selection” and “survival 
of the fittest” from evolutionary biology. The starting point for a genetic algorithm is a 
population of candidate solutions to a problem. In each of a series of generations, the ‘fittest’ 
(best) solutions are selected (based on an evaluation of their performance), mutated, and 
combined to produce ‘offspring’ (i.e. new solutions) that form a new, more evolved 
population with which the process is repeated (Cawsey 1998: 153–156, [INT 122]). 
• Artificial neural networks (ANNs). Learning that involves training networks which link a 
large number of simple processing units by means of weighted connections. All units in such 
a network operate in parallel without a central control mechanism. The learning process 
modifies the weights on the connections and thus influences the future operation of the 
network (Cawsey 1998: 156–163, cf. Chapter 11.1.1.2 and Section 12.2.1). 
The machine learning techniques chosen are preferably compatible with and complementary 
to the efforts of the knowledge engineer (cf. Section 12.1.1.1). Whether hand-coded or derived 
automatically, the acquired knowledge then has to be refined, debugged, and reorganized in 
several successive cycles in order to improve the efficiency and accuracy of the agent or 
program. 
12.1.2  Knowledge Representation 
The majority of research in the history of artificial intelligence has been based on the (physical) 
symbol system hypothesis (Newell & Simon 1976; Copeland 1993: Chapter 4; Simon 1996), 
according to which 
[a] physical symbol system [(e.g. a computer or a human being)] has the necessary and sufficient 
means for general intelligent action. (Newell & Simon 1976: 116). 
This hypothesis implies that artificial agents and other computer-based systems can achieve 
intelligent behavior by manipulating structures that represent items of knowledge in terms of 
combinations of symbols standing for entities and relationships between these entities in the 
domain (Cawsey 1998: 9; Russell & Norvig 2003: 18).172 For example, the symbol berlin may 
be used to denote a particular city, the symbol germany to label a particular country, and the 
symbol Capital(x,y) to express the relationship between a city x and a country y, that the 
former is the capital of the latter. Hence, the symbol structure Capital(berlin,germany) (in 
                                              
172  See Chapter 14.1.2 for a discussion of a more recent, alternative approach to the computation of 
intelligent behavior that relies less on the manipulation of internal symbolic representations and more 
on the interaction between an agent and its environment, combining simple behaviors bottom-up into 
more complex behaviors. 
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predicate-argument notation, cf. Section 12.1.2.1) captures the fact that the capital of Germany 
is Berlin. 
The symbol structures encoding the knowledge that an agent or system has about its domain 
are stored in its knowledge base or domain model. To facilitate encoding domain-related 
knowledge, various knowledge representation languages (KRLs) have been developed (Cawsey 
1998: Chapter 2; Russell & Norvig 2003: Chapter 10; Brachman & Levesque 2004). In general, 
a KRL should provide a formalism in which facts of adequate complexity can be represented in 
a way that is unambiguous and accurate but also comprehensible, and furthermore facilitates the 
derivation of representations capturing new facts from representations of existing knowledge 
(Cawsey 1998: 10). To achieve this, a knowledge representation language requires (p. 12): 
• Representational adequacy. It should be possible to represent the whole range of knowledge 
required by the application in a structured way that facilitates reasoning with the knowledge. 
• Inferential adequacy. The language should support inferences from represented knowledge 
to derive new facts. 
• Inferential efficiency. Making inferences from existing knowledge should require as little 
time and as few computational resources as possible. 
• Clear syntax and semantics. Every expression in the language should have a well-defined 
structure and meaning. 
• Naturalness. It should be easy for humans to understand and use the language. 
Four173 major families of symbolic knowledge representation languages have been used in 
the field of artificial intelligence: logic, semantic networks, frames and scripts, and rules. These 
formalisms are discussed in the subsections below. A final subsection explores the possibility of 
creating knowledge representations outside an agent by adding semantic annotations to the 
agent’s environment. 
12.1.2.1 Logic 
Formal logic, especially predicate logic and its derivatives, was one of the first schemes for the 
representation of knowledge used in the field of artificial intelligence (McCarthy 1958), and its 
role as the most important knowledge representation language for intelligent systems continues 
(Cawsey 1998: 20). Logic is fundamental in the sense that representations in other formalisms 
(semantic networks, frames, scripts, and rules) can be translated into equivalent logical 
formulae with relative ease (p. 37). 
Predicate (or first-order) logic (Cawsey 1998: 20–29; Russell & Norvig 2003: Chapters 8–9; 
Brachman & Levesque 2004: Chapter 2) represents facts in terms of predications, i.e. symbol 
structures that express a property of a single entity or a relationship among several entities. The 
property or relationship is encoded by the predicate whose argument(s) denote the entity or 
entities involved (Cruse 2000: 19). For example, the predication Hate(john,milk) consists of the 
predicate Hate(x,y), which, in turn, takes two arguments, john and milk. The internal structure 
of predications represents the structure of the particular state of affairs in the world which they 
describe. In particular, the order of arguments in a predication is important: Hate(john,milk) and 
                                              
173  It can be argued that frames and scripts are essentially a variant of semantic networks (Cawsey 1998: 
16), so there are only three major approaches to the symbolic representation of knowledge. However, 
for expository reasons, frames and scripts are discussed separately from semantic networks in this 
chapter. 
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?Hate(milk,john) make two different statements about the world, the latter of which is doubtful 
(indicated by the ‘?’) because it contradicts common-sense knowledge. 
Depending on the number of arguments involved, a distinction is made between one-place, 
two-place, three-place, and n-place predicates, which take one, two, three, and n arguments, 
respectively (Cruse 2000: 20). Expressions in predicate logic may also use quantifiers, i.e. 
operators that allow the formulation of statements about all, some, or none of the (anonymous) 
entities (represented by variables x, y, etc.) in a given collection (Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 
517ff.; Russell & Norvig 2003: 249–253). The set of quantifiers includes the universal 
quantifier ∀ (implies universality; the expression affected by the quantifier holds for all 
entities), the existential quantifier ∃ (implies existence; the expression holds for at least one 
entity), and the negative quantifier ¬ (implies non-existence; there is no entity for which the 
expression holds). Furthermore, logical connectives are used to combine simple predications 
into expressions describing more complex states of affairs. The set of connectives comprises ∧ 
(conjunction, “and”), ∨ (disjunction, “or”), ↔ (equivalence, “if and only if”), → (implication, 
“if .. then”), and ¬ (negation, “not”) (Cawsey 1998: 21; Russell & Norvig 2003: 204ff.). 
Several facts and their representations in predicate logic are listed in Table 18. 
Predicate logic provides a formal language, based on the notion of truth (i.e. statements can 
either be true or false), in which facts about the world can be expressed in terms of statements 
about entities and the relationships between them, which can be generalized to entire collections 
of entities. The syntax and semantics of this language are well-understood, so the structure and 
meaning of statements formulated in predicate logic are clear (Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: 
157). Proof systems based on predicate logic are sound (i.e. everything that is concluded 
follows from the premises) and complete (i.e. everything that follows from the premises can be 
derived) (pp. 157f.). Automated reasoners can use them to reveal implicit knowledge by 
drawing conclusions (inferences) from the facts that are explicitly represented in the knowledge 
base (p. 13). One of the most important inference rules in logic is modus ponens (if-then 
Table 18. Some facts and their representation in predicate logic. 
Fact Representation in Predicate Logic Description 
John is human. Human(john) “The entity ‘john’ is human.” 
Humans are mortal. ∀x(Human(x) → Mortal(x)) “For all x, it holds that if x is 
human then x is mortal.” 
Robins are birds. ∀x(Robin(x) → Bird(x)) “For all x, it holds that if x is a 
robin then x is a bird.” 
Birds have wings. ∀x(Bird(x) → Have_wings(x)) “For all x, it holds that if x is a 
bird then x has wings.” 
Berlin is the capital 
of Germany. 
Capital(berlin,germany) “The entity ‘berlin’ is the capital 
of the entity ‘germany’.” 
The yellow box is 
between the red box 
and the green box. 
Between(yellow_box,red_box,green_box) “The entity ‘yellow_box’ is 
between the entity ‘red_box’ and 
the entity ‘green_box’.” 
Vampires do not 
exist. 
¬x(Vampire(x)) “There is no x for which it holds 
that x is a vampire.” 
All books are written 
by at least one 
author. 
∀x∃y(Book(x) → (Author(y) ∧ 
Write(y,x))) 
“For all x, it holds that there is a 
y such that if x is a book then y 
is an author and y wrote x.” 
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reasoning) (Cawsey 1998: 22; Jurafsky & Martin 2000: 520; Russell & Norvig 2003: 211). It is 
defined as follows (p and q stand for logical formulae; ⇒ means ‘yields’ or ‘proves’): 
(p ∧ p → q) ⇒ q 
(Human(john) ∧ ∀x(Human(x) → Mortal(x)) ⇒ Mortal(john) 
According to modus ponens, the formula on the right of ⇒ can be derived from the formula 
in brackets on the left in the following way: if the knowledge base has the antecedent (p) of an 
implication rule (p → q), it is possible to infer the consequent of the rule (q) (Jurafsky & Martin 
2000: 520). In the example, given the knowledge that John is human and that all humans are 
mortal, it can be inferred that John is also mortal. There are two practical uses of modus ponens 
(pp. 520f., cf. Section 12.1.2.4): 
• Forward chaining. The reasoner automatically adds more facts to the knowledge base by 
applying all implication rules matching a new fact. 
• Backward chaining. The reasoner proves query formulae not contained in the knowledge 
base by showing the truth of the antecedent of any implication rule whose consequent 
matches the query formula. 
Apart from inferring implicit knowledge, automated proof systems based on logic are also 
useful for identifying inconsistencies in the knowledge base (e.g. the inconsistency of having 
*(Male(john) ∧ Female(john))), and for helping intelligent agents in decision making and 
action selection (Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: 14). The possibility for an agent to explain 
chains of reasoning that underlie its action or answer (by going backwards through the sequence 
of inference steps) makes the agent’s reasoning processes transparent to the user (p. 14), which 
is an important aspect of several instructional interactions of pedagogical agents (cf. Section 
12.3) and a highly desirable feature in other domains that involve the user delegating tasks to 
and thus having to trust the agent, such as electronic commerce (cf. Chapter 3.2.2). 
Predicate logic is sufficiently expressive to allow the representation of a wide range of 
reasonably complex declarative knowledge. In addition, it provides a well-defined syntax and 
semantics, as well as sound and complete proof systems that facilitate efficient inferences from 
existing knowledge using automated reasoning tools (Cawsey 1998: 12 + 20; Russell & Norvig 
2003: 240). While other logics are more expressive than predicate logic, computing inferences 
from their representations is generally more expensive and in certain cases even impossible 
(Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: 14). 
However, predicate logic cannot be recommended as a knowledge representation language 
without some reservations. First, if the application involves only simple facts and inferences, 
the expressive and inferential power of a logic-based system may be overkill (Cawsey 1998: 
12). A simpler language, for example one based on frames (cf. Section 12.1.2.3) or rules (cf. 
Section 12.1.2.4), may be more than sufficient for these applications (p. 13). Another problem 
arises with respect to the possibilities of knowledge organization. Logic-based (as well as rule-
based) knowledge representations are flat, i.e. they consist of unstructured collections of self-
contained statements that can be interpreted without referring to other statements. As a result, 
collecting all available knowledge about a particular entity or class of entities becomes difficult 
because it may be scattered among numerous statements that have no obvious relation to each 
other (Brachman & Levesque 2004: 135). In contrast, semantic networks (cf. Section 12.1.2.2), 
frames, and scripts (cf. Section 12.1.2.3) provide structures that organize knowledge about 
entities, classes, or activities in a way that clearly indicates which items of a representation 
relate to which entity, class, or activity. 
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A third issue concerns limitations of the expressive power of predicate logic. There are 
certain types of knowledge that are difficult to represent in predicate logic (Cawsey 1998: 27; 
Brachman & Levesque 2004: 44): 
• Statistical facts. Statements that hold for all, none, or at least one member of a set are 
straightforward in predicate logic; however, it is much harder to specify subsets that can be 
quantified more or less precisely (e.g. “half of the students,” “most of the instructors,” and 
“almost none of the laboratory staff”). 
• Uncertainty. In complex, dynamic, or inaccessible environments, agents will always operate 
under uncertainty, i.e. lack of complete knowledge (Russell & Norvig 2003: 462), due to 
both laziness (rules without exceptions are too difficult to develop and apply) and theoretical 
(there is no complete theory for the application domain) or practical ignorance (not all 
pertinent information has been or can be obtained) (pp. 463f.). As a result, the agent can only 
have a certain degree of belief in the truth of statements (e.g. “Fuel prices will rise next 
month”), which is expressed as a probability between 0 and 1 (p. 464). Degree of belief 
cannot be captured by predicate logic. 
• Fuzzy knowledge. Vague descriptions and the extent to which they apply to entities in the 
domain constitute another problem for predicate logic (Russell & Norvig 2003: 526). For 
example, the predication Tall(john) states that a certain individual with the name John is 
‘tall.’ The problem is that the word ‘tall’ used as the label of the predicate does not define a 
clearly demarcated category of sizes for which the predicate is true. In other words, tallness 
is a matter of degree, and so is the truth of the statement Tall(john) (p. 526). In predicate 
logic, however, this statement can only be either true or false, i.e. either John is a member of 
the set of tall people or not. Fuzzy logic (Zadeh 1965) is a theory of multi-valued logic (as 
opposed to binary predicate logic) that provides a way to reason with logical statements like 
Tall(john), which denote membership in a vaguely defined (fuzzy) set of entities. In this 
framework, Tall(x) would be regarded as a fuzzy predicate, and Tall(john) would be assigned 
a number between 0 and 1 that represents its degree of truth (Russell & Norvig 2003: 526f., 
[INT 123]). 
• Default and prototypical knowledge. Certain facts are normally (assumed to be) true, unless 
(or until) there is contradictory evidence. Examples include “Exchange students speak 
English,” “Computers have one central processing unit,” and “People applying for Job X 
have Qualification Y.” It is difficult to create statements in predicate logic which are initially 
held to be true but may turn out to be false, or which have exceptions. 
• Propositional attitudes. Predicate logic does not provide adequate means for agents to 
represent and reason about what they (or other agents) believe, know, or want, i.e. their 
mental attitudes (or those of other agents) toward a statement (or proposition) (Russell & 
Norvig 2003: 341). The reality of certain propositional attitudes for an agent does not 
necessarily mean that the outside world concurs with them. For example, John may believe 
that pigs can fly, but they cannot; Mary may know that London is the capital of Australia, 
but it is not; or Paul may not want Linda to know that he loves her, but she does. 
• Time. There is no straightforward way to represent time using predicate logic. Expressions in 
predicate logic generally do not provide temporal information, so Write(peter,letter), for 
example, could mean “Peter wrote a letter,” “Peter is writing a letter,” or “Peter will write a 
letter.” One way to address this problem is to add temporal variables and temporal predicates 
to the representation. Temporal variables capture the time interval and the end point of that 
interval that are associated with a given event. Temporal predicates like Precedes indicate 
how the end point of the interval is related to the current time (represented by the constant 
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Now). For events in the past, Precedes(e,Now) locates the end point before the current time, 
whereas Precedes(Now,e) states that the current time precedes the end point of a future 
event. For present events, the current time lies within the time interval of the event (Jurafsky 
& Martin 2000: 528). The first logical system for the representation of time was temporal 
logic, which is based on the assumption that logical statements are true at particular points or 
intervals of time, which are ordered (Russell & Norvig 2003: 244). In this framework, a set 
of modal operators is applied to logical statements to indicate, for example, that a statement 
(proposition) p will be true at all times in the future (□p) or at some time in the future (◊p) 
(p. 364). 
• Change. Another point of criticism concerns the ‘static’ nature of predicate logic. In a given 
interpretation, statements in predicate logic are either true or false and keep their truth value, 
regardless of what changes occur in the world or in an individual’s beliefs about the world 
(Brachman & Levesque 2004: 285). However, agents need to consider both sorts of changes: 
they have to reason about a changing environment, and they may have to revise (change) 
some of their beliefs about the environment. Situation calculus (Russell & Norvig 2003: 
328–340; Brachman & Levesque 2004: Chapter 14) is a dialect of predicate logic that allows 
to represent an agent’s beliefs about a changing world (Brachman & Levesque 2004: 286). 
In this framework, change occurs when an action takes an agent from a given static situation 
to a new situation. For example, if a robot picks up a bucket of water, that action takes it 
from one situation (not holding the bucket) to another (holding the bucket) (p. 286). Three 
basic elements are involved in expressions used in situation calculus (Russell & Norvig 
2003: 329; Brachman & Levesque 2004: 286f.; [INT 124]): 
• Actions that can be carried out in the environment (e.g. Pickup(r,x) “robot r picking up 
object x”); 
• Fluents, i.e. predicates and functions with (possibly) different values across situations, 
which represent what is true in a given situation (e.g. Holding(r,x,s) “robot r holding 
object x in situation s”); 
• Situations consisting of histories of situations, where each situation results from applying 
an action to the previous situation. The initial situation to which the first action is applied 
is called S0. A function Do(a,s) maps from an action a performed in situation s to a certain 
resulting situation. For example, Do(Pickup(r,b2),Do(Pickup(r,b1),S0)) is a situation term 
corresponding to the situation resulting from robot r first picking up object b1 in the initial 
situation S0 and then picking up object b2 in the following situation. 
12.1.2.2 Semantic Networks 
The term semantic network (Collins & Quillian 1969; Cawsey 1998: 14f.; Russell & Norvig 
2003: 350ff.; Brachman & Levesque 2004: Chapter 10174) refers to a group of knowledge 
representation formalisms which have in common that they represent knowledge as a network 
of labeled nodes and arcs (or links). The nodes in the network stand for concepts (entities, 
events, and states) of the domain. Arcs represent the relations between concept nodes (Cawsey 
1998: 14). There can be various such relationships, like the taxonomic IS-A relation (e.g. 
CANARY IS-A BIRD), the property-assigning HAS relation (e.g. ROBIN HAS WINGS), and the 
                                              
174  Brachman and Levesque used the term “inheritance network” (Brachman & Levesque 2004: 188), 
which emphasizes the possibility of inheritance reasoning enabled by these networks (see below). 
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classifying INSTANCE-OF relation (e.g. TWEETY is an INSTANCE-OF the category (class) CANARY). 
The direction of a relation is often explicitly shown in the network by means of arrows but may 
also be given by the underlying theory. Figure 55 provides an example of a partial semantic 
network of animals, their attributes, and taxonomic and instance relationships. 
Semantic networks provide a simple and intuitive formalism for capturing knowledge about 
entities in a given domain and the relationships between them. The graphical network notation 
makes the organization of the domain knowledge transparent for human readers (Cawsey 1998: 
15). Another major feature of semantic networks is that their formalism minimizes redundancy 
in the knowledge representation and facilitates inferences from the represented knowledge. The 
IS-A links between nodes in a semantic network define a property inheritance hierarchy among 
the corresponding domain concepts. By default, lower nodes in this hierarchy inherit properties 
associated with higher nodes. The inherited properties can be kept or redefined, and new ones 
can be added. Given this mechanism, it is possible to infer from the semantic network in Figure 
55 that, for example, TWEETY has the attribute IS-YELLOW and possesses a particular kind of 
wings (WINGS-2) and a HEAD, by following the link from TWEETY to the class (node) of which 
TWEETY is an instance (CANARY) and then moving up the IS-A hierarchy from there, collecting 
the properties linked to the nodes in the hierarchy along the way. With property inheritance, 
both overloading individual concepts with properties and redundant specification of properties 
across the network can be avoided. However, despite their elegance, semantic networks have 
several shortcomings: 
• Their complexity quickly becomes overwhelming with the rapidly growing number of nodes 
and links required to represent more, and more complex knowledge (Handke 1995: 96f.). 
• The interpretation (semantics) of the nodes and links in semantic networks is application- 
and theory-dependent. Hence, the validity of inferences made from a given network is not 
 
Figure 55. Part of a semantic network showing taxonomic (IS-A), property (HAS) and instance 
(INSTANCE-OF) relationships. 
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guaranteed, because its representation might be misinterpreted (Cawsey 1998: 14f.).175 In 
contrast, the semantics of logical expressions is clear, and inferences from them are assured 
to be valid (cf. Section 12.1.2.1). 
• Semantic networks only support inheritance reasoning to infer the properties of subclasses 
from the properties of parent classes in the hierarchy (Cawsey 1998: 37).176 
• In comparison to predicate logic, it is difficult to express negation (something is not true), 
disjunction ((either) A or B is true), and quantification (something is true of all or some (at 
least one) of the entities in a set) (Cawsey 1998: 20). 
12.1.2.3 Frames and Scripts 
When people encounter a new situation, their previous experience supplies them with a set of 
expectations, or predictions, about what they will find and how they should behave in that 
situation. Frames and scripts are two related representation languages for encoding knowledge 
about the entities and events that are (stereo-) typically involved in particular situations. 
Frames (Minsky 1975; Cawsey 1998: 16–20; Nebel 2001; Brachman & Levesque 2004: 
Chapter 8) organize stereotyped knowledge about an entity, event, or situation in a container 
structure (cf. Figure 56) consisting of attribute-value pairs (slots and fillers), which resembles 
the record (or ‘struct’) data structures used in programming languages (Cawsey 1998: 16). Slots 
of superordinate frames are inherited through a hierarchy by subordinate frames, as well as by 
particular instances of frames (Nebel 2001: 324). A given frame can have several parent frames 
(multiple inheritance) (Cawsey 1998: 18). In general, property inheritance in frame hierarchies 
is defeasible, i.e. an inherited slot filler provides a default value that is kept only if no filler has 
been provided or can be computed. Hence, slot fillers may represent typical values that can be 
overridden by a different value in both instances and specializations of a generic frame (Cawsey 
1998: 17; Brachman & Levesque 2004: 139). Furthermore, slots can have procedures attached 
to them, i.e. programmed routines which derive missing values (IF-NEEDED) or perform an 
action if the value of a slot is deleted (IF-REMOVED) or added/updated (IF-ADDED) (Cawsey 
1998: 19; Brachman & Levesque 2004: 138ff.). 
Like semantic networks, frames represent (categories of) objects, their properties, and their 
relationships,177 but in a more compact and encapsulated (‘object-oriented’) format (Nebel 
2001: 324).178 Property inheritance provides them with a mechanism to infer knowledge that is 
                                              
175  In general, a precise formulation of the semantics of a knowledge representation language is essential 
for knowing the exact meaning of each expression written in the language as well as the range of 
sound inferences from known facts (Cawsey 1998: 15). 
176  It should be noted that the restriction to inferences based on property inheritance is not necessarily a 
weakness of semantic networks (or frames, which are restricted in the same way). In fact, if the 
application involves the representation of declarative knowledge about related concepts or objects 
that can be arranged in a taxonomic hierarchy, and only requires a single type of inference, frames 
and semantic networks may be more adequate than more complex formalisms, such as logic (Cawsey 
1998: 37). 
177  Both frames and semantic networks can be translated into the other representation with relative ease. 
The nodes in the semantic network become frames for classes and instances, their outgoing links 
become slots in those frames, and the nodes at the other end of the links fill the slots in the frames 
(Cawsey 1998: 16). 
178  Frame systems share terminology and ideas with the object-oriented programming (OOP) paradigm, 
which was concurrently developed and influenced by them (Cawsey 1998: 16; Nebel 2001: 324). 
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not explicitly stated in a given frame but inherited from parent frames in the hierarchy (Cawsey 
1998: 20). In fact, frame-based reasoning involves instantiating generic frames, supplying 
values for some of the slots in the instance frames, and computing other slot values by way of 
property inheritance or execution of procedures attached to slots (Brachman & Levesque 2004: 
138f.). Standard expectations can be encoded as default values, and missing or changing values 
can trigger appropriate computational procedures. 
Frames (and semantic networks) are appropriate for representing declarative knowledge that 
can be organized in terms of taxonomic hierarchies. However, things like negation, disjunction, 
and quantification can be better expressed using predicate logic (cf. Section 12.1.2.1). The only 
type of inference supported is enabled by property inheritance: properties are passed down from 
higher levels down to lower levels in the hierarchy (Cawsey 1998: 20). However, this may be 
sufficient for quite a number of applications. Furthermore, the frame mechanism itself gives 
rise to several issues: 
• Is there a universal set of slots that can be used across domains? What should be included in 
this set? Is the set finite? 
• Slot names and fillers are generally arbitrary labels whose meanings are not formally and 
clearly defined. Terminological or description logics (DL) allow to specify the semantics of 
the expressions and relations used in frame-based languages in terms of a structurally and 
formally well-understood logic (Cawsey 1998: 27f.; Russell & Norvig 2003: 353f.; 
Brachman & Levesque 2004: Chapter 9). Having a formal specification of the semantics in a 
                                                                                                                                                
Like frames, OOP involves classes, instances (objects), properties (attributes or fields), procedures 
(methods), and inheritance; however, instead of knowledge representation, OOP is concerned with 
writing computer programs that consist of encapsulated, cooperating objects with different roles and 
responsibilities that work by exchanging messages with other objects and internally processing data 
(Cawsey 1998: 16; Booch et al. 2007; [INT 125]). 
 
Figure 56. The components of a frame. 
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terminological logic helps to ensure the soundness of all inferences obtained from the frame 
structure (Cawsey 1998: 27). 
• When default values of slots can be overridden in an unconstrained fashion, the resulting 
frame structure may be at odds with human understanding of the domain or the world in 
general (Brachman & Levesque 2004: 140). For example, it is possible to create an instance 
or specialization of the ELEPHANT frame in which the default value of the Habitat slot is 
overwritten with TREE (a reference to the TREE frame), making that (kind of) elephant one 
that lives in trees, which is quite difficult to imagine given the size, weight, and extremities 
of these animals (Brachman 1985: 81). 
Scripts (Schank & Abelson 1977) are basically a kind of frame that encodes stereotyped 
event sequences representing socially ritualized human activities including visiting a restaurant, 
buying a car, and opening a bank account (Dyer et al. 1992: 1443f.). An example of a script for 
eating at a restaurant is provided in Figure 57. Each event in a script is described in terms of a 
conceptual dependency (CD-) structure (Schank 1972) defining a network of relationships 
(dependencies) between a primitive action, an actor performing the action, an object affected by 
the action, and a direction specifying source and goal of the action (Handke 1995: 103). Actions 
in a CD-structure can be ‘stand-alone’ basic acts (ATRANS, PTRANS, MTRANS, MBUILD, PROPEL, 
and INGEST) or ‘supporting’ instrumental acts (GRASP, MOVE, SPEAK, ATTEND, and EXPEL) 
(p. 104). 
Scripts have had a number of successful applications in natural language processing (Dyer et 
al. 1992: 1449–1456). In particular, they have been used to understand simple stories, as in the 
SAM (Script-Applier Mechanism) system (Cullingford 1978).179 But relying only on scripts to 
accomplish story understanding and other tasks raises several issues (Barr & Feigenbaum 1981: 
308): 
• The number of possible stories is overwhelming. Hence, story understanding cannot work by 
simply matching scripts to stories, even if scripts are defined as generally as possible and a 
computer knows a large number of them. 
• Scripts describe a complete sequence of events. But more often than not, everyday activities 
(or accounts of them) remain unfinished, or they are interrupted by other, unrelated events. 
How can a script-based system reliably detect transitions and interactions between scripts 
when these are not clearly marked? 
• The execution of scripts can be hindered by obstacles, like, for example, the application of 
the LIBRARY script: “I went to the library for a book I needed for my Ph.D. research. But the 
library was closed.” 
• Stories may provide insufficient information for a computer to activate a script, but people 
can still understand them by making bridging inferences (cf. Chapter 11.1.3.3), e.g. “Paul 
wanted to marry Linda. He picked up a gun and went to her father.” 
• The CD-format used for the event descriptions in scripts may be too restricted for realistic 
applications. Specific shortcomings of the original CD-theory concern the handling of 
                                              
179  The ability to understand stories may be much more important to the operation of intelligent systems 
than it seems. Narrative psychology (cf. Chapter 7.7) regards stories, or narratives, as fundamental to 
making sense of the behavior of intentional beings. So by assimilating the observed actions of others 
into narrative structures, intelligent systems can see how these actions fit into a larger scheme, what 
they are eventually aiming at, what the other might do next (i.e. how the story might continue), and 
so on. 
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quantification and metaphor as well as the theory’s focus on action verbs, whose meanings 
were reduced to their physical realizations (e.g. kiss = “MOVE lips to lips”) (Barr & 
Feigenbaum 1981: 214). Later extensions to CD-theory included mechanisms for the 
representation of social and interpersonal activities (Schank & Carbonell 1978). 
One alternative to having a set of static, pre-fabricated scripts for different kinds of scenarios 
is to dynamically construct a plan (or alternative plans) that account(s) for a given situation by 
integrating the observed actions of an actor into a sequence of actions that, if carried out, would 
achieve the identified goals and subgoals of that actor (Allen 1994: 480). Plan-based story 
 
Figure 57. A script for eating at a restaurant, subdivided into four scenes. Adapted from Schank and 
Abelson (1977: 43f.) and Schmitz (1992: 69). The events in each scene are specified as pseudo-natural 
language descriptions around a primitive act (e.g. DO, MBUILD, PTRANS) from conceptual 
dependency theory (written in capital letters). 
Chapter 12: Expertise 293 
understanding then involves establishing the actor’s goals and their associated instrumental 
subgoals from the story and building plans that achieve goals and subgoals while incorporating 
the actor’s observed actions (Schank & Abelson 1977; Barr & Feigenbaum 1981: 309f.). Unlike 
scripts, plan-based approaches allow for the dynamic construction (for different situations and 
from individual observed actions), incompleteness, and as-needed revision of representations. 
See Chapter 12.1.3.3 for a discussion of planning. 
12.1.2.4 Rule-Based Systems 
Rule-based systems (also called production systems) (Cawsey 1998: 29–36; Simon 2001; 
Russell & Norvig 2003: 280–295; Brachman & Levesque 2004: Chapter 7) are a popular way 
to represent and reason with knowledge in expert systems (Cawsey 1998: 13, cf. Footnote 171). 
The knowledge of a rule-based system consists of a set of IF-THEN (condition-action) rules 
(often called production rules or productions), which define what to do or conclude given 
certain conditions (Cawsey 1998: 29). Figure 58 shows the main components of a rule-based 
system (Cawsey 1998: 29f.; Brachman & Levesque 2004: 118f.): 
• A constantly updated database of assertions (facts) about the domain. Another term for this 
component is working memory. 
• A collection of rules of the format “IF conditions THEN actions,” which specify a set of 
conditions (the antecedent) that have to be satisfied by the current state of the working 
memory for the actions in the body of the rule (the consequent) to be considered for 
execution. If this happens, the actions performed change the working memory. 
• A control scheme (interpreter), which identifies applicable rules, selects a subset of them for 
execution (using conflict resolution strategies), and fires the selected rules, i.e. performs their 
action part, which causes the working memory to be updated. 
Each rule is a self-contained piece of knowledge, whose application is controlled by the 
interpreter, guided by the contents of the working memory (Cawsey 1998: 29). While 
condition-action rules are reminiscent of implications in predicate logic (cf. Section 12.1.2.1), 
rule-based languages are more procedural than declarative in nature (p. 13), i.e. rather than 
making statements about the world which are true or false, as in logic, production rules state 
what actions to take or what conclusions to draw in a given situation; in other words, they 
encode more of the ‘know-how’ of a domain than of its ‘know-what’ (cf. Table 17) (p. 37). 
Both rules and facts may contain variables. In facts, these variables carry specific values, as 
in the two facts F1 and F2 below; in rules, they form patterns that the interpreter matches 
against the instantiated facts in the working memory (cf. R1 and R2) (Cawsey 1998: 32): 
F1: number_of_terms(peter,2) 
F2: passed_introlin(peter) 
R1: IF number_of_terms(S,N) < 5 THEN 
       ADD undergraduate_student(S) 
R2: IF undergraduate_student(S) AND passed_introlin(S) THEN 
       ADD cleared_for_ps(S) 
In rule R1, the pattern number_of_terms(S,N) matches the fact F1, the condition is 
satisfied, and the rule fires, adding the new fact F3: undergraduate_student(peter)to the 
working memory. The facts F2 and F3 match the patterns passed_introlin(S) and 
undergraduate_student(S), respectively, so rule R2 can fire, adding the new fact F4: 
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cleared_for_ps(peter). It is also possible to match goals whose variables are instantiated 
with specific values, e.g. G1: accept_registration(peter), against the parameterized 
conclusions (actions) of rules (Cawsey 1998: 33), as in rule R3 below: 
R3: IF cleared_for_ps(S) THEN 
       ADD accept_registration(S) 
Two major classes of algorithms are used in production systems to reason with the rules: 
data-driven (or bottom-up) forward chaining and goal-driven (or top-down) backward chaining. 
Forward chaining starts with the available facts in the working memory and repeatedly fires 
applicable rules to derive new facts (or perform specified actions) based on the evolving state of 
the fact database. A given rule becomes available for execution if the working memory contains 
facts that match its antecedent. A rule that is fired typically modifies the working memory by 
adding or deleting facts, but its action part may also invoke procedures that perform certain 
operations, such as animating an on-screen character (Cawsey 1998: 30). The basic algorithm 
of forward chaining is a selection-execute cycle (pp. 30f.). Conclusions derived during forward 
chaining may become invalid because of changes to the facts that serve as their justifications. In 
consequence, these obsolete facts have to be retracted, i.e. removed from the working memory 
(Russell & Norvig 2003: 360). If additional facts have been inferred from the obsolete facts, 
those inferred facts cannot simply be deleted as well because the invalidated facts may not be 
their only justifications (p. 360). Truth maintenance systems (TMSs) efficiently perform these 
kinds of updates, resolving conflicts and ensuring the consistency of the fact database (Cawsey 
1998: 32; Russell & Norvig 2003: 360ff.). 
While forward chaining works from existing facts to new conclusions, backward chaining 
takes the reverse direction (from conclusions to facts) (Brachman & Levesque 2004: 92f.). The 
starting point is an initial hypothesis (or goal) to be proved. If that goal matches one of the 
current facts, nothing has to be done. Otherwise, a rule is selected whose consequent matches 
the goal. The antecedent conditions of that rule become new subgoals that the system tries to 
prove by recursively applying the same procedure (Cawsey 1998: 34). The initial hypothesis 
has been proved if the algorithm has managed to prove all the subgoals and has found a chain of 
rules that link the hypothesis to facts in working memory which provide the basis for the proof 
(Cawsey 1998: 34f.; Russell & Norvig 2003: 220). 
 
Figure 58. The architecture of a rule-based system. Adapted from Cawsey (1998: 29, Figure 2.6). 
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Forward chaining enables agents to perform data-driven reasoning. Given incoming percepts 
from their environment, agents can fire applicable rules to draw conclusions from those inputs, 
without the need for a particular hypothesis (or goal). However, depending on the rule set and 
the fact database, a potentially large number of conclusions could be derived this way that are 
not relevant to the agent’s circumstances and tasks, so mechanisms are required that help to 
avoid flooding the agent’s working memory with irrelevant conclusions (Russell & Norvig 
2003: 219f.). 
The strength of backward chaining is goal-driven reasoning, which focuses on just the goal 
to be proved and does not consider irrelevant facts. In general, backward chaining provides an 
efficient way for agents to answer specific questions or decide on a course of action to achieve 
a particular goal (Russell & Norvig 2003: 220). Still, the process can also be computationally 
expensive if it has to consider many potential hypotheses with many possible ways to prove 
them (Cawsey 1998: 36). Backward chaining may be combined with forward chaining, with the 
latter generating facts that are likely to pertain to goals to be proved by the former (Russell & 
Norvig 2003: 220). 
12.1.2.5 The Semantic Web 
Instead of trying to rebuild some aspects of a human brain, we are going to build a brain of and 
for humankind. (Fensel & Musen 2001: 25). 
Traditionally, the domain model is developed as a separate module of an intelligent software 
agent. Because it encodes knowledge about the agent’s environment (among other things), it 
has to be updated whenever that environment changes, which is a problem especially for agents 
in open, complex, and dynamic environments, such as the World Wide Web, where changes 
tend to occur frequently and unpredictably. An alternative to developing the domain model 
exclusively as an internal component of an agent is to represent at least part of this knowledge 
externally by adding annotations to the environment (Doyle & Hayes-Roth 1998; Isbister & 
Doyle 1999; Doyle 2004), which consist of declarations and procedures attached to objects, 
tasks, and individuals in different places in the environment (Isbister & Doyle 1999). An agent 
visiting a particular virtual place reads its embedded annotations to learn about the structure, 
entities, events, and history of that place, as well as about appropriate behaviors for itself and 
for others (Doyle & Hayes Roth 1998). The advantage of this approach is that the agent can 
operate in unknown or changed/changing locations by querying the environment directly rather 
than by engaging in complex reasoning about the environment. Moreover, the information that 
the agent has about the environment can be more easily kept up-to-date (Doyle & Hayes Roth 
1998). 
The concept of annotating resources with semantic information that can be processed by 
machines is at the core of the emerging Semantic Web180 (Berners-Lee 2000: Chapter 13; 
Berners-Lee et al. 2001; Fensel et al. 2003; Golbeck et al. 2005; Shadbolt et al. 2006; Ziegler 
2007; Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008; [INT 127]), an extension of the current World Wide 
Web which adds a semantic layer of machine-processable annotations to web resources 
                                              
180  The vision of the Semantic Web was first formulated by Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World 
Wide Web, at the first International World Wide Web Conference in Geneva, Switzerland in 1994 
(Shadbolt et al. 2006: 96). The realization of the Semantic Web is a collaborative process involving 
contributors from both academia and industry that is led by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) 
([INT 127]). 
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(formulated using shared vocabularies of terms) that provides a common infrastructure for 
programs, services, devices, agents, and people to consume, produce, and share information on 
the Web (Berners-Lee et al. 2001; Hendler et al. 2002; Koper 2004: 2; Motta 2006: 88). The 
goal of building the Semantic Web is for web-based interactions between machines to become 
as commonplace and straightforward as human-human exchanges mediated by the World Wide 
Web are today. However, interactions between machines are meant to supplement, not replace 
those between people (Clark et al. 2004b: 6). 
Instead of developing complex software to interpret web content (which is largely in formats 
more suitable for human understanding than for machine processing), the Semantic Web 
approach is based on the concept of the self-describing resource (Antoniou & van Harmelen 
2008: 9f.; [INT 126]). Resources include (web) documents, multimedia elements, people, 
places, database records, abstract concepts, search queries, etc. – in short, any entity that can be 
referenced with a unique identifier (Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: 67f.). Anything uniquely 
identifiable, whether in virtual worlds or in the real world, qualifies as a resource. On the World 
Wide Web, users are asked to add semantic markup to web resources (Horrocks 2002; Marshall 
& Shipman 2003), i.e. annotations encoding knowledge about the contents, author, price, etc. of 
a web page, image, product, and so on in a publicly accessible, machine-processable form. Such 
“data about data,” referred to as metadata, can be processed by agents and other application 
systems to gain access to the meaning (semantics) of web content rather than just its form 
(Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: 10). In web-based learning environments, metadata can be 
added as semantic markup to web pages and their components in order to create external 
knowledge representations in different parts of the environment that pedagogical agents can 
read, manipulate, and reason with. This idea is outlined below and applied in Chapter 16.3.4. 
The general format for representing metadata statements is as triples consisting of a subject 
(the resource that is the topic of the statement), a predicate (what the statement asserts about the 
subject), and an object or value (the resource or literal that is the value of the assertion) 
(Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: 68ff.). A resource associated with one of these components is 
identified by a unique name or address called a uniform resource identifier (URI) (Berners-Lee 
et al. 2005), such as http://www.linguistics-online.com/people/instructors.owl#PF. 
For example, the following metadata triple expresses the proposition that a certain individual 
referred to as “Peter Franke (PF)” (subject) has the current position (predicate) of research 
assistant (object): 
Subject: http://www.linguistics-online.com/people/instructors.owl#PF 
Predicate: http://www.linguistics-online.com/people/staff.owl#currentPosition 
Object: http://www.linguistics-online.com/people/staff.owl#researchAssistant 
The terms used in metadata statements to refer to concepts and relationships of the domain 
are defined in ontologies (Gruber 1993; Uschold & Gruninger 1996; Studer et al. 1998; Vossen 
2003), i.e. abstract models which explicitly and formally capture the structure of knowledge in 
distinct and specified areas, as it is understood and shared by a particular group of people 
and/or machines. Ontologies usually provide taxonomies of domain concepts and rules for 
deriving new facts through inference. A taxonomy defines a collection of terms and their 
relationships that are relevant for describing the domain (Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: 11). 
Each term labels a concept (class of entities) of the domain. Members of a class are called 
instances of that class. The classes are typically organized in terms of hierarchical relationships 
between classes and their subordinate and superordinate classes, which represent more specific 
and more generic domain concepts, respectively (pp. 85f.). For example, in Figure 59, the class 
ACADEMIC STAFF has three subclasses (REGULAR FACULTY STAFF, RESEARCH STAFF, and 
Chapter 12: Expertise 297 
VISITING STAFF) and one superclass (STAFF). Ontologies may also specify other types of 
information about their elements, such as properties (attributes) of instances of classes, 
restrictions on the range of permissible property values, disjointness statements (two classes do 
not have any common members), and logical relationships (synonymy, meronymy, symmetry, 
transitivity, cardinality, etc.) between ontology elements (pp. 11f.). 
One important goal for the Semantic Web is to support the operation of intelligent software 
agents that autonomously and proactively carry out tasks on the user’s behalf (cf. Chapter 3), 
which involves collecting information from various sources on the World Wide Web and 
elsewhere, communicating with agents representing other individuals or organizations, filtering 
information according to the user’s requirements and preferences, and presenting the user with 
the result, which may enable him or her to make a choice (Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: 
15). Metadata annotations help agents to find relevant information on the Web and to extract 
information from web-based resources. Ontologies provide shared vocabularies that facilitate 
the search for and interpretation of information, as well as the communication with other 
agents. Logic (cf. Section 12.1.2.1) plays a central role in processing the collected information 
(including the drawing of inferences) (pp. 15f.). In addition, intelligent agents on the Semantic 
Web require languages for exchanging messages with other agents (cf. Chapter 14.1.5); formal 
representations of agents’ beliefs, desires, and intentions (including their own) (cf. Chapter 
14.1.1); and user modeling capabilities (cf. Section 12.2.1) (p. 16). 
For the Semantic Web to emerge, elaborate standards which arise from a consensus among 
key players are essential (Shadbolt et al. 2006: 99). The architecture of the Semantic Web is 
being developed step by step in a bottom-up fashion by the various working groups of the 
World Wide Web Consortium. Each step adds a new layer that provides higher-level 
functionality (Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: 17–20).181 The layers of the Semantic Web 
architecture are shown in Figure 60 (for a detailed discussion of the individual layers, see, for 
example, Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008). The basic standards of the Semantic Web (URI, 
                                              
181  It should be noted that the layered architecture shown in Figure 60 is currently the subject of debate 
in the Semantic Web community. It is quite likely that this architecture will change in the near future 
to accommodate recent developments (Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: 20). 
 
Figure 59. A taxonomic hierarchy representing people at a university. Adapted from Antoniou and van 
Harmelen (2008: 11, Figure 1.1). 
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XML,182 RDF,183 and OWL184) are now in place ([INT 127]). Ongoing efforts target the higher 
levels of rules,185 logic, and proof (Shadbolt et al. 2006: 98; Antoniou et al. 2007: 62). Various 
initiatives are creating ontologies for biology, e-government, medicine, environmental science, 
genomics, and other domains (Neumann et al. 2004; Shadbolt et al. 2006: 96f.). Development 
tools (for editing, storage, querying and inferencing, visualization, and versioning) have been 
contributed mostly by academic researchers; however, commercial entities have started to adopt 
these tools and to contribute their own (Antoniou & van Harmelen 2004: 225). Semantic Web 
applications of different kinds are being built by both communities. 
As indicated at the beginning of this section, in the context of the present work, the Semantic 
Web approach of annotating resources with machine-processable semantic markup according to 
a shared conceptualization of the domain (ontology) (Studer et al. 1998) is mainly of interest 
because it provides an attractive alternative method to represent knowledge for agents operating 
in web-based environments that involve a limited number of element types whose instances are 
added, modified, or removed in controlled ways. The elements of such environments (content 
items, navigation controls, tools, people, agents, etc.) can be conceived of as resources and 
become the subjects or objects of metadata statements. These statements can be created during 
the processes of building and maintaining the structure, content, and artifacts of the 
environment and enrolling its users, ideally with minimal intervention of knowledge engineers 
(cf. Section 12.1.1.2), content developers, administrative staff, or users because mechanisms 
embedded in the development tools or in the environment add or change the relevant statements 
automatically. New objects introduced into the environment may have their own annotations, 
which integrate seamlessly with the other metadata since they are based on the same domain 
ontology or on one whose terms can be mapped to it. Ontologies are associated with 
environments rather than agents, and they are processed by agents to access the vocabulary for 
                                              
182  XML (eXtensible Markup Language) is a standardized metalanguage for developing custom markup 
languages with user-defined tags (e.g. <firstName>, <instructor>, <orderNo>, etc.), which can 
be used to write structured documents that describe web content (rather than layout) (Antoniou & van 
Harmelen 2008: Chapter 2; [INT 128]). XML provides the syntactic framework for higher-level 
Semantic Web languages. 
183  RDF (Resource Description Framework) provides a standardized data model for expressing metadata 
in a machine-accessible format (Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: Chapter 3; [INT 129]). Each 
metadata statement consists of a three-element structure which asserts that the resource X has the 
property Y with the value Z. RDF statements are commonly written using an XML-based syntax 
(RDF/XML) (Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: 66). 
184  OWL (Web Ontology Language) is the standard language for creating ontologies on the Semantic 
Web (Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: Chapter 4; [INT 130]). It provides a layer on top of RDF and 
RDFS (= RDF Schema, a primitive RDF-based ontology language in which class and property 
hierarchies can be expressed ([INT 131])) with advanced features allowing the definition of various 
relationships, restrictions, combinations, and special characteristics of classes and properties. OWL 
ontologies are written in RDF/XML (Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: 119). OWL consists of three 
sublanguages (listed in ascending order of expressiveness and computational complexity): OWL Lite, 
OWL DL (= “Description Logics”), and OWL Full (pp. 117ff.). 
185  Rules can be used for various purposes, including knowledge representation, inference, specification 
of constraints, mapping from stimuli (events, changes, etc.) to responses (actions), and so on. A rule 
specifies an implication between an antecedent consisting of a conjunction of premises (conditions), 
and a consequent (Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: 162f., cf. Section 12.1.2.4). Ongoing work aims 
to combine OWL and the Rule Markup Language (RuleML) ([INT 132]) in order to create a Semantic 
Web Rules Language (SWRL) (Parsia et al. 2005; [INT 133]; Antoniou & van Harmelen 2008: 170f.). 
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describing the domain/environment. Changes to an object can be reflected in its semantic 
markup, and the object may even carry a history of its changes. Agents interacting with these 
objects do not have to represent and keep track of knowledge about their properties or status; 
they only need to be able to read and process the objects’ semantic markup. Since the 
environment contains elements of a limited number of types, the corresponding number of 
concepts and their relationships in the ontology for the domain is manageable. In sum, at least 
in theory, Semantic Web technologies can be used to create annotated web-based environments 
that represent domain knowledge and vocabulary within the environment and in a format that is 
accessible to agents with different roles, implementations, and origins. In reality, however, 
these ideas have not yet been widely realized. 
The proponents of the Semantic Web regard it as the next important stage in the evolution of 
the World Wide Web, and they have commonly expected the community of web users to 
embrace their vision as well and to start contributing, sharing, and reusing metadata and 
ontologies in order for the Semantic Web to gradually take shape. However, years after the 
publication of the Semantic Web’s inaugural paper (Berners-Lee et al. 2001), none of these 
things have happened on a large scale yet (Shadbolt et al. 2006; Borland 2007). Instead, these 
days, Web users collaboratively annotate web-based resources with self-made tags and thus 
build folksonomies together, both in the context of Web 2.0 (a collective term for recent social 
and technological developments that are changing the World Wide Web into a medium inviting 
(and relying on) user participation, user collaboration, and social networking, cf. Chapter 2.3.9). 
Folksonomies can be defined as user-generated taxonomies (classification systems) that emerge 
organically through a collaborative effort to categorize web resources which involves many 
individuals who associate these resources with descriptive keywords (tags) of their own choice 
(Shadbolt et al. 2006: 100; [INT 136]; Hayman 2007). While having users create their own 
descriptive tags and label resources with these tags provides a simple way to define the 
vocabulary for describing a domain and to generate descriptions of resources, the resulting tag 
structures are generally not suitable for interpretation by machines, except using statistical 
techniques like clustering, because formal and unambiguous definitions of the meanings and 
interrelations of the tags are not available (Shadbolt et al. 2006: 100). As a result, folksonomies 
 
Figure 60. The layered architecture of the Semantic Web. Adapted from ([INT 134]) and ([INT 135]). 
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may contain ambiguous tags and lack a clear structure (Guy & Tonkin 2006). In short, 
folksonomies are created for humans, not for machines. 
However, it has been suggested that Web 2.0 and the Semantic Web are not incompatible but 
can complement each other in a hybrid “Web 3.0” (Markoff 2006), where semantic descriptions 
of web content and services are developed by inspiring and facilitating Web 2.0-typical massive 
participation of non-expert users, and applications combine Web 2.0 features with RDF and 
other low-level Semantic Web technologies (Borland 2007; Lassila & Hendler 2007; Ankolekar 
et al. 2008; Hendler 2008; Wahlster 2008). In these approaches, the more ambitious work on 
ontologies and inference in the Semantic Web community is largely dismissed as ‘academic’ 
and thus irrelevant to solving real-world problems (Borland 2007). 
In general, the Semantic Web will not achieve its (possibly too) ambitious goal of building 
“a brain of and for humankind” (Fensel & Musen 2001: 25) by weaving a web of metadata and 
ontologies, unless there is a critical mass of developers, content authors, web masters, and users 
that are willing and able to generate and consume these types of machine-readable information. 
Therefore, the major challenge remains to motivate individuals and organizations to build 
ontologies and to add semantic markup to the electronic documents, multimedia elements, data, 
products, and services that they create, host, sell, use, or view on the World Wide Web (or 
elsewhere), by advertizing and demonstrating the financial, personal, or other gains that can be 
obtained from the investment of additional resources in the creation of semantic webs (Golbeck 
et al. 2005: 177). Those motivated to contribute require effective (semi-) automatic tools for 
producing metadata and ontologies, as well as for linking to existing resources on the Semantic 
Web. As much semantic markup as possible should be generated automatically, either directly 
from the source or as a by-product of the user’s regular work (Hendler 2001: 31; Antoniou & 
van Harmelen 2008: 248). In fact, large-scale automatic annotation of web pages with (simple) 
semantic markup by means of natural language understanding (cf. Chapter 11.1.3) and machine 
learning (cf. Section 12.1.1.2) techniques has become feasible (Antoniou & van Harmelen 
2008: 248). 
Furthermore, the Semantic Web enterprise has to win the trust of users, which requires social 
and technological mechanisms that ensure the validity, identity, and credibility of statements 
and sources. Logic (cf. Section 12.1.2.1) can be used to automatically prove the validity of 
statements (Hendler 2001: 34f.). Digital signatures help to verify the identity of sources and to 
ascertain the integrity of content ([INT 137]). The credibility issue is addressed by building a 
Web of Trust, a social network that links each user to a small number of other users he or she 
trusts (to different degrees). Trust (or distrust) is propagated in a transitive fashion (if A trusts B 
and B trusts C and D, then A may extend his or her trust to C and D) through this network 
(Golbeck et al. 2003; Richardson et al. 2003; Welsh 2003; Golbeck & Hendler 2004; Antoniou 
& van Harmelen 2008: 19). 
Related to trust are concerns about censorship of content and threats to users’ privacy on the 
Semantic Web (Kim et al. 2002; [INT 138]). Semantic markup is generally invisible (and 
incomprehensible) to the average user of the Semantic Web. Software (agents) could use this 
markup to manipulate and pre-select content, to collect sensitive personal information, or to 
decide what user-related details to share with others, all without the user’s consent or even 
knowledge. Therefore, the Semantic Web requires effective mechanisms that prevent illegal or 
unethical manipulation of content and handling of personal data by machines. 
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12.1.3  Problem Solving 
In intelligent agents, knowledge representation is usually not an end in itself but rather plays an 
important role in enabling these agents to solve problems. But knowledge alone is not enough: 
intelligent agents also require effective strategies to find solutions using the represented 
knowledge. For intelligent agents, problem solving generally involves search (Cawsey 1998: 
Chapter 4; Russell & Norvig 2003: Part II). That is, the agent has an inventory of actions that 
could be carried out to solve a given problem, but it has no knowledge about which of these 
actions (in what order) will produce a solution. To find a sequence of actions that solves the 
problem and meets specified success criteria, the agent has to search through the space of 
possible action sequences and evaluate different solution candidates (Cawsey 1998: 68; Russell 
& Norvig 2003: 60). A particular sequence of actions is regarded as a solution if it connects a 
specified initial state and a desired target state through a series of intermediate states (Cawsey 
1998: 69). Problem-solving processes in intelligent agents are subject to various constraints 
(Russell & Norvig 2003: 35): 
• The goal, i.e. the target state(s) of the agent and/or the environment to be achieved; 
• The current state of the agent and the environment; 
• The agent’s prior knowledge of its domain and its environment; 
• The agent’s inventory of actions (i.e. what it can do to affect its environment); 
• The agent’s percept sequence (i.e. the history of its sensor inputs) up to the present moment; 
• The performance measure that is used to determine the agent’s degree of success; 
• Limitations of time and resources. 
Given these constraints, a problem-solving agent has to go through the following “formulate-
search-execute” cycle (Russell & Norvig 2003: 60f.): 
1. Goal formulation identifies an objective (desired target state) that the agent will attempt to 
accomplish. 
2. Problem formulation determines the set of actions and states that the agent will take into 
account in trying to achieve the goal. 
3. Search looks for a sequence of actions that constitutes a solution to the problem (achieves 
the goal) and satisfies the agent’s success criterion, ideally maximizing the performance 
measure (p. 36). 
4. Execution performs the action sequence specified by the solution found. 
12.1.3.1 Search Techniques 
When computers are faced with the task of finding a solution to a problem, one typical strategy 
involves generating all possible solutions (i.e. sequences of actions) and then searching through 
the whole set or a subset of these possibilities to identify one (or several) that meet specified 
requirements. The set of solution candidates to be considered may be large, so efficient search 
techniques are needed. 
If the problem is of low complexity, a systematic and exhaustive search of the entire set of 
possible paths is feasible. The search process examines every state that can be reached from the 
initial state (on a path leading through one or several intermediate states). If it is a target state, a 
solution has been found. The set of all states to be considered in a given search problem is 
called the search space (Cawsey 1998: 69). In the following, the simplifying assumption is 
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made that the search space is structured as a search tree, in which each node (state) can be 
reached from the root node by only one path (p. 70).186 Search techniques that systematically 
consider all the paths in the search space are called brute force or blind search techniques 
(pp. 69f.). The simplest two among the blind search techniques are:187 
• Breadth-first search. Explore all states in a search tree at a given depth before moving on to 
their direct successors at the next level. In other words, the tree is searched one level after 
the other (Cawsey 1998: 72ff.; Russell & Norvig 2003: 73f.). 
• Depth-first search. Explore a given branch of a search tree to its full length before exploring 
other branches (Cawsey 1998: 74f.; Russell & Norvig 2003: 75ff.). 
Brute force techniques may be too inefficient for complex problems that involve large search 
spaces. For such problems, heuristics (rules of thumb that allow an informed guess of what the 
next problem-solving step will be) can indicate which paths most likely lead to a solution 
(Luger 2005: 123f.). Rather than search through the whole space of possibilities, only those 
paths or states that appear promising according to a heuristic evaluation function f(n) are 
considered. This function estimates the distance from any state n of the search space to the 
target state. Those states (or paths) that move the problem-solving process closer to the goal 
state are tried before considering the others (Cawsey 1998: 77). For example, best-first search 
uses an evaluation function to determine the state with the best score (i.e. smallest distance to 
the goal) and always selects that state as the next one (pp. 79f.). The most widely used best-first 
search algorithm is A* search, which attempts to find a solution path through state n that 
minimizes total cost as defined by the evaluation function f(n) = g(n) + h(n), where g(n) is the 
actual cost (distance) of reaching n from the initial state and h(n) is the estimated cost of getting 
from n to the target state. The state n with the lowest score for f(n) (and thus the lowest 
estimated total cost of the solution path through n) becomes the next state (Cawsey 1998: 80ff.; 
Russell & Norvig 2003: 97–104). Provided that a good evaluation function is used, the score 
produced by that function, while only a guess, can help to speed up the search process 
considerably (Cawsey 1998: 77 + 80). However, heuristic search algorithms (Cawsey 1998: 78–
82; Russell & Norvig 2003: Chapter 4; Luger 2005: Chapter 4) do not reliably produce the best 
solution to a problem. In fact, they will quite often find suboptimal solutions or even none at all 
(Luger 2005: 124). 
Search algorithms are basic components of various advanced problem-solving techniques. 
Three of them, state space search, planning, and practical reasoning with beliefs, desires, and 
intentions, are discussed in the following. 
12.1.3.2 State Space Search 
State space search (Cawsey 1998: 82–87) is a widely used search-based method for problem 
solving. Problems are specified in terms of an initial state and a target (or goal) state. Solutions 
are action sequences that link these two states (via any number of intermediate states). The 
                                              
186  In general, search graphs may have a more complex structure with multiple paths leading to a given 
state. This raises the problem of how to avoid considering the same state repeatedly. The detection of 
repeated states requires the search algorithm to maintain a history of previously visited states. If the 
current state is found in this history, it is discarded (Russell & Norvig 2003: 81ff.). 
187  Further, more sophisticated blind search algorithms based on breadth-first or depth-first search are 
discussed by Russell and Norvig (2003: 73–81). 
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nodes in the search space correspond to different states of the problem (Cawsey 1998: 82). The 
search space is also called the state space because it consists of all states that can be reached 
from the initial state (through other states) (Russell & Norvig 2003: 62). A limited set of 
(abstract or physical) actions is available to solve the problem. Each action is represented as a 
rule or operator that, if applied, changes the problem state in a well-defined way (Cawsey 1998: 
82f.). Starting from some initial state, different paths are constructed by identifying actions 
applicable in the current state and using them to determine the states that result from them (in 
other words, possible extensions of the path that led from the initial state to the current state). 
By systematically searching through all possible paths (using blind or heuristic techniques) and 
discarding those that contain loops, a path may be found eventually that connects the initial 
state and the target state (pp. 83–85). 
12.1.3.3 Planning 
Another approach to problem solving constructs plans, i.e. (incomplete) specifications of future 
courses of action (that of the reasoning agent or some other individual), which determine the 
agent’s own behavior and help the agent to interpret or adapt to the behavior of other entities 
(Tate 2001: 653). Plans break some high-level action down into a hierarchy of successively 
more specific subactions. Each level of the hierarchy shows the temporal order in which the 
actions specified at that level have to be carried out in order to achieve goals and subgoals (cf. 
Figure 52 and Chapter 11.3.3.2.2). The planning process (Cawsey 1998: 87–90; Russell & 
Norvig 2003: Part IV) applies search techniques to find a decomposition of higher-level actions 
into lower-level actions which at the lowest level consists of a sequence of primitive actions 
that will achieve the specified goal. This sequence represents a possible plan of action, which 
may be evaluated and finally executed (Cawsey 1998: 87; Russell & Norvig 2003: 375). 
Planning typically involves building alternative plans and reasoning about their consequences. 
One early, simple planning technique is based on the means-ends analysis (MEA) approach 
(Copeland 1993: 86–91; Cawsey 1998: 87ff.). Means-ends analysis is a control strategy that 
regulates the search process involved in finding a path from an initial state to a desired goal 
state (Cawsey 1998: 87; [INT 139]). It examines the actions (means) available to accomplish 
goals (ends) and selects those actions that, given the current state, result in a new state which 
differs less from the goal state. If such an action is not applicable in the current state, the 
planner is given the new subproblem of reaching a state that allows the application of this 
action (Cawsey 1998: 87). The actions can be modeled as plan operators specifying the pre-
conditions of an action and its effects on the problem state (p. 88). A given plan operator is 
considered for application if its effects bring about a new state that is more similar to the target 
state. The pre-conditions of the operator determine its applicability in the current state. If 
certain pre-conditions are not fulfilled, they become goals with which the means-ends algorithm 
is called recursively (p. 88f.). 
Means-ends analysis has provided the basis for several more advanced planning approaches, 
which include: 
• Planning with goal protection. Previously achieved goals are preserved by ensuring that they 
are not accidentally undone by the action currently under consideration (Cawsey 1998: 90). 
• Partial-order planning. Instead of requiring all actions in a plan to occur strictly one after 
the other, it is possible to include actions whose temporal order is not specified, provided 
that one action does not depend on the other (Cawsey 1998: 90; Russell & Norvig 2003: 
388). 
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• Hierarchical planning. Planning starts from a high-level initial plan that is successively 
refined through decomposition of higher-level actions into lower-level and, eventually, 
primitive actions (Russell & Norvig 2003: 422f.). 
• Reactive planning. Instead of a complete action sequence, the planner only determines the 
next action to be carried out, given the current context. As a result, it becomes possible to 
deal with environments that are dynamic and unpredictable ([INT 140]).188 
12.1.3.4 Practical Reasoning 
Practical reasoning is the rational process by which intelligent agents work out, moment by 
moment, what to do in order to get closer to achieving their goals (Bratman 1987; Wooldridge 
1999: 54). This involves determining what goals to achieve (deliberation) and how to achieve 
them (means-ends reasoning) (Wooldridge 1999: 55). Practical reasoning agents first generate a 
set of options (i.e. alternative courses of action) available to them, then make a choice between 
these options, weighing their advantages and disadvantages, and finally commit to the selected 
options as intentions that drive their actions and influence their future practical reasoning 
(p. 55). Intentions serve several important functions in practical reasoning agents (pp. 55ff.): 
• Intentions drive means-ends reasoning. Agents will try to achieve an intention to which they 
have committed themselves, which involves deciding on an appropriate course of action. If 
the chosen option fails, another may be attempted. 
• Intentions constrain future deliberation. Options that are not consistent with a given adopted 
intention will not be considered by the agent. 
• Intentions persist. They will not be abandoned unless either the agent has achieved them, the 
agent comes to believe that they are unattainable, or their justification is gone. 
• Intentions influence beliefs upon which future practical reasoning is based. For example, the 
agent should believe (with a certain degree of confidence) that it will achieve its intentions. 
The agent cannot intend to achieve something and at the same time believe that this will 
never happen. Such behavior would be inconsistent and irrational. 
• Intentions involve a tradeoff between the degree of commitment and reconsideration. If the 
environment is static, bold agents (which never reconsider their intentions) perform better 
than cautious agents (which reconsider their commitments all the time) because they stay on 
target without being distracted by unnecessary reasoning about whether they have to modify 
their intentions. By contrast, in dynamic environments, cautious agents are better off because 
they can recognize unsuccessful intentions and seize opportunities as they arise. 
The belief-desire-intention (BDI) architecture is possibly the most widely used model of 
practical reasoning agents. The BDI model will be discussed in Chapter 14.1.1. 
12.2  The Student Model 
The ability of pedagogical software agents to effectively tailor their instruction and other kinds 
of assistance to the individual learner depends critically on the image, or model, of that learner 
which they have been able to construct in the course of a history of learner-agent interactions. 
                                              
188  See also the discussion of reactive agent architectures in Chapter 14.1.2. 
Chapter 12: Expertise 305 
This section reviews techniques that enable pedagogical agents to become learner-, or, more 
generally, user-adaptive. First, the more general task of modeling the user in user-adaptive 
systems is discussed in Section 12.2.1. The following sections are then concerned with user 
modeling for educational purposes in an educational context, which is commonly referred to as 
student modeling. Section 12.2.2 provides a discussion of the nature, contents, and functions of 
student models, as well as of issues involved in their design. Section 12.2.3 reviews different 
approaches to student modeling that have been described in the literature, chiefly for intelligent 
tutoring systems (cf. Chapter 2.3.3). 
12.2.1  User Modeling 
State-of-the-art computer-based applications are commonly characterized by adaptability. An 
adaptable system provides the individual user with the means to adjust its appearance and 
behavior so that it better suits his or her preferences (Jameson 2003: 306; Rothrock et al. 2002; 
Johnson & Taatgen 2005: 430). While the possibility to adapt a given system emphasizes users’ 
freedom of choice and promotes their sense of being in control of the system, it also has a 
number of limitations (Jameson 2003: 308): 
• The user may not know what aspects of the system can be adapted and how this can be done. 
• The user may be overwhelmed by large numbers of options. 
• The user may have to find his or her optimal personal settings by trying many different ones. 
A different perspective on adaptation stresses the active role of the machine in the process: 
rather than have the user adapt the system, the system adapts to the user. This ability is a key 
feature of user-adaptive systems (UASs) (McTear 1993; Kobsa 2001; Rothrock et al. 2002; 
Jameson 2003; Johnson & Taatgen 2005), which include (pedagogical) software agents (cf. 
Chapter 3.1.2). A user-adaptive system (or agent) has been defined as: 
An interactive system that adapts its behavior to individual users on the basis of processes of user 
model acquisition and application that involve some form of learning, inference, or decision 
making. (Jameson 2003: 306). 
The general motivation for incorporating models and processes enabling adaptation to users 
into agents and other interactive systems is to help the individual user to achieve his or her 
goals through the interaction with the system more effectively (cf. Chapter 6.3) and to make the 
experience more enjoyable for the user (cf. Chapter 6.4). Jameson identified several functions 
that can be served by user adaptiveness, grouped into functions supporting the use of the system 
(doing (parts of) routine tasks for the user, tailoring the user interface, providing adaptive help, 
and choosing appropriate dialogue strategies (cf. Chapter 11.3.3.2.1)) and functions facilitating 
individual or collaborative acquisition of information (recommending or selecting information; 
customizing information presentation; predicting user interests; supporting collaboration among 
users; and adapting the content, form, selection, and timing of instructional interactions (cf. 
Section 12.3)) (Jameson 2003: 307–316). 
Processing in a user-adaptive agent involves two major steps: the acquisition of a user model 
from information about the user and the application of the user model to make predictions or 
decisions about the user (Jameson 2003: 306, cf. Figure 61). In the acquisition step, the agent 
applies machine learning (cf. Section 12.1.1.2) or inference procedures (cf. Section 12.1.2.1) to 
information collected about the user in order to build the user model (p. 306). The outcomes of 
the acquisition process are explicit assumptions about various user-related aspects (Wahlster 
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1988: 102) that may serve the agent in carrying out its tasks and building a relationship with the 
user (cf. Chapter 7.16). The assumptions in the user model are applied in the analysis of the 
current agent-user situation in order to inform (decisions about) adaptive responses of the agent 
(Jameson 2003: 306). 
Various aspects of the user may be of interest to a user modeling agent. The following is an 
incomplete list of user characteristics (cf. Chapter 6.1) that may be included in the user model 
of an adaptive agent: 
• Goals and plans (for the interaction and beyond); 
• Expectations (of interaction and performance, cf. Chapter 6.1); 
• Background (cultural, demographic, economic, educational, etc.); 
• Expertise level (linguistic and non-linguistic knowledge and skills); 
• Preferred mode of interaction (spoken, written, or multimodal, cf. Chapter 11); 
• Limitations (originating both from within the user and from the context, cf. Chapter 6.1); 
• Tasks (to be accomplished by the user alone or in cooperation with the agent); 
• History of interactions (including conversation logs, results, and user feedback); 
• Perceived emotional state (e.g. angry, depressed, happy, cf. Chapter 13.1); 
• Identified personality traits (e.g. extrovert vs. introvert, cf. Chapter 13.5); 
• Degree of closeness (to the agent and other individuals); 
• Relative social status (with respect to the agent and other entities). 
The process of acquiring a user model may draw on both information explicitly provided by 
users and information obtained unobtrusively by means of more indirect techniques. The former 
approach elicits self-reports and self-assessments from users that inform the adaptation process 
(Jameson 2003: 318f.). Many user-adaptive systems ask their users to provide their age, gender, 
profession, and other ‘objective,’ relatively static personal information (p. 318). Furthermore, it 
is possible to have users rate themselves on various dimensions, such as how much they are 
interested in or know about a given product, topic, etc. or how important they deem a certain 
feature, issue, or criterion (p. 318f.). Apart from self-rating, users can also be asked to evaluate 
specific items or actions (p. 319). In computer-based learning environments, learner assessment 
activities are common practice and thus provide natural opportunities for collecting information 
 
Figure 61. Processing in a user-adaptive system. Adapted from Jameson (2003: 306, Figure 15.2). 
Dotted arrows indicate that certain information is used by a component process, whereas solid arrows 
link processes to their outcomes. 
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about each learner’s progress, misconceptions, gaps in knowledge, etc. (p. 319). While the 
direct approach is generally easy to implement using forms and questionnaires (Johnson & 
Taatgen 2005: 430, cf. Chapter 15.4.5.1), it is also obtrusive (distracting the user from what he 
or she is trying to accomplish) and threatens the user’s privacy (stored user-related information 
may be used for purposes that are not in the user’s interest and do not have his or her approval) 
(Jameson 2003: 317). 
Instead of asking (and possibly interrupting) the user, a user-modeling agent equipped with 
an appropriate array of internal and/or external sensors (cf. Chapter 4.2) can less obtrusively 
monitor the user and his or her behavior while he or she is interacting with the agent or system, 
and interpret the collected data in terms of various user-related dimensions (see above). This 
approach has the advantage that users do not have to interrupt their normal work and perform 
actions that are only relevant for user modeling; they just do what they always do. On the 
downside, the data generated by monitoring natural user behavior is often incomplete or 
ambiguous (Jameson 2003: 320). Furthermore, there is the issue of whether or not to reveal to 
users that they are being monitored. The most authentic data can be obtained if users are 
unaware of the agent’s monitoring because if they knew, this would quite likely influence their 
behavior. For example, users might feel uneasy about being watched and behave accordingly 
(cf. Chapter 10.4), or they might try to present themselves in a certain (positive) light. However, 
it is also true that users have a right to know what data a monitoring agent is collecting about 
them and for what purposes, and that users generally do not appreciate it if such things are 
happening behind their backs (p. 320). 
Recently, the possibilities of user monitoring have been significantly extended because of 
the availability of increasingly small and sophisticated external sensors that can capture low-
level physiological signals from users, in particular signals related to the bodily experience of 
emotions (cf. Chapter 13.1.1). User-modeling agents can now collect quite reliable data about 
the physiological correlates of anger, frustration, boredom, attraction, stress, and other mental 
states of the user (Jameson 2003: 320). Physiological data, such as blood pressure, body 
temperature, and respiration patterns, can be obtained both from sensors that are attached to (or, 
in the future, may even be implanted in) the user’s body and from sensors that are embedded in 
objects and devices that have physical contact with the user (including clothing) (Picard 2000; 
Jameson 2003: 320). Cameras and microphones can monitor the user’s face (cf. Chapter 10.1.3) 
and voice (cf. Chapter 10.1.1), respectively, for additional cues as to what he or she is thinking 
or feeling (Jameson 2003: 320, cf. Chapter 13.4.1). The incoming data from the different 
sensory channels is analyzed and fused into a meaningful interpretation of the user’s current 
state, possibly using disambiguation information from other sources (p. 320, cf. Chapter 11.2). 
All the sensors mentioned above can provide the user modeling process with an uninterrupted 
supply of data whose corresponding bodily responses are not (fully) under the user’s conscious 
control (cf. Chapter 15.4.5.5). As a result, assessments of his or her internal state may be closer 
to reality. However, again, privacy issues arise: users may feel threatened by machines that can 
probe deeper than the average person. 
Users typically interact with several computer-based systems, and other systems already may 
have acquired valuable information about the user. Therefore, drawing on stored information 
previously collected by others can be a feasible strategy for user-modeling agents (Jameson 
2003: 320). Examples of external information sources include (p. 320): 
• Records about the user (as a customer, patient, student, etc.) in databases maintained by the 
institution or system of which the user-modeling agent is also a part; 
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• Information in publicly accessible repositories, in particular the World Wide Web; 
• Results of user modeling by other agents or systems. 
Information from external sources is available to an agent already on its first encounter with 
the user. However, the content and form of the external information may limit its usefulness for 
the agent’s user modeling efforts. Furthermore, accessing confidential user-related information 
without the user’s knowledge or permission is unlikely to inspire trust or liking when the user 
finds out, and may also have legal consequences (Jameson 2003: 320). 
Finally, user-adaptive agents can extend their attention beyond the individual user to include 
the context of the interaction (Jameson 2003: 320f.). The context includes other individuals 
(both human and artificial), the task to be accomplished, artifacts relevant to the interaction, and 
the current physical, sociocultural, and organizational environment (cf. Chapter 6.2). 
In general, it could be assumed that more, and more diverse, information about a particular 
user can only help a user-modeling agent in its attempts to adapt to that user’s behavior or 
characteristics. However, the usefulness of the collected information depends on its relevance, 
detail, quality, and timely availability, as well as on the agent’s ability to make use of the 
information. In fact, it might happen (and has happened before) that much more user-related 
information is being collected than the agent can use (cf. Chapter 12.2.2). 
User-adaptive agents need computational techniques that help them to learn different things 
about the user, to draw conclusions about the user from their knowledge, and to decide on the 
best way to adapt to the user (Jameson 2003: 321). Techniques from different computational 
paradigms have been used for this purpose (pp. 321–324). One of them, classification learning, 
subsumes various techniques from the field of machine learning (cf. Section 12.1.1). All of 
these techniques offer solutions to the basic problem of learning a classifier, i.e. a model that 
can assign an unseen item to one of a set of pre-defined categories based on the item’s features, 
from a collection of training data whose items were previously classified into the same set of 
categories (Cawsey 1998: 179; Jameson 2003: 321). Often, there will be uncertainty about how 
to correctly classify a given item. In such cases, a set of possible classifications ranked 
according to confidence may be returned (Jameson 2003: 321). 
Webb et al. discussed several issues faced by machine learning in user modeling. First, the 
machine learning techniques involved require large sets of training data that have been 
explicitly and accurately labeled. Second, the computational complexity of the trained 
classifiers should be acceptable for practical systems. Third, the features used to model the user 
may change with the passage of time (Webb et al. 2001). 
Popular examples of classification-based techniques include: 
• Decision trees. These flow-chart-like tree structures consist of tests or questions (nodes), 
answers (branches), and conclusions (leaves). A decision tree is traversed by answering 
question after question until the leaf node with the conclusion is reached (Cawsey 1998: 
180). 
• Probabilistic classifiers. These classifiers compute the conditional (or posterior) probability 
P(ci|dj)189 that a pattern dj consisting of a set of feature variables f1j,…,fnj falls into a particular 
category ci, using Bayes’ theorem ([INT 141]). Based on the assumption of conditional 
independence between feature variables, the widely used Naïve Bayesian classifiers 
calculate this probability as P(ci|dj) = P(ci)P(dj|ci), where P(ci) is the unconditional (or 
                                              
189  The conditional or posterior probability P(A|B) of “A given B” is the probability of an event A given 
knowledge that another event B has occurred (Russell & Norvig 2003: 470f.; [INT 142]). 
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prior) probability190 that an item picked at random can be classified into category ci, and 
P(dj|ci) = P(f1|ci)P(f2|ci)…P(fn|ci), i.e. the product of the individual conditional probabilities 
of the feature variables (Russell & Norvig 2003: 481f.; [INT 141]). 
• Case-based reasoning (CBR). In this approach, a new problem is solved by 1. retrieving the 
most similar previous problem situations (cases); 2. reusing the specific knowledge of these 
cases in the new problem situation; 3. revising the suggested solution; and 4. retaining 
information from the current case that may be of interest in solving future cases (Aamodt & 
Plaza 1994). 
• Artificial neural networks (ANNs). These networks consist of a large number of processing 
units that are linked by connections whose weights are determined by training. Processing 
arises from the interaction between the connected units, all of which are capable of operating 
in parallel (Handke 1995: 44; Holmes & Holmes 2001: 214, cf. Chapter 11.1.1.2). 
• Text classification. This technique is used in information retrieval to automatically induce a 
model of the user’s interests or information needs (by using a machine learning algorithm to 
learn a classifier based on a collection of user-rated documents) with the goal of improving 
document retrieval (Webb et al. 2001: 23). 
Collaborative filtering approaches anticipate users’ responses to items (e.g. their ratings of 
products) based on how other users with similar response patterns (‘neighbors’) have responded 
to the same items before, rather than on characteristics of the items themselves (Jameson 2003: 
322; Johnson & Taatgen 2005: 430; [INT 144]). Large data sets of user responses to relevant 
items, preferably by users who are similar to the current user, are required to allow reliable 
predictions ([INT 144]). However, the accumulation of these responses may take more time 
than is appropriate for applications involving a high fluctuation of items (Jameson 2003: 322). 
Users may also have to contribute a substantial number of responses before the system is able to 
find similar users, predict the user’s preferences, and make useful recommendations (Jameson 
2003: 312 + 322; [INT 144]). 
The third paradigm, decision theory, is concerned with goal-directed behavior (choices) of 
rational agents (including both humans and intelligent machines) given closed sets of mutually 
exclusive alternatives, i.e. it deals with how agents should make decisions to qualify as rational 
(normative) or how agents actually make decisions (descriptive) (Hansson 2005: 6). Decision 
making processes are influenced by how much an agent knows about the probabilities of the 
outcomes of the different alternatives. The spectrum ranges from certainty (known outcomes) 
to risk (known probabilities) to uncertainty (partial knowledge of probabilities) to ignorance 
(no knowledge of probabilities) (pp. 27f.). A rational agent facing risk in a decision situation 
calculates the expected utility191 of each alternative as the weighted sum of the utility values 
associated with the different possible outcome states of the alternative, using the probabilities of 
these outcomes as weights on the utility values, and picks the alternative with the highest 
(maximum) expected utility (Hansson 2005: 29; Russell & Norvig 2003: 585). Typically, the 
probabilities represent an individual’s degree of belief in a state (or event), given his or her 
background information (Horvitz et al. 1988; Russell & Norvig 2003: 464; Hansson 2005: 37). 
Likewise, the utility of different options usually also depends on the decision maker’s point of 
view (Hansson 2005: 30f.). The calculation of expected utility based on both subjective utilities 
                                              
190  The prior or unconditional probability P(A) of a random event A is its probability if no other 
information is available (Russell & Norvig 2003: 468ff.; [INT 143]). 
191  The expected utility of a given alternative is a numerical value indicating the degree of happiness or 
gratification that a decision-making agent can obtain when selecting that option. 
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and subjective probabilities is at the heart of Bayesian decision theory (p. 37), which models 
decision situations in terms of a set of alternative actions (physical actions, communicative 
acts, action sequences, etc.), a probability distribution assigning a probability to each possible 
world state, the outcome of each action in each possible state, and a utility function quantifying 
the degree of usefulness of each possible outcome (Haddawy 1999). A Bayesian decision-
theoretic agent decides on an action, given a set of probabilistic beliefs about the present world 
state, by (1) calculating updated probabilities for the current belief state; (2) computing 
outcome probabilities for actions; and (3) selecting the action (or one of several equivalent 
actions) that maximizes expected utility (Russell & Norvig 2003: 466). 
The central tool for representing and reasoning about decision problems in the Bayesian 
framework is a graphical network model that describes probabilistic relationships among 
variables192 (Heckerman 1996). Bayesian networks (or belief networks) (Pearl 1988; Charniak 
1991; Heckerman 1996; Jensen 1996; Haddawy 1999; D’Ambrosio 1999; Pearl 2001; Pearl & 
Russell 2003; Russell & Norvig 2003: Chapter 14; Ben-Gal 2007; [INT 145]), such as the 
partial network in Figure 62, are directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) composed of nodes that 
correspond to random variables of interest (in user-adaptive systems typically (observable or 
unobservable) properties of the user) about which an individual or system has a probabilistic 
belief, and directed arcs (or links) that encode causal or informational dependencies between 
the connected nodes/variables (Pearl 2001; Russell & Norvig 2003: 493; [INT 145]). Each node 
Xi with inbound links is associated with a conditional probability distribution P(Xi|Parents(Xi) 
that gives the probability of each possible value of the node for each possible combination of 
the values of its parents (i.e. nodes that have an outgoing directed link to the current node (one 
of their children)) (Haddawy 1999; Murray et al. 2001; Zukerman & Albrecht 2001: 11; Russell 
& Norvig 2003: 493). Nodes without parents are associated with prior probability distributions 
(Murray et al. 2001). The prior and conditional probability distributions are also called the 
parameters of the network (Michel & Jacobs 2007: 12). 
The interlinked organization of Bayesian networks makes it possible to compute (updated) 
probabilities for any subset of variables in a network based on information available about any 
other subset (Pearl 2001). If the value of a particular variable is observed, the corresponding 
node in the network is instantiated (i.e. assigned the observed value with certainty), and the 
evaluation of the network leads to revised beliefs about the other variables (Mayo & Mitrovic 
2001: 126). The possibility to spread information through a network in any direction (Pearl & 
Russell 2003) enables different types of inference. For applications in user modeling, it is 
important that Bayesian networks support predictive inference (from causes to possible effects 
or actions) through downward propagation of beliefs from parent to child nodes in the network, 
as well as diagnostic inference (from observed effects or actions to possible causes) by way of 
upward propagation in the reverse direction (Jameson 1995: 196f.; Haddawy 1999; Lauría & 
Duchessi 2006: 1575). In a causal Bayesian network, the parents of a given node are interpreted 
as its immediate causes (Pearl & Russell 2003). For example, the network in Figure 62 shows 
that the user’s need for assistance, on the one hand, depends on his or her expertise and the 
difficulty of the current task, and, on the other hand, accounts for certain user behaviors (menu 
surfing and pauses). Furthermore, task difficulty is represented as a possible cause of user 
distraction which, in turn, is a further likely reason for the user pausing after some activity 
(Jameson 2003: 323). 
                                              
192  Examples of variables include the temperature of an engine, the test score of a student, the rating of a 
product, the occurrence of an event (Pearl 2001), the user’s need for assistance (Horvitz et al. 1998), 
etc. 
Chapter 12: Expertise 311 
Jameson argued that the use of Bayesian networks and other decision-theoretic models in 
user modeling has several advantages. For one, the modeling agent does not have to engage in 
long-term collection of data about a particular user before it can draw conclusions about him or 
her. Furthermore, decision-theoretic models can help agents to select adaptive actions by 
weighing the quantified anticipated benefits and costs of different options (Jameson 2003: 323). 
However, according to Jameson, the difficulty lies in the construction of decision-theoretic 
models, which become complex for realistic applications and require the manual specification 
of their parameters and structure (p. 323). But there are now several methods for learning these 
aspects of decision-theoretic models from data (e.g. Heckerman 1996; Russell & Norvig 2003: 
712–733). For further discussion of Bayesian networks, see Section 12.2.3.4 on probabilistic 
student modeling. 
In the plan recognition paradigm, the observed actions of users are used to infer their goals 
as well as the plans by which they intend to achieve these goals (Carberry 2001: 31; Jameson 
2003: 323). Once a user-adaptive agent has uncovered the user’s plan, it can use this knowledge 
to help the user to carry out his or her plan, by asking if it should take over the execution of 
routine plans in the future, by diagnosing the user’s plan and offering helpful suggestions, or by 
planning its next dialogue move or other action so as to further the user’s plan (cf. Chapter 
11.3.3.2.2) (Jameson 2003: 323). 
Depending on the role played by the observed agent in the recognition process (here: the 
user), two major types of plan recognition can be identified (Carberry 2001: 32): keyhole 
recognition, in which the agent (user) does not know (or does not care) that he or she is being 
observed (in other words, the observation is unobtrusive, and the user does not try to influence 
the process of recognizing his or her plan), and intended recognition, in which the observed 
agent is assumed to attempt to facilitate (or hinder) the recognition of his or her plan by 
deliberately structuring his or her activities in a certain way (Cohen et al. 1982). Given a set of 
potential goals of a user in the domain and an observed action of the user, plan recognition for 
user modeling must determine the user’s goal and how it is furthered by the observed action 
(Carberry 2001: 32). The plan inference system knows what user actions are possible in the 
domain and has a plan library which represents each action in terms of a plan operator 
 
Figure 62. A fragment of a Bayesian user model (adapted from Horvitz et al. (1998, Figure 2)) that 
allows to infer the user’s need of assistance based on his or her expertise and the difficulty of the 
current task as well as on observations of the user’s recent activities (menu surfing and pauses) 
(Horvitz et al. 1998). 
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specifying the action’s preconditions and the effects (or goals) of its execution (p. 32, cf. the 
examples in Chapter 11.3.3.2.2). The user’s goal is inferred from his or her observed action by 
constructing a chain from actions to their goals (effects) to other actions for which the goals are 
preconditions, and so on, starting from the observed action and ending in a possible domain 
goal. The resulting inference chain of goals and actions accounts for the user’s observed action 
by making its contribution to the domain goal explicit (p. 33). In the real world, multiple chains 
(hypotheses about the user’s plan) with different degrees of plausibility may be constructed for 
a given observed user action (p. 34). To eliminate less plausible hypotheses, the plan inference 
system could ask the user for clarification, apply heuristics based on rationality or coherency, 
use domain knowledge (cf. Section 12.1), or exploit knowledge about the user or group of users 
(pp. 34ff.). 
The final user-modeling paradigm to be discussed here assigns a given user to one or several 
of a set of pre-defined user categories (stereotypes), using a first impression of the user based 
on, for example, observations of user behavior, users’ self-reports and self-assessments (see 
above), or knowledge about what kinds of people typically use the system (Jameson 2003: 324; 
Tsiriga & Virvou 2003). Each stereotype provides a set of default assumptions about the user 
that can provide the basis for constructing a more elaborate user model (Kay 2000). Triggers 
associated with a stereotype specify a set of conditions under which to activate the stereotype 
for the current user. The body of the stereotype provides defaults that are assumed to apply to 
users who fit the stereotype (Rich 1989). Acquiring an (initial) model for the current user then 
involves activating all stereotypes with satisfied trigger conditions and applying the information 
in their bodies to the user. Stereotypes are an old but still very popular user modeling technique 
(Jameson 2003: 324; Tsiriga & Virvou 2003). Only a small amount of information about the 
user has to be collected in order to trigger a stereotype (Kay 2000), and the default assumptions 
provided by the stereotype can either directly serve as the user model or provide the basis for 
further modeling. Of course, as noted in Chapter 7.15, stereotypes are simplifications and thus 
may not do a particular user justice. Hence, a stereotype-based user model may be too coarse-
grained and require further elaboration. 
12.2.2  Aspects of Student Models 
Student modeling is the continuing process of building and maintaining “an approximate, 
possibly partial, primarily qualitative representation” (Sison & Shimura 1998: 131f.) of an 
individual learner’s goals, plans, knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, emotions, personality, etc. (the 
student model), to the extent to which information about these aspects can be obtained with 
reasonable computational effort by diagnosing and making inferences from the learner’s 
observable behavior (pp. 129 + 131f.). Much of the work on student modeling so far has been 
done in the field of intelligent tutoring systems (ITSs) (Sleeman & Brown 1982; Wenger 1987; 
Self 1988; VanLehn 1988; Rickel 1989; Nwana 1991; McCalla 1992; Brusilovsky 1994; Holt et 
al. 1994; Self 1994a; Shute & Psotka 1996; Self 1999), which has used artificial intelligence 
techniques to build computer-based tutors that are similar to good personal human tutors 
(Servan-Schreiber 1987) in their “ability to perceive the student’s view and to adapt [their] 
behavior accordingly” (Wenger 1987: 16, cf. Chapter 2.3.3). The case for providing 
individualized learner support is usually made by pointing out that students being tutored 
individually have been shown empirically to outperform those being taught in a group setting 
by up to two standard deviations (the so-called two-sigma effect) (Bloom 1984). ITS developers 
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have tried to achieve this effect with their systems but have not yet succeeded (Abdullah 2003: 
12). 
Student models are primarily qualitative in nature, i.e. they use spatial, temporal, or causal 
relations, rather than numbers, as their major descriptive devices (Clancey 1986: 394; Sison & 
Shimura 1998: 132), although they may contain quantitative information like scores and 
frequencies. They are typically approximate and partial because a complete and precise model 
of all aspects of individual students’ behavior and characteristics is neither computationally (or 
theoretically) feasible nor necessary in practice (Sison & Shimura 1998: 132). In other words, 
computational utility of student models is more desirable than their cognitive fidelity (Self 
1994a). 
In contrast to other components of pedagogical agents, the student model is not a static pre-
built resource. The modeling agent dynamically constructs its model of the individual learner 
during its interactions with the student, using the accumulating evidence obtained by recording, 
diagnosing, and concluding from the learner’s activities, expressions, responses, and other cues. 
The current student model allows the agent to adapt its instructional interactions (cf. Section 
12.3) to each learner, which includes: 
• The design, delivery, and timing of interventions; 
• The generation of individualized feedback and problem-solving hints; 
• The identification and remediation of errors, gaps, and inconsistencies in learners’ 
knowledge and skills; 
• The detection of opportunities for teaching the learner new knowledge and skills; 
• The communication of encouragement, empathy, praise, etc. 
In short, paraphrasing Self, a student model is what enables a pedagogical agent to care 
about each individual learner (Self 1999: 352). Four central questions have to be answered in 
building such a model (Stauffer 1996): 
1. Who will be modeled? – The degree of specialization with respect to the object of modeling 
(a typical learner, different groups of learners, or each individual learner); 
2. What will be modeled? – Different learner characteristics (goals, plans, knowledge, skills, 
preferences, emotional and mental states, personality traits, etc.); 
3. How will the model be developed? – Strategies for acquiring and maintaining the model; 
4. Why will the model be developed? – Motivations for modeling (develop a profile of the 
learner, support the customization of assistance and feedback, facilitate the interpretation and 
prediction of learner behavior, etc.). 
Various kinds of learner-related information may be included in a student model. Jameson 
identified five categories of such information (Jameson 1995: 246):193 
• Personal characteristics. Factual, objective information about the learner, such as his or her 
demographic and academic background, performance records, and previous interactions with 
the agent or system; 
• Position on dimensions. Ratings of the learner on various general or specific dimensions, 
such as proficiency, preferences, personality, expectations, experiences, etc.; 
• Long-term cognitive states. Knowledge, beliefs, and goals of the learner that are important 
across tasks and situations; 
                                              
193  See also the lists of user-related characteristics provided in Chapter 6.1 and in Section 12.2.1. 
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• Short-term cognitive states and events. Events and temporary states occurring in the context 
of the task in which the learner is currently engaged; 
• Observable states and events. States and events that can be reliably detected by people, 
agents, or systems, such as learners’ actions and their observable causes and outcomes. 
In general, the contents of a particular student model will depend on what information the 
instructional module of the modeling agent or system requires and can use (Self 1990: 114).194 
So far, the focus has mostly been on modeling the student’s knowledge, chiefly because 
information about other (e.g. affective or motivational) aspects of the student is difficult to 
obtain and interpret (Abdullah 2003: 17). Furthermore, the interest in the learner’s knowledge 
reflects the common perception in the early days of intelligent tutoring systems that the purpose 
of student models is to support the remediation of learner errors (p. 115). This view encouraged 
the development of mechanisms for judging the correctness of student knowledge with respect 
to a body of pre-defined (expert) knowledge (p. 117, cf. Section 12.2.3.2). In contrast, Self 
argued that student modeling should be concerned with describing learners’ subjective beliefs 
(rather than their objective knowledge) in their own terms (rather than judge them against pre-
specified ‘correct’ knowledge) in order to support processes that challenge learners to reflect on 
the justifications and implications of their beliefs (p. 117). On the practical side, for many 
subject areas, including virtually every domain that is not part of mathematics and the natural 
and engineering sciences (the traditional domains of intelligent computer-based tutors), it is 
very difficult to identify and describe ‘correct’ vs. ‘incorrect’ knowledge (Self 1990: 118; Good 
& Berger 1998: 223).195 
A number of taxonomies for classifying student models have been proposed in the literature. 
One taxonomy (Self 1988), which emphasizes the different functions of student models, has 
been widely cited (e.g. Self 1990: 117; Nwana 1991: 3; Brusilovsky 1994: 77f.; Schulmeister 
1997: 184; Wilson & Villa 2002: 7f.; Abdullah 2003: 15f.): 
• Corrective. The student model helps to determine necessary remediating actions by detecting 
differences between the ‘correct’ (expert) knowledge and the learner’s current understanding 
of the subject matter. 
• Elaborative. The student model is used to extend or refine the learner’s incomplete current 
knowledge. Activities for elaboration may be selected based on a curriculum, a comparison 
of student and expert knowledge, an analysis of the contents of the student model, or a set of 
options generated for the learner to choose from. 
• Strategic. The student model captures information about the learner, for example concerning 
the individual effectiveness of different teaching strategies, that enables the agent or system 
to make strategic changes to its operation, such as using a different tutoring approach or 
adapting the interaction style to the learner. 
• Diagnostic. The student model contains information that can be inspected or queried to 
analyze the learner’s knowledge state and to clarify what elements are incorrect or missing in 
his or her knowledge. 
                                              
194  In fact, it has been argued that student models in intelligent tutoring systems have often included 
information for which the rest of the system had no use (Self 1990; Beck et al. 1996; VanLehn et al. 
2005), hence Self’s warning “Don’t diagnose what you can’t treat” (Self 1990: 114). 
195  Philosophers of science actually have long maintained that there is no scientific knowledge that is 
final and invulnerable to falsification (Self 1990: 115). 
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• Predictive. The student model simulates the learner’s behavior, which allows predictions 
about the effects of particular instructional actions on the learner. 
• Evaluative. The student model contains information that enables the agent or system to 
assess the learner’s level of achievement and/or its own success in teaching or assisting the 
learner. 
Since the first reported student model in an intelligent tutoring system (Carbonell 1970), the 
problem of building an accurate, broad, and computationally efficient model of the individual 
learner has generated much interest in the ITS community and beyond. Many different 
techniques have been proposed for this purpose over the years. The most important of them will 
be reviewed in the next section. However, all of them have had to find solutions to a number of 
fundamental issues, which are discussed below: 
• Initialization. What is the initial state of the student model? Student modeling has to start 
with some kind of initial model of the learner that contains assumptions about his or her 
background, preferences, goals, knowledge of domain concepts, and so on. Some of these 
assumptions may turn out to be correct while others may have to be revised during later 
updates to the student model. Eliciting a learner profile by means of explicitly requesting 
information from the learner is one way of obtaining an initial state for the student model 
(Self 1994a); activating learner stereotypes (Kay 2000; Tsiriga & Virvou 2003, cf. Section 
12.2.1) or assuming a default learner profile are further possibilities (Self 1994a). 
• Bandwidth. What is the amount and quality of the information about the student’s activities 
and characteristics that is available to the student modeling process (VanLehn 1988: 58; 
Amižić et al. 2002)? At one extreme, student modeling may only have access to the learner’s 
answer or result for the current task. Other approaches monitor the student’s observable 
actions while performing a task as well as his or her intermediate and final results. Still 
others combine information about the student’s observable behaviors and results with some 
kind of model of his or her cognitive processes (VanLehn 1988: 58f., cf. Section 12.2.3.5). 
In addition, information about individual characteristics of the learner, such as motivation, 
preferences, and personality, may be available in some cases (although, for the most part, it 
is not) (Abdullah 2003: 17). A history of the learner’s actions, results, states, etc. can also be 
created. 
• Knowledge acquisition. How are the elements and the structure of the student model and the 
necessary background knowledge196 for student modeling acquired? In Section 12.1.1, two 
categories of knowledge acquisition methods were discussed: human knowledge engineering 
and machine learning. If permitted by the formalism used for modeling, combining both 
paradigms can facilitate the knowledge acquisition process and improve its outcomes. So far, 
manual encoding of student models and background knowledge has been predominant, but a 
growing number of systems build at least part of their structures and knowledge with the 
help of machine learning (Sison & Shimura 1998: 128). See the article by Sison and Shimura 
(1998) for a review of the use of machine learning techniques to induce student models and 
to develop background knowledge for student modeling. Machine learning for user modeling 
is reviewed by Webb et al. (2001). 
                                              
196  According to Sison and Shimura, the background knowledge of a student modeling agent or system 
includes ‘correct’ domain knowledge (cf. Section 12.1), ‘faulty’ student knowledge (cf. Section 
12.2.3.2), (historical) knowledge about the individual learner, and stereotypical knowledge about 
categories of learners (Sison & Shimura 1998: 130f.). 
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• Knowledge type. What is the nature of the knowledge to be represented (Amižić et al. 2002)? 
Many systems have modeled procedural and/or declarative knowledge (cf. Table 17) of the 
subject area (domain) (VanLehn 1988: 59ff.; Schulmeister 1997: 182f.), typically using the 
same formalism for both the domain knowledge and the student knowledge (VanLehn 1988: 
62; Abdullah 2003: 17) and imposing a hierarchy or some other organization on the 
knowledge representation (Wilson & Villa 2002: 9). Procedural knowledge comprises a set 
of procedures that specify how to perform particular tasks, often in the form of production 
rules (cf. Section 12.1.2.4). Procedural models can be executed by an interpreter to simulate 
the problem-solving behavior of the learner or the domain expert (Brusilovsky 1994: 72; 
Abdullah 2003: 16). Declarative knowledge consists of facts and rules organized in a way 
that enables the system to reason with them in order to verify the consistency of facts, derive 
new facts, etc. Quite a number of intelligent tutoring systems have used semantic networks 
(cf. Section 12.1.2.2) for this purpose (Wilson & Villa 2002: 24). The corresponding 
declarative student model is often used to capture the learner’s level of mastery of the 
domain facts and rules. 
• Student-expert difference. How do the models of student knowledge and expert knowledge 
differ (Amižić et al. 2002)? Some items which are in the expert model may be missing from 
the student model. Conversely, the student model may contain items that are incorrect (or 
‘buggy’) and therefore are not part of the expert model (VanLehn 1988: 62). Other items in 
the student model may be correct, but they may not be represented in the expert model 
(Friedland 2001: 58). It should be noted that while the expert paradigm (Brusilovsky 1994: 
81ff.), which places the system in the role of an omniscient tutor, has dominated research on 
student modeling for a long time, this approach has turned out to be infeasible from an 
implementation point of view and undesirable in light of the currently prominent 
constructivist theories of learning (cf. Chapter 2.2.3) (Self 1990: 115–118; Brusilovsky 
1994: 82). More recent alternative approaches to student modeling have abandoned the idea 
of the omniscient tutor and have turned to greater learner involvement, sufficiently accurate 
representations of the learner’s beliefs (rather than models of his or her correct and incorrect 
knowledge), open student models (see below), and the role of the system as an assistant or 
collaborator (Self 1990: 118; Brusilovsky 1994: 82f.). 
• Grain size. At what level of detail is the student’s knowledge of the subject matter being 
modeled? The granularity of student models typically ranges between the two extremes of 
noting that the learner does or does not know the domain on the one hand and keeping track 
of every action and state of the learner on the other. Most systems model both the domain 
and the student’s knowledge at the same level of granularity (Beck et al. 1996). 
• Completeness and precision. How accurate is the learner-related information being 
modeled? Does the model cover all (relevant) aspects of the student? In general, building a 
complete and fully accurate student model has proven to be an intractable problem (Self 
1990), given the potentially large number of factors involved, their complex and numerous 
relationships, and the difficulty to detect, track, and model both the factors and their 
relationships over time. In fact, even constructing a partial model with reduced accuracy is 
generally a non-trivial task (Abdullah 2003: 38). Given that student models are incomplete 
and imprecise at best, a number of researchers have argued that having no student model at 
all would be better than having to live with one that is less than optimal. This view has led 
these researchers (e.g. Gugerty 1997) to give up the whole endeavor of student modeling as 
infeasible and even unnecessary (Abdullah 2003: 38). However, it appears unreasonable to 
assume that intelligent tutoring systems or pedagogical software agents would be able to 
assist the individual learner effectively if they knew nothing about the student and his or her 
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development. Besides, as argued above, in practice, both completeness and full precision 
may actually matter less than performance since the results of student modeling may have to 
be available on time while the learner is interacting with the agent or system. 
• Level of analysis. At what level(s) are the relationships between observable learner behaviors 
and the background knowledge of a student modeling system analyzed? Sison and Shimura 
described three levels of (error) analysis (Sison & Shimura 1998: 132): the first level, the 
behavior level, identifies syntactic mismatches between the learner’s behaviors and a set of 
pre-specified desired behaviors. These discrepancies are interpreted as behavioral errors. The 
next higher level, the knowledge level, uses the results of the behavior level to detect both 
inconsistent or incorrect and missing or incomplete knowledge that may be responsible for 
behavior-level errors.197 At the highest level, the learning level, such knowledge errors are 
related to corresponding, analogous, or otherwise relevant items of knowledge. For example, 
misconceptions (incorrect or inconsistent knowledge, cf. Section 12.2.3.2) may be linked to 
items from which they possibly arose, e.g. by way of overgeneralization. In the hierarchy of 
the three levels (behavior, knowledge, and learning), each higher level accounts for errors at 
the next lower level. 
• Time frame. What is the temporal scope of the student model? Long-term student models 
accumulate information about learners over a series of interactions, including their growing 
level of knowledge, recurring errors, etc. In contrast, short-term models capture the learner’s 
conceptions and misconceptions at a particular point in time, which are derived by reasoning 
about the learner’s behavior in the current context. Ideally, systems providing individualized 
learner support should have both types of models (Kabassi & Virvou 2003: 61). From 
another point of view, the distinction between short-term and long-term modeling can also 
be made in terms of local vs. global modeling. Local modeling traces the learner’s current 
performance using online monitoring and error recognition. Global modeling uses the trace 
data generated by local modeling to develop a persistent model of the learner’s knowledge 
across interactions (Johnson & Taatgen 2005: 433). 
• Inspectability. Can the learner being modeled inspect, and possibly even modify, the 
contents of his or her own student model? Most student modeling approaches have used 
internal student models that are manipulated by the system alone (Self 1990: 120). However, 
opening student models to learners and involving them in their construction may increase the 
accuracy of the resulting models and provide additional educational advantages, such as 
increased learner reflection and learner control (Self 1990: 120; Abdullah 2003: 40, cf. 
Section 12.2.3.7). 
• Sharability. Is it possible for different agents or systems to share their student models? The 
shared student modeling data could be used to quickly adapt to the characteristics of a new 
learner, and also inform the development of better learner-adaptive systems (Gertner 1999). 
The sharing of student models would benefit from a common, domain-independent standard 
for student modeling, which allows to clearly specify what learner-related aspects are being 
modeled at what level of detail (grain size) and what the measurements used mean (Gertner 
1999). Such a standard is not yet available. 
                                              
197  Sison and Shimura also allowed for the possibility of behavioral errors being caused by slips in the 
learner’s performance (Sison & Shimura 1998: 132). 
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12.2.3  Approaches to Student Modeling 
This section reviews a number of approaches to student modeling that have been described in 
the literature, chiefly in the context of intelligent tutoring systems. The advantages and 
shortcomings of each approach are discussed. 
12.2.3.1 Student Modeling Using Scales and Tallies 
The simplest way to model a learner’s level of knowledge about a domain is to measure it on a 
scale (Brusilovsky 1994: 72). Scalar models indicate the learner’s knowledge level in terms of a 
number on a scale between a minimum and a maximum value representing the lowest and the 
highest possible estimate, respectively (p. 72). Scales can be maintained both for the learner’s 
knowledge as a whole and for different components of his or her knowledge. 
Another simple student modeling technique that has been widely used in computer-assisted 
instruction involves keeping a record, or tally, of the correct and incorrect answers given by the 
learner (Rickel 1989). Some limited forms of adaptation are possible with this technique, in 
particular taking a different branch of instruction if the learner’s current answer is (in-) correct 
or if he or she has given a certain number of correct (or incorrect) answers (Rickel 1989, cf. 
Chapter 2.3.2). 
The problem of both the scalar and the tally models is that they can only provide a very 
coarse representation of the learner’s knowledge state, which may be sufficient for calculating a 
grade for the learner’s performance but is clearly unsuitable for providing truly individually 
adaptive instruction (Rickel 1989). There is no representation of what items the learner knows 
and does not know and where he or she may have incorrect or inconsistent conceptions about 
the domain. The overlay model and its extensions were developed to address these 
shortcomings (Brusilovsky 1994: 72). 
12.2.3.2 Overlay Student Modeling 
For much of their history, intelligent tutoring systems have used student modeling mainly to 
capture the system’s evolving view of the learner’s developing knowledge or understanding of 
the subject matter (cf. Section 12.2.2). An intelligent tutor analyzes the learner’s activities and 
responses, referring to its model of domain knowledge, in order to identify gaps and errors in 
the learner’s knowledge that call for an intervention by the tutor (Self 1999: 362). The gaps and 
errors correspond to underlying missing conceptions and misconceptions of the learner, 
respectively (VanLehn 1988: 62). Both missing conceptions and misconceptions are defined in 
terms of differences between the domain (expert) model (cf. Section 12.1) and the student 
model. The term missing conception refers to an item of knowledge (a concept, fact, principle, 
procedure, schema, strategy, or topic (Beck et al. 1996; Sison & Shimura 1998: 132)) that is 
present in the expert model but not in the student model (VanLehn 1988: 62). Misconceptions 
are items of knowledge which are present in the student model but not in the expert model, and 
which are therefore assumed to be incorrect or inconsistent conceptions (p. 62).198 
                                              
198  A student may actually possess correct knowledge which an expert (model) does not have (Friedland 
2001: 58). However, traditionally, intelligent tutoring systems have implicitly claimed for themselves 
the position of the sole authority in their domain of expertise (Self 1990: 115). 
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If only missing conceptions are considered, the student model becomes a subset of the expert 
model (Wenger 1987: 137; VanLehn 1988: 62). In other words, the student model is structured 
in the same way as the expert model and contains the same items (though not all of them) 
(Wilson & Villa 2002: 9; Abdullah 2003: 17). The student is regarded as an ‘expert-in-training’ 
who knows part of what the expert knows, but not yet everything. A comparison of the learner’s 
and the expert’s knowledge (referred to as ‘overlay’) yields differences (missing conceptions) 
that are addressed by exposing the learner to material which increases his or her knowledge so 
that it eventually approximates the knowledge of the domain expert (Beck et al. 1996; Friedland 
2001: 58). Figure 63 shows this overlay model (Carr & Goldstein 1977), which has been widely 
adopted for student modeling in intelligent tutors and other user-adaptive systems for education 
(VanLehn 1988: 62; Sison & Shimura 1998: 133; Wilson & Villa 2002: 9) because it is 
conceptually simple and easy to implement while still effective as a model of the learner’s 
knowledge in applications that involve teaching the expert knowledge to the learner (Baffes 
1994: 5; Holt et al. 1994: 6f.). 
One problem of the overlay model is that only missing conceptions (lack of knowledge) can 
be represented (VanLehn 1988: 62; Abdullah 2003: 18). Furthermore, no distinction is made 
between items of knowledge that the learner has seen but not yet mastered and items which the 
learner cannot possibly know due to lack of exposure to these items (Friedland 2001: 58; 
Abdullah 2003: 18; [INT 146]). The latter problem has been addressed by differential student 
models (Burton & Brown 1982), which extend the overlay model as shown in Figure 64. The 
student’s knowledge is modeled as a subset of the knowledge that has been presented to the 
learner, and both are embedded in the expert’s knowledge (Friedland 2001: 58; [INT 147]). The 
goal of the system is to bring the learner closer to expert-level proficiency in two steps, by first 
increasing his or her knowledge of items to which he or she has already been exposed (using an 
overlay model) and then introducing him or her to new material (Friedland 2001: 58). While an 
improvement over simple overlay models, differential student models are still unable to deal 
with misconceptions or correct student knowledge that is not part of the expert knowledge 
modeled in the system (p. 58). 
To handle misconceptions, the expert knowledge in overlay models has been augmented 
with a representation of faulty knowledge, which is called a bug library (Baffes 1994: 5; Holt et 
al. 1994: 8f.).199 This library is a database of common misconceptions (also referred to as 
                                              
199  The terms buggy knowledge and bug catalogue are also used (Abdullah 2003: 20). 
 
Figure 63. The schema of the overlay student model. Adapted from Friedland (2001: 58, Figure 4.4). 
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bugs200) that are held by students (Baffes 1994: 5; Sison & Shimura 1998: 131; Friedland 2001: 
58). Given a bug library, diagnosing the learner’s misconceptions involves matching his or her 
observed behaviors against the catalogue of pre-defined bugs (VanLehn 1988: 62; Baffes 1994: 
5). Bug libraries can simply list common bugs that have been pre-constructed using sources 
including the educational literature, an analysis of learners’ behaviors (in particular errors), and 
a learning theory for the domain (bug enumeration), or they may provide a collection of bug 
parts from which bugs are dynamically generated while diagnosing the student (bug generation) 
(VanLehn 1988: 62f.; Baffes 1994: 5; Sison & Shimura 1998: 131; [INT 148]). Student models 
involving bug libraries are instances of the perturbation or buggy student model (Burton 1982), 
which is illustrated in Figure 65. By applying an overlay model to the augmented model 
consisting of expert knowledge and bug library, the system seeks to both extend the student’s 
knowledge and reduce the number of detected learner misconceptions (Holt et al. 1994: 8f.; 
Friedland 2001: 58). Some differences between the student model and the expert model are 
regarded as less important than others, including cases where the learner has correct knowledge 
which the system does not have (p. 58). 
Diagnosis and remediation of student misconceptions are hallmark capabilities of intelligent 
tutoring systems, which were the concern of much work in the early days of the field (Corbett et 
al. 1997: 858). At first, student models involving bug libraries seemed to be appropriate for this 
task. However, while an important extension of the overlay student model, the bug library 
approach is faced with a number of serious issues. First, the construction of a bug library is 
costly in terms of time and effort (Baffes 1994: 6). Second, a complete bug model for a given 
area of expertise is effectively unattainable because no matter how much effort may be put into 
its construction, the resulting bug library will quite likely miss a substantial number of student 
misconceptions (Baffes 1994: 6; Sison & Shimura 1998: 131). Systems that can extend or build 
bug libraries are still very rare (Sison & Shimura 1998: 131), although some researchers have 
investigated the use of machine learning techniques (cf. Section 12.1.1.2) for the construction 
of bug libraries (e.g. Baffes 1994; Baffes & Mooney 1996). Third, bug libraries are static 
resources and therefore unable to model learner behaviors that were not anticipated during their 
construction (Baffes 1994: 6). Fourth, the issues of bug interaction and bug migration have to 
be considered. Bug interaction means that an observed student error may be the result of a 
combination of underlying misconceptions (Stevens et al. 1982; Rickel 1989). The problem of 
                                              
200  Different labels for items of faulty knowledge can be found in the literature, including bug, error, 
mal rule, and misconception. Authors tend to use these labels interchangeably and with different 
meanings (Abdullah 2003: 20). 
 
Figure 64. The schema of the differential student model. Adapted from Friedland (2001: 58, Figure 4.5). 
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bug migration occurs when a bug apparently changes (‘migrates’) over time into another that is 
different but related (Brown & VanLehn 1980: 410; VanLehn 1982; Abdullah 2003: 21). Fifth, 
it may be necessary to construct different bug libraries for different groups of learners (Payne & 
Squibb 1990; Sison & Shimura 1998: 131). Sixth, enduring misconceptions are not as frequent 
as originally thought (VanLehn 1990; Sleeman et al. 1991; Corbett et al. 1997: 858). Seventh, 
empirical research has questioned both the instructional effectiveness and the cost-benefit ratio 
of remedial feedback based on bug modeling (Sleeman et al. 1989; McKendree 1990; Corbett et 
al. 1997: 858). 
12.2.3.3 Student Modeling Using Genetic Graph Models 
Overlay models provide a snapshot of the present state of the learner’s knowledge compared to 
the knowledge of a domain expert, but they cannot account for the evolution of the learner’s 
knowledge over time during the learning process (Abdullah 2003: 22). To model how learners 
progress from simple to complex and from particular to general knowledge (Brusilovsky 1994: 
72), genetic graph models (Goldstein 1982; Wasson 1985; Brecht & Jones 1988) have been 
proposed, which define possible paths by which learners develop knowledge of the subject area 
(Holt et al. 1994: 7). A genetic graph is a kind of semantic network (p. 7, cf. Section 12.1.2.2) 
in which nodes correspond to items of (originally procedural) knowledge at different levels of 
complexity or generality (Brusilovsky 1992) and links between nodes represent evolutionary 
relationships between the connected items, including analogy, generalization, refinement, and 
deviation (Wenger 1987: 141), which can be regarded as domain-independent mechanisms for 
learning a given item from the one linked to it (Wenger 1987: 403; Vassileva & Wasson 1996). 
For definitions of the evolutionary links used in genetic graphs, see Wasson (1985: 32). 
Genetic graphs extend the overlay-based student models discussed in the previous section 
(Wenger 1987: 140f.; Brusilovsky 1994: 72). The learner’s knowledge and his or her learning 
behavior (represented by his or her individual learning path) are represented as an overlay on 
the nodes and the links of the genetic graph, respectively, including correct and incorrect pieces 
of knowledge, which are connected by deviation links (Wasson 1985: 33 + 45; Wenger 1987: 
141f.). Thus not only the current state of learners’ knowledge can be modeled but also their 
progress in acquiring different aspects of expertise (Holt et al. 1994: 7f.; Abdullah 2003: 22). 
Information about both the learner’s path and possible extensions to it can be used to flexibly 
 
Figure 65. The schema of the perturbation student model. Adapted from Friedland (2001: 58, Figure 
4.6) and ([INT 148]). 
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adapt future instructional interventions to the learner’s progress (Wasson 1985: 39 + 41; 
Vassileva & Wasson 1996). 
While genetic graph models incorporate some degree of learner orientation into the student 
model (Wasson 1985: 33; Wenger 1987: 140), they are still based on the overlay approach and 
therefore define the knowledge of the learner as a subset of the expert’s knowledge (Abdullah 
2003: 22). Furthermore, genetic graphs are static models consisting of pre-defined nodes and 
links that cannot be changed at run-time (Wasson 1985: 52; Wenger 1987: 144; Greve 1990). 
For complex domains, pre-constructing a complete static graph should be very difficult, if not 
impossible (Wenger 1987: 144). As a result, there may be learning paths that the static model is 
unable to account for. While Goldstein hinted at the possibility of building genetic graphs with 
dynamically generated links and nodes, the feasibility of this idea for complex domains remains 
doubtful (p. 144). A theoretical issue is that the evolutionary relations in a genetic graph do not 
provide a full account of the complex learning processes which they represent (p. 144). In 
addition, learning is taken to involve only local additions and refinements of knowledge; major 
reconceptualizations are not possible (p. 144). 
12.2.3.4 Probabilistic Student Modeling 
There is typically a significant gap between the nature and amount of the information that an 
intelligent system can feasibly and reliably collect about the learner and the inferences that have 
to be made from that information about the learner’s beliefs, abilities, goals, motivations, and 
future behavior (Jameson 1995: 193). In other words, student modeling (and user modeling in 
general) normally has to deal with considerable uncertainty with respect to the conclusions that 
have to be drawn from the comparatively meager and haphazard evidence available (p. 193). 
One important numerical approach to uncertainty management in student modeling makes 
use of Bayesian networks201 (cf. Section 12.2.1) to model the uncertainty of determining the 
learner’s knowledge state and plans (Martin & VanLehn 1995; VanLehn & Martin 1997; 
Conati et al. 1997; Mayo & Mitrovic 2001; Conati et al. 2002). In particular, Bayesian networks 
have been proposed as a solution to the so-called assignment of credit problem in student 
modeling (VanLehn 1988). That is, if an observed action of the learner has multiple possible 
explanations with respect to the learner’s knowledge and/or plan, how much credit should be 
assigned to each of them? In probabilistic terms, how likely is each explanation? Which one is 
the most likely? (Conati et al. 2002: 372). 
In student modeling, Bayesian networks have been mainly used to infer from the learner’s 
observable actions how well he or she knows the domain and what his or her actions are trying 
to accomplish, in other words, for student assessment202 (Martin & VanLehn 1995) and for plan 
recognition (cf. Section 12.2.1). A great deal of inherent uncertainty is involved in both tasks 
when learners can reason along various lines and do not have to make explicit all the steps in 
their reasoning (Conati et al. 2002: 371). A third application of Bayesian networks in student 
modeling is to provide support for the prediction of the learner’s behavior while he or she is 
                                              
201  The Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence (Dempster 1968; Shafer 1976) and fuzzy logic (cf. Section 
12.1.2.1) are two further important frameworks for numerical uncertainty management in user and 
student modeling. See Jameson (1995) for a review. 
202  Another term for student assessment is knowledge tracing (Conati et al. 2002: 371). A discussion of 
knowledge tracing (which also employs Bayesian techniques) is provided in the following section on 
cognitive student modeling. 
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engaged in problem solving. If the learner’s inferences and actions in a given problem-solving 
context can be predicted, it becomes easier to assist him or her in overcoming an impasse 
(p. 373). 
A simple example (adapted from Mayo & Mitrovic 2001) will suffice to illustrate how the 
relationships between observed actions of the learner, his or her internal states, and a set of 
outcomes can be modeled with Bayesian networks (p. 126). Figure 66 shows a small Bayesian 
network that can be used to predict the learner’s performance on a particular task in a test, given 
how likely it is that he or she knows three different concepts (which, in turn, depends on the 
probability that he or she has performed certain learning activities) and the likelihood that the 
learner is not fond of tests in general. The two peripheral nodes in dark grey, “Studied Virtual 
Session” and “Completed Worksheet,” represent variables whose values were observed in the 
learner’s behavior and which therefore could be instantiated (set with certainty to) YES and NO, 
respectively (cf. Section ) (p. 126). As a result of the instantiation, the probability distributions 
of all non-instantiated nodes in the network are updated to integrate these observations, which 
leads to updated probabilistic beliefs about the non-instantiated variables (cf. Section 12.2.1). 
Bayesian networks provide a consistent, robust, flexible, and theoretically solid mechanism 
for managing uncertainty in student modeling (Myllymäki 2005). Consistency means that 
outputs computed using a Bayesian network model are always unambiguous and that alternative 
ways of computing an output from a given input using the network will produce the same 
result. The performance of a Bayesian network is robust, i.e. not severely affected by minor 
changes to the network structure. Bayesian networks are flexible structures because the same 
network model can be used for a variety of tasks, including student assessment, recognition of 
the student’s plans, and prediction of learner steps (see above) (Myllymäki 2005). Furthermore, 
Bayesian networks have a solid theoretical basis in probability theory, graph theory, computer 
science, and statistics (Ben-Gal 2007). Bayesian networks are also transparent because their 
structure, variables, and probabilities can be inspected and understood, not only by their 
developers but also by domain experts, in contrast to artificial neural networks (cf. Chapter 
11.1.1.2 and Section 12.2.1), whose internals are not accessible to the observer (Myllymäki 
2005). Combined with well-understood formal mechanisms for computing probabilities and 
making inferences, this ensures that a given Bayesian student model can be used to explain its 
own outputs (Gertner 1999). Finally, Bayesian networks can incorporate information from 
 
Figure 66. A simple Bayesian student model. Adapted from Mayo and Mitrovic (2001: 126, Figure 2). 
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various sources. For example, a domain expert bootstraps the network, the rest is automatically 
learned from data, and the expert makes the final adjustments (Mayo & Mitrovic 2001: 127). 
Despite these advantages, the construction and performance of Bayesian student models pose 
significant challenges for developers. Their task is to build the structure of a Bayesian network 
and to define the probability distributions of its nodes in such a way that the final network has 
sufficient accuracy and coverage and can be used efficiently in processing. In short, problems 
related to the acquisition and computational complexity of Bayesian networks have to be solved 
(Jameson 1995: 239–243). 
In general, the quality and trustworthiness of the probabilities computed from a Bayesian 
student model depend on the extent to which the prior and conditional probabilities specified 
for the nodes of the network are reliable (Gertner 1999). Determining the prior and conditional 
probabilities for a given domain is a difficult knowledge engineering task (cf. Section 12.1.1.1). 
Probabilities have been obtained from a variety of sources, including domain experts, empirical 
data, the research literature, machine learning (see below), and (quite often) more or less 
informed guessing (Jameson 1995: 197; Gertner 1999; Conati et al. 2002: 388). 
Depending on how they develop the structure and the prior and conditional probabilities of 
Bayesian student models, current methods have been classified intro expert-centric, efficiency-
centric, and data-centric approaches (Mayo & Mitrovic 2001: 127–131; González et al. 2006). 
Expert-centric approaches develop all or most of the structure and probabilities of a Bayesian 
network model based on an analysis of the domain provided by a human expert, imposing no 
structural restrictions on the network in order to model the structure of the domain as faithfully 
as possible (Mayo & Mitrovic 2001: 127). The resulting networks often have a large number of 
variables, many of them specifying unobservable internal states of the learner. It is difficult to 
obtain probability distributions for these variables without data (p. 127f.). In addition, dynamic 
adaptation of the structure and/or parameters of the network to the learner is not possible 
(p. 129). Finally, the size and complexity of expert-centric network models needed for realistic 
domains have been found to cause performance problems (see below). 
Concerns about the lack of efficiency of Bayesian student models have motivated efficiency-
centric approaches, which try to make building these networks and processing with them more 
efficient by specifying them partially (rather than completely) or by restricting their structure 
(Mayo & Mitrovic 2001: 127; González et al. 2006). However, restrictions introduced to reduce 
complexity (and thereby increase efficiency) may lead to an oversimplified model that possibly 
even includes incorrect assumptions about the domain (Mayo & Mitrovic 2001: 128; González 
et al. 2006). 
A third possibility is to learn Bayesian student models from data which has been collected 
from a representative group of learners by exposing them to a reduced version of the final 
system that selects its instructional actions randomly (Mayo & Mitrovic 2001: 132f.). The next 
step is to apply machine learning techniques (cf. Section 12.1.1.2) to the data in order to induce 
the structure and probabilities of a Bayesian network that can predict student performance 
(p. 132f.). This model, in turn, is gradually adapted to the current learner over time (Mayo 
2001: 110; Mayo & Mitrovic 2001: 144). The details of this data-centric approach to Bayesian 
student modeling have been described in the literature (Mayo 2001; Mayo & Mitrovic 2001). 
One advantage of data-centric Bayesian student models is that their predictive performance can 
be readily tested using unseen data that was not part of their training data set (Mayo & Mitrovic 
2001: 130). Furthermore, Mayo and Mitrovic pointed out that data-centric networks usually 
contain a much smaller set of variables than expert-centric models because they only represent 
the relationships between observable variables to predict learner performance while expert-
centric networks model both observable and hidden variables (Mayo & Mitrovic 2001: 128 + 
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130). One problematic aspect of the data-centric approach is that the performance of the 
resulting student models depends on the amount and quality of the training data that can be 
obtained for the machine learning process (cf. Section 12.1.1.2), although human involvement 
is possible both before and after the learning stage (Mayo & Mitrovic 2001: 133). Furthermore, 
the purpose of the Bayesian student model seems to be to inform “pedagogical action selection” 
(i.e. selection of problems, error messages, topics, etc.) (p. 138) rather than assessment of the 
learner’s knowledge: “The output of the Bayesian network (which is a prediction about how the 
student will (…) behave in a given context) is the input to a decision-theoretic process for 
tutorial action selection” (Mayo 2001: 9). Finally, modeling only observable variables makes it 
easier to acquire the network, but reasoning about unobservable aspects of the tutorial state, 
including the learner’s knowledge, is not possible with the resulting model (Murray et al. 2004). 
Concerning computational complexity, a general problem of large Bayesian networks is that 
their online evaluation (i.e. while the learner is working with the system) is computationally 
expensive, even to the point of intractability (Mayo & Mitrovic 2001: 127). In fact, performing 
exact inference in large, complex Bayesian networks is known to be NP-hard (i.e. no exact 
solution can be found in polynomial time) and hence computationally intractable in general 
(Jameson 1995: 242; Russell & Norvig 2003: 511; Ben-Gal 2007). Inference from a Bayesian 
network involves belief propagation, i.e. if new information about a subset of the variables in 
the network is available, it is used to update the uncertain beliefs about the other variables 
(Laskey 2008, cf. Section 12.2.1). In the worst case, the number of operations involved in the 
probability propagation algorithms grows exponentially with the number of the variables in the 
network (Ben-Gal 2007). While there is no solution to the general problem of Bayesian 
inference, tractable algorithms exist for singly connected networks with at most one undirected 
path between any two of their nodes (Jameson 1995: 242), for some types of low-connectivity 
networks, and for networks suitable for approximate inference techniques (Russell & Norvig 
2003: 504–519; Laskey 2008). 
In sum, Bayesian networks are a versatile probabilistic framework for processing uncertain 
information, which has a solid and well-understood theoretical foundation. Not surprisingly, 
these networks have been widely adopted to manage uncertainty in student modeling. However, 
developers considering the use of Bayesian networks need to be prepared to address problems 
related to the acquisition of the structure of and probabilities for their networks as well as issues 
involved in the management of the computational complexity of Bayesian models, which can 
be considerable in realistic domains. 
12.2.3.5 Cognitive Student Modeling 
Cognitive approaches to student modeling have been quite influential in the field of intelligent 
tutoring systems over the last twenty years. Cognitive tutors (Anderson et al. 1995; Koedinger 
et al. 1997; Koedinger 2001) are intelligent computer-based tutors which are characterized by 
their use of a psychological model of the cognitive processes that underlie (near-) successful 
performance of learners in problem solving (Koedinger et al. 1997: 32). The Adaptive Control 
of Thought(-Rational) (ACT(-R)) theory of learning and performance (Anderson 1983; 
Anderson 1993; Anderson & Lebiere 1998; Anderson et al. 2004) provides the theoretical basis 
of this approach (Koedinger 2001: 147). The cognitive model of student problem solving built 
for the tutor consists of production rules (cf. Section 12.1.2.4) that represent (alternative) steps 
to solve problems in the domain, and mis-steps corresponding to typical learner misconceptions 
(cf. Section 12.2.3.2) (Koedinger et al. 1997: 32; Koedinger 2001: 149). At each point in the 
problem-solving process, the model can be used to dynamically generate a set of possible 
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solution paths and to suggest correct and incorrect steps that could be performed by students at 
that stage (Anderson et al. 1995: 171; Amižić et al. 2002; Mitrovic et al. 2003). The cognitive 
model is involved in two student modeling techniques that trace the learner’s problem solving 
and knowledge development, respectively. 
Model tracing performs a step-by-step analysis of the learner’s problem-solving activities, 
matching each student action to the actions that would be generated by those production rules in 
the cognitive model that are applicable in the current situation, in order to identify both on-path 
actions (i.e. legitimate actions, which lie on one of the solution paths generated by the cognitive 
model) and off-path actions (i.e. learner actions that are not on one of the correct paths and 
therefore assumed to result from misconceptions) (Anderson et al. 1995: 171; Corbett et al. 
1997: 853; Johnson & Taatgen 2005: 433). Learner actions matching either one of the buggy 
production rules (which embody common learner misconceptions) or none of the production 
rules in the cognitive model are interpreted as errors and may trigger tutorial responses from the 
system (Mitrovic et al. 2003). While the learner is on-path, the tutor silently performs its tracing 
activities in the background and does not intervene (Anderson et al. 1995: 171; Koedinger et al. 
1997: 32). However, this silent monitoring allows the tutor to keep track of the state of the 
learner’s problem solving and to provide the student with timely, individualized and context-
sensitive assistance (feedback on errors and problem-solving hints) (Koedinger et al. 1997: 32; 
Koedinger 2001: 157f.). 
Knowledge tracing (Corbett & Anderson 1994) keeps track of how the knowledge of a given 
learner increases as he or she solves problem after problem, by maintaining a student-specific 
model of probabilistic estimates of the learner’s mastery of each production rule in the generic 
cognitive model.203 Based on these estimates, problem selection and pacing may be tuned to the 
individual learner (Koedinger 2001: 149). The estimates can also be made visible to the student 
or teacher, for example as a graphical scale (Koedinger et al. 1997: 36). To obtain the 
probabilistic estimates for the production rules, a Bayesian procedure (cf. Section 12.2.1) is 
employed, which was described by Corbett and Bhatnagar (1997). Each production rule is in 
one of two states: learned or unlearned. The transition from unlearned to learned (but not 
backwards) may take place before the rule can be applied for the first time (initial learning) or 
whenever it is possible to use the rule during problem solving (acquisition). Because slips and 
lucky guesses will occur in the student’s use of learned and unlearned rules, respectively, 
knowledge tracing maintains for each production rule an estimate of its probability to be in the 
learned state, which is updated at each point where the rule is applicable in the problem-solving 
process, depending on whether the learner has taken a correct or an incorrect action. The 
Bayesian procedure for computing the probability uses a set of learning and performance 
parameters whose estimates are obtained empirically for each rule (Corbett & Bhatnagar 1997). 
One major advantage of cognitive tutors is that they use an explicit model of the procedural 
knowledge which learners have to acquire in order to be able to solve problems in the domain 
(Mitrovic et al. 2003). Cognitive tutors evaluate each problem-solving step taken by the student 
and can respond appropriately. Feedback is typically provided immediately but can also be 
given on demand (Mitrovic et al. 2003). Furthermore, cognitive tutors can generate context-
sensitive strategic hints on the next problem-solving step (when requested by the learner or 
when the number of his or her mistakes exceeds a pre-set threshold) with the help of the set of 
production rules in their cognitive model (Koedinger 2001: 157f.; Mitrovic et al. 2003). 
                                              
203  In other words, the student’s knowledge is modeled as an overlay on the ideal knowledge (Corbett & 
Bhatnagar 1997, cf. Section 12.2.3.2). 
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Unrecognized problem-solving steps of the learner (i.e. steps that fail to trigger a correct or a 
buggy production rule) are assumed to be incorrect. In such cases, the tutor can indicate the 
deviant step, although it cannot offer an explanation of why that step is wrong (Mitrovic et al. 
2003). However, in so doing, a cognitive tutor may also misjudge correct problem-solving steps 
if it lacks the relevant correct production rules (Mitrovic et al. 2003). In general, the “guilty 
until proven innocent” default behavior of cognitive tutors when analyzing student actions can 
lead to the rejection of correct solutions if the solution paths that can be generated by the 
cognitive model are unable to account for them (Mitrovic et al. 2003). In fact, tutors based on 
the model tracing approach have been criticized for their rigidity because they deny the learner 
the freedom to explore approaches that are outside their own pre-defined set of problem-solving 
strategies (VanLehn et al. 2000; Mitrovic et al. 2003). Another point of criticism concerns the 
high degree of scaffolding which these tutors provide for error detection and remediation: they 
identify every problem-solving error for the learner and generate an appropriate remedial hint, 
which, however, does not help students to develop these error handling capabilities themselves. 
In contrast, human tutors offer substantial scaffolding only at the beginning and then gradually 
fade as the learner’s proficiency increases (VanLehn et al. 2000, cf. Chapter 2.2.3). Therefore, 
VanLehn et al. suggested that model tracing tutors should be equipped with the ability to fade 
their scaffolding. Furthermore, they should gradually increase the learner’s freedom in problem 
solving by easing their restrictions on how to correctly solve problems in the domain (VanLehn 
et al. 2000). 
A number of critics have also found fault with model tracing tutors because of their lack of 
support for deep learning (VanLehn et al. 2000). Some of the criticisms in this area were 
discussed by VanLehn et al. (2000) and are summarized in the following. First, learners are not 
encouraged to reflect on the hints provided by the tutor and can arrive at a correct action simply 
through trial and error. In so doing, they might learn how to solve problems, but only at a 
shallow level, without really understanding what they are doing. Second, students are not 
required to explain their problem-solving actions and therefore may not learn the terminology 
of the domain and how to use it properly. Third, model tracing tutors request learners to 
develop detailed solutions to specific problems. As a result, learners may fail to see the “big 
picture,” i.e. the general approach that enables them to solve a whole class of similar problems. 
Finally, students learning a quantitative skill are not invited to take a qualitative, semantic 
viewpoint on the problems they are solving and thus do not develop the ability to tackle related 
qualitative problems and to determine whether a given quantitative problem makes sense. 
VanLehn et al. suggested that these shortcomings could be addressed by combining the 
problem-solving expertise of a model tracing tutor with knowledge about principles and 
rationales; domain language; abstract, basic approaches; and qualitative rules of inference. They 
further argued that “if [model tracing tutors] are to become more effective at encouraging deep 
learning, they must use natural language” in instructional interactions between the tutor and the 
learner (cf. Section 12.3.9) that help learners to acquire the kinds of knowledge mentioned 
above (VanLehn et al. 2000). 
12.2.3.6 Constraint-Based Student Modeling 
Constraint-based modeling (CBM) (Ohlsson 1992; Ohlsson 1994; Mitrovic & Ohlsson 1999; 
Mitrovic et al. 2001; Mitrovic et al. 2003; Ohlsson & Mitrovic 2006) has been developed as a 
solution to the intractable problem of creating and maintaining a complete and precise model of 
the student’s knowledge (Mitrovic et al. 2003, cf. Section 12.2.2). The central idea of CBM is 
to model knowledge about a given domain in terms of an inventory of constraints on correct 
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solutions in that domain (Mitrovic & Ohlsson 1999: 239). These constraints divide the space of 
possible solutions into correct solutions that satisfy and incorrect solutions that violate the 
constraints. Put differently, given the set of all possible solutions, the constraints select those 
solutions from this set which are correct (p. 239). For each constraint, the corresponding set of 
incorrect solutions consists of all solutions violating that constraint (p. 239). The learner’s 
knowledge of the domain can be modeled in terms of the constraints which are violated and the 
ones which are not violated by the learner during problem solving (Mitrovic & Ohlsson 1999: 
239; Ohlsson & Mitrovic 2006: 16). Instead of modeling the learner’s actions, the student 
model captures the effects of his or her actions (Mitrovic et al. 2001). Diagnostic information is 
assumed to be obtainable from the learner’s current situation (i.e. the problem state) rather than 
the sequence of actions by which he or she reached that state (Mitrovic et al. 2001). 
The basic unit of knowledge in constraint-based models is the state constraint, an ordered 
pair <Cr, Cs> consisting of the relevance condition Cr and the satisfaction condition Cs 
(Mitrovic & Ohlsson 1999: 239). Cr represents “the class of problem states for which the 
constraint is relevant,” whereas Cs is “the class of (relevant) states in which the constraint is 
satisfied” (p. 239). Both Cr and Cs are described in terms of features or properties (p. 239). A 
state constraint can thus be read as: If the constraint is relevant (the properties Cr hold), then it 
has to be satisfied (the properties Cs have to hold as well). Otherwise, something is wrong 
(p. 239). “In other words, if the student solution falls into the state defined by the relevance 
condition, it must also be in the state defined by the satisfaction condition in order to be 
correct” (Mitrovic et al. 2006). To give a concrete example: If the code of an if-condition 
statement contains an opening curly brace (‘{’) (= Cr), there has to be a closing curly brace 
(‘}’) as well (= Cs). Otherwise, the statement is incorrect (after Mitrovic & Ohlsson 1999: 239). 
One way to implement state constraints is as pairs of patterns that are matched to problem 
states (Mitrovic & Ohlsson 1999: 239). A two-step procedure can be used to determine whether 
a given problem state satisfies or violates the members of a set of constraints. In the first step, 
the relevance patterns of all constraints in the set are compared to the problem state in order to 
find the subset of constraints that are relevant in this state. The second step tests for each of the 
relevant constraints if its satisfaction pattern matches the problem state. If that is the case, the 
problem state satisfies the matching constraint; otherwise, it violates the constraint (pp. 239f.). 
In instructional systems, constraints are used to both model the domain and to evaluate the 
solutions produced by the learner. The constraints represent syntactic or semantic properties of 
the domain being modeled (Ohlsson & Mitrovic 2006: 9). The current problem state has to be 
represented in a form that can be matched to the constraints (p. 9f.). While changes to the 
problem state have to be recorded, the actions or processes that are responsible for these 
changes do not (p. 10). The consistency of the problem state with the set of constraints is 
checked by comparing the state to the constraints as described above and noting any constraint 
violations (Ohlsson & Mitrovic 1999: 239; Ohlsson & Mitrovic 2006: 10). Since correct 
solution paths cannot involve problem states that violate constraints of the domain (Mitrovic et 
al. 2003), constraint violations indicate student errors and point to underlying misconceptions or 
missing conceptions (i.e. incorrect or incomplete knowledge, cf. Section 12.2.3.2), which can 
be addressed by appropriate instructional actions (e.g. feedback messages) (Mitrovic et al. 
2001; Mitrovic et al. 2006). If a constraint is satisfied, the system does not intervene. Each 
constraint defines a class of problem states whose members are instructionally equivalent, i.e. 
they activate the same instructional response which can be directly linked to the constraint 
(Mitrovic et al. 2006; Ohlsson & Mitrovic 2006: 12). Since the student’s current state rather 
than his or her sequence of actions is of interest, no solution path is prescribed: as long as no 
constraint violation is detected, the student can perform any actions he or she chooses (Mitrovic 
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et al. 2003; Mitrovic et al. 2006). The short-term student model keeps track of the constraints 
that have been satisfied and the constraints that have been violated by the learner204 and 
provides the basis for feedback to the learner during problem solving (Ohlsson & Mitrovic 
2006: 10). For modeling the learner’s long-term knowledge, overlay (cf. Section 12.2.3.1) or 
probabilistic (cf. Section 12.2.3.4) techniques can be used (p. 10). 
Constraint-based modeling has several advantages over other, more complex approaches to 
student modeling. First, the process of student modeling essentially consists of pattern matching 
and is therefore more efficient (Mitrovic et al. 2001). Second, constraint-based modeling 
systems can be built with less cost and effort (Mitrovic et al. 2003). Laborious empirical studies 
to inform the construction of bug libraries (cf. Section 12.2.3.2) are not necessary (Ohlsson & 
Mitrovic 2006: 17). Constraints are modular (i.e. there is no direct interaction between them), 
general (i.e. they embody correctness criteria that are assumed to apply everywhere in the 
domain), and do not require a hierarchical or other kind of organization (Ohlsson & Mitrovic 
2006: 8f.). As a result, constraint sets have turned out to be easier to represent, implement, and 
debug than bug libraries or rule sets (Mitrovic & Ohlsson 1999: 253; Ohlsson & Mitrovic 2006: 
8f.). Third, correct student solutions are recognized even if they use a different approach than 
the ideal solution. If the learner’s solution does not violate any constraints, it is regarded as 
correct with respect to the constraint database (Ohlsson & Mitrovic 2006: 13). Problem-solving 
steps that do not provide instructionally relevant information do not trigger any constraints, 
which means that they are effectively ignored by the system (Mitrovic & Ohlsson 1999: 240). 
In fact, CBM ignores the learner’s particular problem-solving strategy altogether (Mitrovic et 
al. 2001) and is therefore open to free exploration and creative solutions (Abdullah 2003: 23). 
Fourth, complete coverage is not a requirement for constraint sets as long as the most typical 
learner errors can be detected (Mitrovic & Ohlsson 1999: 240). Fifth, constraint-based 
modeling has been argued to avoid the overspecificity problem of student modeling (i.e. the 
problem that techniques for modeling the student’s knowledge tend to expect more detail than 
can be provided (p. 238)) because problem-solving steps can be evaluated selectively (and those 
which are not instructionally informative can be ignored), and the system works with classes of 
instructionally equivalent solution paths that can be mapped to the same instructional response 
(p. 240). 
However, constraint-based modeling also involves a number of problems (Ohlsson 1992; 
Mitrovic & Ohlsson 1999: 253). One concerns the feasibility of developing sets of appropriate 
constraints for qualitatively different domains, such as algebra, geography, and linguistics 
(p. 253). There is also the possibility that the constraint set created for a given domain has 
insufficient coverage and thus too many errors made by learners may escape the system’s 
attention (p. 253). In general, if the relevant constraints cannot or have not been modeled, 
incorrect solutions may be regarded as correct, based on the default assumption that the student 
is right until he or she is shown to be wrong (“innocent until proven guilty”). This, in turn, may 
lead to unfounded confidence on the part of the learner that he or she has mastered a given skill 
(Mitrovic et al. 2003; Ohlsson & Mitrovic 2006: 13). Hence, a number of implementations of 
constraint-based modeling have used more restrictive techniques that compare the learner’s 
solution to a stored ideal solution (Ohlsson & Mitrovic 2006: 13). A negative side to being 
                                              
204  The literature on constraint-based student models does not seem to be consistent with respect to the 
exact contents of the (short-term) student model. Some papers state that this model only consists of 
the violated constraints (e.g. Mitrovic et al. 2003), others say that it includes both satisfied and 
violated constraints (e.g. Ohlsson & Mitrovic 2006), and still others contain both statements (e.g. 
Mitrovic & Ohlsson 1999: 239 + 246). 
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flexible with respect to the student’s problem-solving strategy is that unlike cognitive tutors (cf. 
Section 12.2.3.5), many constraint-based tutors are unable to provide strategic problem-solving 
advice because they cannot solve the problems themselves, although they can detect and give 
feedback on the absence of necessary elements in a solution if they have access to a pre-
specified ideal solution (Mitrovic et al. 2003). The disadvantage of not having a library of 
common student bugs in CBM is that these bugs cannot be recognized and addressed by giving 
specific feedback (Mitrovic et al. 2003). 
In sum, like other student modeling techniques, constraint based modeling is more suitable 
for some domains than for others, due to its characteristic combination of strengths and 
weaknesses (Mitrovic et al. 2003; Ohlsson & Mitrovic 2006: 18), which were outlined in the 
previous paragraphs. According to Ohlsson and Mitrovic, case-based modeling can demonstrate 
its strengths in two categories of domains. The first includes domains in which problem states 
have complex internal structures that become more and more detailed in the course of problem 
solving. In these domains, state constraints can be used to identify inconsistencies between 
parts of complex problem states that result from errors made by the learner (Ohlsson & 
Mitrovic 2006: 18). The second category benefits from CBM’s ability to tolerate different ways 
of solving a problem. It includes domains in which correct solutions do not require a particular 
order of problem-solving steps and the learner’s behavior has to be diagnosed based on the final 
result rather than his or her sequence of actions (p. 18). Furthermore, CBM may be considered 
if well-defined problem-solving strategies do not exist for a given domain or if modeling them 
would involve prohibitive time and effort (Mitrovic et al. 2003). 
12.2.3.7 Collaborative Student Modeling 
The approaches to student modeling reviewed so far use internal representations of the student 
whose contents is not accessible to the learner and which are maintained by the (intelligent 
tutoring) system alone. In contrast, collaborative student modeling opens the student model for 
inspection by the learner and makes him or her an active participant in its construction (Bull & 
Pain 1995; Beck et al. 1997; Bull 1998; Bull et al. 1999). In addition to task-related exchanges, 
the learner interacts with the system to negotiate or collaborate on the contents of an open or 
inspectable student model205 (Kay 1997; Hartley & Mitrovic 2002; Bull et al. 2005; Bull et al. 
2007a), contributing information explicitly that the system cannot reliably obtain on its own, 
such as the learner’s current goal or his or her level of confidence in a particular response or 
action, and possibly questioning assessments derived by the system and suggesting corrections 
(Bull & Pain 1995; Beck et al. 1997; Hartley & Mitrovic 2002). The resulting model is a 
synthesis of the viewpoints of the system and the learner with respect to the latter’s abilities, 
goals, performance, etc. (Beck et al. 1997). Student modeling thus becomes an interactive 
process in which the learner, rather than being the passive object of scrutiny and diagnosis on 
the part of the system, plays an active role (Self 1994b: 4). Apart from student-system 
                                              
205  An open student model makes its contents accessible to the learner and possibly to other interested 
parties, such as instructors, peers, and pedagogical software agents. Users can at least inspect such a 
model, but they may also be able to change it (Bull et al. 2007b). Open student modeling can be as 
simple as providing a visualization of the student model (e.g. a skill meter), but there are also more 
ambitious efforts in which learners actively participate in shaping the student model by engaging in 
negotiation or collaboration with the system (Hartley & Mitrovic 2002). Various ways to present and 
interact with open student models have been explored (Bull et al. 2005). 
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interaction, collaborative student modeling can also include contributions from human or 
artificial peers (cf. Section 12.3.10) and from human instructors (Bull et al. 1999). In fact, in 
educational settings where the learner interacts with a variety of human and/or non-human 
agents (instructors, other learners, computer-based tutors, etc.), the instructionally relevant 
knowledge about the learner is not exclusively in the possession of a single individual or system 
but is actually distributed among potentially many agents that interact with the learner (McCalla 
et al. 2000). If learner-related information is fragmented among multiple different sources, 
trying to maintain a single, monolithic global model for each learner in one place appears both 
infeasible and ineffective (McCalla et al. 2000). An alternative approach to collaborative 
student modeling dispenses with the traditional idea of a single global student model and views 
student modeling as 
the process of assembling and summarizing fragmented learner information from potentially 
diverse sources. This information can be raw data, recorded by a web application, partially 
computed learner models inferred by an ITS, opinions about the learner recorded by a teacher or 
peers, or a history of learner actions. (McCalla et al. 2000). 
This ‘active’ learner modeling approach (McCalla et al. 2000) is characterized by a shift in 
focus from the product to the process of student modeling. The student model is conceptualized 
as a function by means of which a modeling agent computes just in time relevant information 
about a set of learners for a specific purpose using the computational resources available. The 
model computed is meaningful only in the context defined by the parameters of the function 
(agent, learners, purpose, and resources) (McCalla et al. 2000). Model management (rather than 
model building) becomes the major concern of the modeling agent, which involves dealing with 
the retrieval of fragmentary information, its integration, and the interpretation of the resulting 
model (McCalla et al. 2000). 
The most common motivation behind collaborative approaches to student modeling is that 
by involving students and other parties in the construction of the student model, more accurate 
models of learners can be created (Beck et al. 1997; Bull 1998). A second goal is to encourage 
learners’ “reflection [(about their learning and the domain)] through discussion and negotiation 
of the student model” (Bull & Pain 1995). Collaborative student models attempt to project a 
faithful image of the learner, rather than an approximation (Bull et al. 1999). If this image is in 
conflict with how learners see themselves, it is assumed that they are encouraged to reflect at a 
metacognitive level on their own knowledge and misconceptions (cf. Section 12.2.3.2) and to 
engage in a menu-based (Bull & Pain 1995) or natural language (Kerly et al. 2006) discussion 
with the system in which they might challenge some of the system’s assessments or ask for an 
explanation of them (Bull & Pain 1995; Bull et al. 1999; Hartley & Mitrovic 2002). In 
response, the system can provide rationalizations for its ratings of the student and, in turn, 
challenge him or her with questions concerning the disputed pieces of knowledge. Correct 
responses provided by the learner may then lead to a reassessment of the learner’s abilities 
(Bull & Pain 1995). A third goal of collaborative student modeling is to give the learner a sense 
of being in control of his or her own learning, something which traditional intelligent tutoring 
systems have largely failed to achieve (Beck et al. 1997). Because the learner’s perspective as 
communicated to the system carries some weight in shaping how the system views his or her 
abilities, the learner comes to perceive that he or she can influence the behavior of the system to 
some extent (Beck et al. 1997). 
Collaborative student modeling and open learner models are the topic of ongoing research 
(Bull et al. 2007a; Dimitrova et al. 2007). In general, by allowing learners to contribute to the 
construction of a student model, collaborative modeling becomes more complex than other 
approaches which do not request input from the learner. This is because the system has to 
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distinguish between its own view of the learner and the viewpoints provided by the learner and 
by other parties, and has to combine the different sources (Beck et al. 1997). A fundamental 
problem of encouraging learner input into student models is that these contributions may not be 
accurate. Learners may be over- or underconfident and therefore overstate or understate their 
abilities, or they may lack the ability to precisely specify their level of knowledge about the 
subject matter (Beck et al. 1997). Collaborative student modeling techniques must be prepared 
to deal with such cases. When multiple external sources have to be integrated into the student 
model, it is necessary to determine their relative importance for modeling the learner in the 
current context, resolve inconsistencies and contradictions between them, and combine the 
different views into a model that reflects the learner’s abilities more accurately than what the 
system can build on its own (Beck et al. 1997; McCalla et al. 2000). 
With respect to the design of open student models, a variety of issues have to be addressed. 
Some examples of research questions are provided below, which have been adapted from lists 
compiled by Kay (1997) and Bull et al. (2007b): 
• What is the most appropriate format for making the student model accessible to the learner? 
• How freely should students be able to choose the presentation format of their model? 
• Which aspects of the student model should learners (or others) be allowed to inspect or 
modify, and when? 
• What is the right level of detail for modeling and presentation? 
• What terminology and structures are comprehensible to the target group of learners? 
• How can the complexity of realistic open student models be managed? 
• What are effective strategies for using open student models in teaching and learning? 
12.2.3.8 Case-Based Student Modeling 
Case-based reasoning (CBR) solves new problems by referring to knowledge about previously 
encountered similar problems (cases) and their solutions (cf. Section 12.2.1). CBR techniques 
have recently been applied to student modeling in intelligent tutoring systems; the approach is 
called case-based student modeling (CBSM) (Shiri et al. 1998a; Shiri et al. 1998b; Shiri et al. 
1998c). The basic CBSM method is to present a problem to the student which he or she tries to 
solve by (a) retrieving a stored case that he or she deems most similar to the problem; and 
(b) adapting the solution of that case (Shiri et al. 1998a). The learner’s solution is evaluated by 
the system to build the knowledge component of the student model, which captures different 
aspects of the learner’s knowledge (see below) (Shiri et al. 1998a). 
Figure 67 shows the process of case-based student modeling in detail. The case-based 
student modeler (contained in the dark-grey box) is depicted as a component of an intelligent 
tutoring system. According to Shiri et al., the modeling cycle starts by choosing a problem for 
the learner to solve from a database of problems, based on input from the student model and a 
set of domain concepts to be taught. To solve this problem, the learner first selects what he or 
she thinks is the most similar case and then adapts the solution associated with that case (Shiri 
et al. 1998a). In the accessible solution (AS) mode (Shiri et al. 1998b), the learner has access to 
the set of cases and their solutions stored in the cases database and generates a solution by 
choosing one of these cases and modifying its solution. This mode is appropriate for novice 
learners (Shiri et al. 1998a). In contrast, in the unaccessible solution (US) mode (Shiri et al. 
1998c), the learner cannot access the cases and their solutions stored in the system. Hence, he 
or she has to retrieve a relevant case from his or her memory and recall the solution steps for 
that case (Shiri et al. 1998c). This mode is for advanced learners who solve the current problem 
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on their own by applying their knowledge of previous similar problems and their solutions 
(Shiri et al. 1998a; Shiri et al. 1998b). 
The CBSM module for the accessible solution mode involves three processing steps, which 
are represented by three modules in Figure 67: the verificator, the solution generator, and the 
analyzer (Shiri et al. 1998a).206 The first step is to make sure that the case picked by the learner 
is actually similar to the problem to be solved and therefore useful for creating a solution. If the 
case can be applied, it is used in the second step to generate a set of solutions to the problem; 
otherwise, appropriate feedback is provided. The representation of the problem in the problems 
database is updated with these solutions, so they can be referenced on future occasions and do 
not have to be re-computed. In the third step, the learner’s solution is analyzed by comparing it 
to the solutions generated by the system in the second step, which are regarded as solutions that 
domain experts might produce using the same case (Shiri et al. 1998b). The results of this 
analysis are used to update the information in the knowledge component of the student model, 
which includes the level of the learner’s knowledge (on a scale, cf. Section 12.2.3.1), his or her 
capabilities of retrieving and adapting relevant cases to solve problems, and both the problems 
solved by the learner (together with his or her solutions) and the problems that he or she did not 
solve. The latter are assumed to be useful indicators of where the learner may have difficulties 
(Shiri et al. 1998a; Shiri et al. 1998b). 
Case-based student modeling provides a simple and computationally efficient approach to 
evaluate learners’ problem solving, by looking at how they make use of knowledge of previous 
problems (cases) which are similar to the problem they are currently working on (Shiri et al. 
                                              
206  The architecture in Figure 67 shows the CBSM module for the accessible solution mode. In the 
unaccessible solution mode, the verificator is replaced by a discovery module, which uses heuristic 
search (cf. Section 12.1.3.1) to determine which case provided the basis for the learner’s solution to 
the current problem. See Shiri et al. (1998c) for a detailed discussion. 
 
Figure 67. The process of case-based student modeling for the accessible solution (AS) mode. Adapted 
from Shiri et al. (1998a, Figure 3). 
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1998a). In contrast to other student modeling techniques, the approach does not need complex 
inference algorithms (Shiri et al. 1998a). CBSM can be used to acquire different kinds of 
information about the learner’s knowledge state, including knowledge level, problem-solving 
capabilities, and knowledge of solutions (Shiri et al. 1998a). Furthermore, it has been suggested 
that other components of the student model, such as a model of the learner’s characteristics (e.g. 
his or her preferred method of reasoning), can also be built using case-based reasoning 
techniques (Shiri et al. 1998a; Shiri et al. 1998b). However, case-based student modeling still 
compares the learner’s performance to the one of a domain expert (represented by the solution 
generator of the system) (Shiri et al. 1998b, cf. Section 12.2.3.2). Learners’ creative use of 
cases to solve problems in novel ways which are not accounted for by the solutions generator 
will be rejected as incorrect. Furthermore, the approach seems to be restricted to the teaching of 
problem-solving skills (Shiri et al. 1998c). Finally, managing the size of the cases and problems 
databases can be a problem in complex domains. 
González et al. (2006) described another way to use case-based reasoning in student 
modeling. In their approach, the student modeling component is implemented as a multi-agent 
system (cf. Chapter 14.1.5). The modeling process moves through the stages of the case-based 
reasoning cycle: retrieval, reuse, revision, and retention (cf. Section 12.2.1). These stages were 
described by González et al. and are summarized in the following. The learner to be modeled is 
regarded as a new case. The data about the student necessary to initialize the new case can be 
obtained via questionnaires, stereotypes, or tests (cf. Section 12.2.2). During the retrieval stage, 
the system tries to identify a similar, previously solved case (learner) by comparing the features 
of the new case against the database of stored cases. If the new case and a stored one are 
sufficiently alike (i.e. their degree of similarity exceeds a specified threshold), the diagnostic 
and problem-solving methods associated with the stored case are applied to (i.e. reused for) the 
new case. Revision (adaptation) of the selected case involves disposing of unsuitable items and 
removing inconsistencies. If no sufficiently similar stored case can be found, the case (learner) 
is treated as a completely new one and retained together with its specific information, including 
the results and misconceptions of the learner’s problem solving, in the cases database (González 
et al. 2006). Based on a comparison of their case-based student modeling approach to student 
modeling with Bayesian networks (cf. Section 12.2.3.4), González et al. identified three 
advantages of case-based student modeling (González et al. 2006): 
1. It facilitates handling, maintaining, and updating the student model. 
2. Case-based reasoning techniques can be used for both instructional strategy selection and 
diagnosis of learner misconceptions. 
3. The system can continuously model the learner’s performance in terms of both qualitative 
and quantitative information. 
12.3  The Instructor Model 
Similar to human teachers, pedagogical agents are versatile, i.e. they can be designed to do 
many different things in order to promote learning. The instructor model207 is the component of 
a pedagogical agent that embodies its instructional expertise in terms of a set of instructional 
interactions (i.e. joint instructional activities involving one or several agents and one or several 
                                              
207  The discussion of the instructor model in this section is based on and elaborates the one provided in 
Franke (2006: 271f.). 
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learners, in which both parties may participate in different ways and to different extents), which 
provide contextualized, qualified, personalized, and timely assistance, cooperation, instruction, 
motivation, and services for an individual learner or a group of learners (cf. Chapter 4). Given 
an instructional context and a set of instructional goals, the instructor model selects an 
appropriate instructional interaction and determines how to implement this interaction in order 
to achieve those goals in that context. The content, form, and timing of the agent’s intervention 
are designed taking into account the learner’s characteristics as well as the current state of the 
learning environment and the task, by interacting with both the domain model (cf. Section 12.1) 
and the student model (cf. Section 12.2). 
Different instructional functions (roles) of pedagogical agents involve particular inventories 
of interactions, which include activities from among those to be discussed in the following 
subsections. The set of interactions extends the list provided by Clarebout et al. (2002: 270f.). 
12.3.1  Supplanting 
The agent completely takes over a task and carries it out for the learner, who observes the agent 
during its performance of the task (Clarebout et al. 2002: 270). The agent compensates for the 
learner’s lack of capabilities and knowledge. Supplanting requires a complete model of the task 
and the environment (including the learner and other agents). 
12.3.2  Scaffolding 
In construction or maintenance, the term scaffolding refers to the act of setting up a temporary 
structure consisting of (interconnected) platforms arranged around a building, machine, or other 
construction exceeding a certain height, in order to elevate and support workers, equipment, and 
materials ([INT 149]). As summarized by Greenfield, 
[t]he scaffold, as it is known in building construction, has five characteristics: It provides a 
support; it functions as a tool; it extends the range of a worker; it allows the worker to 
accomplish the task not otherwise possible; and it is used selectively to aid the worker where 
needed. (Greenfield 1984: 118). 
These ideas about the functions of physical scaffolding have been transferred to the domain 
of instruction. Scaffolding is a selectively supportive instructional strategy aiming to promote 
the extension of the learner’s capabilities in the zone of proximal development (Vygotsky et al. 
1978), which is the distance between what learners can achieve on their own and what they can 
achieve through interaction with more capable others (Vygotsky et al. 1978: 86; McLoughlin & 
Oliver 1998: 128; Kim 2003; [INT 14], cf. Chapter 2.2.3). The role of the teacher in 
instructional scaffolding is the following: 
[T]he teacher’s selective intervention provides a supportive tool for the learner, which extends his 
or her skills, thereby allowing the learner to successfully accomplish a task not otherwise 
possible. Put another way, the teacher structures an interaction by building on what he or she 
knows the learner can do. Scaffolding thus closes the gap between task requirement and the skill 
level of the learner. (Greenfield 1984: 118). 
Pedagogical agents which are more capable and knowledgeable with respect to the task at 
hand than the learner can offer this kind of scaffolding that enables the learner to cross the zone 
of proximal development and reach a higher level in his or her intellectual development 
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(McLoughlin & Oliver 1998: 128; Kim 2003). For example, agents may serve as cognitive tools 
(cf. Chapter 2.2.3) that enhance the cognitive abilities of learners by providing additional 
memory or processing capacities (Baylor 1999; Baylor 2001); share learning tasks as (more 
advanced) peers (Kim et al. 2006: 226f., cf. Section 12.3.10); or carry out those aspects of tasks 
that are beyond learners’ (current) capabilities (Clarebout et al. 2002: 270). 
12.3.3  Demonstrating 
The agent first performs a particular task for the observing learner, and then the roles are 
reversed (Clarebout et al. 2002: 270). Embodied pedagogical agents can demonstrate tasks by 
carrying out actions involving the use of their body in the environment (cf. Chapter 4.1). 
Learners can view the demonstration from different perspectives, as often as they like, interrupt 
with questions, and ask to finish the task themselves (Rickel & Johnson 2000: 100). The agent 
can demonstrate a task under different conditions and with different parameters. Demonstrating 
requires that the agent be able to construct, revise, and execute plans that accomplish the task 
and to monitor the learner’s performance of the task (Rickel & Johnson 1997; Rickel & 
Johnson 2000: 100). 
12.3.4  Modeling 
The agent accompanies its demonstration of a particular task with a running commentary on 
what it is doing, and why (Clarebout et al. 2002: 270, cf. Chapter 2.2.3). While performing the 
task, the agent interweaves its actions with explanations of the steps, strategies, and mental 
models involved (pp. 270f.). Embodied agents can deliver their explanations multimodally, 
using natural, unambiguous, and contextually appropriate combinations of speech, gestures, 
facial expressions, eye gaze, postures, and locomotion (e.g. Rickel & Johnson 1997; Rickel & 
Johnson 2000; Lester et al. 1999b; Lester et al. 2000, cf. Chapter 10.1). Where appropriate in 
the current task and situation, multimedia elements and presentations are included in the agent’s 
explanation (cf. Chapter 4.2 and Section 12.3.12). 
12.3.5  Coaching 
The agent observes the learner while he or she is working on a task, imitating the agent’s 
behaviors and (ideally) its reasoning, which were made explicit during the agent’s previous 
demonstrations and modeling efforts (cf. Section 12.3.3 and Section 12.3.4). At certain points, 
the agent intervenes with additional modeling, corrective feedback, encouragement, reminders, 
etc., either at the learner’s request or proactively (cf. Chapter 3.1.6) to seize opportunities for 
learning while the learner is performing the task. Coaching is thus part of a cognitive 
apprenticeship model of instruction that involves the agent and the learner in the roles of master 
teacher and apprentice, respectively. The agent models the skill to be learned for the student, 
coaches him or her during practice, and gradually fades its support as the student becomes more 
proficient (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). 
The following aspects have to be considered when designing the interventions of a coaching 
agent (adapted from Kim & Baylor 2006: 588): 
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• Type. Informative, corrective, motivational, or scaffolding; 
• Scope. Global, situation-specific, task-specific, or action-specific; 
• Timing. Beforehand, immediate, delayed, just-in-time, or afterwards; 
• Learner characteristics. Knowledge, preferences, affective state, personality, sociocultural 
background, etc. (cf. Section 12.2); 
• Learning objectives and contexts. 
Contextually appropriate and carefully timed interventions presuppose that the agent has a 
number of capabilities. These include the ability to keep track of both learners’ actions and the 
changing state of the learning environment, to adapt its behavior and internal models based on 
the results of monitoring, to choose the right moment for interacting with the learner (cf. 
Chapter 7.15.8), and to devise and deliver instructional interventions in a way that considers the 
learner’s cognitive and emotional state. 
The need for proper timing of interventions by computing technology in general was stressed 
by Fogg (2003: 41–44). He formulated the Principle of Suggestion as follows: 
A computing technology will have greater persuasive power if it offers suggestions at opportune 
moments. (Fogg 2003: 41). 
Following Fogg, pedagogical agents should be designed as suggestion technologies which 
provide assistance and information to change attitudes and/or behaviors “at the most opportune 
moment” (Fogg 2003: 41).208 In general, finding or creating such a moment is a difficult task 
that involves the consideration of many factors, such as the current state of the environment and 
the learner’s activities, the learner’s disposition (mood, motivation, self-image, etc.), the agent-
learner relationship, sociocultural conventions, and ethical considerations. As a result, general 
guidelines for timing agents’ interventions right are difficult to obtain (p. 43). However, Fogg 
identified some moments in which people may be more open to persuasion from others (p. 43): 
• When they are in a good mood; 
• When they realize that their current world view is no longer in accord with reality; 
• When they can act on a request or suggestion immediately; 
• When they think that they owe someone something because they have received a favor, have 
made a mistake, or have denied a request. 
12.3.6  Advising 
The agent offers counseling or recommendations on what would be a prudent future course of 
action or way of conduct for the learner from the agent’s perspective (OED 1998: 26). The 
advice is given from a position of perceived knowledge and/or authority (p. 26) in order to help 
the learner by addressing his or her uncertainty or lack of direction with respect to what to do or 
                                              
208  Opinions are divided on the question whether persuasion is “fundamentally good” or “inherently 
unethical” (Fogg 2003: 212). Fogg argued that the answer to this question depends on how people 
use persuasion on other people (p. 213). Persuasion can be abused to achieve ends that are deemed 
unethical in a given sociocultural context, but it can also be used for positive outcomes (pp. 212f.). 
The main responsibility lies with the designers of the persuasive technology or experience, but the 
recipients of attempts at persuasion are well advised to be vigilant and critical as well (Weiten et al. 
2009: 192). 
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how to behave. Advice has a number of properties that distinguish it from other forms of 
directive behavior, such as commands or instructions (Lieberman 2001: 476): 
• It can be less specific than commands. 
• It may focus on particular aspects of the learner’s behavior. 
• It does not have to specify action but can suggest or modify it. 
• It only has to solve part of the overall problem. 
• The order in which advice is given or received is not required to be strictly sequential. 
• It may critically appraise earlier behavior or guide future behavior of the learner. 
• Good advice is context-sensitive (p. 481). 
In general, the agent’s advice is personalized (based on what the agent knows about the 
learner, cf. Section 12.2), ongoing (provided continuously and timely), and non-coercive (the 
learner can choose to follow, turn down, or disregard the advice) (Lieberman 2001: 478). Its 
form can be demonstrative, graphical, and/or verbal, depending on the agent’s capabilities and 
the requirements of the situation (p. 478). The agent should not force its advice on the learner 
but grant him or her freedom to decide what to do with it (p. 477). The learner’s decision to 
accept, reject, or ignore a particular piece of advice is influenced not only by its contents and 
way of delivery but also by the learner’s overall perception of the advisor’s expertise, authority, 
and trustworthiness (cf. Chapter 3.2.2). 
In general, influential advisors are (perceived as) trustworthy and confident, and they are 
also known for their accuracy (Park & Catrambone 2007). A trustworthy advisor has proven 
both competent and reliable in situations in which listening to bad advice involves some risk 
(Park & Catrambone 2007). In particular, the advice given by trustworthy advisors is perceived 
by the advisees to be in their best interest rather than to the advantage of the advisor or a third 
party. Embodied interactive software agents, being computer programs and not people, might 
be perceived as offering more ‘objective’ advice and hence might be preferred in some advice-
giving situations (Park & Catrambone 2007). However, if the agent advisor represents a 
company or some other institution, it may be more difficult for the user to trust this particular 
agent. 
Confident advisors show that they believe strongly in the quality of their advice (Park & 
Catrambone 2007). Embodied interactive pedagogical software agents can signal confidence by 
modulating their voice (cf. Chapter 10.1.1), facial expression (cf. Chapter 10.1.3), and tone of 
language, and thus increase learners’ acceptance of their recommendations (Park & Catrambone 
2007). A confident agent both appears and sounds calm and assured rather than hesitating or 
nervous about a situation or a piece of advice. 
Another dimension of the advisor-advisee relationship is rapport, or the emotional bond that 
may develop between the two over time (Park & Catrambone 2007, cf. Chapter 7.16). As the 
duration of relationships between humans and the agents advising them extends beyond single 
encounters, the emotional connection that people experience with agents might strengthen as 
well. Children have already been observed to form bonds with a pedagogical tutor agent, which 
had positive effects on their motivation (Massaro et al. 2000: 312; Oviatt & Adams 2000: 339f.; 
Cole et al. 2003: 1395). 
12.3.7  Testing 
The agent implements ways to assess (qualitatively or quantitatively) the learner’s knowledge, 
abilities, aptitude, etc. with respect to different (aspects of) tasks or the subject domain in order 
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to inform guidance and support activities as well as provide a basis for performance or progress 
reports (Clarebout et al. 2002: 271; [INT 150]). The agent’s assessment can be formative 
(process-oriented, while the learner is engaged in some activity) and/or summative (outcome-
oriented, after the learner has completed the activity) ([INT 151], cf. Chapter 15.3.2 and 
Chapter 15.3.3). These two types of assessment address the quality of the learner’s approach 
and the quality of his or her accomplishment, respectively. 
12.3.8  Motivating 
Motivation can be defined as an internal condition of an individual that provides incentive and 
direction for behavior, in particular to achieve certain desirable states (e.g. satiation or success) 
or avoid undesirable ones (e.g. danger or failure) ([INT 152]; Ortony et al. 2005: 174). In 
learning processes, motivation plays a key role because it can (Ormrod 2003; [INT 152]): 
• Focus learners on particular goals; 
• Increase the effort and energy invested by learners in order to achieve those goals; 
• Induce learners to start more activities and to see them through; 
• Promote learners’ cognitive processing;209 
• Identify consequences that reinforce learner behavior; 
• Positively influence learner performance. 
Given the importance of motivation for learning and the critical amplifying/modifying role 
of emotions in motivation (Elliott et al. 1999; Cañamero 2003: 132f.; Rolls 2003: 17), agents 
that seek to motivate the learner require the ability to interpret, manage, and express emotions 
(Elliott et al. 1999), qualities that will be discussed in the next chapter. Pedagogical agents with 
emotional intelligence (cf. Chapter 13.4) can motivate learners by (Elliott et al. 1999): 
• Showing that they care about the learner and his or her successes and setbacks (Picard et al. 
2004: 261, cf. Section 12.2.2),210 thus establishing themselves as “attachment figures” whose 
opinion of the learner matters to him or her; 
• Tuning their behavior to the learner’s emotional state; 
• Giving praise, offering encouragement, and reducing frustration where appropriate; 
• Transmitting their own (displayed) enthusiasm for the content to the learner; 
• Promoting the learner’s enjoyment of the learning experience through enjoyable interactions 
with a deep and appealing virtual persona; 
• Winning the learner’s affection and trust with the aim to develop a friendly and productive 
long-term social-emotional relationship (cf. Chapter 7.16). 
                                              
209  Schank and Neaman discussed three ways in which cognition may be affected by motivation. First, a 
learner may choose to participate or not in a learning activity, depending on his or her motivation. 
Second, motivation influences how much a participating learner will pay attention during the activity. 
The third impact of motivation arises from its close connection with the learner’s goals. These goals, 
in turn, determine what is learned and how the learned information is organized in the learner’s mind 
(Schank & Neaman 2001: 61–66). 
210  Lee et al. (2007a) found that a co-learner (peer) agent (cf. Section 12.3.10) that communicated caring 
for the learner through expression of empathy as well as supportive and encouraging verbal feedback 
inspired more trust and improved learning (according to recognition and recall memory tests). 
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12.3.9  Conversing 
The agent involves the learner in a spoken or written natural language conversation (cf. Chapter 
11.3) which it carefully orchestrates in order to achieve some instructional goal, such as: 
• Making the learner articulate his or her knowledge about a topic; 
• Identifying and remediating missing or incorrect knowledge of the learner; 
• Guiding the learner through a problem-solving process or to new insights; 
• Teaching the learner new information; 
• Motivating the learner; 
• Giving the learner the opportunity to practice social or communication skills. 
One-to-one tutorial dialogue is commonly assumed to be more beneficial for learners than 
receiving group instruction or studying from a textbook (VanLehn et al. 2007: 3). VanLehn et 
al. conducted a number of experiments to test what they called the interaction hypothesis: 
When one-on-one natural language tutoring, either by a human tutor or a computer tutor, is 
compared to a less interactive control condition that covers the same content, then the tutees will 
learn more than the non-tutees. (VanLehn et al. 2007: 5). 
However, the experiments indicated that the effectiveness of tutorial dialogue depended on 
whether the difficulty level of the instructional content matched the knowledge level of the 
learners or went beyond it (VanLehn et al. 2007: 3). Tutorial dialogue made no real difference 
(in comparison to low-interaction text-based control conditions) when novice or intermediate 
learners studied material designed for their level of knowledge (p. 50). However, for novice 
learners studying content for intermediate learners (i.e. content that was above their level of 
capability and thus more challenging), tutorial dialogue was found to be more effective than 
forms of instruction with less interactivity because it provided the necessary scaffolding (cf. 
Section 12.3.2) that enabled learners to cross the zone of proximal development (pp. 50f.). As 
summarized by VanLehn et al.: 
In short, these data indicate that if students are given instructional content that is designed for 
students at their level of preparation, then tutoring has no advantage over studying text alone. 
However, if the content is in the students’ [zone of proximal development], then tutoring has a big 
advantage over studying text alone. (VanLehn et al. 2007: 52). 
As discussed in Chapter 4.2 and in Chapter 11.3.3.2.1, conversations and other agent-learner 
interactions can be initiated and controlled by the agent, the learner, or both. System control 
may be too restrictive and user control too unpredictable for instructional agent-learner 
conversations; hence, it seems appropriate to use a mixed-initiative approach (Lester et al. 
1999a), in which the agent and the learner share control over the dialogue, because it gives 
learners the opportunity to participate freely while the agent can still intervene when 
appropriate or necessary. Having said that, there are certain types of instructional conversations 
for which either system initiative or user initiative may be useful. For example, system initiative 
could be used for testing the learner (cf. Section 12.3.7) and user initiative for research that 
involves the learner querying the agent as a knowledge source (cf. Section 12.3.13). 
The interventions of conversational pedagogical agents have to be designed and delivered 
with the learner’s cognitive, emotional, and social development in mind. The content of an 
agent’s contribution is determined based on cognitive considerations while social (cf. Chapter 
7.16) and motivational (cf. Section 12.3.8) aspects need to be considered when deciding on the 
manner in which the agent should deliver its contribution (Mayer et al. 2006: 36). Manner of 
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delivery matters because the content of a given contribution may not be neutral but may 
actually pose a threat to the learner’s positive and/or negative face (p. 36, cf. Chapter 11.3.1). 
Hence, politeness is an important quality of pedagogical agents designed to be tactful and 
motivating because it can help them to reduce the potential impact of threats to the learner’s 
face posed by certain kinds of messages (e.g. criticism, bad news, requests, suggestions, etc.) 
(pp. 36f.). Polite communication, in turn, may have positive effects on students’ perception of 
the learning experience (e.g. the perceived difficulty of the instructional content) and of the 
agent as well as on their performance (Wang et al. 2005; Wang et al. 2008). 
As a step toward developing principles for the design of polite conversational pedagogical 
software agents, Mayer et al. investigated whether learners can detect different politeness tones 
of tutorial suggestions and requests, which were expressed through different wordings of the 
statements. The suggestions and requests used in the study were of eight types (Mayer et al. 
2006: 37) that were derived from transcripts of tutorial dialogues, based on the set of general 
politeness strategies defined by Brown and Levinson (Johnson et al. 2004d, cf. Chapter 11.3.1): 
• Bald on record. The tutor explicitly tells the learner what to do. 
• Conventional indirectness. The tutor attributes an explicit instruction to the computer. 
• Request. The tutor expresses what he or she would like the learner to do. 
• Tutor goal. The tutor states what he or she would do in the learner’s situation. 
• Joint goal. The tutor suggests an action to be performed together with the learner. 
• Question. The tutor asks an indirect question that indicates a possible action. 
• Student goal. The tutor offers a guarded suggestion of what the learner should want to do. 
• Socratic hint. The tutor’s guarded suggestion is embedded in a question. 
The participants were asked to rate a set of tutorial statements (which they were to told to 
imagine as being delivered by an on-screen character (Mayer et al. 2006: 37)) on negative 
politeness (i.e. the degree to which the participants perceived the (imagined) agent making the 
statement as giving them the freedom to decide for themselves) and positive politeness (i.e. the 
degree to which participants thought that the agent imagined to be delivering the statement was 
cooperating with them) (p. 36). Commands, whether directly given or attributed to the machine, 
received the lowest ratings on both dimensions. The highest ratings with respect to negative 
politeness were obtained for guarded suggestions and Socratic hints while guarded suggestions 
and statements expressing a joint goal were rated most favorably regarding positive politeness 
(pp. 38f.). Furthermore, the rating patterns suggested that participants with less computer 
experience regarded politeness of suggestions or requests as more important than participants 
with a high level of computer experience (pp. 40f.). Overall, these findings have the following 
implications for the present work: 
• Learners are sensitive to the tone of politeness exhibited by a tutorial statement (p. 41), 
which, interestingly, was successfully conveyed only by its wording in the study. 
• Bald on record and conventional indirectness are both inappropriate strategies for polite 
conversational pedagogical agents (p. 42). 
• Polite agents should rather use guarded suggestions and questions (and generally be more 
indirect in their statements) (pp. 38f.). 
Along the same lines, Wang et al. (2005; 2008) reported the results of a number of Wizard-
of-Oz experiments (cf. Chapter 15.3.2) that revealed what they referred to as the politeness 
effect: the performance, attitudes, and motivation of learners were positively influenced by a 
pedagogical tutor agent which used a model of socially intelligent tutorial dialogue based on 
342 Chapter 12: Expertise 
Brown and Levinson’s theory of politeness to generate polite feedback that enhanced learners’ 
social face and mitigated threats to their face, compared to an agent that gave direct feedback 
(Wang et al. 2008: 98f.). The effect was stronger for learners who preferred indirect feedback, 
were less experienced with computers, and did not have an engineering background (p. 108). 
These results indicate that beyond the mere presence of a pedagogical agent (the persona effect, 
cf. Chapter 5.4.5), the way it behaves toward and communicates with the learner can make a 
difference for the learning experience (p. 99). Therefore, Wang et al. argued that the social 
intelligence of pedagogical agents, in particular their use of politeness strategies, deserves more 
attention from agent developers (p. 98). 
While it is important for a pedagogical agent to contribute to conversations with the learner, 
it is also critical for the agent to interweave talking with listening appropriately to the learner. 
This goes beyond trying to build a representation of the meaning of the learner’s message and 
includes conversational techniques that influence not only the outcome of the conversation but 
also the learner-agent relationship, by showing that the agent cares about and respects the 
learner. Examples of these techniques include (Park & Catrambone 2007): 
• Nondefensive listening. The agent signals attentiveness without interrupting the learner. 
• Active listening. The agent demonstrates that it is really trying to understand the learner, for 
example by facing the learner, maintaining eye contact, giving backchannel feedback, asking 
questions, and summarizing the learner’s contribution. 
• Disclosure. The agent takes the initiative in sharing ideas, information, opinions, etc. with 
the learner, thus encouraging him or her to reciprocate. 
• Editing. The agent converses politely with the learner (see above) and does not overreact 
when something goes wrong (e.g. when the learner’s response is incorrect). 
Humans tutoring other humans is a long-established and effective method of instruction. Not 
surprisingly, developers of conversational computer-based tutors have studied human-to-human 
tutoring to obtain ideas for the design of human-computer tutorial dialogues (e.g. Graesser et al. 
1995). Person and Graesser (2003b) compiled a list of fourteen characteristics of (or ‘facts’ 
about) effective human tutoring, which they argued to be instructive for the design of computer-
based tutors as well: 
1.  Human tutors mostly do not implement ideal tutoring strategies based on well-established 
theoretical approaches like case-based reasoning (cf. Section 12.2.1), Socratic tutoring, and 
Vygotsky’s theory of development (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). 
2.  Tutors use a limited inventory of dialogue moves that refer to an immediately preceding 
contribution from the learner. The set of moves comprises pumps for more information, 
hints that become more and more specific, elaborations on learners’ contributions, and 
splicing in the correct solution when students’ answers are incorrect or incomplete. 
3.  Tutors provide feedback to student errors immediately rather than delay it. 
4.  Tutors’ feedback to student errors is indiscriminately positive, negative, or neutral. Still, 
they avoid giving strong negative feedback in order not to discourage the learner. 
5.  Tutors generally do not remediate or give specific feedback to errors made by learners. 
6.  Tutors refrain from making both positive and negative remarks about learners’ ability. 
7.  The number of questions asked by both tutors and learners in one-to-one tutoring settings is 
significantly higher than in classroom situations. 
8.  Most questions in a tutoring session serve to establish a common ground between the tutor 
and the student. Students typically ask common ground questions to make sure that their 
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own knowledge is valid, whereas tutors generally use such questions to assess the learner’s 
knowledge. 
9.  Good students do not ask more questions overall, but they do ask a larger number of deep-
reasoning questions. 
10. To determine whether learners actually comprehend the instructional material, it is better to 
evaluate the quality of their answers than to ask them directly if they understand. 
11. Tutors generate a large number of examples in the course of a tutoring session. 
12. Tutor-generated examples are much more often used to explain difficult aspects of the 
subject matter and to test the learner’s knowledge than to address student errors. 
13. Most of the time, tutors present the learner with concrete and difficult examples that involve 
specific referents and challenge the learner. 
14. Tutors primarily use pre-constructed (canned) examples (which they made up themselves or 
gleaned from textbooks or other sources). Spontaneously generated examples are much less 
frequent. 
Although human tutors are often not trained in expert tutoring strategies and draw on a small 
and comparatively unsophisticated inventory of instructional interventions, they are surprisingly 
effective in their job, and students benefit from their interactions with them (Bloom 1984; 
Graesser et al. 1995; Person et al. 2001). While considering the above facts about human 
tutoring can simplify the design of computer-based tutors, and the resulting systems may still be 
effective, the facts also indicate opportunities for improvement, where computer-based tutors 
can be equipped with more sophisticated tutoring strategies, such as discriminating feedback, 
Socratic tutoring, and modeling-scaffolding-fading techniques, that enable them to perform 
better than the average untrained human tutor (Person & Graesser 2003b). 
Boyer et al. conducted a corpus study to investigate how different characteristics of learners, 
including their performance level, self-efficacy, and gender, influence the structure of task-
oriented tutorial dialogue, with the goal of obtaining insights that are useful for the design of 
tutorial dialogue systems (Boyer et al. 2007). They collected and analyzed a corpus of tutorial 
dialogues occurring during problem-solving activities in the domain of introductory computer 
science. Based on their results, Boyer et al. gave the following recommendations for tutorial 
dialogue strategies that accommodate learners with different performance and self-efficacy 
levels (Boyer et al. 2007): 
• Encourage reflection of low-performing learners who are reluctant to request feedback. 
• Give adequate feedback to low-performing or low-efficacy learners more frequently. 
• Confirm understanding of low-performing learners after tutor hints or advice more often. 
• Give acknowledgements to high-efficacy learners more often. 
• Maintain a comfortable conversational setting for low-performing learners. 
12.3.10 Interacting as Peers 
The instructional interactions discussed in the previous sections are characteristic of individuals 
(people or agents) who play an instructor or tutor role and thus belong to a group with different 
characteristics than the learner. However, pedagogical agents can also play other roles in which 
they are perceived by the learner as similar to himself or herself in terms of attributes including 
age, status, and level of knowledge or ability, i.e. as peers belonging to the learner’s own group. 
Learners have been argued and empirically demonstrated to obtain substantial benefits from 
interacting with their peers (Kim & Baylor 2006: 569), which include cognitive, procedural, 
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and social knowledge and skills, as well as motivation (cf. Section 12.3.8) and self-confidence 
(Aïmeur & Frasson 1996; Kim 2003; Kim & Baylor 2006: 572). Students can learn both from 
and with their peers, by: 
• Cooperating with teammates. The members of a team have to learn both their own roles and 
how to coordinate their behavior with other team members in order for the team to function 
smoothly as a unit (Rickel & Johnson 2000: 99). 
• Competing with rivals. Rivals vie with the learner for attention, resources, success, etc. They 
challenge the learner in the task and set a level of performance which the learner has to 
surpass in order to win. 
• Learning with companions. Companions compliment, encourage, empathize, and banter with 
the learner, but they can also provide valuable suggestions (Kim 2003). 
• Handling troublemakers. A troublemaker is an unreliable learning companion whose actions 
or suggestions cannot (always) be trusted because they may be intentionally deceptive in 
order to challenge the learner’s knowledge and self-confidence (Aïmeur & Frasson 1996; 
Frasson et al. 1997). 
• Imitating role models. A role model is an individual who provides an example which the 
learner should emulate. 
• Learning from peer tutors. A peer tutor is similar in status to the tutee but more advanced 
with respect to the subject of tutoring. Peer tutors are generally perceived as being closer to 
the level and status of the individuals being tutored; therefore, they appear less intimidating 
and more trustworthy as advice givers ([INT 153]). 
• Teaching peer tutees. Learners tutor their peers, and, in the process of teaching them, learn 
about the subject matter themselves (Biswas et al. 2005: 364; Katzlberger 2005: 1). The 
learning-by-teaching process consists of making preparations for teaching, performing the 
teaching activities, and reflecting on feedback, observations, and results obtained during and 
after teaching (Katzlberger 2005: 4). 
When human players are not available, pedagogical agents can take over any of these peer 
roles (teammate, rival, companion, troublemaker, role model, peer tutor, and peer tutee). 
Depending on their role, peer agents require different levels of expertise (above, below, or at 
the same level as the learner) (Dowling 2000; Kim 2003). The appearance (cf. Chapter 9) and 
behavior (cf. Chapter 10) of the peer agent persona must be designed in a way that facilitates its 
perception and acceptance by learners as a member of their peer group. 
12.3.11 Sequencing 
The agent dynamically creates and guides the learner through a sequence of instructional units 
and/or activities (cf. Chapter 2.3.2), based on its evolving model of the learner’s knowledge, 
abilities, motivational state, and preferences (cf. Section 12.2). The next unit or activity selected 
by the agent may: 
• Elaborate on the current topic; 
• Cover a new topic of the curriculum; 
• Introduce the learner to a related interesting topic outside the core curriculum; 
• Address the learner’s deficiencies with respect to the prerequisites of another unit or activity. 
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The selection of materials and activities depends on the set of topics to be covered, the 
prerequisites of the unit or activity, the priority of the unit or activity, the learner’s history of 
successfully and unsuccessfully completed activities and units, and the learner’s preferences. 
12.3.12 Presenting 
The agent displays information about a particular topic of instruction, using combinations of 
media and enhancing the multimedia presentation with appropriate spoken commentary and 
gestures (André et al. 1999b; Johnson 2003: 91–94; Rist et al. 2004, cf. Chapter 14.2.3).211 In an 
interactive presentation, the agent may also answer learners’ questions about the material being 
presented (Johnson 2003: 91). Settings for presentations differ with respect to the number of 
agents and learners involved as well as the degree of interaction among and between the human 
and artificial participants (Rist et al. 2004, cf. Figure 68): 
• Non-interactive presentation. A single animated agent presents information to the learner. 
There is no interaction between agent and learner during the presentation (Rist et al. 2004: 
378ff.). 
• Hyper-presentation/dialogue. The learner can engage in some kind of dialogue with a single 
presentation agent, using menus or spoken or typed natural language (Rist et al. 2004: 378 + 
381ff.). 
• Presentation teams. The learner watches a presentation involving the on-screen interaction 
of several agent performers.212 However, he or she cannot participate during the performance 
and remains a passive observer (Rist et al. 2004: 378 + 383–387). 
• Interactive performances. Several agent performers interact among themselves and with the 
learner, who may both respond and take the initiative in the ongoing open multi-party 
conversation (Rist et al. 2004: 378 + 392ff.). 
• Multi-party multi-threaded conversations. The conversational setting involves multiple on-
screen performers and multiple learners that may have multiple conversations among 
themselves and with one another (Rist et al. 2004: 378f. + 392ff.). 
Research in the field of multimedia learning supports the idea of having virtual presenters 
that use speech and animation, by providing empirical evidence for the modality principle of 
multimedia learning (cf. Table 1), according to which people learn better when presentations 
use both the auditory and the visual mode to convey information (Clark 2002; Johnson 2003: 
91; Low & Sweller 2005). 
                                              
211  It should be emphasized here that although pedagogical agents can be used to present subject matters, 
they are not another type of (interactive) content, just as little as a human instructor can be reduced to 
what he or she teaches. Rather than being manipulated, pedagogical agents themselves manipulate 
(create, select, sequence, etc.) content to help learners while they are working with the content. 
212  Examples for the effectiveness of presentation teams come from the popular children’s educational 
television show Sesame Street ([INT 154]), which often uses multi-character performances involving 
human and/or puppeteered performers as an entertaining method to teach its young audience a variety 
of authentic concepts. 
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12.3.13 Knowing 
The agent serves the learner as an expert or information source, providing relevant information 
about concepts, procedures, and resources on demand or unsolicitedly. The agent as expert 
shows mastery (extensive knowledge and/or above-average skill) in a particular subject area 
(Baylor & Kim 2005), which may include encyclopedic, instructional, problem-solving, and/or 
social expertise (see the discussion at the beginning of this chapter). Furthermore, experts 
generally appear confident, exhibit stability in performance, and maintain their composure 
despite unfavorable internal or external conditions (Baylor & Kim 2005). 
The agent as information source aims to increase the learner’s productivity by helping him 
or her to manage information and by protecting him or her from being flooded with information 
(Nwana 1996, cf. Chapter 3.2.3). This involves acquiring, collating, and manipulating different 
kinds of information, possibly in various formats and languages, from potentially distributed 
and heterogeneous sources. The information provided by the agent pertains to the learner’s 
articulated or identified information needs and is delivered timely and in a format which the 
learner can understand and use. 
12.3.14 Administrating 
The agent manages organizational aspects of an individual’s learning experience in the larger 
context of an e-learning course or curriculum. It usually works behind the scenes to create and 
maintain general conditions for learning that promote the learner’s success. Examples of 
administrative activities include: 
• Regulating access to instructional materials, activities, and resources; 
• Reminding the learner of important events and deadlines; 
• Keeping records of the learner’s personal data, assignments, submissions, achievements, 
participation in course-related activities, etc.; 
• Booking fee payments, selling additional printed materials, reminding payers in arrears, etc.; 
• Helping with routine technical problems; 
• Providing information about enrollment, course organization, requirements, navigation, how 
to use software, etc. 
 
Figure 68. Character-based presentations in different conversational settings. Adapted from Rist et al. 
(2004: 379, Figure 1). 
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Pedagogical agents with administrative background tasks do not have to interact ‘face-to-
face’ with learners and thus do not require an articulate embodiment or the ability to speak. 
Furthermore, they normally do not need teaching strategies or a detailed model of the student’s 
knowledge (cf. Section 12.2). However, they must be equipped with knowledge and skills to 
deal with any routine issues related to the organization of the learning process. 
12.4  Summary 
Agents will be useful to, and sought by, users in a particular application context if they possess 
the relevant kind(s) of expertise (encyclopedic, instructional, problem-solving, and/or social) 
and successfully communicate their competence to the user. This chapter was concerned with 
the components making up the expertise of embodied interactive (pedagogical) software agents: 
the domain model (a repository of the knowledge which an agent has about its subject area), the 
student model (a user model built for educational purposes that captures the agent’s evolving 
view of the learner and his or her development over time), and the instructor model (a 
representation of the agent’s repertoire of instructional interactions). 
Section 12.1 discussed the design of the domain model in terms of three knowledge-related 
activities: acquisition, representation, and use. The first is concerned with extracting knowledge 
for representation and use from sources including individuals, data, and experience. The second 
organizes, structures, and encodes knowledge in ways intended to facilitate acquisition and use. 
The third involves applying the acquired and represented knowledge to solve problems. Various 
methods for knowledge acquisition were reviewed in Section 12.1.1, including techniques for 
use by human knowledge engineers (cf. Section 12.1.1.1) and machine learning algorithms for 
the automatic acquisition of knowledge (cf. Section 12.1.1.2). 
For the representation of the acquired knowledge in the agent’s domain model, four major 
symbolic knowledge representation languages have been used, which were compared in Section 
12.1.2: logic (cf. Section 12.1.2.1), semantic networks (cf. Section 12.1.2.2), frames and scripts 
(cf. Section 12.1.2.3), and rule-based systems (cf. Section 12.1.2.4). Section 12.1.2.5 explored 
the use of the Semantic Web approach to create external knowledge representations for agents 
in the form of semantic markup added as annotations to resources (objects, tasks, individuals, 
etc.) in different places in the agent’s environment. 
The use of the knowledge represented in the domain model for problem solving was 
discussed next in Section 12.1.3. Problem solving was defined as the ability of an agent to 
search for and find a sequence of actions that take it from a given initial state through a series of 
intermediate states to a desired goal state. Different search techniques were reviewed in Section 
12.1.3.1. The following sections discussed several problem-solving approaches that are based 
on search: state space search (cf. Section 12.1.3.2), planning (cf. Section 12.1.3.3), and practical 
reasoning (cf. Section 12.1.3.4). 
Student modeling was the topic of Section 12.2. First, Section 12.2.1 discussed aspects of 
user modeling by agents and other user-adaptive systems, including functions of user modeling 
(supporting system use and facilitating information acquisition), the acquisition and application 
of user models, their contents, direct and indirect strategies for obtaining information relevant 
to user modeling, and, finally, computational user modeling techniques (classification learning, 
collaborative filtering, decision-theoretic methods, plan recognition, and stereotypes). Next, in 
Section 12.2.2, the student model was defined as “an approximate, possibly partial, primarily 
qualitative representation” (Sison & Shimura 1998: 131f.) of various aspects of an individual 
learner, including his or her goals, plans, knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, emotions, personality, 
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etc. A general account of the nature, contents, and functions of student models was provided in 
that section. Furthermore, a number of issues involved in the construction of student models 
(initialization, bandwidth, knowledge acquisition, knowledge type, student-expert difference, 
grain size, completeness and precision, level of analysis, time frame, inspectability, and 
sharability) were discussed in some detail. Section 12.2.3 reviewed different approaches to 
student modeling, which use scales and tallies (cf. Section 12.2.3.1); overlay, differential, and 
perturbation models (cf. Section 12.2.3.2); genetic graph models (cf. Section 12.2.3.3); 
probabilistic models (cf. Section 12.2.3.4); cognitive models (cf. Section 12.2.3.5); constraint-
based models (cf. Section 12.2.3.6); collaborative models (cf. Section 12.2.3.7); and case-based 
models (cf. Section 12.2.3.8), respectively. 
The third component of the expertise of a pedagogical agent was discussed in Section 12.3: 
the instructor model, which specifies the inventory of interactions that enable an agent playing a 
particular instructional role to provide one or several learners with contextualized, qualified, 
personalized, and timely assistance, cooperation, instruction, motivation, and services. Fourteen 
instructional interactions for pedagogical agents were discussed in this section: supplanting (cf. 
Section 12.3.1), scaffolding (cf. Section 12.3.2), demonstrating (cf. Section 12.3.3), modeling 
(cf. Section 12.3.4), coaching (cf. Section 12.3.5), advising (cf. Section 12.3.6), testing (cf. 
Section 12.3.7), motivating (cf. Section 12.3.8), conversing (cf. Section 12.3.9), interacting as 
peers (cf. Section 12.3.10), sequencing (cf. Section 12.3.11), presenting (cf. Section 12.3.12), 
knowing (cf. Section 12.3.13), and, finally, administrating (cf. Section 12.3.14). 
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13 Emotion and Personality 
It may be more efficient to communicate through Internet and e-mail, but it is not possible to hug 
a computer. (Anonymous. Translated from German). 
The question is not whether intelligent machines can have emotions, but whether machines can be 
intelligent without emotions. (Minsky 1985). 
Humans are social beings whose behavior, thinking, and interactions with other individuals are 
considerably influenced by what they feel (their emotions) and who they are (their 
personalities). Not surprisingly, people also expect their interaction partners to exhibit 
consistent personalities and to handle emotions in a competent and natural way. 
Interaction with computers has commonly been viewed as an exception: computers are the 
stereotypically impersonal, unemotional artifacts, which force users to suppress the affective 
and social parts of their nature while working with the efficient and ‘rational’ machine. 
However, even ordinary computers with simple text-based interfaces elicit social and emotional 
responses from users (cf. Chapter 6.5), a finding that has been replicated with embodied 
interactive software agents (e.g. Lester et al. 1997b; Nass et al. 2000a; Cole et al. 2003; Paiva et 
al. 2004). 
Paraphrasing Ball (2003: 303), embodied interactive software agents will be useful if they 
add value to the user’s experience (cf. Chapter 7.1); they will be usable (cf. Chapter 6.3) if they 
are effective and natural communicators. However, to be comfortable for users, they will have 
to present themselves as emotionally adept individuals with appealing and deep personalities, 
which invite the user to form a relationship with them. An agent that can address the user’s 
emotional state and create (the illusion of) an interesting character requires a wide range of 
capabilities, including the following (Hudlicka 2003): 
• Recognizing and interpreting the user’s emotional state; 
• Modeling the user’s emotional state; 
• Adapting to the user’s emotional state; 
• Generating appropriate emotional states within the agent; 
• Communicating (‘genuine’ or pretended) emotions to the user; 
• Portraying and revealing a rich and appealing agent personality and back-story. 
These capabilities are discussed in this chapter. But first, it is useful to explore what 
‘emotion’ (an intuitively clear but surprisingly complex phenomenon) means and involves in 
the context of the design of embodied interactive agents, by examining in some detail the two 
major views of emotion in humans, as a cognitive or as a physical phenomenon, in Section 
13.1. After shedding some light on the nature of emotions (what they are), Section 13.2 
identifies what they do, i.e. the functions of emotions in human cognitive processes and social 
interactions. Equipped with this understanding of emotion in humans, Section 13.3 turns to 
emotion modeling in computers, discussing communication-driven and simulation-based 
approaches. Section 13.4 then covers the interpretation and expression of emotions as essential 
component processes of agents’ emotional intelligence. The remaining two sections of the 
chapter are concerned with aspects that define both human and artificial agents as distinct 
persons, including their characteristic psychological traits, or personality (cf. Section 13.5), and 
the story of their individual lives (cf. Section 13.6). 
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13.1  The Nature of Emotions 
Emotion is a complex, multifaceted phenomenon which lacks a universally accepted definition 
(Kleinginna & Kleinginna 1981). For the purpose of the present discussion, emotions may be 
characterized as short-term changes in the internal state of an artificial or natural agent that 
provide “situationally and individually appropriate internal responses” (Ortony 2003: 189) to 
events or circumstances in the agent or in the environment which the agent regards as relevant 
to its needs, goals, or concerns. The plethora of theories on emotion can be largely classified in 
terms of the extent to which they emphasize the role of the body or the role of the mind (Picard 
1997: 281f.; Picard 2000: 22): 
• Physical theories are chiefly concerned with the bodily response (e.g. increased heart rate, 
hand perspiration, etc.) associated with an emotion and try to identify universal physiological 
cues corresponding to emotional states (e.g. furrowed eyebrows as a signal of anger). 
Physical aspects of emotion are discussed in Section 13.1.1 below. 
• Cognitive theories focus on the mental aspects of emotion, in particular how emotions arise 
from mental appraisals213 (evaluations) of the situation and how agents deal with emotions 
by changing or maintaining their relationship with the environment (coping). The cognitive 
component of emotion is covered in Section 13.1.2. 
Either view of emotions – the physical just as the cognitive – is only a part of the overall 
picture. In fact, the generation of emotion and its experience involve the interaction of the body 
and the mind (Picard 2000: 22). Emotions in humans are characterized by neuroendocrine, 
physiological (visceral and muscular), behavioral, cognitive, communicative, social, and 
cultural components. Specific kinds of emotions or emotion episodes involve these aspects in 
different proportions (Cañamero 2003: 117). 
13.1.1  Physical Aspects of Emotion 
Research on the physical component of emotions focuses on the physiological responses (e.g. 
voice inflection (cf. Chapter 10.1.1), facial expression (cf. Chapter 10.1.3), posture (cf. Chapter 
10.1.5), heart rate, pulse, temperature, blood pressure, and perspiration) that accompany 
emotions or quickly follow them (Picard 2000: 22). This approach goes back to the 
psychologist William James ([INT 155]), whose 1890 theory equates emotion with the mind’s 
perception of physiological responses to a stimulus (James 1890). In other words, emotion is 
the experience of changes in the body, such as increased adrenaline level, heart rate, etc. 
James’s famous example was that people do not fear a bear and then run from it but rather run 
from the bear and consequently fear it. The mind’s perception of the bodily arousal is the 
emotion ([INT 155]). 
While most theorists today acknowledge that emotions have a bodily component (although 
they may have different views of its nature), they reject James’s view of equating emotion with 
bodily response (Picard 2000: 25). Still, the body is an important vehicle for expressing 
emotions (cf. Section 13.4.2). The term sentic modulation labels variations in motor output and 
                                              
213  For example, an agent’s emotional state of anger may result from an appraisal such as the following: 
“I had to submit the online worksheet until 1 pm, but my roommate hogged the computer and thus 
prevented me from achieving this important goal. As a result, I am angry with him.” 
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body readouts that serve as the primary means by which people (usually subconsciously) 
express their emotional state. Hence, physiological correlates of emotion created through sentic 
modulation are the main source from which software agents can obtain cues as to users’ 
emotional states (Picard 2000: 25f.). Conversely, agents should use at least some of the 
channels of emotional communication available to people in order to convey their own affective 
state in human-agent interactions. 
There are different forms of sentic modulation, which are more or less apparent to observers 
(cf. Table 19). Some forms can be perceived by watching or listening to another person while 
others are detectable through touch or use of measuring instruments (Picard 2000: 27). Most 
perceptible are the modulation of the facial expression (Ekman 1982, cf. Chapter 10.1.3) and 
the voice (Banse & Scherer 1996, cf. Chapter 10.1.1) (Picard 1995). For the former, it has been 
argued that there are basic emotions (cf. Chapter 7.15.7 and Chapter 10.1.3), each characterized 
by a distinctive set of facial muscle movement patterns. 
13.1.2  Cognitive Aspects of Emotion 
Apart from physical aspects, emotions also have a cognitive component. Not only are people 
often aware of their emotions, but emotions may also be generated based on prior cognitive 
assessment (Picard 1995). As a result, appraisal theories of emotion (Frijda 1986; Ortony et al. 
1988; Lazarus 1991; Frijda 1993; Scherer 1999; Scherer et al. 2001; Ellsworth & Scherer 2003) 
have been developed, which emphasize the influence of cognitive variables and processes on 
emotion. 
Appraisal theories view emotion as a mechanism for continuous, flexible adaptation to 
changes in circumstances that mediates between stimulus events and the agent’s behavioral 
reactions (Petta 2003: 257). The emotional responses of a human or artificial agent are viewed 
as arising from a two-stage process (Gratch & Marsella 2003, cf. Figure 69): 
• Appraisal evaluates the agent’s relationship with the environment along several dimensions 
concerning the agent and generates an emotion. 
• Coping deals with the generated emotion by suggesting problem-focused or emotion-focused 
strategies that may change the environment or the agent’s beliefs or attention, respectively. 
As the diagram in Figure 69 shows, there is a close interaction between appraisal, coping, 
and cognition, which develops over time. Cognitive processes build interpretations of the 
agent’s current situation that provide the information necessary to appraise that situation. 
Coping uses the results of the appraisal process to select appropriate strategies for changing or 
preserving the agent-environment relationship and enlists cognitive processes to implement 
Table 19. Forms of sentic modulation. Adapted from Picard (2000: 27, Table 1.1). 
Apparent to Others Less Apparent to Others 
• Facial expression 
• Voice inflection 
• Gestures, locomotion 
• Posture 
• Pupillary dilation 
• Respiration 
• Heart rate, pulse 
• Temperature 
• Electrodermal response, perspiration 
• Muscle action potentials 
• Blood pressure 
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them. Eventually, coping strategies lead to new interpretations of the agent’s relationship with 
the environment and possibly new appraisals (Gratch & Marsella 2004). 
However, appraisal is by no means a necessary pre-condition for emotion (Picard 1995). In 
fact, neurological investigations have found evidence indicating that emotions can be activated 
without prior appraisal and can even temporarily seize control of the cognitive brain centers. 
For example, fear can make people jump out of the way of a rapidly approaching object before 
they can consciously perceive and analyze that a bus is about to hit them (Picard 2000: 32). 
13.1.2.1 Appraisal 
Appraisal is a process of continuous evaluation (Petta 2003: 257) by which agents assess their 
relationship with their physical and social environment, including their current state, the history 
of events leading to this state, and expectations of future developments (Gratch & Marsella 
2005a). This assessment is formalized in terms of a set of abstract features for determining the 
affective state and guiding the behavior of an agent (Gratch & Marsella 2004). Appraisal is a 
reflexive rather than a deliberative process, but it both informs and is informed by cognition 
(Gratch & Marsella 2005a). 
Cognitive processes involved in understanding and interacting with the environment (e.g. 
planning, explanation, perception, memory, linguistic processes, etc.) interpret external events 
in relation to an agent’s internal dispositions (including its beliefs, desires, and intentions). 
Appraisal summarizes this interpretation by specifying the values of a set of appraisal variables 
(cf. Table 20), which describe the agent-environment relationship and are mapped to affective 
states (emotions and moods) of different type and intensity, including associated physiological 
responses and action tendencies (Gratch & Marsella 2004). 
Appraisal variables can be regarded as criteria for judging the significance of events from the 
perspective of a particular agent. In other words, the significance of events arises only from 
their interpretation in the context of the beliefs, desires, and intentions of the agent, the agent’s 
abilities, and past events (Gratch & Marsella 2004). 
 
Figure 69. Typical components of an appraisal theory of emotion. Adapted from Gratch and Marsella 
(2004, Figure 1). 
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Appraisal serves as a mediator between events and emotions in the emotion generation 
process and thus accounts for the ability of the same event to elicit different emotions in 
different individuals or in the same individual (at different times). It also helps to identify the 
conditions that give rise to different emotions, and to understand the differences among 
emotions (Petta 2003: 257). 
13.1.2.2 Coping 
Appraising the situation, while an important first step, is not enough for an agent to achieve 
successful adaptation. The second step is for emotion to make an impact on the agent’s actions 
(Petta 2003: 259). Emotions are not tied to specific actions but lead to the generation of action 
tendencies, which are defined as 
states of readiness to achieve or maintain a given kind of relationship with the environment. They 
can be conceived of as plans or programs to achieve such ends, which are put in a state of 
readiness. (Frijda 1986: 75). 
For example, aggression is a tendency for individuals to behave when they experience anger. 
Other theorists have argued that action tendencies are not plans but rather innate biological 
impulses that may or may not lead to action, especially in humans (Lazarus 1991). Instead, they 
emphasize the role of coping in determining an agent’s response to the appraised significance of 
events in the past, present, or future (Gratch & Marsella 2005b). In comparison to action 
tendencies, “coping is a much more complex, deliberate, and often planful psychological 
process” (Lazarus 1991: 114) that involves “cognitive and behavioral efforts to manage specific 
external or internal demands (and conflicts between them) that are appraised as taxing or 
exceeding the resources of the person” (p. 112). The coping process may suggest different 
strategies that change or maintain the relationship between the agent and the environment. 
Table 21 lists various coping strategies, categorizing them into two broad classes (Gratch & 
Marsella 2004): 
Table 20. Appraisal variables. Adapted from Gratch and Marsella (2004, Table 1). 
Relevance Does the event require attention or adaptive reaction? 
Desirability Does the event facilitate or thwart what the agent wants? 
Causal 
Attribution 
Agency Who was responsible for the event? 
Blame and Credit Does the causing agent deserve blame or credit? 
Likelihood How likely was the event; how likely is an outcome? 
Unexpectedness Was the event predicted from past knowledge? 
Urgency Will delaying a response make matters worse? 
Ego Involvement To what extent does the event impact the agent’s sense of 
self (social esteem, moral values, cherished beliefs, etc.)? 
Coping 
Potential 
Controllability The extent to which the event can be influenced 
Changeability The extent to which the event will change of its own accord 
Power The power of a particular agent to directly or indirectly 
control the event 
Adaptability Can the agent live with the consequences of the event? 
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• Problem-focused coping selects strategies that aim to change the environment. For example, 
the agent may deal with guilt by trying to make up for its mistakes. 
• Emotion-focused coping deals with emotion internally, by proposing strategies that change 
how the agent interprets the circumstances. An emotion-focused way for the agent to cope 
with guilt would be to blame someone else. A changed perspective, in turn, can induce the 
agent to reappraise the situation, which may lead to anger toward the individual given the 
blame (Gratch & Marsella 2005b). 
13.1.3  Primary and Secondary Emotions 
The distinction between non-cognitively and cognitively generated emotions has been made in 
terms of primary vs. secondary emotions (Damasio 1994; Picard 2000: 35). Primary emotions 
Table 21. Coping strategies. Adapted from Gratch and Marsella (2004, Table 2). 
Problem-focused Coping 
Active coping 
Take active steps to try to remove or circumvent the stressor. 
Planning 
Think about how to cope. Come up with action strategies. 
Seeking social support for instrumental reasons 
Seek advice, assistance, or information. 
Emotion-focused Coping 
Suppression of competing activities 
Put other projects aside or let them slide. 
Restraint coping 
Waiting till the appropriate opportunity. Holding back. 
Seeking emotional support for social reasons 
Get moral support, sympathy, or understanding. 
Positive reinterpretation and growth 
Look for silver lining. Try to grow as a person as a result. 
Acceptance 
Accept the stressor as real. Learn to live with it. 
Turning to religion 
Pray, put trust in God (assume God has a plan). 
Focus on and vent 
Can function to accommodate loss and move forward. 
Denial 
Deny the reality of the event. 
Behavioral disengagement 
Admit inability to deal with the event. Reduce effort. 
Mental disengagement 
Use other activities to take the mind off the problem, e.g. 
daydreaming, sleeping. 
Alcohol/drug disengagement 
Consume substances that affect the metabolism in a way which 
changes the individual’s perception of the problem. 
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(e.g. fear, anger, surprise, sadness, and happiness) are basic, innate (‘hard-wired’) emotions that 
form the underlying mechanism of secondary emotions. They are automatic and involuntary, 
i.e. usually do not arise from cognitive processing. 
In human-computer interaction, objects and events on a computer screen may be responsible 
for automatic and involuntary (primary) emotional responses in users. Several examples were 
discussed by Brave and Nass (2003). For one, people may startle and experience sudden fear 
when a pop-up window, an animation, or an embodied agent appears or moves unexpectedly on 
the screen, or when the interface produces loud or sharp noises. Images can be arousing if they 
occupy much of the user’s field of view, give the impression of coming toward the user, or 
move in the user’s peripheral vision. Finally, humans are innately attracted to or repulsed by 
certain images and sounds, including explicit displays of sexual acts or violence and screeching 
or crying noises (cf. Table 9). 
Secondary emotions (e.g. sympathy, guilt, pride, jealousy, and admiration) are higher-order 
emotions that arise as an individual matures and discovers that certain categories of objects and 
situations are systematically linked to particular primary emotions he or she experiences 
(Damasio 1994: 134). For example, grief involves bodily responses co-occurring with a 
cognitive understanding of loss (Picard 2000: 35). Secondary emotions may be the result of 
conscious or unconscious cognitive processing ranging in complexity from simple object 
recognition to sophisticated reasoning about the consequences of an action or event (Brave & 
Nass 2003). The majority of emotions relevant for human-computer interaction design are 
secondary emotions, including frustration, pride, and satisfaction (Nass & Brave 2005: 75). 
13.2  The Functions of Emotions 
Emotion is a necessary element of all intelligent agents, whether natural or artificial, for 
engaging with a complex and unpredictable physical and social environment. Humans, in 
particular, are the most expressive, emotionally complex, and socially sophisticated agents. 
They are equipped with two conceptually distinct, seemingly opposite but still complementary 
information processing systems: cognition, which is concerned with interpreting, reflecting on, 
and remembering aspects of the environment, and affect, which continuously provides quick 
positive or negative assessments of entities, events, and situations in the world (Norman et al. 
2003: 38, cf. Chapter 6.4). Both systems are closely interrelated and depend on each other. 
They also play important adaptive roles in cognitive and social behaviors and processing, 
including decision making, planning, learning, attention, communication, relationship building, 
memory, etc. (Lazarus 1991; Damasio 1994; Picard 1995; Picard 2000; Brave & Nass 2003). 
In artificial intelligence, the focus has traditionally been on emulating the cognitive abilities 
of humans, whereas affect in general and emotion in particular have been either completely 
disregarded or dismissed as a distraction to rational thinking (Gratch & Marsella 2005a). 
However, findings from neuroscience and psychology indicate that emotions are critical for 
aspects of behavior that have been traditionally viewed as ‘rational,’ including action selection, 
decision making, learning, and planning, among others (Hudlicka 2003: 10). Furthermore, not 
only does emotion influence cognitive behavior in various ways, but displays of emotion also 
serve important interpersonal functions and communicate an agent’s internal state. Affective 
computing, i.e. “computing that relates to, arises from, or deliberately influences emotions” 
(Picard 2000: 3), is a growing field of research in artificial intelligence which acknowledges the 
importance of emotion in human-computer interaction and attempts to tap the potential of the 
emotion system with the goal to build ‘intelligent’ machines that can better make sense of and 
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respond to complex and changing environments that include people, other machines, and 
themselves. The role of emotions in human and artificial intelligence was examined in a recent 
review by Martínez-Miranda and Aldea (2005), which summarized both research showing the 
importance of emotions in human intelligent behavior and research that seeks to incorporate 
emotions into intelligent systems, including affective agents. 
In humans, and by analogy in artificial agents, emotion has two kinds of functions: cognitive 
(intra-agent) functions affect mental information processing, whereas social (inter-agent) 
functions mediate social interaction (Gratch & Marsella 2005a). Both functions are discussed in 
the following. 
13.2.1  Cognitive Functions of Emotions 
Emotion has strong adaptive influences on a wide range of cognitive processes in an agent. It is 
an important indicator of salience, guiding attention toward the important things and away from 
distractions, thereby helping the agent to manage its priorities (Picard 2000). It can facilitate or 
hinder memory and recall, and it regulates how agents solve problems and perform tasks (cf. 
Chapter 6.4). Specific cognitive functions of emotion include the following (Gratch & Marsella 
2005a): 
• Situation awareness. Emotion guides an agent’s perception and categorization of salient 
inputs from its environment. In particular, it is instrumental in the process of interpreting the 
relationship between external events and situations on the one hand and the agent’s internal 
beliefs, desires, and intentions on the other. The agent can then quickly determine whether 
subsequent ambiguous inputs are consistent with these prior appraisals, although this 
interpretation may be incorrect. 
• Action selection. Emotion is involved in choosing and preparing an agent for a particular 
course of action in the environment. For example, fear causes arousal of the mind and body, 
directs attention toward the aggressor, and readies the individual for an appropriate action 
(flight, attack, etc.). 
• Coping. Agents develop persistent cognitive and behavioral patterns (coping strategies) to 
deal with their emotions (cf. Section 13.1). Some of these are problem-focused (e.g. planning 
how to address a problem that causes negative emotions) while others are emotion-focused 
(e.g. denial, make-believe, and positive reinterpretation). The latter may be ‘irrational,’ but 
they still have positive effects on stress, life expectancy, and social-emotional relationships. 
• Learning. Processes of learning in humans interact with emotions like curiosity, frustration, 
and satisfaction (Kort et al. 2001a). Memory and recall, problem solving, and decision 
making are influenced by emotional state. Positive emotions can facilitate learning, but 
encountering and surpassing failure and frustration is also an important part of the learning 
process (Burleson & Picard 2004, see also below). 
Kort et al. (2001a; 2001b) proposed a model of the interaction between emotions and 
learning (cf. Figure 70), in which learners’ emotions change as they move through four 
quadrants (I – IV) and up a spiral during the learning process. In the model, the horizontal 
Emotion Axis ranges from negative to positive affect (emotion), whereas the upward section 
of the vertical Learning Axis represents the construction of knowledge (constructive 
learning) and its downward section the discarding of misconceptions (unlearning). Learners 
are constructing knowledge and experiencing positive affect in Quadrant I. Discrepancies 
between the study material and their own mental information structures cause learners to 
move to Quadrant II, which is characterized by constructive learning and negative affect 
Chapter 13: Emotion and Personality 357 
(Craig et al. 2004: 242). Learners experience a cognitive disequilibrium (Piaget 1952, cf. 
Chapter 2.2.3) resulting from their encounter with stimuli or experiences that are not in line 
with their expectations, including contradictions, anomalies, obstacles, contrasts, surprises, 
perturbations, and equivalent options (Craig et al. 2004: 243). Cognitive disequilibrium is 
linked to the emotional states of confusion and possibly frustration, and it spurs cognitive 
processes of deliberation, inquiry, and search within the learner in order to restore cognitive 
equilibrium, which has the potential to result in deep learning. In Quadrant III, learners are 
eliminating their misconceptions about the study material (unlearning) while experiencing 
negative emotions, such as frustration. Quadrant IV is characterized by unlearning and 
positive affect. Having lost their misconceptions, learners now engage in new research, make 
new discoveries, and may even gain profound insights. They also recover hopefulness and 
positive attitude (Kort et al. 2001a). New ideas move learners back into the first (or second) 
quadrant, and a new learning cycle begins, which takes them further up the spiral (along the 
implicit Knowledge Axis). 
Csikszentmihalyi (1975; 1990) argued that there is an ideal mental state of learning in 
which the student becomes fully absorbed in the learning activity, experiencing stimulation, 
complete involvement, and success ([INT 156]). This state, called the zone of flow, is 
characterized by clear goals, concentration and focus, a loss of the feeling of self-
consciousness, a distorted sense of time, direct and immediate feedback, a balance between 
ability level and challenge, a sense of personal control over the situation or activity, the 
intrinsically rewarding nature of the activity, and full absorption of the individual in the 
activity ([INT 156]; Csikszentmihalyi 1975: 72). In the state of flow, materials and tasks 
have just the right level of difficulty for learners to forget time, fatigue, and boredom (Craig 
et al. 2004: 243).214 Difficulty should not be avoided, but it “should be sought out, as a spur 
                                              
214  A proper level of challenge is also central to the user experience in computer games. Gee (2003) 
argued that the experience should be “pleasantly frustrating” for the user, i.e. challenging but not too 
much. Challenge can promote intrinsic motivation, not only in games but in all learning activities 
(Lepper & Henderlong 2000). 
 
Figure 70. A cyclic model relating learning to emotions (Kort et al. 2001a, Figure 2; Kort et al. 2001b, 
Figure 1a). 
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to delving more deeply into an interesting area. An educational system that tries to make 
everything easy and pleasurable will prevent much important learning from happening.” 
(Kay 1991). In other words, failure is critical to learning (Schank & Neaman 2001: 38). 
Therefore, the possibility of failure should be explicitly designed into educational activities 
in order to create opportunities for learning. On the other hand, fear of failure constitutes a 
significant barrier to learning (Burleson 2005: 445). Schank and Neaman (2001) proposed 
several strategies for reducing this fear and keeping learners motivated: 
• Minimize discouragement by decreasing the humiliation associated with failure. 
• Help learners to understand that their failure will have minimal consequences. 
• Motivate learners in ways that outweigh or distract from the perceived negative aspects of 
failure. For example, give them access to experts when they experience failure. 
Pedagogical agents can be designed to be both empathetic and knowledgeable and thus 
have the potential to become caring experts (cf. Chapter 12.3.8 and Chapter 12.3.13) that 
contribute advice and encouragement in a non-humiliating fashion at the right time, 
minimizing the consequences of but not the opportunities for failure. 
Learning processes are also greatly facilitated by learners’ intrinsic motivation, i.e. when 
they deal with materials and activities for their own sake, without requiring external 
reinforcement (extrinsic motivation) (Sansone & Harackiewicz 2000). Indicators of higher 
levels of intrinsic interest include, on the one hand, more pleasure in the activity, more active 
involvement, and more task persistence, and, on the other hand, less boredom, less anxiety, 
and less anger (Craig et al. 2004: 243). 
Craig et al. (2004) explored the role of learners’ emotional states in learning with a 
pedagogical agent. They found significant relationships between learning and the states of 
boredom, flow, and confusion. Consistent with Csikszentmihalyi’s model, learning gains 
were negatively correlated with boredom and positively with flow. Support for the idea that 
cognitive disequilibrium fosters deep learning was provided by the positive correlation 
between confusion and learning. In contrast, no evidence for a significant role of the basic 
emotions (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise, and embarrassment, cf. Section 
13.4.2) in learning was found (Kort et al. 2001a; Craig et al. 2004; D’Mello et al. 2006; 
Graesser et al. 2006; D’Mello et al. 2007a). 
13.2.2  Social Functions of Emotions 
Apart from mediating cognition, emotion also plays a number of important roles in the social 
capabilities of humans. In social interactions, emotional displays (cf. Section 13.4.2) carry 
information and regulate interpersonal behavior. While people deliberately portray emotions to 
manipulate others, communication of emotion is also instrumental in promoting cohesion and 
preventing misunderstandings in social groups (Gratch & Marsella 2005a). Emotional displays 
indicate when it is (not) appropriate or advisable to interact with others, and when it is, they 
indicate the kind of interaction expected (Ortony et al. 2005: 195). Furthermore, emotions are 
central to the development of long-term relationships between agents, restricting the self-
interested behavior of an agent in favor of cooperative, altruistic behavior. Gratch and Marsella 
(2005a) discussed the following specific social functions of emotion: 
• Communication of mental state. The emotional displays of others provide observers with a 
window into their beliefs (e.g. frowning may indicate disagreement), desires (e.g. joy shows 
the personal appreciation of an event or outcome), and intentions or action tendencies (e.g. 
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anger suggests aggression), although these displays may be based on communicative 
conventions rather than genuine emotional states. In addition, emotional displays convey 
information about dimensions relevant to the appraisal of the emotional significance of 
events, including valence, intensity, certainty, expectedness, and blameworthiness, among 
others. 
• Social manipulators. Emotional displays can be used to manipulate other individuals into 
showing certain desired emotional responses. The targets may be unable to resist or may 
even be unaware of the manipulation. For example, manipulators may communicate anger to 
coerce action and enforce social norms; distress to obtain social support; guilt to reconcile 
with others; and joy or pity to signal that they feel happy or sympathetic for the addressee. It 
is also possible to influence the behavior of others by displaying emotions that give rise to 
particular emotional states in observers. Examples include emotional contagion (‘catching’ 
the emotions of others, similar to a disease)215 and the Pygmalion effect.216 Brave et al. (2005) 
investigated the psychological effects of two types of emotions in embodied agents: self-
oriented emotion and other-oriented (empathic) emotion. They found that an agent that 
displayed empathic emotion was rated more positively by users in terms of likeability, 
trustworthiness, perceived caring, and felt support. Furthermore, agents that displayed 
empathic emotion were perceived as significantly more submissive than agents exhibiting 
self-oriented emotion or no emotion at all. In general, embodied interactive agents can be 
designed to enhance users’ perception of being supported (by showing more other-oriented 
emotion) or of being independent (by showing more self-oriented emotion). Brave et al. 
suggested that designing the right level of agent support requires consideration of the user’s 
personality and the application domain. For some applications, including education, they 
favored dynamic adaptation of agents’ emotional behavior. For example, a pedagogical 
agent playing the role of coach (cf. Chapter 16.2.3) could provide more empathy and support 
for novice learners and make them feel more independent as they gain proficiency (Brave et 
al. 2005: 172f.). 
• Believability. Convincing emotional displays of an embodied interactive agent can contribute 
to the believable, human-like image which it portrays to users and lead them to treat the 
agent in the same way as a human interaction partner. In particular, users interacting with a 
                                              
215  People involuntarily mirror the facial expressions which they perceive in others. Apart from building 
connections and conveying empathy to their audience, this behavior can also cause people to 
experience the emotion that they mirror or ‘fake’ (Isbister 2006: 149). This is the basic idea of the 
facial feedback hypothesis (Darwin 1872; Strack et al. 1988; McIntosh 1996), which states that the 
experience of emotion can be influenced by facial muscle movements ([INT 157]). Likewise, 
recognition of a particular emotion in a voice can cause listeners to ‘contract’ that emotion as well 
(Nass & Brave 2005: 93f.). However, the complete emotion, including both arousal (high .. low) and 
valence (positive .. negative), is not always transferred to the audience. Listeners reliably catch the 
speaker’s emotional arousal (excitement), which, in turn, intensifies whatever emotions they are 
experiencing at the moment, both positive and negative ones. In other words, a voice ringing with 
happiness can make a listener feel even angrier, more frustrated, more jealous, etc. Therefore, voices 
expressing strong emotions should be used with care in agent design, in order to avoid the danger of 
intensifying the wrong emotions in users (p. 94). 
216  Verbal or non-verbal cues conveying certain (positive or negative) expectations of others about an 
individual can induce the individual to fulfill these expectations. This is known as the Pygmalion 
effect or the self-fulfilling prophecy (Gratch & Marsella 2005a; Draper 2006). The Pygmalion effect 
was originally observed in students who outperformed their peers simply because their teachers 
expected them to do so (Rosenthal & Jacobson 1992; Draper 2006). 
360 Chapter 13: Emotion and Personality 
believable agent are more polite, make socially desirable choices, are more nervous (Krämer 
et al. 2003), trust the agent more (Cowell & Stanney 2003), and feel greater empathy for the 
agent (Paiva et al. 2004). 
13.3  Computational Models of Emotion 
At the heart of an emotionally adept agent is a computational model of emotion,217 which 
provides a symbolic description of human or human-like emotions, as well as their dynamics, at 
a certain level of granularity and in a format that facilitates recognition, interpretation, 
disambiguation, management, and synthesis of emotions in the context of the agent’s 
application and/or sheds light on human emotion systems and processes (Elliott 2003: 237). 
Agents can use these models to (Hudlicka 2003: 6): 
• Predict the user’s emotional state or how he or she will most likely react to a (hypothetical) 
situation or event; 
• Disambiguate incoming sensor data (e.g. does the user’s increased heart rate mean that he or 
she is excited or afraid or angry?) or compensate for the lack of such data; 
• Determine how to best respond to a recognized emotional state of the user. 
Furthermore, computational frameworks of emotion can serve as a test bed for models of the 
mechanisms underlying emotional behavior and its influence on cognitive processing, which 
show how emotion is related to other mental systems like cognition and language (Gratch & 
Marsella 2004). Depending on whether computational models of emotion stress deliberately 
communicated emotion or the simulation of genuine emotion, they can be divided into 
communication-driven and simulation-based approaches (Gratch & Marsella 2005a): 
• Communication-driven approaches use emotional displays as a means to achieve certain 
communicative or manipulative goals (cf. Section 13.3.1). 
• Simulation-based approaches model aspects of emotion processes in order to simulate ‘true’ 
emotions in an agent (cf. Section 13.3.2). 
13.3.1  Communication-Driven Emotion Modeling 
In many implemented artificial agents, emotional behaviors are chosen on the basis of their 
desired impact on the user. As discussed by Gratch and Marsella (2005a), these agents do not 
‘have’ emotions which arise from an internal computation of the agent’s ‘natural’ emotional 
state given its current disposition and situation. Instead, emotional behaviors are selected which 
are useful at the current state of the agent-user interaction to achieve specific communicative, 
social, or task-related goals. Often, the agent’s developers (rather than the agent itself) 
determine the utility of particular emotional behaviors and encode it into the agent’s inventory 
of behaviors. Models for different agents and applications typically each have their own ad hoc 
implementation. Pedagogical agents have typically adopted a communication-driven approach, 
deliberately selecting emotions for their positive effects on student motivation and thus learning 
(Elliott et al. 1999). 
                                              
217  Enos (2003) provided an annotated bibliography of models of emotion that are useful in the context 
of computational applications. 
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Gratch and Marsella proposed that that the communicative function of emotional displays 
could be formally described in terms of emotion acts in analogy to speech acts (cf. Chapter 
11.1.3.3). Emotion acts contribute information to the current state of the interaction and allow 
the same emotional display to be associated with several emotional acts and a given emotional 
act to be realized by different emotional displays (Gratch & Marsella 2005a). 
Agents capable of portraying emotions will invite users to communicate back with emotional 
displays of their own. The ability to comprehend the user’s emotional expressions provides 
agents with information about the user’s cognitive or emotional state, the current state of the 
interaction, and the effectiveness of their communicative actions (Gratch & Marsella 2005a). 
Therefore, agents that communicate emotions also should be equipped with input channels and 
components for the detection and interpretation of users’ emotional displays (cf. Section 
13.4.1). 
13.3.2  Simulation-Based Emotion Modeling 
The focus of simulation-based emotion models is on the simulation of ‘genuine’ emotion in 
artificial agents, as opposed to the deliberate portrayal of useful emotional displays. Simulation-
based approaches build computational models of cognitive processes from which emotional 
behaviors arise that provide adaptive responses to the agent’s environment (Gratch & Marsella 
2005b). Emotional expressions are not selected deliberately to achieve a communicative effect; 
instead, they originate from an internal representation of the agent’s (simulated) emotional state 
and thus reveal something about its “inner life” (Gratch & Marsella 2005a). 
The vast majority of current simulation-based approaches to emotion modeling draw on 
appraisal theories of emotion (cf. Section 13.1.2) as their conceptual basis, due to the popularity 
of these cognitive frameworks in psychological research today (Gratch & Marsella 2005b). The 
most prominent appraisal theory used in computational systems is the model by Ortony, Clore, 
and Collins (the OCC model). The Emotion and Adaptation (EMA) model extends the OCC 
model, integrating a plan-based model of appraisal with an elaborate model of coping. An 
alternative approach uses Bayesian networks to probabilistically model how emotion and 
personality are related to behaviors that express them. These three simulation-based models are 
discussed in the following sections. 
13.3.2.1 The OCC Model 
Andrew Ortony, Gerald Clore, and Allan Collins’ cognitive appraisal theory (Ortony et al. 
1988) – commonly referred to as the OCC model – views emotions as the outcome of positive 
or negative responses of an agent to situations218 involving events, agents, and objects, 
influenced by the agent’s goals, standards, and attitudes (Picard 2000: 196). The model 
proposes a cognitive framework of emotions comprising specifications for 22 emotion types 
(cf. Figure 71). This structure groups emotions according to the cognitive conditions under 
which they are elicited (Ortony 2003: 193). 
While it was originally intended for reasoning about emotions, the OCC model has become 
the default model for the generation of (cognitive) emotions in computers (Picard 2000: 195f.), 
                                              
218  The range of emotion-generating situations includes the experience of emotions itself. As a result, 
emotions can lead to further emotions or to the same emotion again and again (Picard 2000: 198). 
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which has found implementation in various computational systems and agents (e.g. Bates et al. 
1992; André et al. 1999a; Elliott et al. 1999; Martinho et al. 1999). The OCC model provides a 
rule-based system for generating the different emotion types. The example below shows the 
rules for the generation of the emotional state of joy (Picard 2000: 196): 
1. Set the potential Pj for generating a state of joy:  
IF D(p,e,t) > 0 THEN set Pj(p,e,t) = fj(D(p,e,t), Ig(p,e,t)) 
2. Set an intensity of joy Ij, given a threshold value Tj: 
IF Pj(p,e,t) > Tj(p,t) THEN set Ij(p,e,t) = Pj(p,e,t) - Tj(p,t) 
ELSE set Ij(p,e,t) = 0 
3. Map the resulting intensity to an emotion term from the joy family. 
The first rule sets the potential Pj for synthesizing a state of joy. If the desirability D assigned 
by a person p to an event e at time t (D(p,e,t)) is greater than 0 (i.e. the consequences of 
event e are expected to be beneficial), then the potential of event e for generating a state of joy 
in person p at time t (Pj(p,e,t)) is computed by a function specific to the emotion of joy (fj) 
 
Figure 71. The cognitive structure of emotions as defined by the OCC model. Adapted from Picard 
(2000: 197, Figure 7.1). The 22 emotion types are given in black boldface print in the boxes along the 
bottom of the diagram. 
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based on its two parameters: the desirability D(p,e,t) and a combination of global variables 
affecting emotion intensity, such as expectedness, reality, and proximity (Ig(p,e,t)). 
The second rule sets an intensity value Ij for the emotion of joy being generated. If the 
potential of event e for generating a state of joy in person p at time t (Pj(p,e,t)) is greater 
than a threshold value for activating the emotion of joy in person p at time t (Tj(p,t)), then the 
intensity of joy in person p given event e at time t (Ij(p,e,t)) is set to the difference between 
the potential and the threshold value; otherwise, the intensity is set to zero. 
Finally, the resulting intensity value is used to find an appropriate emotion label from the joy 
family. For example, a moderate intensity value corresponds to ‘pleased’ while a very high 
intensity value translates to ‘euphoric.’ 
Ortony later recognized the problem that the original system of emotion categories was too 
cumbersome for being implemented in affective artifacts (Ortony 2003: 193ff.) and proposed a 
refined scheme that reduces some of the categories in the original OCC model to five positive 
and five negative specializations of affective reactions (cf. Table 22). In addition, affective 
agents and systems need a coherent and stable value system for appraising their environment 
(p. 194). Such a system is presented in Figure 72. In this system, events, agents, and objects are 
appraised in terms of goals, norms/standards, and tastes/attitudes. The resulting appraisals give 
rise to emotions from different categories, including goal-based, compound, standards-based, 
and attitude-based emotions (p. 195). 
Table 22. Five specializations of generalized positive and negative affective reactions. Adapted from 
Ortony (2003: 194, Table 6.1). The undifferentiated positive or negative reaction is shown in the first 
section of the table. The remaining five entries are specializations (goal-based, standards-based, and 
taste-based). 
Undifferentiated 
Positive Reactions Negative Reactions 
• Because something good happened  
(joy, happiness, etc.) 
• Because something bad happened  
(distress, sadness, etc.) 
Goal-based Specializations 
Positive Reactions Negative Reactions 
• About the possibility of something good 
happening (hope) 
• About the possibility of something bad 
happening (fear, etc.) 
• Because a feared bad thing didn’t happen 
(relief) 
• Because a hoped-for good thing didn’t happen 
(disappointment) 
Standards-based Specializations 
Positive Reactions Negative Reactions 
• About a self-initiated praiseworthy act  
(pride, gratification) 
• About a self-initiated blameworthy act  
(remorse, self-anger, shame, etc.) 
• About an other-initiated praiseworthy act 
(gratitude, admiration) 
• About an other-initiated blameworthy act 
(anger, reproach, etc.) 
Taste-based Specializations 
Positive Reactions Negative Reactions 
• Because one finds someone or something 
appealing or attractive (love, like, etc.) 
• Because one finds someone or something 
unappealing or unattractive (hate, dislike, etc.) 
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13.3.2.2 The EMA Model 
The Emotion and Adaptation (EMA) model has been designed as a general computational 
framework for modeling the mechanisms that give rise to different emotions in agents and 
determine how these emotions influence agents’ cognitive and behavioral responses, with an 
emphasis on coping (Gratch & Marsella 2004; Gratch & Marsella 2005a; Gratch & Marsella 
2005b). The model has been implemented in virtual humans (Gratch et al. 2002; Rickel et al. 
2002; Marsella et al. 2004) to inform their decision making, perceptual attention, and non-
verbal behavior (Gratch & Marsella 2005b). 
Based on appraisal theories of emotion, EMA models the processes of appraisal and coping 
as a five-stage algorithm which manipulates a causal interpretation of the agent-environment 
relationship (cf. Figure 73). This interpretation is built by cognitive processes, characterized in 
terms of appraisal variables, and modified by coping responses (Gratch & Marsella 2005b). The 
EMA algorithm is summarized below (Gratch & Marsella 2004): 
1. Construct and maintain a causal interpretation of ongoing world events in terms of beliefs, 
desires, plans, and intentions. 
The causal interpretation represents the agent’s current mental state. It encodes past, present, 
and future actions and states; the likelihood and desirability of these actions and states; and 
causal relationships between them. Figure 74 shows an example, which is explained below. 
 
Figure 72. Appraisal and resulting emotions in the OCC model (Ortony 2003: 195, Figure 6.1). 
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2. Generate multiple appraisal frames that characterize features of the causal interpretation in 
terms of appraisal variables. 
Each appraisal frame contains a set of appraisal variables whose values capture the 
assessment of a particular event from a certain perspective. New appraisals are formed and 
old ones are retracted depending on changes in the causal interpretation. Multiple events are 
appraised simultaneously and from different perspectives, including the agent’s own 
perspective and the imagined perspectives of other agents. 
3. Map individual appraisal frames into individual instances of emotion. 
This step uses mapping rules that take the configuration of variables in an appraisal frame 
and derive an emotion of a particular category (e.g. hope, joy, fear, distress, anger, or guilt) 
and intensity. 
4. Aggregate emotion instances into a current emotional state and overall mood. 
Acting in the environment requires agents to perform a variety of operations (e.g. language 
processing, planning, perception, etc.) that read or update the causal interpretation. Access to 
elements of the causal interpretation brings their associated appraisal frames/emotion 
instances into focus as ‘concerns’ for the coping process (Gratch & Marsella 2003). The 
most-recently accessed emotion instances determine the agent’s current emotional state. In 
contrast, the agent’s mood results from aggregating all emotion instances connected to the 
current causal interpretation. 
5. Adopt a coping strategy in response to the current emotional state. 
The selected coping strategy purports to maintain a desirable or reverse an undesirable 
emotional state currently in focus by identifying relevant items of the causal interpretation 
and assessing the potential for maintaining or changing them. Coping thus works with the 
same representation as, but in the opposite direction of, appraisal (Gratch & Marsella 2003). 
The structure and elements of the causal interpretation, depicted in Figure 74, were described 
by Gratch and Marsella (2005b) as follows. The causal interpretation contains separate sections 
for past, present, and future (cf. Figure 74). It represents actions as rectangles, states as rounded 
rectangles, and causal relationships as arrows between actions and states. Each state indicates 
its utility for the agent (cf. Chapter 12.2.1), its current truth-value, its probability (indicating 
degree of belief for present states and likelihood of goal achievement for future states), and 
whether it constitutes a goal for the agent. Actions indicate who is responsible for their 
execution, the likelihood of their execution, and whether there are intentions to execute them. In 
 
Figure 73. The Emotion and Adaptation (EMA) model (Gratch & Marsella 2004, Figure 2). 
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the causal interpretation shown in Figure 74, the agent has a current goal (affiliation) that was 
thwarted by the previous departure of a friend (the past action “Friend Departs” is responsible 
for the deletion of the Affiliation state). The agent may reachieve the Affiliation goal by 
performing the Join Club action. 
Different actions have the potential to facilitate or hinder the achievement of desired states. 
Each case of facilitation or inhibition is assessed (from different points of view) in terms of an 
appraisal frame. Figure 74 shows appraisal frames encoding how the agent assesses the effects 
of two actions, namely the threat to the Affiliation state posed by the Friend Departs action and 
the future prospect of re-achieving the Affiliation state by means of the Join Club action 
(Gratch & Marsella 2005b). 
13.3.2.3 Bayesian Networks 
While the OCC model and the EMA model rely on complex, ‘deep’ processes of appraisal and 
coping to generate emotional responses, a simpler approach by Gene Ball and Jack Breese 
(Breese & Ball 1998; Ball & Breese 2000; Ball 2003) uses Bayesian networks (cf. Chapter 
12.2.1) like the one in Figure 76 to model the inherently non-deterministic219 relationship 
between emotion and personality and their behavioral expression (Ball & Breese 2000: 202ff.). 
The approach by Ball and Breese reduces the complexity of both emotion and personality to 
two basic dimensions220 in each case. To further simplify these continuous dimensions, they are 
                                              
219  That is, the relationship is hard or impossible to formalize in terms of explicit rules. 
220  Up to this point, emotions have been discussed as distinct categories. That is, they are either present 
or absent and can be (more or less accurately) labeled with a natural-language term. Alternatively, 
 
 
Figure 74. Causal interpretation and appraisal frames in the EMA model (Gratch & Marsella 2005b, 
Figure 3). 
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characterized in terms of a small set of discrete values (Ball & Breese 2000: 200). Emotions (cf. 
Figure 75a) are specified with respect to the following dimensions (Ball 2003: 309): 
• Valence. The positive-negative dimension (value: negative, neutral, or positive); 
• Arousal. The degree of intensity (value: excited, neutral, or calm). 
The representation of personality (cf. Figure 75b) consists of (p. 310): 
• Dominance. How much an agent tends to control (or be controlled by) others (value: 
dominant, neutral, or submissive); 
• Friendliness. The agent’s disposition toward showing warmth and sympathy to others 
(value: friendly, neutral, or unfriendly). 
As shown in Figure 76, a Bayesian network consists of nodes representing variables and 
directed arcs representing probabilistic causal interactions among the variables (cf. Chapter 
12.2.1). Ball and Breese’s network has internal, unobservable variables for arousal and valence 
(the dimensions of emotion) and for dominance and friendliness (the dimensions of 
personality), which are linked to observable variables representing aspects of verbal and non-
verbal behavior (word selection, vocal expression, gesture, posture, and facial expression) that 
are influenced221 by those hidden states with a certain probability, as specified by the parameters 
of the network (Ball & Breese 2000: 204f.; Ball 2003: 312ff.). This network has the advantage 
that it can be used for both the interpretation and the simulation of emotion. The operation of 
the Bayesian network as described by Ball (2003: 312) is summarized below. 
                                                                                                                                                
emotions can be located as points (or regions) in a space defined by a small number of continuous 
dimensions (Picard 2000: 168ff.). As a result, the characterization of different emotions becomes a 
matter of defining the degree to which they vary along these dimensions (e.g. low .. high, positive .. 
negative). Important dimensions of emotion include valence and arousal; control is sometimes added 
as a third dimension (Nass & Brave 2005: 93). 
221  For example, the network in Figure 76 encodes the expectation that higher levels of arousal increase 
the pitch of speech. 
  
Figure 75a. Several labeled emotions located in 
the valence-arousal space (Ball & Breese 2000: 
201, Figure 7.2). 
Figure 75b. The position of different labeled 
personality traits in the dominance-friendliness 
space (Ball & Breese 2000: 202, Figure 7.3). 
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Interpreting the user’s emotional state starts with observing the user’s behavior and setting 
the values of (or instantiating) the corresponding behavioral leaf (or dependent) nodes in the 
network. Next, the network is evaluated, which produces estimates for the internal nodes 
corresponding to the components of the user’s emotional state (arousal and valence). The result 
with the highest probability is interpreted as the user’s perceived emotional state. Multiple 
results with similar probabilities render the diagnosis uncertain. 
The simulation of behavior that is appropriate with respect to both emotion and personality 
operates in the reverse direction. The internal causal nodes of the network are instantiated with 
values representing the emotion and personality that the agent should portray. Evaluation of the 
network then gives probability distributions for the different available categories of verbal and 
non-verbal behavior. In other words, this evaluation estimates the likelihood of specific body 
postures, gestures, verbal messages, etc., depending on the specified personality type and 
emotional state. Random sampling of a probability distribution over time can be used to 
generate a sequence of behaviors that are consistent with the agent’s personality and current 
emotional state but show a certain degree of variability (cf. Chapter 7.9). 
13.4  Emotional Intelligence 
Whether artificial agents (and computers in general) can have emotions, moods, etc. like 
humans do is a philosophical question that is probably unanswerable (Picard 2000; Picard 2003; 
Clark et al. 2004a; Evans 2004; Adolphs 2005), similar to the related issue of whether these 
artifacts can think (Turing 1950; Minsky 1982; Copeland 1993: Chapter 3; Horn et al. 1998). 
However, for human-agent interaction, the functional utility of emotion and of affect in general 
is of greater interest. Emotional intelligence (Picard 2000; Picard et al. 2001; Emmerling & 
 
Figure 76. A Bayesian network modeling the relationships between emotion (represented by arousal and 
valence) and personality (represented by dominance and friendliness) on the one hand and their verbal 
and non-verbal expression on the other. Adapted from Ball and Breese (2000: 205, Figure 7.4) and Ball 
(2003: 313, Figure 11.2). 
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Goleman 2003) is the subset of social intelligence (Salovey & Mayer 1990) that includes the 
ability of agents to recognize, interpret, predict, express, and manage affective state (including 
emotions, moods, etc.) in themselves, the user, and other agents skillfully and for constructive 
purposes (Picard et al. 2001: 1175). Emotional intelligence is critical for the agent’s effective 
cognitive and social functioning (cf. Section 13.2), together with the ability to make inferences 
from a model of personality (cf. Section 13.5) – its own and the personality of others. Most 
emotionally intelligent agent systems involve four components (Arnold 2003): 
• The ability to interpret emotions (cf. Section 13.4.1); 
• A computational model of emotions and their dynamics (cf. Section 13.3); 
• Processes that guide behavior based on emotional state (coping, cf. Section 13.1.2.2); 
• Channels for expressing emotions (cf. Section 13.4.2). 
13.4.1  Emotion Interpretation 
In social interactions, effective social functioning of artificial agents depends on their ability to 
interpret the emotions of the user, of other agents, and their own (simulated) emotions. External 
or internal emotional states are inferred based on observing the emotional displays of others and 
by way of reasoning about the current situation, which may include external events, actions of 
other agents, and aspects of objects in the environment (Picard 2000: 50). Alternatively (or 
additionally), it is possible to explicitly ask the user how they feel (user self-report) or to make 
assumptions based on information about user types or a typical user (Elliott et al. 1999, cf. 
Chapter 11.3.3.2.3). Characteristics of artificial agents with the ability to interpret emotions are 
listed below (Picard 2000: 55): 
• Input. The agent receives visual, audio, and/or physiological signals from different input 
channels (cf. Chapter 11.2). The input signals may provide information about different forms 
of sentic modulation (cf. Section 13.1.1), including facial displays, voice inflection, gestures, 
posture, gait, respiration, electrodermal response, temperature, blood pressure, pulse, etc., 
depending on the array of sensors available. 
• Pattern Recognition. The agent extracts features from the input signal and classifies them. 
For example, it analyzes an input video stream to extract features corresponding to different 
facial expressions (e.g. frowns vs. smiles), or it performs an analysis of voice quality, timing, 
and pitch contour to detect emotional arousal and specific emotions in speech (Picard 1997: 
288). 
• Reasoning. The agent infers the emotional state that most likely underlies the recognized 
emotional expression, using knowledge about emotion generation, the current situation, the 
user, and the sociocultural context. 
• Learning. The agent improves its interpretation performance over time by acquiring 
knowledge about how emotions are generated and expressed from its interactions with 
particular individuals and contexts. 
• Bias. The agent’s simulated affective state (if applicable) influences its interpretation of 
ambiguous emotional displays. For example, an agent in a bad (or good) mood is more likely 
to interpret an ambiguous facial expression as negative (or positive) (Picard 2000: 54). 
• Output. The agent provides a label or description for the identified expressions and their 
underlying emotions. Accuracy rates may be way below 100%, in the same range as humans, 
or perhaps even better if input channels beyond the human senses are used (Picard et al. 
2001). 
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To be able to interpret audio-visual displays of emotion, agents have to be equipped with 
auditory and visual sensors for recognizing and tracking the user’s facial expressions, gestures, 
and voice inflection (cf. Chapter 11.2).222 In addition, information can be collected from other 
forms of sentic modulation (cf. Section 13.1.1) that are not accessible to humans. Examples 
include reading infrared temperature and measuring electrodermal response (Picard 2000: 50). 
Furthermore, current research is concerned with detecting the emotional state of learners who 
are engaged in a tutorial dialogue with a pedagogical tutor agent based on conversational cues 
extracted from the exchange, such as learner response time, number of characters and words per 
response, answer quality score, degree of tutor agent directness, and type of tutor feedback 
(D’Mello & Graesser 2007; D’Mello et al. 2008). 
Facial displays are among the most perceptible indicators of underlying emotions (Cohn & 
Kanade 2007). Table 23 lists sets of observable facial cues for different (basic) emotions. 
However, speakers can also easily control their facial expressions to hide their emotions (Picard 
1997: 288). The expression of emotional states is governed by display rules, i.e. cultural 
conventions that determine the appropriate manner, timing, addressees, and circumstances for 
different emotional displays (cf. Chapter 10.1.3). In addition, accurately mapping from 
observed facial expressions to underlying emotions can be difficult because a particular 
emotion may not generate overly expressive facial displays, and a given facial display may be 
ambiguous in the sense that it can be mapped to different emotional states, or the same (or a 
quite similar) display can be associated with different emotions. It is also possible that the facial 
image of the user that can be feasibly obtained given situational and technological limitations 
provides insufficient information for making an informed guess about the user’s emotional 
state. 
Apart from the face, a speaker’s voice provides further important cues as to his or her current 
emotional state, including speech rate, pitch average, pitch range, intensity, voice quality, pitch 
changes, and articulation (Picard 2000: 179), whose different combinations and their 
corresponding emotions are discussed in detail in the following section on emotion expression. 
It is interesting to note that the analysis of emotions in speech has received much less attention 
in the speech processing community than the synthesis of emotional speech (Pantic & 
Rothkrantz 2003: 1379). The work that has been done has focused for the most part on the 
recognition of a subset of the basic emotions (cf. Chapter 7.15.7 and Chapter 10.1.3) from an 
input speech signal (Pantic & Rothkrantz 2003; Zeng et al. 2009). However, as discussed in 
Section 13.2.1, anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise, and embarrassment may be 
less important in learning than the non-basic emotions boredom, flow, confusion, and 
frustration. Ongoing efforts are concerned with detecting (and appropriately responding to) the 
latter emotions in an educational setting involving natural language dialogues between learners 
and a pedagogical tutor agent (Craig et al. 2004; D’Mello et al. 2006; D’Mello & Graesser 
2007; D’Mello et al. 2007a; D’Mello et al. 2007b; McDaniel et al. 2007; D’Mello et al. 2008; 
Graesser et al. 2007; Graesser et al. 2008). 
                                              
222  See also Pantic and Rothkrantz (2003) and Zheng et al. (2009) for reviews of techniques for the 
audio- and vision-based automated recognition of human emotional states. 
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Recent research suggests that the consideration of (combined) cues from different input 
channels (cf. Chapter 11.2) may be the most effective way to detect different emotional states 
of users. For example, D’Mello et al. (2007a) reported that emotional states such as boredom 
and flow, which are not revealed by distinctive facial expressions, can be quite reliably detected 
using posture sensors, whereas detection of confusion and delight, which involve a high level of 
arousal, is best accomplished by monitoring the face. For the detection of frustration, D’Mello 
Table 23. Facial cues of different emotions. Adapted from Brave and Nass (2005: 141, Table 11.1.A). 
Emotion Observable Facial Cues 
Surprise 
Brows raised (curved and high) 
Skin below brow stretched 
Horizontal wrinkles across forehead 
Eyelids opened and more of the white of the eye is visible 
Jaw drops open without tension or stretching of the mouth 
Fear 
Brows raised and drawn together 
Forehead wrinkles drawn to the center 
Upper eyelid is raised and lower eyelid is drawn up 
Mouth is open 
Lips are slightly tense or stretched and drawn back 
Disgust 
Upper lip is raised 
Lower lip is raised and pushed up to upper lip or it is lowered 
Nose is wrinkled 
Cheeks are raised 
Lines below the lower lid, lid is pushed up but not tense 
Brows are lowered 
Anger 
Brows lowered and drawn together 
Vertical lines appear between brows 
Lower lid is tensed and may or may not be raised 
Upper lid is tense and may or may not be lowered due to brows’ action 
Eyes have a hard stare and may have a bulging appearance 
Lips are either pressed firmly together with corners straight or down or open, 
tensed in a squarish shape 
Nostrils may be dilated (could occur in sadness too) 
Unambiguous only if registered in all three facial areas 
Happiness 
Corners of lips are drawn back and up 
Mouth may or may not be parted with teeth exposed or not 
A wrinkle runs down from the nose to the outer edge beyond lip corners 
Cheeks are raised 
Lower eyelid shows wrinkles below it, and may be raised but not tense 
Crow’s-feet wrinkles go outward from the outer corners of the eyes 
Sadness 
Inner corners of eyebrows are drawn up 
Skin below the eyebrow is triangulated, with inner corner up 
Upper lid inner corner is raised 
Corners of the lips are drawn or lip is trembling 
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et al. suggested examining features of the conversation in the context of the human-agent 
dialogue. Overall, they found that high levels of detection accuracy can be achieved by using 
the appropriate emotion-sensor combinations. Furthermore, a combination of cues from 
multiple sensor channels can improve detection performance (D’Mello & Graesser 2007). Lee 
et al. (2007b) collected data about user actions, locations, temporal information, task structure, 
physiological response, and self-report affective states during interactions between learners and 
a task-oriented learning environment including interactive animated characters in order to 
induce different types of affect recognition models using machine learning techniques 
(cf. Chapter 12.1.1.2). 
Once they have detected the presence of a particular emotional state in the user with 
sufficient confidence, agents require strategies that enable them to respond to this emotion in a 
way that takes into account the present context, the needs of the user, and cultural conventions 
and involves appropriate actions and emotional displays (cf. Section 13.4.2). To handle states of 
boredom, confusion, flow, and frustration, which play an important role in learning situations 
(cf. Section 13.2.1), the following strategies have been suggested for a pedagogical tutor agent 
(D’Mello et al. 2007a; Graesser et al. 2008): 
• Boredom. Stimulate the learner’s interest and cognitive arousal with challenging problems, 
options of choice, embedded games, etc. 
• Confusion. Delay feedback and other support and intervene only if the learner fails to restore 
cognitive equilibrium (cf. Section 13.2.1) by himself or herself after a certain period of time. 
• Flow. Keep a low profile (cf. Chapter 10.4) and challenge the learner within his or her zone 
of proximal development (e.g. with new or more difficult content and tasks). 
• Frustration. Convey empathy (Baylor & Rosenberg-Kima 2006), correct misconceptions (cf. 
Chapter 12.2.3.2), and/or give hints that guide the learner’s thinking toward more promising 
paths. 
D’Mello et al. (2007a) noted the need for a pedagogical agent to guide the learner into a 
“virtuous cycle of flow and confusion,” which keeps him or her engaged and promotes learning. 
At the same time, the agent has to make sure that the learner does not enter the “vicious cycle of 
boredom and frustration,” which would be detrimental to both the learner’s engagement and his 
or her success in the learning process. 
13.4.2  Emotion Expression 
In addition to interpreting and modeling emotion, affective embodied interactive agents require 
the ability to express emotions in a manner that is easily interpretable and convincing 
(believable) to the user223 and observes the display rules of the target culture. This involves 
using at least some of the channels of emotional communication by which people convey their 
own affective state in human-agent interactions. The following characteristics of emotion 
expression in artificial agents can be identified (Picard 2000: 60): 
• Input. Instructions about the emotion(s) to be expressed may be provided by the agent’s own 
emotion processes, an external computer program, or a human being. 
                                              
223  People tend to ascribe emotions to others even if they do not display any visible cues. Hence, it is 
important for artificial agents to make their emotional expressions as clear as possible in order to 
reduce the risk that users misinterpret their behavior (Gratch & Marsella 2005b). 
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• Intentional vs. spontaneous pathways. Emotion expression may be the result of deliberation 
about whether or not the agent should communicate emotion (in response to the user’s 
emotional state), and if so, how (intentional path). In contrast, the spontaneous path is 
available in an agent with simulated emotions, where the current simulated emotional state 
automatically affects selected outputs of the agent. 
• Feedback. The emotional state influences emotion expression, but the expression may also 
feed back into the state. 
• Bias-exclusion. The current emotional state is easiest to express for the agent, and it can 
inhibit the expression of other states. 
• Display rules. Sociocultural conventions regulate the expression of different emotions (cf. 
Chapter 10.1.3). 
• Output. Agents can portray emotional expressions through combinations of voice, facial 
expression, gesture, posture and locomotion displayed by an animated character as well as 
through appropriate music and background colors.224 An agent has to know when to be more 
subtle and when to be bolder in its emotional expression. 
Effective means for both humans and embodied interactive agents to express emotions 
include (combinations of) facial expression, voice inflection, gesture, and posture (cf. Chapter 
10.1), with the face and voice providing the most perceptible cues (Picard 2000: 26f.; Russell et 
al. 2003).225 The face is the primary means for visual communication of emotion (cf. Chapter 
10.1.3). Most existing systems for either generating or recognizing facial expressions are based 
on the Facial Action Coding System (FACS) developed by Paul Ekman and Wallace Friesen to 
classify human facial expressions (Ekman & Friesen 1978; Ekman et al. 2002; Ekman & 
Rosenberg 2005; [INT 158], cf. Chapter 11.2). The FACS describes basic emotions (cf. Table 
24) in terms of combinations of so-called action units (AUs), i.e. primitive facial muscular 
movements which, in concert, generate different facial expressions (cf. Table 25) (Picard 2000: 
175). 
There has also been work on the expression of emotion in natural and machine-generated 
voices (e.g. Cahn 1990; Kappas et al. 1991; Murray & Arnott 1993; Johnson et al. 2002; 
Oudeyer 2003; Schröder 2004). In general, humans can detect emotions both in human and 
synthetic voices quite well, with recognition accuracies of 60 percent for human speech 
(Scherer 1981) and 50 percent for synthetic speech (Cahn 1990). Researchers have identified 
signatures of emotions in voice that consist of patterns of cues, including speech rate, pitch 
average, pitch range, intensity, voice quality, pitch changes, and articulation (Isbister 2006: 
185f.). Table 26 summarizes cue patterns that signal different basic emotions in voices. A 
similar list of vocal cues for different moods and emotions is provided by Isbister (2006: 186): 
                                              
224  Juslin and Laukka found that “there are emotion-specific patterns of acoustic cues that can be used to 
communicate discrete emotions in both vocal and musical expressions of emotions” (Juslin & 
Laukka 2003: 799). The makers of films and computer games exploit the connection between music 
and emotion to intensify the viewer’s or player’s experience of the emotional reactions displayed by 
movie or game characters (Isbister 2006: 187f.). 
225  While visual behaviors for expressing emotions are already quite sophisticated, it is still difficult for 
current speech synthesizers to convey emotions properly (cf. Chapter 11.1.2.4). Furthermore, little 
research has addressed affective language generation, i.e. the task of communicating emotions 
through text and sentence structure or word choice (but see the annotated bibliography compiled by 
Piwek 2003). 
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• Anger (hot). Tense voice, faster speech rate, higher pitch, broader pitch range; 
• Anger (cold). Tense voice, faster speech rate, higher fundamental frequency and intensity, 
tendency toward downward-directed intonation contours; 
• Joy. Faster speech rate, raised pitch, broader pitch range, rising pitch pattern; 
• Fear. Raised pitch, faster speech rate, broadened pitch range, high-frequency energy; 
• Boredom. Slower speech rate, additional lengthening of stressed syllables, lowered pitch, 
reduced pitch range and variability; 
• Sadness (crying despair). Slower speech rate, raised pitch, narrowed pitch range, narrowed 
variability; 
• Sadness (quiet sorrow). Slower speech rate, lowered pitch, narrower pitch range, narrower 
variability, downward-directed intonation contours, lower mean intensity, less precision of 
articulation; 
• Depression. Lower intensity and dynamic range, downward intonation contours. 
Looking at both lists, it is worth noting that there are similarities among the vocal 
expressions of moods and emotions (Isbister 2006: 186). For example, such different emotions 
as fear, anger, and joy are all signaled by faster speech rate, higher pitch, and increased pitch 
range. On the other hand, (quiet) sadness, boredom, and depression have a slower speech rate, 
lower pitch, and reduced variability in common. In these cases, additional cues may have to be 
provided in the voice, the content of the speech, and the speaker’s facial expressions, gaze 
patterns, gestures, postures, and way of moving, in order to clarify what emotion is being 
expressed. Knowing another person well is also helpful because it includes knowledge about 
the particular ways in which that person expresses certain emotions through what he or she 
says, and how, as well as his or her visible displays of emotion (Isbister 2006: 186). This has 
two implications for designing the emotion expression of embodied interactive agents. First, 
while both the face and the voice are powerful means to convey emotions by themselves, an 
agent may often have to integrate them with each other and with further cues to convey an 
emotional message. Second, idiosyncratic ways of expressing emotions are part of an individual 
and hence should be designed into an agent. But the agent also has to do the best it can to help 
the user to get used to its expressive patterns, in particular if the user and the agent are to 
become companions for the long term, as in the relationship between a learner and an embodied 
pedagogical software agent in the role of fieldwork informant (cf. Chapter 16.2.2 and Chapter 
16.3.5.1.3), coach (cf. Chapter 16.2.3), or learning companion (cf. Chapter 16.2.4). 
Concerning what kinds of emotion should be expressed, the psychological literature 
identifies two general principles governing the expression of emotions in humans: hedonic 
preference and contextual appropriateness (Gong 2007). Hedonic preference means that people 
Table 24. Basic emotions described in terms of action units. Adapted from Pelachaud (2003, Table 4). 
Basic Emotion Action Units 
Anger AU2 + AU4 + AU5 + AU10 + AU20 + AU24 
Disgust AU4 + AU9 + AU10 + AU17 
Embarrassment AU12 + AU24 + AU51 + AU54 + AU64 
Fear AU1 + AU2 + AU4 + AU5 + AU7 + AU15 + AU20 + AU25 
Happiness AU6 + AU11 + AU12 + AU25 
Sadness AU1 + AU4 + AU7 + AU15 
Surprise AU1 + AU2 + AU5 + AU26 + rotate-jaw 
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generally prefer to perceive, experience, and express positive emotions over negative ones and 
therefore think that interaction partners displaying positive emotions are more attractive and 
appealing to work with (Gong 2007: 184). However, hedonic preference is constrained by the 
second principle, contextual appropriateness. That is, people usually adjust their emotional 
displays to make them appropriate for particular sociocultural contexts, following the display 
rules of their culture. Nass and Brave (2005) emphasized the importance of appropriateness of 
emotional tone for voices delivering different kinds of content. They argued that: 
In sum, paralinguistic cues like speed, pitch, and volume are integrated with the perceived 
meaning of spoken words into a single message. Matching a voice to the content is just as 
Table 25. The FACS facial action units. Adapted from Pelachaud (2003, Table 5). 
Action Unit Name Action Unit Name 
AU1 Inner Brow Raiser AU31 Jaw Clencher 
AU2 Outer Brow Raiser AU32 Lip Bite 
AU4 Brow Lowerer AU33 Cheek Blow 
AU5 Upper Lid Raiser AU34 Cheek Puff 
AU6 Cheek Raiser & Lid Compressor AU35 Cheek Suck 
AU7 Lid Tightener AU36 Tongue Bulge 
AU8 Lips Toward Each Other AU37 Lip Wipe 
AU9 Nose Wrinkler AU38 Nostril Dilator 
AU10 Upper Lip Raiser AU39 Nostril Compressor 
AU11 Nasolabial Furrow Deepener AU41 Lip Droop 
AU12 Lip Corner Puller AU42 Slit 
AU13 Sharp Lip Puller AU43 Eyes Closed 
AU14 Dimpler AU44 Squint 
AU15 Lip Corner Depressor AU45 Blink 
AU16 Lower Lip Depressor AU46 Wink 
AU17 Chin Raiser AU51 Head Turn Left 
AU18 Lip Pucker AU52 Head Turn Right 
AU19 Tongue Show AU53 Head Up 
AU20 Lip Stretcher AU54 Head Down 
AU21 Neck Tightener AU55 Head Tilt Left 
AU22 Lip Funneler AU56 Head Tilt Right 
AU23 Lip Tightener AU57 Head Forward 
AU24 Lip Presser AU58 Head Back 
AU25 Lips Part AU61 Eyes Turn Left 
AU26 Jaw Drop AU62 Eyes Turn Right 
AU27 Mouth Stretch AU63 Eyes Up 
AU28 Lip Suck AU64 Eyes Down 
AU29 Jaw Thrust AU65 Walleye 
AU30 Jaw Sideways AU66 Cross-eye 
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important, and may even be more important than matching the voice to the emotion of the user. 
(Nass & Brave 2005: 88).226 
For cases in which the emotion of the content, the user, or the voice-based interface is not 
detectable or present, Nass and Brave suggested a slightly happy voice as a default in order to 
take advantage of people’s hedonic preference (Nass & Brave 2005: 91). However, they also 
pointed out that expressions of anger or sadness tend to receive more attention and stick in the 
minds of the audience. Furthermore, cues of submissive emotions (e.g. sadness and fear) in the 
voice of a speaker are likely to increase the trust of listeners because they take these cues as 
indicators of the speaker being vulnerable and “opening up” to them (p. 92). 
Embodied agents are able to express basic emotions through the manipulation of vocal cues 
as well as using the Facial Action Coding System outlined above. However, they still fall short 
when it comes to adapting emotion expression to changes within and across contexts: 
[T]he state of technology today can easily enable agents including synthetic faces and speech to 
automatically generate effective positive or negative emotions. But it cannot yet automatically and 
reliably detect the emotional tone of the real-time interaction content and then correspondingly 
stipulate appropriate emotions to be displayed. In other words, without manual programming or 
simple and predictable scenarios, agents can easily fulfill the rule of hedonic preference but fall 
short in automatically meeting contextual appropriateness. (Gong 2007: 185). 
Gong (2007) conducted a study to investigate the question how far agents can go taking 
advantage of hedonic preference without achieving contextual appropriateness in emotion 
expression. A talking-head agent showing happy or sad emotional expressions presented novels 
with happy or sad content to the participants. Gong found that although neither ‘happy’ nor 
‘sad’ agents adapted their expression to the emotional tone of the books, the agent showing the 
positive emotion elicited more positive responses to the books, the book reviews, and the agent 
and the interface. Furthermore, the overall user experience was more positive when the agent 
                                              
226  It is also important to maintain consistency between the content of the verbal message of an 
embodied agent and its emotional facial expressions, as demonstrated by Berry et al. (2005). 
Table 26. Vocal cues of basic emotions. Adapted from Nass and Brave (2005: 95, Table 8.1.A). 
 Fear Anger Sadness Happiness Disgust 
Speech Rate Much faster Slightly faster Slightly 
slower 
Faster or 
slower 
Very much 
slower 
Pitch Average Very much 
higher 
Very much 
higher 
Slightly lower Much higher Very much 
lower 
Pitch Range Much wider Much wider Slightly 
narrower 
Much wider Slightly wider 
Intensity Normal Higher Lower Higher Lower 
Voice Quality Irregular 
voicing 
Breathy chest 
tone 
Resonant Breathy 
blaring 
Grumbled 
chest tone 
Pitch Changes Normal Abrupt on 
stressed 
syllables 
Downward 
inflections 
Smooth 
upward 
inflections 
Wide 
downward 
terminal 
inflections 
Articulation Precise Tense Slurring Normal Normal 
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appeared happy rather than sad. However, Gong was also careful to point out that “contextual 
appropriateness still appears necessary and important for achieving a satisfactory human-
computer interaction experience” (Gong 2007: 189), given that the means of most of the 
measures in the study were fairly low, indicating that users did not like neither the happy nor 
the sad non-adaptive agent too much.227 
13.5  Personality 
Apart from how they feel at the moment about particular events, actions, or objects in their 
environment, the cognition and social interaction of individuals is also influenced by the 
attributes that define them as a distinct person. Personality is the complex of psychological 
traits that describe the unique character of an individual (Hayes-Roth et al. 1997), accounting 
for consistently chosen patterns of behavior, emotion and thought over situations and time 
(Moffat 1997; Ball & Breese 2000). Personality and emotion are essentially the same 
mechanism; however, they differ in terms of duration and focus (Moffat 1997). Personality is 
persistent and resistant to change over a lifetime, and it has a less clear focus than emotion 
(Gratch et al. 2002). In contrast, emotions are both short-lived and focus on particular events, 
actions, or objects (Moffat 1997, cf. Figure 77).228 Personality influences how individuals 
interpret and respond to the environment, and it regulates their emotional state. Other things 
being equal, the behaviors of two individuals would show little difference were it not for 
differences in personality (Arnold 2003). 
Personality is an essential property of life-like artificial agents because it functions as a 
generative engine that is instrumental in achieving individual appropriateness of an agent’s 
emotional responses by contributing to their coherence, consistency, and predictability (Ortony 
2003: 201f.). An agent that is (or portrays) a particular kind of person is influenced by its 
personality to respond to different kinds of situations in certain kinds of ways. In other words, 
being a particular kind of person (partially) determines the agent’s behavior (p. 203).229 
                                              
227  Kim et al. (2007) found that pedagogical agents as learning companions (PALs) expressing positive 
emotions were perceived by learners as more facilitating to their learning, more engaging, and more 
intelligent. However, despite this demonstration of hedonic preference, Kim had previously made the 
case for contextual appropriateness by pointing out that “[t]o be effective, PAL affect should be tied 
to the learner’s affect when possible. Rather than being simply a ‘happy’ talking head, a PAL should 
respond to or deal with the learner’s affect and flexibly adapt its affect to the learner’s in order to 
motivate the learner” (Kim 2005). 
228  A third category, mood, lies between these two extremes. Moods do not have a specific focus but are 
experienced as more diffuse, global, and general. They tend to have a longer lasting influence on an 
individual’s cognitive strategies and processing (Brave & Nass 2003). 
229  Personality can thus be regarded as “the consistent expression of emotions” (Moffat 1997), and the 
personality of an agent can be created by building its emotional responses (Paiva et al. 1999). 
 
Figure 77. Personality, mood, and emotion on a scale from static to dynamic. Adapted from Egges et al. 
(2004, Figure 2). 
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Simple artificial personalities with a limited number of traits can be constructed trait by trait. 
However, with increasing diversity and complexity of traits and trait configurations, a more 
principled approach is required to create consistent and coherent personalities (Ortony 2003: 
202). Matters are simplified by the fact that traits cluster together (Isbister 2006: 35)230 and that 
two to five factors (depending on how they are grouped) are sufficient to describe the trait space 
(Ortony 2003: 203). Two popular five-factor models of personality (Wiggins 1996; John & 
Srivastava 1999) include the “Big Five” model (Digman 1990; Goldberg 1990; Goldberg & 
Saucier 1998) and the Revised NEO231 Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R), also referred to as 
the OCEAN model (Costa & McCrae 1992; McCrae & John 1992). Table 27 and Table 28 
show the sets of factors defined by these models. 
Embodied interactive agents project a personality both through how they portray themselves 
(using their face, body, and voice) and through what they do and how they do it. The design 
challenge involves creating a personality expression that uses all available communication 
channels to consistently and coherently convey the essence of a character using both verbal and 
non-verbal cues. Verbal cues include word choice, sentence types, fluidity of speech, ways of 
referring to other individuals, and use of indirect speech acts. Non-verbal cues include 
appearance (cf. Chapter 9.2), voice (cf. Chapter 10.1.1), gesture (cf. Chapter 10.1.2), facial 
features (cf. Chapter 10.1.3),232 posture (cf. Chapter 10.1.5), and gait (cf. Chapter 10.1.6). In 
addition, different personality types are commonly associated with certain patterns of behavior 
(e.g. cautiousness vs. daringness). People observe all these cues and use them to interpret the 
personality of others (Nass & Brave 2005: 33). For example, there are observable differences in 
appearance and behavior between extrovert and introvert individuals, which are listed in Table 
29. 
The term ‘personality’ originates from the Latin verb personare, which means “to sound 
through” (a mask worn by an actor on stage). In fact, voice characteristics tend to play a more 
important role in assessing the personality of others than content of speech (Nass & Brave 
2005: 33f.). Hence, it is not surprising that voice is one of the most effective ways to manifest a 
personality. Voices convey four types of cues that indicate personality (p. 34): 
• Volume (how loud the voice is); 
• Pitch (how high or low the voice is); 
• Pitch range (how much the voice varies between high and low frequencies); 
• Speech rate (how fast the person is speaking). 
Nass and Brave (2005: 34) argued that while each of these aspects provides information 
about the personality of the speaker on its own, in concert, they have an even greater effect on 
the listener’s judgment. For example, people are very likely to associate loudness, fast speech 
rate, high pitch, and wide pitch range with extroversion, whereas they would believe that a 
voice with the opposite characteristics belongs to an introvert person (cf. Table 29). Whatever 
the assessment will be, perceptions of personality in voice, looks, expression, and actions will 
                                              
230  For example, friendliness is often found together with generosity, outgoingness, warmth, sincerity, 
helpfulness, etc. in a person (Ortony 2003: 202). 
231  The acronym NEO consists of the initial letters of the original three factors in the model: 
neuroticism, extraversion, and openness. 
232  In faces, dominance is signaled by strong features, a raised head, and lowered eyebrows. In contrast, 
a tilted head and raised eyebrows suggest submissiveness. A friendly person has a rounded face and 
large eyes. Pointed features indicate a character that is both hostile and dominant (Nass & Brave 
2005: 139). 
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influence how a person feels and behaves with respect to other individuals. In particular, people 
will be drawn to others whose (voice) personality they perceive as similar to their own (cf. 
Chapter 10.1.1), perceiving them as more intelligent, trustworthy, and friendly, among other 
positive attributes (Nass & Brave 2005: 34).233 As a result, the voice personality of an embodied 
interactive software agent should be cast with care. When using synthetic speech (cf. Chapter 
11.1.2), the voice parameters relevant to personality (volume, pitch, pitch range, and speech 
rate) can be manipulated to induce different perceptions of personality (pp. 36ff.); however, 
designers should be careful to keep the personality projected by an agent’s voice consistent (cf. 
Chapter 7.5) with the one projected by the other aspects of the agent’s embodiment (cf. 
Chapter 9) and behavior (cf. Chapter 10). Nass and Brave argued that apart from similarity 
attraction, people exhibit consistency attraction with respect to personality. Whereas consistent 
personality cues guide people’s expectations of and behavior toward others (Nass & Brave 
2005: 33), perceived inconsistency of personality leads to feelings of confusion, uncertainty, 
and disturbance (p. 51). 
Assessing the user’s personality in order to adapt the agent’s projected personality may 
involve direct methods in which users are asked to answer questions about their personality, or 
indirect methods that are based on analysis (e.g. of user profiles), inference (e.g. inferring 
personality type from information about the user’s line of work), and user monitoring (Nass & 
Brave 2005: 40ff.). While visual cues of the user’s appearance and behavior are still difficult to 
recognize and interpret for machines in general (cf. Chapter 11.2), agents can more easily 
identify characteristics of the user’s voice to determine his or her personality. For cases in 
which the user’s personality cannot reliably be detected, Nass and Brave (2005) gave the 
general recommendation of using an extrovert voice in an interface, which is more expressive 
(higher volume, faster speech rate, and increased pitch variation) than an introvert voice and 
                                              
233  The principle of similarity attraction is only seemingly in conflict with the saying “Opposites attract.” 
As argued by Nass and Brave (2005: 35), similarity attraction is actually responsible for opposites 
eventually liking each other. People have been shown to like others whose personality changes from 
being dissimilar to being similar to their own more than they like individuals who have been like 
them from the beginning (Moon & Nass 1996). This happens because “imitation is flattery,” as 
another saying goes (Fogg & Nass 1997). 
Table 27. The “Big Five” model of personality. Adapted from Pettijohn (1998: 281). 
Factor Example Traits (Positive Dimension) 
Extroversion (or Surgency) vs. Introversion Sociable, talkative, active, bold, fun-loving, 
spontaneous, adventurous, enthusiastic, person-
oriented, assertive 
Agreeableness (or Friendliness) vs. Antagonism Warm, generous, trustful, courteous, agreeable, 
cooperative, flexible, forgiving, cheerful, humble 
Conscientiousness (or Dependability) vs. 
Negligence 
Conscientious, practical, cautious, serious, 
reliable, organized, careful, dependable, 
hardworking, ambitious 
Emotional Stability vs. Neuroticism Relaxed, peaceful, objective, calm, unemotional, 
even-tempered, secure, patient, uninhibited 
Openness (or Culture, Intellect) vs. Closed to 
New Experiences 
Original, imaginative, creative, perceptive, 
sophisticated, knowledgeable, cultured, artistic, 
curious, analytical, liberal 
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thus associated with predictability, which, in turn, is known to reduce listeners’ cognitive load 
(cf. Chapter 2.2.2) and make them feel more comfortable. In addition, an extrovert voice may 
be perceived as friendlier and may receive more attention (Nass & Brave 2005: 42). However, 
Nass and Brave mentioned one exception to this extroversion rule, which is relevant to the 
design of pedagogical agents: when the system (or agent) should be perceived as competent 
(rather than likeable, cf. Chapter 7.2), a voice with deeper-than-average pitch should be chosen 
(p. 42). 
Churchill et al. (2000: 80) proposed the following dimensions as a means to assess whether 
the design of the personality of an embodied interactive software agent is successful: 
• The lay personality psychologist test. The agent’s personality expression enables a human 
observer to create an informal description of the personality portrayed that provides a quite 
accurate picture of the agent’s personality as intended by its designers (cf. the relationship 
between design model, system image, and user’s model discussed in Chapter 6.3). 
Table 28. The Revised NEO Personality Inventory (OCEAN model) (Costa & McCrae 1992). 
Low Scorer Traits Factor/Description High Scorer Traits
Openness (O) 
Conventional, down to earth, 
narrow interests, unartistic, 
unanalytical 
Assesses proactive seeking and 
appreciation of experience for its 
own sake; toleration for and 
exploration of the unfamiliar 
Curious, broad interests, 
creative, original, 
imaginative, untraditional
Conscientiousness (C) 
Aimless, unreliable, lazy, 
careless, lax, negligent, weak-
willed, hedonistic 
Assesses the individual’s degree 
of organization, persistence and 
motivation in goal-directed 
behavior. Contrasts dependable, 
fastidious people with those who 
are lackadaisical and sloppy 
Organized, reliable, hard-
working, self-disciplined, 
punctual, scrupulous, neat, 
ambitious, persevering
Extroversion (E) 
Reserved, sober, aloof, task-
oriented, retiring, quiet 
Assesses quantity and intensity of 
interpersonal interaction, activity 
level, need for stimulation and 
capacity for joy 
Sociable, active, talkative, 
person-oriented, optimistic, 
fun-loving, affectionate
Agreeableness (A) 
Cynical, rude, suspicious, 
uncooperative, vengeful, 
ruthless, irritable, manipulative 
Assesses the quality of one’s 
interpersonal orientation along a 
continuum from compassion to 
antagonism in thoughts, feelings 
and actions 
Soft-hearted, good-natured, 
trusting, helpful, forgiving, 
gullible, straightforward
Neuroticism (N) 
Calm, relaxed, unemotional, 
hardy, secure, self-satisfied. 
Assesses adjustment vs. emotional 
instability. Identifies individuals 
prone to psychological distress, 
unrealistic ideas, excessive 
cravings or urges and maladaptive 
coping responses. 
Worrying, nervous, 
emotional, insecure, 
inadequate, hypochondriacal.
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• Shared traits. Different embodied interactive agents may share certain personality traits (cf. 
Chapter 16.3.5.2), but the traits may be more or less pronounced in each agent. 
• Consistency vs. variability. In general, the agent’s responses to external events should be 
consistent with its personality (cf. Chapter 7.5). However, individual behaviors may involve 
a certain degree of randomness and unpredictability. Furthermore, repetitions of the same 
event may trigger slightly varied behavioral responses (cf. Chapter 7.9). 
• Different reaction tendencies. The same event will elicit different responses from agents 
with different personalities. Human observers would explain the different behaviors in terms 
of the different personalities of the agents. 
• Perceptual filtering. Personality serves as a filter through which the agent perceives external 
events. For example, a submissive agent may especially watch out for and respond to threats. 
• Modified presentation of self. The agent can portray a modified personality expression in 
service of some goal. This change would be noticeable by an observer who knows the agent 
from previous encounters. 
• Adaptation. During interactions with users, the agent can subtly adapt its personality 
expression in response to the personality or changing needs of its interaction partner. 
13.6  Back-Story 
What distinguishes people from machines is that behind every person, there is a rich individual 
back-story, which has been written since the day of their birth. Back-stories go beyond 
biographical data (family, education, job, etc.) to include idiosyncratic experiences, insights, 
memories, stories, and views. The closer we get to know someone, the more we learn about 
these things, which help us to understand and appreciate that person and make us share similar 
items in return. This mutual disclosure of personal information gradually establishes a bond 
between people (cf. Chapter 7.16), which may develop into friendship or even love. 
Pedagogical agents should be designed to convey the impression of being an individual and 
to build relationships with learners. Both tasks are facilitated if the personality (cf. Section 
13.5) of an agent is enriched with a back-story. Having its own experiences, insights, and 
stories to share with the learner allows the agent to enhance its believability as a person and 
facilitates establishing some common ground with the learner upon which a relationship can be 
built. The back-story of an agent may also contain items which are relevant to the current 
Table 29. Perceived characteristics of extroverts vs. introverts. Compiled from Nass and Brave 
(2005: 33f.). 
Extroverts Introverts 
Charge into situations Proceed cautiously 
Talk more than they listen Listen more than they talk 
Speak loudly, rapidly, in a high pitch, and with 
a wide pitch range 
Speak softly, slowly, with a deep and monotone 
voice 
Use strong terms like definitely and absolutely Use more neutral words like perhaps and maybe 
Use many broad gestures Use fewer, tighter gestures 
Open their arms wide Hold their arms close to the side 
Hold their head erect Hold their heads down 
Tall and muscular Short and frail 
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instructional situation and can be contributed by the agent to add flexibility and depth to its 
instructional conversations with the learner (cf. Chapter 16.3.5.3). 
Writing the biography of another person is not an easy task, and it is even more difficult to 
invent the back-story of a synthetic agent which does not yet exist (and never will have an 
existence like a real person does). Striving for completeness is a hopeless endeavor because the 
description would soon lose itself in details. The writer needs to focus on creating a back-story 
that provides sufficient breadth and depth to support the agent’s pedagogical, believability-
enhancing, and interpersonal functions. The back-story should be internally organized in such a 
way that it is easy for the agent to relate the learner’s contributions to items of the story and to 
retrieve relevant items that can be shared with the learner. 
The story of a life is never finished until the person dies, so updating the back-story of an 
agent in a regular and timely fashion is an important issue. Again, it is not feasible to capture 
every small detail (unless the agent could be programmed to write its own life story), so the 
authors of back-stories have to make careful choices about what and when to update in order to 
maintain the illusion of a synthetic persona with a progressing life. 
13.7  Summary 
To become comfortable (in addition to useful and usable) for users, embodied interactive 
software agents should possess qualities that make them appear as emotionally intelligent 
individuals endowed with appealing and deep personalities. This chapter discussed the design 
of capabilities that allow agents to interpret, model, and adapt to the user’s emotional state; 
generate appropriate emotional states within themselves; communicate (‘genuine’ or pretended) 
emotions to the user; and portray a rich and appealing personality and back-story. 
To provide a background for this discussion, the nature of emotions was discussed in Section 
13.1. After clarifying what emotions are, Section 13.2 was concerned with their functions in 
cognitive processes and social interactions. Two types of functions were identified: cognitive 
(intra-agent) functions (cf. Section 13.2.1) mediate various cognitive processes in an agent, 
whereas social (inter-agent) functions (cf. Section 13.2.2) influence social interactions between 
agents. 
Equipped with the understanding of the nature and functions of emotions in humans, Section 
13.3 covered the modeling of emotion in computers. Communication-driven approaches (cf. 
Section 13.3.1) select emotional displays for agents which are useful to achieve communicative, 
social, or task-related goals. In contrast, simulation-based approaches (cf. Section 13.3.2) aim to 
give an agent ‘genuine’ emotions by modeling the internal cognitive processes that give rise to 
observable emotional behavior. Three simulation-based approaches to emotion modeling were 
discussed in Section 13.3: the appraisal-based OCC model (cf. Section 13.3.2.1), one of its 
extensions, the Emotion and Adaptation (EMA) model (cf. Section 13.3.2.2), and an alternative 
approach based on Bayesian networks (cf. Section 13.3.2.3). 
Section 13.4 was then concerned with emotional intelligence, i.e. the ability of an agent to 
recognize, interpret, predict, express, and manage emotions, moods, etc. within itself, the user, 
and other agents. Two component processes of emotional intelligence were discussed in this 
section: emotion interpretation (cf. Section 13.4.1), which infers the emotional state of the user, 
other agents, or the agent itself, and emotion expression (cf. Section 13.4.2), which generates 
emotional displays that are believable, easy to interpret, and observe the relevant display rules. 
The final two sections covered aspects that define an agent as a person set apart from others. 
Section 13.5 discussed the design of personality, i.e. the complex of persistent psychological 
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traits that characterize the agent as a unique individual. Two popular five-factor models of 
personality were presented (cf. Table 27 and Table 28), followed by a discussion of verbal and 
non-verbal cues for personality expression. Finally, section 13.6 argued that agents designed to 
convey the impression of an individual and to build relationships with users should be equipped 
with a rich, developing personal back-story that gives others an insight into their (scripted) 
lives. Writing the (ongoing) detailed back-story for an agent is a difficult task, so a number of 
suggestions were provided that may facilitate authoring these stories. 
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14 Architectures and Platforms 
Whereas the previous chapters were concerned with the design of the different components of 
embodied interactive software agents, the focus of this chapter is on their underlying technical 
framework. Section 14.1 reviews various architectures that have been proposed to implement 
the internal mechanisms responsible for determining the actions and future internal states of an 
agent given its sensor input, as well as the collaborative problem-solving behavior of multiple 
agents. 
Beyond the capability to act and solve problems, embodied interactive agents have to be able 
to generate believable behaviors in the context of real-time interactions with the user. Various 
approaches to behavior generation have been used for embodied agents, which provide different 
degrees of efficiency and flexibility as well as support for single or multiple characters. These 
approaches are discussed in Section 14.2. 
Furthermore, embodied interactive agents always operate in some kind of computational 
environment and are therefore constrained by that environment, in particular by the qualities 
and deficiencies of the underlying technical platform. Different platforms for software agents 
are compared in Section 14.3. Finally, Section 14.4 summarizes the chapter. 
14.1  Agent Architectures 
A key problem for agents situated in a particular environment which they can sense and act 
upon is how to decide which actions will be most effective in helping them to achieve their 
design objectives in their current situation (Wooldridge 1999: 30). Various software 
architectures for situated decision making have been proposed in the literature. These 
architectures define a collection of component modules and how these modules interact to 
determine the actions and future internal states of a software agent given its sensor input data, 
as well as how groups of agents cooperate to solve problems beyond their individual 
capabilities. The following subsections review architectures for different types of software 
agents, including deliberative, reactive, hybrid, blackboard, and multi-agent approaches. 
14.1.1  Deliberative Agents 
Deliberation is the process by which a software agent weighs and chooses between alternative 
courses of action to achieve its goals. As shown in Figure 78, deliberation involves coming up 
with a set of alternatives and then picking one of them. The agent may consider both ends and 
means, i.e. both whether to attempt to achieve some goal and how to achieve it (Logan 2008c). 
Deliberative agents have to maintain internal representations of both their environment and 
possible courses of action. Their reasoning processes manipulate these representations (rather 
than the environment) and produce descriptions of individual actions or action sequences to be 
carried out by the agent (Logan 2008c). Usually, these descriptions take the form of plans (cf. 
Chapter 12.1.3.3). Agents can generate plans to determine their future courses of action, by 
using a planning system with the following components (Jennings et al. 1998: 10f.): 
• A symbolic model of the agent’s environment (usually written in a manageable subset of 
first-order predicate logic, cf. Chapter 12.1.2.1); 
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• A symbolic specification of the agent’s inventory of actions (typically a set of plan operators 
with associated pre-conditions and effects); 
• A planning algorithm, which computes a plan (or program) for the agent to achieve some 
goal, using the elements above plus a representation of the desired goal state as input. 
Practical reasoning is a form of deliberation by which an agent decides on actions that serve 
to achieve its goals (cf. Chapter 12.1.3.4). The most widely used model of practical reasoning 
agents is the belief-desire-intention (BDI) model (Bratman et al. 1988; Georgeff et al. 1998; 
Wooldridge 2002: Chapter 4). The major components of a BDI agent are shown in Figure 79. 
They include (Wooldridge 1999: 57): 
• A belief revision function, which computes new beliefs for the agent on the basis of the 
agent’s perceptual input and its current beliefs; 
• A set of beliefs, i.e. the knowledge that the agent has about its current environment; 
• An option generation function, which identifies what options the agent has (i.e. its desires), 
based on its current beliefs and intentions; 
• A set of desires, i.e. current options representing courses of actions that the agent could take; 
• A filter function, i.e. the deliberation process which computes the agent’s intentions from its 
current beliefs, desires, and intentions; 
• A set of intentions, which represent the states of affairs that are the agent’s current focus, in 
other words, which the agent has committed to trying to achieve; 
• An action selection function, which decides what action to carry out given the agent’s 
current intentions. 
In general, deliberative agent architectures may be considered for applications in which 
mistakes made by agents are costly, and for implementing general procedures that solve whole 
classes of problems (rather than just one problem) (Logan 2008c). Their disadvantages include 
the difficulties of deriving accurate environment models and the high computational complexity 
of the underlying (planning) algorithms that makes real-time performance virtually impossible 
(Logan 2008d). 
14.1.2  Reactive Agents 
Deliberative agent architectures, like most work in artificial intelligence (AI) to date, are based 
on the symbol system hypothesis, which contends that intelligent behavior of machines can 
arise from the manipulation of structures composed of symbols representing objects or concepts 
 
Figure 78. The architecture of a deliberative software agent. Adapted from Logan (2008c). 
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in the world (cf. Chapter 12.1.2). Since the second half of the 1980s, a growing number of 
AI researchers have distanced themselves from the traditional (symbolic) approach to building 
intelligent systems (Brooks 1986; Agre & Chapman 1987; Brooks 1990; Brooks 1991) and 
have formulated their own assertions about the nature of intelligence (Jennings et al. 1998: 12; 
Wooldridge 1999: 48f.): 
• Intelligent behavior does not require explicit internal world models and complex deliberation 
processes. 
• Intelligent behavior arises from the interaction between agents and their environments. It is 
not a characteristic of expert systems, theorem provers,234 and other disembodied software 
systems that by the standards of traditional AI would be labeled ‘intelligent.’ 
• Intelligent behavior is an emergent product of the interaction of simpler behaviors. 
As an alternative to the symbol system hypothesis of ‘classical’ AI, the ‘nouvelle’ or 
‘fundamentalist’ AI movement proposed the physical grounding hypothesis, which states that 
“to build a system that is intelligent it is necessary to have its representations grounded in the 
physical world” (Brooks 1990). Physically-grounded AI systems manipulate and respond to the 
environment itself rather than work with an internal model of it, as symbol-based systems do 
(Sengers 1998: 5). Taking the stance that “the world is its own best model” (Brooks 1990), 
nouvelle AI creates systems which often lack an internal symbolic environment model (Nwana 
1996). A recurring theme in nouvelle AI is that of developing simple individual behaviors and 
combining them bottom-up into more complex behaviors, an idea that is at the heart of Brook’s 
well-known subsumption architecture for mobile robots (Brooks 1986; Brooks 1990; Brooks 
1991; Sengers 1998: 31f.; Russell & Norvig 2003: 932f.). Furthermore, intelligent systems 
typically are not regarded as disembodied entities but rather as situated (embedded) in some 
environment, connected to it via sensors and actuators (Brooks 1990; Sengers 1998: 6, cf. 
Chapter 3). Finally, because nouvelle AI systems tend to respond immediately to stimuli from 
the environment in which they are situated (Nwana 1996), without reasoning (too much) about 
its current state, they are sometimes called reactive (Wooldridge 1999: 49). 
Reactive agent architectures are based on the physical grounding hypothesis and the 
nouvelle AI paradigm (Nwana 1996). In simple reactive architectures (cf. Figure 80a), sensor 
inputs are directly mapped to actions by means of condition-action rules (if (sensor input) 
then action) (Logan 2008b, cf. Chapter 12.1.2.4). Multiple inputs may trigger multiple 
actions, which may be performed in parallel (cf. Figure 80b), may be combined to create one 
                                              
234  A theorem prover is a computer program for the automated proving (i.e. demonstrating the truth) of 
mathematical statements (or theorems) ([INT 159]). 
 
Figure 79. A generic belief-desire-intention architecture. Adapted from Wooldridge (1999: 32, 
Figure 1.5). 
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composite action (cf. Figure 80c), or one of the triggered actions is executed with priority over 
the others (cf. Figure 80d) (Logan 2008a). 
More complex reactive agents may additionally maintain an internal representation of their 
own state and/or the state of their environment (cf. Figure 80e), which enables them to select 
actions based on sequences of states, for example to respond to change or lack of it (cf. Figure 
80f) (Logan 2008b). Such agents additionally require rules that are triggered by the internal 
state as well as rules with the ability to modify the internal state (Logan 2008b). 
In principle, reactive agents maintaining internal state can generate any kind of behavioral 
response to sensor inputs in a timely fashion. However, both building complex internal models 
and reasoning about alternatives in problem solving are beyond the capabilities of these agents. 
Further problems concern the huge size of reactive agent programs for complex problems and 
the need to pre-specify all solutions to a given problem (Logan 2008b). 
 
Figure 80a. The architecture of a simple reactive 
software agent. Adapted from Logan (2008a). 
 
Figure 80b. Multiple parallel sensor inputs trigger 
parallel action outputs. Adapted from Logan 
(2008a). 
Figure 80c. Multiple triggered actions are 
combined into a single action output. Adapted 
from Logan (2008a). 
Figure 80d. One action output takes precedence 
over the other potential action outputs. Adapted 
from Logan (2008a). 
 
Figure 80e. A reactive agent architecture with a 
representation of internal state. Adapted from 
Logan (2008b). 
 
Figure 80f. A sensor input triggers a change of 
internal state, resulting in a modified internal state 
and an associated action output. Adapted from 
Logan (2008b). 
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14.1.3  Hybrid Agents 
There are many problems for which neither deliberative nor reactive agent architectures may be 
the most suitable approach, but where a combination of the two may succeed (Jennings et al. 
1998: 13; Sycara 1998: 82). Hence, interest in hybrid agent architectures has grown, which seek 
to combine the strengths of both paradigms by integrating deliberative and reactive components 
(Jennings et al. 1998: 13; Logan 2008e). 
Hybrid architectures are typically realized as a hierarchy of interacting software layers 
(Wooldridge 1999: 61), from lowest to highest, that process information about the environment 
at increasing levels of abstraction (Jennings et al. 1998: 13). Most hybrid agents use three layers 
(Sycara 1998: 82; Logan 2008e): 
• A reactive layer, which quickly decides on basic actions in response to raw sensor input; 
• A deliberative layer, which maintains a symbolic representation of the environment and 
determines and sequences actions for the reactive layer; 
• A social layer, which regulates the social aspects of the agent’s operation, in particular its 
coordination with other agents. 
The integration of the layers is a central concern for the design of hybrid agents because the 
layers may use different representations and operate over different timescales (e.g. (fractions of) 
seconds for the reactive layer vs. minutes to hours for the deliberative layer) (Logan 2008e). 
The control mechanism used can be hierarchical or concurrent in nature (Jennings et al. 1998: 
13; Logan 2008e): 
• Hierarchical control. Higher-level layers control the operation of lower-level layers. Only 
the lowest level can access sensor inputs and action outputs (cf. Figure 81a). 
• Concurrent control. The layers operate at the same time, as independent communicating 
processes. Sensor inputs and action outputs are accessible to all layers (cf. Figure 81b). 
14.1.4  Blackboard Agent Architectures 
In blackboard agent architectures (cf. Figure 82), multiple independent specialist agents 
(knowledge sources) cooperate to solve a problem, using a shared global workspace (the 
blackboard) for incrementally developing the solution, guided by a control component 
(Engelmore & Morgan 1988; Corkill 1991; Corkill 2003; [INT 160]). 
Problem solving starts with a problem and initial data on the blackboard (Corkill 1991). 
Each knowledge source agent has special knowledge and capabilities for solving certain 
portions of the overall problem (Neumann 2000). When an agent’s triggering condition is 
satisfied by information on the blackboard (usually events and/or data of a particular kind in 
which the agent is interested, generated by the agent itself or by other agents), the agent applies 
a filter to determine if this information allows it to make a contribution (Neumann 2000; Corkill 
2003). If that is the case, the information is read from the blackboard, processed within the 
agent’s body, and finally written back to the blackboard (Neumann 2000). In turn, this event 
triggers other agents, which likewise post their updates to the blackboard. This pattern is 
repeated until a solution is found ([INT 160]). A separate control agent manages the course of 
problem solving, selecting the next contributor(s) from a set of candidates based on the 
potential overall benefit of their contributions (Corkill 2003). 
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Blackboard architectures are suitable for ill-defined, complex problems involving diverse 
knowledge representations, problem-solving techniques, and developers ([INT 160]). They 
divide expertise into independent agents, which may use different technologies and can be 
easily added, modified, or removed from the system (Corkill 2003). The blackboard can 
represent any information; however, a common interaction language is required (Corkill 1991). 
14.1.5  Multi-Agent Systems 
Multi-agent systems originate from research on distributed artificial intelligence.235 A multi-
agent system (MAS) consists of a network of multiple interacting agents situated in the same 
environment (cf. Figure 83) that collaboratively solve problems which cannot be solved by the 
individual agents on their own (Stone & Veloso 1997; Sycara 1998; Weiss 1999; Wooldridge 
2002; Vlassis 2007). Multi-agent systems have the following properties (Sycara 1998: 80): 
• The agents in MASs are autonomous and may be of different types. 
• The agents are designed to interact with one another, which involves cooperation (to achieve 
common goals), competition (to achieve individual goals at the expense of other agents), and 
negotiation (to resolve conflicts and to reach joint decisions). 
• Individual agents in the network do not see the whole picture because they lack complete 
information or capabilities. 
• Control and data are decentralized (i.e. distributed over the component agents). 
• Computation is asynchronous (i.e. not happening at the same time). 
Recent years have seen an increasing interest in multi-agent systems. This is mainly due to 
the following reasons (Sycara 1998: 80): 
                                              
235  Distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) is the subbranch of artificial intelligence that studies, builds, 
and applies systems consisting of several intelligent problem-solving entities that interact to achieve 
goals or perform tasks (Huhns 1987; Gasser 1989; Hewitt & Inman 1991). DAI has been largely 
supplanted by the field of multi-agent systems. 
 
Figure 81a. Hybrid agent architecture with 
hierarchical control. Adapted from Logan 
(2008e). 
 
Figure 81b. Hybrid agent architecture with 
concurrent control. Adapted from Logan (2008e). 
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• Some application domains (e.g. meeting scheduling, air-traffic control, multi-agent 
bargaining for buying and selling goods on the Internet) require a multi-agent approach, in 
particular if they involve different people or organizations with different (possibly 
conflicting) goals and proprietary information. 
• Multi-agent systems can solve problems that exceed the resources of a centralized agent or 
involve unacceptable risks of performance problems or failure if a single agent tried to deal 
with them on its own. 
• Multi-agent systems can incorporate legacy systems (i.e. software systems that are important 
for an organization and have been in use for a long time), for example by placing the legacy 
software in an agent wrapper. 
• Multi-agent systems can provide solutions in situations with distributed information sources 
(e.g. sensor networks, seismic monitoring, web-based information retrieval, etc.), expertise 
(e.g. health care, manufacturing, etc.), or control. 
• A multi-agent approach can enhance the following aspects of system performance: 
• Efficiency. Multi-agent systems can speed up operation by assigning different tasks to 
different agents that operate concurrently. 
• Reliability. Multi-agent systems can effectively compensate for the failure of individual 
components by dynamically deploying free agent capacities. 
• Extensibility. It is possible to assign more and different agents to work on a problem. 
• Robustness. Multi-agents systems have the ability to compensate for uncertainty through 
information exchange between agents. 
• Maintainability. Components (agents) can be easily enhanced or replaced without 
affecting the others. 
• Responsiveness. Anomalies are handled locally and do not affect the entire system. 
• Flexibility. For different problems, agents can adaptively form teams that combine 
different capabilities. 
• Reuse. Agents with specific talents can find employment in different agent teams. 
• Multi-agent systems provide a way to study intelligence by looking at the social behavior of 
societies of agents. 
 
Figure 82. The blackboard agent architecture. Adapted from Corkill (1991, Figure 1) and Neumann 
(2000). 
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While a promising concept, multi-agent systems may be difficult to design since the 
following issues, among others, need to be considered (Jennings et al. 1998: 17f.; Sycara 1998: 
81; Vlassis 2007: 5): 
• How to specify, decompose, and allocate problems for groups of agents and generate results 
from their interaction; 
• How to enable inter-agent communication and with which languages and protocols; how to 
decide on the contents and timing of communication; 
• How to enable each agent to model the actions, goals, and knowledge of its agent interaction 
partners; 
• How to enable members of agent teams to represent and reason about the state of their 
coordinated problem solving; 
• How to enable agents to identify and handle conflicts within and between groups of agents; 
• How to enable negotiating and contracting among agents; 
• How to reduce the danger or impact of harmful (chaotic or oscillatory) system behavior; 
• How to form and dissolve teams, coalitions, and other structures that effectively accomplish 
assigned tasks or achieve specific goals. 
In contrast to single-agent systems, the agents in a multi-agent system have to model each 
other’s actions, goals, and knowledge (Stone & Veloso 1997). Coordination in multi-agent 
systems is achieved either by direct communication (i.e. managed by the agents themselves) or 
by assisted coordination (i.e. with the help of special facilitator components), with the agents 
exchanging messages in a common agent communication language (ACL) (Genesereth & 
Ketchpel 1994). Such a shared lingua franca is essential if the agents in a multi-agent system 
are heterogeneous (Sycara 1998: 87). It consists of (Wooldridge 2002: Chapter 8): 
• A common communication protocol defining the syntax of messages. For example, the 
Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language (KQML) (Finin et al. 1994; Finin et al. 1997) 
provides such a standardized syntax, plus a set of performatives (e.g. ‘tell,’ ‘perform,’ and 
 
Figure 83. The architecture of a multi-agent system. Adapted from Stone and Veloso (1997, Figure 3). 
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‘reply’) that indicate the communicative force of messages (Wooldridge & Jennings 1995: 
128). 
• A common interchange format for message content. For example, the Knowledge 
Interchange Format (KIF) (Genesereth & Fikes 1992) provides a syntax based on predicate 
logic for specifying the content of messages (Wooldridge & Jennings 1995: 128). 
• A set of shared ontologies, which define the entities, processes, etc. in the environment and 
how they relate to each other (cf. Chapter 12.1.2.5). 
14.2  Behavior Generation 
Beyond the capability to act and solve problems, embodied interactive software agents require 
the ability to generate coordinated verbal and non-verbal behaviors in the context of real-time 
human-agent interactions, which facilitate communication with the user, enhance the agent’s 
believability, and help to establish human-agent relationships (cf. Chapter 10). The majority of 
current systems involving embodied interactive agents follow the mind-body dichotomy by 
distinguishing between an agent’s embodiment and a higher level of behavior control (Rist 
2004: 463). Technically, this distinction is often implemented as follows: 
• Embodiment. An animation engine, often coupled with a speech synthesis system (cf. 
Chapter 11.1.2), generates the agent’s digital representation (its embodiment, cf. Chapter 9), 
delivers the animations that portray the agent’s visible behaviors, and produces the verbal 
utterances (spoken or written) that communicate the agent’s messages. The component of an 
embodied interactive agent that is concerned with animation rendering and speech synthesis 
is often called the character player (cf. Chapter 3.3). Examples of freely available character 
player technologies include the Adobe (once Macromedia) Flash Player ([INT 161]), 
Microsoft Agent ([INT 162]),236 and Cantoche Living Actor ([INT 163]). 
• Behavior control. A behavior generation module formulates temporally ordered sequences of 
behaviors (gestures, gaze, facial expressions, postures, locomotion, spoken utterances, and 
bodily interactions with other actors and objects in the environment) in order to achieve 
communicative or task-related goals, often using planning (cf. Chapter 12.1.3.3) or other 
techniques from artificial intelligence or simulating aspects of human cognition. Behaviors 
have to be believable (cf. Chapter 3.1.3) and must be generated in real time. The output of 
the behavior generation component is a script237 that is executed by the character player to 
produce observable behaviors performed by the agent persona (Rist 2004: 463). 
Various approaches to behavior generation have been used in embodied interactive software 
agents, which provide different degrees of efficiency and flexibility as well as support for single 
or multiple characters. The following subsections discuss the most important architectures, 
including behavior sequencing, layered generation, state machine compilation, and multi-
character systems. 
                                              
236  As of May 2009, Microsoft has stopped developing and supporting the Microsoft Agent technology 
([INT 162]). 
237  Scripts define temporally ordered sequences of actions to be performed by an agent persona in order 
to realize communicative behaviors toward the user and other agents as well as bodily interactions 
with the agent’s environment (Rist 2004: 463). Behavior can be scripted at different levels of 
granularity, ranging from low-level animation or voice commands to high-level specifications of 
complete activities that are hierarchically decomposed into a series of lower-level actions. 
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14.2.1  Behavior Sequencing 
In the behavior sequencing approach (Stone & Lester 1996; Lester et al. 1999b; Lester et al. 
2000; Lester et al. 2001), agent behaviors are composed from a library of pre-recorded 
primitive animations, sounds, and speech elements. These primitive elements are organized into 
a behavior space (cf. Figure 84), which is structured to assist in selecting and assembling agent 
behaviors that are aurally, visually, and semantically coherent (Stone & Lester 1996).238 
At run time, a behavior sequencing engine selects elementary agent behaviors, audio clips of 
the agent’s utterances, and other media elements from the behavior space and assembles them 
dynamically, constructing coherent paths through the behavior space in real time (Lester et al. 
2001: 274f.). Variants of this approach are used by many embodied pedagogical agents, such as 
Vincent (Paiva & Machado 1998; Paiva & Machado 2002), Adele (Shaw et al. 1999; Johnson et 
al. 2003a, cf. Figure 17a), Herman (Lester et al. 1999a; Lester et al. 2001), and Cosmo (Lester 
et al. 1999b; Lester et al. 2001, cf. Figure 17c). 
Behavior sequencing is appropriate for applications with a fixed camera position. 
Assembling behaviors out of prerecorded segments saves time and can produce high-quality 
animated behaviors, provided that the segments are created by expert animators (Johnson 
1998). The major shortcoming of behavior sequencing is its inability to adapt behavior 
sequences to users’ actions in real time. A single action of the user performed during the 
execution of a behavior sequence can render the whole sequence inadequate. Furthermore, 
creating a coherently structured behavior space is a complex, labor-intensive task (Johnson et 
al. 2000), which requires human resources with multiple talents (cf. Chapter 7.12). 
14.2.2  Layered Generation 
In contrast to behavior sequencing, the layered generation approach (Johnson et al. 1998; 
Rickel & Johnson 1999; Rickel & Johnson 2000) creates animated behaviors in real time rather 
than assembling them from a collection of pre-crafted multimedia elements. The architecture 
used consists of two layers: a cognitive decision-making layer and a perceptual-motor layer 
(cf. Figure 85). 
From the various events occurring in the environment, the perception module identifies those 
that are relevant to the agent in order to provide a coherent view of the state of the environment 
to the cognition module. The task of the cognition module is to interpret the information 
provided by the perception module and, based on the agent’s goals and internal state, to decide 
on the agent’s next actions. It outputs high-level commands to the motor control component, 
which decomposes them into a series of lower-level motor commands that eventually produce 
animated and verbal agent behaviors in the environment (Rickel & Johnson 2000: 105f.). 
The main advantage of the layered generation approach is the clear separation between agent 
decision making and the modules for sensing and motor control. Furthermore, a library of pre-
fabricated primitive animations is not required; the agent’s behaviors can be rendered on the fly 
using well-defined rules and can be flexibly controlled with motor commands down to the small 
details even while they are being executed, in particular to adapt the sequence of behaviors to 
some unforeseen changes in the environment (Rickel & Johnson 1999). The chief disadvantage 
                                              
238  The original publications on the topic wrote “pedagogically coherent” instead, but that expression 
seemed to be too specific in the context of the present discussion. 
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of the layered generative approach is the increased amount of rendering computation required 
to create agent behaviors. Furthermore, the quality of the automatically generated animations is 
usually lower than the quality of animations created by human animators (Johnson et al. 2000). 
14.2.3  State Machine Compilation 
The state machine compilation approach (André et al. 1999b) seeks to achieve real-time 
adaptation of agent behavior at acceptable computational costs. The embodied agent acts as a 
presenter of multimedia information, using a combination of speech and gestures to refer to 
elements of the presentation. 
The architecture of the presentation engine is shown in Figure 86. The approach taken is 
similar to behavior sequencing in that behaviors are composed from elementary agent postures 
that correspond to a single animation frame or an uninterruptible image sequence. However, the 
major difference is that for efficiency, behaviors are compiled into a state machine (the 
behavior monitor) that executes them at run time (Johnson et al. 2000: 73), combining planned 
presentation actions with unplanned self-behaviors, such as idle-time actions (e.g. breathing, toe 
tapping) and reactive behaviors (e.g. hanging suspended when the user drags the agent with the 
mouse), in order to adapt to users’ actions and to increase believability (cf. Chapter 10.2) 
(Johnson et al. 2000: 69). 
 
Figure 84. An overview of behavior sequencing showing the behavior space, the behavior sequencing 
engine, and the assembled behavior sequence. Adapted from Lester et al. (2001: 274, Figure 2). 
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The state machine defines a space of possible agent behaviors. A presentation plan specifies 
the set of presentation actions to be performed plus a schedule for performing them. At run 
time, the agent gives its presentation following the preliminary schedule. When the behavior 
monitor carries out additional actions, the schedule may have to be updated, observing the 
constraints imposed by the presentation plan. The agent is thus able to perform sequences of 
actions that are both adaptive and interruptible but still as coherent as possible (Johnson et al. 
2000: 69). 
14.2.4  Multi-Character Systems 
Multi-character systems (Rist et al. 2003; Rist et al. 2004) script and coordinate the behavior 
and interaction among and between multiple animated characters and human users. The 
MIAU239 platform (Rist et al. 2003) is a multi-agent architecture (cf. Section 14.1.5) that is 
tailored to applications involving multiple characters (and users) in different conversational 
settings ranging from non-interactive presentations involving a single user and a single agent to 
multi-party multi-threaded conversations (see Chapter 12.3.12 for a discussion of the different 
scenarios). The elements of the MIAU platform are shown in Figure 87. They include a set of 
character components, a director component, and a user component. 
Each character component C1, …, Cn controls an animated character and consists of a 
behavior planner and an interaction manager. The behavior planner decomposes complex 
discourse goals into basic acts for execution by the character player. The interaction manager 
keeps track of the interaction state and maintains a history of the interaction. It also handles the 
internal communication with other components by means of formalized communication acts 
that are exchanged through the shared message board (Rist et al. 2003). 
The director component D controls the interactive performance as a whole. It contains a 
narration planner module which shapes the course of the performance. Different interaction 
styles are realized by (dynamically) shifting control between the director component and the 
                                              
239  MIAU is obviously an acronym, but unfortunately, none of the publications reviewed spelled it out. 
 
Figure 85. The layered behavior generation architecture. Adapted from Rickel and Johnson (2000: 106, 
Figure 4.5). 
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character components. For example, the director may script all actions for the individual 
characters in detail, or the characters may have greater autonomy and the director intervenes 
only from time to time to increase coherence, introduce new topics, etc. The MIAU platform 
can flexibly switch between different conversational settings (character monologue, character 
dialogue, multi-character performances, and (multi-) character performances with user 
interaction) by adding and removing characters and avatars (representing the user, cf. Chapter 
3.1.4) in the course of a performance (Rist et al. 2004: 393). The interaction manager handles 
the exchange of messages with other modules via the message board. 
The user component U allows for user intervention, enabling the user to become an active 
participant in a character performance, for example by asking the participants questions, and 
even to influence the performance as a director or co-director (Rist et al. 2004: 392). The input 
analyzer maps from user inputs to internal communication acts. Input activity may be indicated 
by the user’s avatar. For example, the avatar may speak the user’s typed input (Rist et al. 2003). 
Again, the interaction manager handles internal communication. While Figure 87 shows a 
single user component, the architecture can be extended to support multi-user multi-character 
scenarios by increasing the number of user components (Rist et al. 2004: 393). 
The major advantage of multi-character platforms like MIAU is the flexibility which they 
add to applications involving one or several embodied agent presenters. They can be used to 
implement a wide range of scenarios ranging from traditional single-presenter non-interactive 
presentations to multi-party multi-threaded conversations. In addition, MIAU allows dynamic 
switching between conversational settings or between director- and character-centered scripting 
approaches during a session. A third advantage of MIAU’s architecture is that it separates the 
specification of scripting knowledge from the design of the computational mechanisms for 
behavior generation; in other words, there is a clear distinction between knowledge engineering 
(cf. Chapter 12.1.1.1) and implementation (Rist et al. 2004: 401). 
However, multi-character systems also involve a number of issues. The scenarios envisioned 
for these systems become more and more complex as the number and interaction possibilities of 
characters and users involved increases. Scripting the interactions among several animated 
characters already involves considerable challenges with respect to creating, maintaining, and 
extending the structure and content of exchanges because manually pre-authored scripts may 
have to be integrated with scripts that are automatically generated at run-time, and different 
types of conversations between the virtual performers (e.g. ‘on-duty’ vs. ‘off-duty’) have to be 
supported (Gebhard et al. 2003). But the situation becomes even more difficult when the human 
user is allowed to participate in the performance, especially if he or she is to be given the 
freedom of expression that she has in natural face-to-face conversations, i.e. to combine verbal 
 
Figure 86. The architecture of the presenter engine. Adapted from André et al. (1999a, Figure 12). 
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and non-verbal modes of communication. The capacity for unrestricted natural language (or 
even multimodal) conversations between users and agents, while highly desirable, will remain 
unattainable for years to come, although various more restricted (embodied) conversational 
agents have become feasible (cf. Chapter 11.3). In the most ambitious setting, multi-party 
multi-threaded conversations, where several users and several characters can interact among 
themselves and with each other, the major challenge is to keep the performance on track while 
allowing the participants to interact freely (Rist et al. 2004: 378). In addition, the system must 
be able to follow the different threads of conversation and detect where they overlap. Further 
difficulties arise from the shortcomings of the technologies required to recognize and interpret 
what the human participants say to each other (p. 379). 
Van Deemter et al. described a multi-character system that automatically generates whole 
scripted multimodal dialogues which are acted out by a cast of embodied conversational agents 
using combinations of text, expressive speech, and non-verbal communicative behaviors (van 
Deemter et al. 2008). In these character performances, the virtual actors have to play their parts 
in the dialogue convincingly, which includes the expression of different emotions (cf. Chapter 
13.4.2). For this, the actors do not have to be equipped with the ability to interpret (spoken) 
language because their exchanges are pre-determined by a script that is (semi-) automatically 
produced from a high-level parameter specification;240 however, their acting should create and 
maintain the illusion that they understand and respond to each other both at the conversational 
and at the affective level (van Deemter et al. 2008, cf. Chapter 16.3.3). Each generated dialogue 
should be (slightly) different from all others; in other words, the generation process should 
provide for variability (cf. Chapter 7.9) at all levels (van Deemter et al. 2008). 
In the system described by van Deemter et al., a script for the scene to be performed by the 
virtual actors is generated first, which specifies the semantic and affective content of the 
dialogue and its organization as an XML (cf. Footnote 182) document that is written in the Rich 
Representation Language (RRL) (Piwek et al. 2002). This high-level scene description becomes 
more and more detailed in the following processing stages that generate appropriate and 
coordinated language, emotionally inflected speech, and non-verbal behaviors for the virtual 
actors participating in the dialogue. Van Deemter et al. stressed the incremental nature of their 
architecture, which never discards information but only adds more at each stage, thus allowing 
later stages to make use of all the information added so far (van Deemter et al. 2008). 
                                              
240  It should be noted that the situation changes as soon as the user is allowed to join the conversation. 
The course of the dialogue is then no longer predictable, and the system also has to deal with the 
user’s linguistic inputs (cf. Chapter 12.3.12 and Chapter 16.3.4). 
 
Figure 87. The MIAU multi-character platform. Adapted from Rist et al. (2004: 393, Figure 9). 
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14.3  Technical Platforms 
The technical platform of a software agent is the specific configuration of hardware and 
software components providing the framework for the agent’s operation and the user’s 
experience. It may consist of computers, networks, input and output devices, system and 
application software. All these components have their own capabilities and limitations and 
interact in complex ways. 
Software agents have been developed for a variety of technical platforms, including desktop 
computers, the World Wide Web, virtual reality simulations, and mobile devices. These 
platforms are discussed in the following sections. 
14.3.1  Desktop Computers 
A desktop computer is a stand-alone personal computer designed for use by an individual user 
in a home or work environment. It may be connected to other computers through the Internet or 
some other computer network, but it does not depend on a network connection for its operation. 
It typically runs an operating system from Microsoft’s Windows ([INT 164]) or Apple’s 
MacOS family ([INT 165]), or an open source operating system like Linux ([INT 166]). Typical 
application software used on desktop computers includes office suites, web browsers, e-mail 
clients, and computer games. Today, desktop computers are increasingly complemented or 
replaced by laptop computers, i.e. small portable all-in-one computers explicitly designed for 
mobile use, which essentially have the same components and capabilities as desktop computers 
but offer users the advantage of mobility, whereas a desktop computer cannot easily be moved 
from one workplace to another. 
Software agents embedded in a desktop computing environment perform tasks defined and 
enabled by the software on that computer for a well-defined range of users, i.e. those users 
having access to the computer system (and the agent). They may be part of a particular piece of 
software (e.g. for learning or entertainment) or their responsibilities may span multiple 
applications and/or system programs (cf. Chapter 3.2.5). 
All components of a desktop agent run on the local computer and can take full advantage of 
its processing, storage, multimedia, and networking capabilities. The agent may be installed as 
a complete package, without the need to worry about missing plug-ins or function libraries. As 
a result, it is possible to equip the agent with advanced features, such as speech recognition (cf. 
Chapter 11.1.1) and speech synthesis (cf. Chapter 11.1.2). 
However, developers usually have to provide implementations of their agents for different 
desktop platforms and may have to deal with compatibility issues involving software already 
running on the user’s computer. Furthermore, there will not be one central but rather multiple 
distributed installations of an agent system on different hardware and software configurations, 
which might be difficult to debug and maintain (although desktop computers with an Internet 
connection can automatically receive updates online). 
14.3.2  World Wide Web 
The World Wide Web is a service for accessing and disseminating information that operates 
over the Internet, a massive global networking infrastructure connecting millions of computers. 
At the technical level, the World Wide Web is a client/server system, i.e. a networked system in 
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which requesters (clients) and providers (servers) of services communicate over the underlying 
network(s) using request-response pairs as defined by the Hypertext Transfer (HTTP) protocol. 
In this network, processing is distributed among clients and servers. A number of issues need to 
be addressed when integrating software agents into web-based environments, which are 
discussed in the following. 
14.3.2.1 Network Latencies 
The most severe technical problem of integrating agents into web-based environments is to find 
workarounds for the slow response times of the World Wide Web. From face-to-face 
interactions in the real world, users will expect a web-based agent to be able to respond in 
(near) real time to a continuous stream of actions rather than discrete request-response pairs 
(Johnson et al. 2000: 73). Tolerance for delays caused by waiting for a server to create agent 
behavior in response to a user’s action will usually be minimal. In addition, the agent may have 
to coordinate the activities of multiple agents and users on different clients, for example in a 
collaborative activity such as a team training scenario (p. 73). 
Network latencies can be dealt with by finding an appropriate distribution of agent 
components between server and clients: 
• Modules implementing the agent’s persona and behaviors (both reactive and proactive) 
should run on the client or a dedicated server. 
• The agent’s domain knowledge (cf. Chapter 12.1) and user models (cf. Chapter 12.2.1) 
should remain on a central server. Relevant parts can be downloaded to the local client and 
processed locally by lightweight components. 
• It is essential to maintain a balance between the workload of the client, the server, and the 
network that connects them. 
14.3.2.2 Performance 
Apart from the network connecting clients and servers, the performance of the computers in the 
network themselves, i.e. of the user’s computer and the server machines, constitute another 
bottleneck. While necessary upgrades can be fairly easily performed on the servers (subject to 
technical and monetary restrictions), developers generally cannot control what hardware people 
buy and use. Consequently, the agent will have to perform reasonably well on a wide range of 
client machines with different processing, storage, multimedia, and networking capabilities. 
This constraint affects in particular the rendering of agent embodiments and their behaviors (cf. 
Chapter 9 and Chapter 10). High-quality animations of dynamically generated agent behaviors 
depend on powerful processors and graphics accelerators (Johnson et al. 2000: 72). 
Given the heterogeneity of client computers, compromises are inevitable. For example, 
instead of creating agent behaviors dynamically, it may be more feasible to assemble them from 
pre-crafted elements (cf. Section 14.2). Another possibility is to adapt the range and detail of 
the agent’s animations to the capabilities of particular platforms (Johnson et al. 2000: 72). Care 
has to be taken, though, that downgrading the agent impairs neither its believability nor its task-
related and social functions (cf. Chapter 8.4). 
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14.3.2.3 Technologies 
Integration and interoperation of a software agent with a web-based environment is facilitated if 
both make use of the same technologies to implement appearance and functionality. The major 
responsibility of client-side technologies is to create the appearance and behaviors of the web-
based agent and to handle the interaction with the user. The following technologies are 
available in many current web browsers to implement the agent-user interface: 
• Adobe Flash/Shockwave ([INT 161]) for agent appearance and animation; 
• HTML ([INT 167]) for embedding the agent in web pages; 
• JavaScript ([INT 168]) for interaction with users and the environment; 
• Java ([INT 169]) for aspects of the agent that require more complex processing. 
As a general recommendation, developers should refrain from relying on special software 
components (plug-ins) to make their agent work in the web-based environment. Any additional 
software which the user has to install is a potential source of error and an obstacle to working 
with the environment and the agent. Instead, the agent should run in a web browser equipped 
with just the common components, including those listed above. In general, relying on standard 
web technologies avoids the plug-in problem and facilitates integration and interoperability.241 
Lightweight processing components (applets, modularization) and formats (e.g. vector-based 
graphics) as well as streaming242 help to minimize the load of the network connection and the 
client computer. 
On the server, a collection of scripts and/or programs is required to manage those aspects of 
the agent and the environment that have been allocated to a central server, plus a database 
system to store information about the agent, the environment, and the users in a central place. 
Server-side components can be written in any programming language. A number of scripting 
languages and relational database systems are freely available and thus provide cost-efficient 
options to implement server-side processing for web-based environments with embedded 
software agents. 
14.3.3  Virtual Reality 
Virtual reality (VR) is a computer-generated, interactive, graphical (usually three-dimensional), 
or multisensory simulation of some environment (Rheingold 1991; Burdea & Coiffet 2003). 
The simulated environment may be similar to the real world (e.g. simulations for pilot or 
combat training), or it can differ significantly from reality, as in VR computer games. 
Most current virtual reality experiences are created by desktop VR systems, which display the 
virtual environment on a conventional computer screen, now typically including sound through 
speakers or headphones and using standard input devices, such as a keyboard, mouse, and 
joystick. Limited tactile, haptic force feedback may also be available (cf. Chapter 1.2). 
                                              
241  However, this also means that agent development has to work around the various limitations of the 
standard web technologies, which would be less of a problem if a custom agent plug-in were used. 
242  Streaming transfers data in such a way that it can be displayed or otherwise processed continuously 
by the recipient while it is being transmitted. On the World Wide Web, streaming is typically used 
for audio, video, and other kinds of high-volume data. 
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In contrast, immersive VR systems move the user’s viewpoint completely into the virtual 
world. Head-mounted displays give the user the impression of being embedded (or immersed) 
in this world. Interaction with the environment usually involves the use of manual input devices 
like data gloves. 
Integrating embodied interactive agents into virtual reality simulations requires addressing a 
number of technical issues: 
• Virtual reality is a demanding technology in terms of processing speed and graphical 
rendering capabilities. Complex, high-fidelity agents and environments may not be feasible 
on the user’s computer. The implementation must be able to reduce detail levels and 
complexity gracefully to maintain the user’s experience while adapting to the capabilities of 
his or her hardware and software. 
• The size of the computer screen or the field of view of the head-mounted display limits what 
the user can see of a virtual environment. As the user moves closer to particular objects in 
order to manipulate them, they may lose sight of a fully embodied agent, or the agent’s body 
may block their view. Therefore, agents in virtual environments must be able to move out of 
or into the user’s field of view (cf. Chapter 10.1.6) or switch to an alternative embodiment 
(cf. Chapter 9.7) (Johnson et al. 1998). 
• The agent needs to monitor the user’s activities in the virtual world (cf. Chapter 4.2). In 
immersive VR systems, it is easier for the agent to locate users and determine what they are 
doing, where they are looking, etc. because that information is provided by the VR system 
itself. In contrast, desktop VR systems require additional devices (cameras, microphones, 
pressure sensors, etc.) to monitor the user. 
• Agents immersed in virtual reality environments must enable multimodal interaction with 
the user (cf. Chapter 11). They have to be able to interpret combined user input modes 
(speech, gesture, etc.) and to effectively control their own virtual body (e.g. gaze/point at or 
manipulate objects). Agent development should consider that some input technologies (e.g. 
keyboard and mouse) are more advanced than others (e.g. face and gesture recognition), and 
enable the agent to flexibly use the most effective combination (cf. Chapter 11.2). 
• Virtual environments may be populated by many human users and agents. The architecture 
of an agent must be designed in such a way that the agent is aware of and can coordinate the 
activities of multiple human and artificial participants in the virtual world. This presupposes 
the ability to distinguish between humans and agents, which may portray themselves in 
similar ways. 
14.3.4  Mobile Devices 
Mobile devices are pocket-sized computers that have become very popular as a convenient tool 
for people to store, organize, and access information, to entertain themselves, and to 
communicate with others anytime and anywhere. The reason for the ubiquity of these devices 
lies in the importance that people place on constant access to information, entertainment, and 
communication both in their professional and their private lives. Examples of mobile devices 
include cell phones, personal digital assistants, digital media players, and handheld game 
consoles. 
Software agents can be embedded in mobile devices to manage calendars, access e-mail and 
voice mail, search the World Wide Web, select music and video clips, serve as an answering 
machine, play adversaries in computer games, etc. The implementation of agents for mobile 
devices needs to consider the following limitations of these artifacts (Chittaro 2006: 40): 
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• Mobile devices have smaller displays with lower resolution and fewer colors than the 
screens of desktop computers. As a result, the agent’s embodiment has to be smaller and 
simpler. On devices with a very small display or none at all, it may not even be possible to 
use a body.243 
• Keyboards are scaled down due to size limitations. Mobile devices therefore increasingly use 
pen-based or voice-based input, either as a complement or as a replacement for keyboards. 
Hence, the agent must be prepared to handle multimodal input, including voice and gesture 
(cf. Chapter 11.2). 
• Memory, storage, and processing capacity are limited, and so is the speed of the network 
connection. Consequently, the agent should only use lightweight processing components and 
limit network access for its own purposes to the necessary minimum. 
14.4  Summary 
This chapter focused on the technical side of embodied interactive software agents, reviewing 
software architectures for situated decision making, approaches to behavior generation, and 
technical platforms for software agents. Section 14.1 compared five different architectures for 
implementing the internal mechanisms that allow an agent to determine its actions and future 
states given its sensor input: deliberative (cf. Section 14.1.1), reactive (cf. Section 14.1.2), 
hybrid (cf. Section 14.1.3), blackboard (cf. Section 14.1.4), and multi-agent (cf. Section 14.1.5) 
architectures. 
The second part of the chapter was concerned with the problem of generating the behaviors 
of an embodied interactive agent. Typically, solutions to this problem involve two components: 
a character player for producing the agent’s animations and utterances and a higher level of 
behavior control that generates scripts specifying temporally ordered sequences of actions 
which are executed by the character player. Approaches to behavior generation differ with 
respect to their efficiency and flexibility as well as their support for single or multiple 
characters. Four of these approaches were reviewed in Section 14.2: behavior sequencing (cf. 
Section 14.2.1), layered generation (cf. Section 14.2.2), state machine compilation (cf. Section 
14.2.3), and multi-character systems (cf. Section 14.2.4). 
Software agents are designed for a particular computational environment, which consists of a 
specific configuration of hardware and software components that exhibit individual capabilities 
and limitations as well as complex interactions with each other. Section 14.3 discussed the 
characteristics of four technical platforms for embodied interactive software agents: desktop 
computers (cf. Section 14.3.1), the World Wide Web (cf. Section 14.3.2), virtual reality 
simulations (cf. Section 14.3.3), and mobile devices (cf. Section 14.3.4). Various technical 
issues were identified that need to be addressed when developing agents for these platforms, 
such as the slow response times of the World Wide Web or the small display sizes and limited 
input and processing capabilities of mobile devices. 
                                              
243  Small display sizes are not necessarily a disadvantage. Johnson et al. (2004c) argued that on a small 
screen, glitches in character animation are less noticeable. Furthermore, users may generally expect 
lower production quality on handheld displays. Finally, if the agent has a smaller and simpler body, 
the task of the character animators becomes easier. 
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15 Evaluation 
[T]he simple question as to whether an animated interface agent improves human-computer 
interaction does not appear to be the appropriate question to ask. Rather, the question to ask is: 
what kind of animated agent used in what kind of domain influences what aspects of the user’s 
attitudes or performance? (Dehn & van Mulken 2000: 19, their emphasis). 
The increasing interest in embodied interactive software agents for applications in e-learning 
(cf. Chapter 2) and other domains largely originates from the assumption that these agents have 
positive effects on human cognition and motivation by making computer-based systems more 
human-like, more engaging, and more motivating (De Angeli et al. 2001b). While anecdotal 
evidence in the form of informal observations, reports, or user feedback may or may not 
support this assumption, it typically fails to inform designers about exactly which features of (a 
particular specimen of) embodied interactive agents have what effect on what group of users in 
what situations and for what purpose. Designers have to make many choices when building an 
agent playing a specific role in a specific context for the target group of users. These design 
choices and their interactions have been discussed in detail in Chapter 9 to Chapter 13. Often, 
choices made in agent design lack a solid foundation. Isbister and Doyle criticized that: 
Choices about the appearance, personality, and behaviors of the agent are frequently made on the 
basis of an introspective examination of personal preferences, and in many cases do not 
accurately reflect the goals of the design or the qualities of the audience with whom the agent is 
ultimately intended to interact. (Isbister & Doyle 2002). 
The question addressed in this chapter is how to determine effective combinations of agent 
design parameters (cf. Section 15.2.1), given the many choices available. The scientific method 
to inform the design of embodied interactive agents and to assess its outcomes is through 
evaluation, which collects, analyzes, and interprets information about how a given agent works 
for a particular group of people in a specific situation, possibly with the potential to generalize 
these results and transform them into guidelines for the design of embodied interactive agents 
(cf. Section 15.1). Ideally, evaluation studies assess agents as they interact with real users in 
realistic scenarios over a longer period of time.244 
This chapter is organized as follows. First, motivations for doing evaluation research on and 
with embodied interactive agents are identified in Section 15.1. Second, Section 15.2 discusses 
factors of agents, users, and contexts that influence evaluation. Different types of evaluation 
research with respect to the time and level of analysis involved are compared in Section 15.3. 
Methodology relevant for evaluating embodied interactive agents, including research models, 
research questions, constructs, research strategies, and methods for data collection and analysis, 
is reviewed in Section 15.4. Guidelines for the evaluation of embodied interactive software 
agents are provided in Section 15.5. Finally, Section 15.6 summarizes the chapter. 
                                              
244  While this is the ideal, restrictions on time, money, availability of subjects, and other resources as 
well as the difficulty of controlling real-world situations have typically led researchers to conduct 
short-term evaluations of agents with a relatively small number of users in a controlled laboratory 
setting. 
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15.1  Motivations for Evaluation 
The evaluation of embodied interactive software agents involves the goal-directed, methodical, 
and systematic collection, analysis, and interpretation of information about how a specific agent 
in a particular state of development works for a particular group of users (cf. Chapter 6.1) in a 
particular predefined context of use (cf. Chapter 6.2) (Christoph 2004: 68). Evaluation is a 
crucial component of both research and development of embodied interactive agents (Sanders 
& Scholtz 2000: 1). It collects information about an agent that helps to answer questions of 
practical and/or theoretical interest to one or several of the parties involved, which include the 
following ([INT 170]): 
• Designers. Evaluation produces sound and verifiable evidence and guidelines (see below) 
that inform decisions in design, demonstrate the suitability of the agent for the client’s needs, 
and provide ammunition for the marketing campaign. 
• Clients. Evaluation provides information for the paying customers that helps them to make 
decisions about intermediate and finished versions of the agent. Successive evaluations of 
increasingly refined designs and implementations can be scheduled as project milestones. 
• End-users. Evaluation can (and should) allow end-users to become (and feel) part of the 
development process by eliciting their ideas, needs, preferences, and views regarding a 
particular agent developed for them. User involvement should start early and continue 
throughout the process of developing an agent (cf. Chapter 7.13). 
• Researchers. Evaluation helps researchers to test theories targeting embodied interactive 
agents as such or using them as a vehicle to investigate other topics, such as principles of 
face-to-face human-human communication. 
In general, evaluation is instrumental in focusing research and development efforts; 
identifying progress toward milestones and end results; selecting the best from among a set of 
candidates, and assessing success of the finished system (Sanders & Scholtz 2000: 1). Table 30 
shows the major categories of research on embodied interactive agents, their criteria for 
success, and how they go about assessing it. Another important motivation for evaluation is to 
produce guidelines (i.e. general rules, best practices, pieces of advice, etc.) for the design of 
(different aspects of) embodied interactive agents, which are intended to streamline the design 
process and to ensure the quality of its outcome by helping designers to make choices that 
eventually produce an agent which is appropriate for its designated role and context (Ruttkay et 
al. 2004: 44f.). For example, evaluation could be performed to shed light on the role of 
personification (cf. Chapter 9.1) in designing the appearance and (communicative) behavior of 
agents. 
Design guidelines may originate from the experience of practitioners in the field, or they 
may be based on a generalization of findings from one or several evaluation studies. A 
substantial body of guidelines for embodied interactive agent design has already been published 
in the literature (e.g. Reeves & Nass 1998; Cassell et al. 2000a; Payr & Trappl 2004; 
Prendinger & Ishizuka 2004a; Isbister 2006), which provided valuable insights for the 
discussion of agent design aspects in the previous chapters. Still, much remains to be clarified, 
detailed, and discovered with respect to what agent designs are effective for what users in what 
contexts. 
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Table 30. A taxonomy of major categories of embodied interactive agent research. Adapted from Isbister 
and Doyle (2002, Table 1; 2004: 11, Table 1.1). 
Category/ 
Research Focus 
Criteria for Successful 
Agent Designs 
Evaluation Techniques 
Subjective Objective 
Believability 
(“Illusion of life”) 
The agent conveys the 
impression of being ‘life-
like’ or “larger than life” to 
the viewer or user. 
User or expert 
assessment of the 
believability of the 
agent’s appearance, 
voice, personality, 
responses, etc. 
Comparison of the 
user’s behavioral and 
physiological reactions 
to the agent with his or 
her responses to other 
humans (similarities/ 
differences; attribution 
of human dispositions 
and qualities to the 
agent) 
Sociability 
(Human-like social 
interactions between 
agents and users) 
Users’ social interaction 
with the agent is ‘natural’ 
and ‘intuitive.’ 
Determining users’ 
perceptions of the 
agent’s friendliness, 
helpfulness, social and 
communicative 
abilities, etc.; users’ 
evaluation of their 
overall experience of 
the interaction (ease, 
satisfaction, speed) 
Measures of elicited 
social responses to the 
agent; changes in user 
behavior predicted by 
the social tactics used 
by the agent (increased 
influence of the agent 
on the user’s answers, 
users’ willingness to 
reciprocate to the agent, 
etc.). 
Application Domains 
(Design for different 
applications and roles) 
The agent achieves the 
goals of the application 
(learning, entertainment, 
changes in attitudes and 
behaviors, etc.). 
Measures of user 
satisfaction with task 
achievement and 
interaction; role 
usefulness of the 
agent as perceived by 
domain experts and 
end users 
Testing of behavioral 
outcomes (memory, 
performance on tasks, 
etc.) using existing 
benchmarks; need to 
separate the effects of 
the agent from those of 
the application 
Agency and 
Computational  
Issues 
(Algorithms, systems, 
and architectures)  
The agents, components, 
and techniques developed 
meet criteria including 
elegance, parsimony, 
optimality, correctness, 
good performance on 
(common) benchmarks, 
broad applicability of 
solutions, etc. 
Peer review by other 
researchers in the 
same knowledge area 
based on relevant 
publications, code 
inspection, use in 
other systems and 
contexts, etc. 
Quantitative analysis 
and evaluation using 
formal (mathematical) 
techniques (e.g. faces or 
gestures recognized 
correctly, number of 
steps in the best plan, 
predictive accuracy of 
machine learning 
techniques, etc.) 
Production 
(Polished end product; 
professional agent 
development) 
The final agent exhibits 
good consistent quality 
throughout, with the look 
and feel of a professional 
product. The development 
process went smoothly and 
efficiently. 
End-user measures of 
satisfaction with the 
agent, its level of 
professional quality, 
and the smoothness of 
the experience. 
Confirmation that 
users read the agent as 
intended 
Empirical comparison 
of production tactics 
with other practices, 
using measurable 
benchmarks (time, 
money, human and 
other resources) 
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Design guidelines typically map from ‘independent’ aspects of an agent that can be 
manipulated by developers or experimenters to ‘dependent’ aspects that change as the result of 
the manipulation (Ruttkay et al. 2004: 44). Broad categories of designable agent characteristics 
include embodiment, behavior, expertise, communicative abilities, emotion and personality, 
which have been discussed in Chapter 9 to Chapter 13. The design of these independent aspects 
influences various dependent dimensions of the user-agent interaction, including: 
• Users’ acceptance of the agent; 
• The actual and perceived efficiency and effectiveness of the agent and the system in which it 
is embedded; 
• The agent’s impact on the observable behavior, subjective experience, and objective 
performance of users. 
It should be noted that these are not isolated but rather mutual effects. For example, the 
degree of acceptance of a pedagogical agent influences how long and how often learners will 
interact with it, which, in turn, may increase effectiveness if the interaction with the agent 
contributes to learning, or decrease effectiveness if dealing with the agent distracts the learner 
from the task. The positive or negative effects of agent design configurations can be modulated 
by another group of aspects related to the user and the context (Krämer & Bente 2001), which 
are discussed in Section 15.2.2 and Section 15.2.3 below, respectively. 
Ruttkay et al. (2004: 44f.) pointed out that design guidelines may apply to specific tasks or 
application contexts, or they may be of more general use (for instance, there is substantial 
evidence that voice is a central feature for making an agent seem person-like, cf. Chapter 
10.1.1). Other, even higher-level guidelines express complex relationships between multiple 
design parameters. In general, it is important to state the scope of design guidelines, i.e. the 
application type and user group for which they are valid (p. 45). For example, the high-level 
guideline “The agent should be consistent, i.e. its appearance, attitudes, behaviors, and language 
should all convey the same general impression of the individual it is intended to portray” (cf. 
Chapter 7.5) has general scope, i.e. it applies across applications and user groups. In contrast, 
the scope of the guideline “The agent should portray a personality that is similar to the user’s 
personality” is limited to people who tend to be attracted by similar personalities in their human 
interaction partners (p. 45). 
15.2  Factors Influencing Evaluation 
Evaluation studies on embodied interactive software agents normally involve a particular agent 
interacting with a certain group of users in a specific context. Agents, users, and contexts are 
each complex entities that can vary along multiple dimensions. In an (experimental) evaluation 
study, the aspects of all three elements, i.e. design parameters of the agent, characteristics of the 
user, and contextual factors have to be carefully controlled in order to create an evaluation 
environment in which only the aspects relevant to the current research question (cf. Section 
15.4.2) are manipulated while the others remain stable (and thus do not interfere with the 
results). 
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15.2.1  The Agent 
Users’ reaction to and interaction with a particular embodied interactive agent are influenced by 
the way it looks, behaves, and communicates. Agents may differ from one another in terms of a 
wide variety of design parameters, and finding the ‘right’ configuration of parameters for a 
particular group of users and a specific role or task can be difficult. Design parameters for 
embodied interactive agents can be categorized as follows:245 
Embodiment (cf. Chapter 9) 
• Personification. How much does the agent persona resemble a human being in appearance? 
• Appearance. What are the attributes of the agent’s physical form in terms of species, 
demographics, body features, and outfit? 
• Completeness. Does the embodiment consist of just a head; a head and neck; a head, neck, 
arms, and torso; or a fully articulate body? 
• Individuality. Does the embodiment reveal and express the agent’s unique and distinctive 
personality? 
• Movement. What kinds of movement (if any) can the embodiment perform? 
• Presence. Is the agent persona always present on the screen, or does it only appear when the 
user requests or needs the agent’s assistance? 
• Realism. Does the embodiment use or observe: 
• Two-dimensional (2D) .. three-dimensional (3D) graphical models; 
• Realistic .. artistic representations; 
• Physiologically accurate models .. cartoon shapes; 
• Human limitations .. cartoon actions? 
• Stability. Does the agent remain in the same body across time and situations, or does it 
change its embodiment? 
Communication (cf. Chapter 10.1 and Chapter 11) 
• Language. Can the agent understand and produce language? What languages does the agent 
support? Does it provide text and/or speech input and output? Is the agent’s speech 
intelligible, natural-sounding, and expressive? Are messages generated and delivered 
dynamically, or do they come from canned resources? What degree of complexity in inputs 
can the agent handle? Does the agent integrate language understanding and generation with 
other input and output modes? 
• Face. What information does the face of the agent persona convey? Are facial displays 
synchronized to speech, gesture, etc.? 
                                              
245  Ruttkay et al. (2004) proposed another catalogue of design aspects of embodied interactive agents, 
which consists of the major categories embodiment, mental capabilities, implementation aspects, and 
application context. Xiao (2006) developed a conceptual framework for describing the design space 
of embodied interactive agent systems, which defined three categories of factors influencing the 
usefulness of agent-based interfaces: features of the agent, features of the user, and features of the 
task. The set of agent attributes consists of representation, presence, initiative, competence and 
performance, verbal communication, non-verbal expression, and role of the agent. 
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• Gaze. Does the agent persona use gaze to disambiguate the verbal message, send social 
signals, establish a channel to obtain information, regulate dialogue flow, express emotions, 
indicate personality characteristics, establish social control, and reflect levels of intimacy? 
• Gesture. In what ways does the agent persona use its hands and other body parts to create 
movements which emphasize, clarify, or amplify its verbal message? 
• Posture. What positions of the body does the agent persona support, and how are they used 
to indicate involvement, liking, and relative status? 
• Locomotion. How does the agent persona move from one place to another? Is this movement 
influenced by the agent’s personality, the agent’s emotional state, the agent’s physical 
constitution, the state of the environment, and cultural specifics? 
• Dialogue. What mechanisms does the agent employ to manage the (multimodal) dialogue 
with the user? This includes techniques for allocating the initiative (system, user, or mixed), 
modeling the dialogue, modeling the user, and handling errors in the interaction. 
Expertise (cf. Chapter 12) 
• Knowledge acquisition. What mechanisms does the agent provide to create, maintain, and 
extend its domain knowledge (knowledge engineering and/or machine learning)? 
• Knowledge representation. What formalisms are used to represent the agent’s domain 
knowledge? Do the chosen formalisms facilitate authoring, learning, inference, problem 
solving, etc.? 
• Problem solving. What algorithms does the agent use to solve problems? 
• Student modeling. What information does the pedagogical agent collect about the learner? 
How is it represented and used? Does the information collected improve the agent’s ability 
to assist the learner? 
• Instructional expertise. What repertoire of instructional interactions for assisting the learner 
is available to the pedagogical agent? How are these interactions designed? Do they work for 
the target context and learners? 
Emotion and Personality (cf. Chapter 13) 
• Emotion. What spectrum of emotional states can the agent interpret, communicate/simulate, 
and express? 
• Emotion modeling. Is an emotion model used at all? Does the chosen emotion model 
emphasize deliberately communicated emotion or the simulation of ‘true’ emotion? Does 
the emotion model support different intensities and mixtures of emotions? 
• Emotion interpretation. What forms of sentic modulation (e.g. facial expression, voice 
inflection, blood pressure, etc.) can the agent perceive and interpret? How accurate are its 
interpretations of the user’s emotional state? 
• Emotion expression. What means of communicating emotion (facial expression, voice 
inflection, gesture, posture, and movement) does the agent use? Are the agent’s emotional 
displays easily interpretable and convincing (believable)? 
• Personality. What personality was chosen for the agent? Is the personality appropriate for 
the agent’s role? 
• Personality modeling. What framework is used to model the agent’s personality (The Big 
Five, NEO-PI-R, etc.)? 
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• Personality interpretation. How good is the agent at interpreting aspects of the user’s 
personality? 
• Personality expression. What aspects of the agent’s appearance, behavior, and 
communication convey its personality (ideally, all)? 
Implementation 
• Animation. What approach is used to produce the animations of the agent? Is the quality 
(defined as frames per second) of the rendered animations acceptable? What is the cost 
(computationally and financially) of producing the animations? Are the animations available 
at different levels of detail (Ruttkay et al. 2004: 39)? 
• Architecture. What architectural framework (if any) is the basis for the agent? Is the chosen 
architecture appropriate for the agent’s role and task? How difficult is it to adapt the agent to 
a new domain, platform, etc.? 
• Authoring support. What tools does the implementation provide for application developers, 
in particular for non-experts? 
• Components. How are the agent’s features implemented in terms of a set of components? 
What is the ratio of proprietary and third-party components? Are all components of the same 
quality? Are the components designed for reusability? 
• Performance. How fast can the individual components and the agent as a whole process 
inputs and generate outputs? Does the implementation support smooth human-agent 
interaction, without perceptible glitches and delays? Is the resource consumption of the 
implementation within acceptable limits? 
• Platform. What is the targeted technical platform of the implementation? Does the 
implementation effectively make use of the resources and observe or work around the 
constraints of the platform? 
• Requirements. What hardware and software are necessary to run the implemented agent? 
What are the assumed operational conditions for the implementation (noise level, screen 
size, network bandwidth, real-time interaction, etc.) (Ruttkay et al. 2004: 40)? 
• Standards. To what extent does the implementation rely on and conform to standards and de-
facto standards, e.g. of the World Wide Web? 
15.2.2  The User 
As discussed in Chapter 6.1, a user is a person who makes use of a thing to achieve something, 
for themselves or for other individuals, alone or in cooperation or competition with other users, 
for work or for pleasure. Quite a number of these ‘things’ are human-made artifacts, such as 
hand tools, weapons, and computers. Computer users interact with these machines through user 
interfaces (cf. Chapter 1.2) to carry out certain activities. The user interface of an embodied 
interactive software agent centers on an animated character and the aspects of face-to-face 
conversations it supports. How users interact with, assess, and are influenced by a particular 
embodied interactive agent depends on the individual characteristics of each user (Ruttkay et al. 
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2004: 48f.). These characteristics have already been described in Chapter 6.1 and are therefore 
just listed below as a summary:246 
• Gender; 
• Age; 
• Culture; 
• Education; 
• Social class; 
• Occupation; 
• Organization; 
• Intrinsic limitations; 
• Extrinsic limitations; 
• Skills; 
• Goals; 
• Needs; 
• Expectations; 
• Experiences; 
• Preferences. 
It is generally not feasible to include all members of the target population in an evaluation 
study. Thus, a sample or subset of the population has to be chosen (Christoph 2004: 86f.). 
Creating a sample involves carefully deciding which and how many individuals to select for the 
study. If generalizations from the sample to the population being studied should be possible, the 
sample has to be representative of the population. A non-representative sample is said to be 
biased. Representative samples can be obtained through random sampling, i.e. each member of 
the population has an equal probability of being selected, and the selection of one member does 
not affect the chances of the others to be included in the sample. When representativeness is not 
an issue (as in case studies, cf. Section 15.4.4.3), other sampling methods can be used (p. 87; 
Verschuren & Doorewaard 1999): 
• Minimize differences between participants by selecting individuals that are very similar to 
each other. This strategy is useful in exploratory studies to avoid distractions by a potentially 
large number of variations when formulating hypotheses. 
• Maximize differences between participants on relevant dimensions by selecting individuals 
that differ as much as possible, but only with respect to the aspects of interest (in all others, 
they are as similar as possible). With this strategy, a broad overview can be obtained. 
• Select participants one at a time, based on the results of the previous study. 
The number of participants to be recruited for an evaluation study (i.e. the sample size) 
depends on the variability of the phenomenon being studied. Phenomena with a wider range of 
variation require a larger sample size than others showing less variation. In general, larger 
samples allow more precise estimates of the phenomenon under study (Christoph 2004: 87). 
15.2.3  The Context 
Embodied interactive agents always operate in some kind of environment and thus need to be 
evaluated with respect to the context of use (cf. Chapter 6.2) for which they are intended. A 
number of contextual factors (Johnson et al. 2004a) can influence the evaluation, including: 
The target user group 
• Number of users (single user vs. multiple users); 
• Stance of users toward the environment (first- vs. third-person perspective, god/director, or 
passive observer). 
                                              
246  Xiao (2006) identified a similar set of user characteristics that are relevant for the evaluation of 
embodied interactive agents. The characteristics are: perceptual abilities, gender, age, knowledge and 
prior experience, intent, personality, and ethnicity and social background. 
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The agent and other agents 
• Number of agents (single agent vs. multiple agents); 
• Stance of agents toward the environment (resident agents vs. migrating agents). 
The task (largely adapted from Xiao et al. 2002; Catrambone et al. 2004: 250–253)247 
• Complexity (number and nesting of subtasks and basic actions and the computational effort 
required); 
• Cooperation (with the user, other agents, and/or external applications); 
• Criteria for success (e.g. quality of performance and/or outcome, timeliness, resource 
consumption, user satisfaction, etc.); 
• Familiarity (Do the agent and/or the user operate in a familiar or unknown domain?); 
• Focus of the agent (The agent might be directly involved in the user’s primary task or help 
with secondary tasks); 
• Isolated activity (e.g. games, web sales, etc.) vs. integrated activity (part of a curriculum, 
work activity, ongoing interaction, etc.); 
• Objectiveness (objective (information gathering, problem solving) vs. opinion-based (giving 
advice or recommendations)); 
• Resources (e.g. applications, databases, internal knowledge and models, input/output 
devices, other agents, etc.); 
• Temporal arrangement (attention (constant or regular vs. on-demand), duration, and 
frequency). 
The application domain 
• Education (cf. Chapter 4), electronic commerce (cf. Chapter 3.2.2), entertainment 
(cf. Chapter 3.2.4), health care, information retrieval (cf. Chapter 3.2.3), etc. 
The physical environment 
• Public vs. private space; distractive vs. quiet environments; mobile vs. stationary systems; 
safety-critical vs. safe work environments. 
The agent’s social role 
• Advisor, companion, guide, opponent, personal assistant, salesperson, tutor, etc. 
The agent’s role in the application 
• Major vs. minor (the degree to which the application depends on the use of an agent); 
• Essential (e.g. actors in a virtual drama, opponents in computer games, and agents providing 
a unique type of information or service); 
• Supporting/supplementary (e.g. facilitators, guides, motivators, etc.); 
• Optional (the application can be used with or without the agent); 
                                              
247  Xiao’s conceptual framework (Xiao 2006) likewise includes aspects of the task: domain, duration 
and frequency, importance and consequence, and difficulty and objectiveness. 
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• Temporary/phased (supporting novice users, then gradually withdrawing as users’ 
proficiency increases). 
The life cycle of the interaction 
• A single episodic interaction (e.g. information kiosks); 
• Repeated episodic interactions (e.g. guides in web sites); 
• Over extended episodes (e.g. interactive movies); 
• Over a series of extended episodes (e.g. virtual course instructors); 
• Unending/lifelong (e.g. ambient agents in the user’s work or living environment). 
15.3  Types of Evaluation Research 
Naively, it could be argued that evaluation can wait until the final stage of development when 
the agent has been implemented and tested and is therefore ready to face the judgment of users. 
However, at that point, it may be too late to include missing features or remedy fundamental 
flaws in the design. In fact, some kind of evaluation should be performed during all stages of 
agent development (Christoph 2004: 69) to elicit users’ opinions, needs, and preferences with 
regard to different features, designs, prototypes, etc. (cf. Section 15.3.1). Evaluation that 
happens while the agent is being developed is called formative evaluation (cf. Section 15.3.2), 
whereas evaluation at the end of the development process is referred to as summative evaluation 
(cf. Section 15.3.3). 
With regard to the level at which evaluation should be performed, it is certainly important to 
assess the agent as a whole in the context of its application, using representatives of the target 
group of users as subjects. But evaluation should likewise determine the effects of individual 
components of the agent on the user’s interaction with the agent and his or her overall 
experience. System-level or macro evaluation is discussed in Section 15.3.4 while component-
level or micro evaluation is the topic of Section 15.3.5. 
15.3.1  Evaluation in the Software Life-Cycle 
The creation of large software systems for realistic applications is a complex task involving 
many different human talents (cf. Chapter 7.12), a considerable amount of time, and many 
interdependent subtasks. To ensure goal-orientation, productivity, and quality, software 
development has to be organized as a structured process. The most commonly distinguished 
stages of software development are described below (Christoph 2004: 69ff.). At each of these 
stages, evaluation research can be performed to inform the work to be done at that stage. 
• Task analysis/functional analysis. Task analysis systematically decomposes a task into its 
elements (subtasks, activities, people, and resources) and indicates their relationships. 
Functional analysis identifies and describes the necessary functions of the system. 
Evaluation research can use unconstrained data collection methods, such as informal 
observations (cf. Section 15.4.5.3) of and unstructured interviews (cf. Section 15.4.5.2) with 
representative users to elicit information about the task and the functionality of the system. 
• Requirements specification. A software requirements specification captures the interactions 
between users and the software in terms of use cases, defines a set of functional requirements 
describing the internal mechanisms of the software necessary to satisfy the use cases, and 
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specifies a number of non-functional requirements on the software, including performance 
requirements, quality standards, design constraints, etc. ([INT 171]). Ways to collect this 
information include more formal, structured, and focused observation and interviewing 
methods, as well as the use of focus groups (cf. Section 15.4.5.2), which involve a small 
number of people (users, developers, experts, etc.) in a moderated discussion of the 
desiderata of the final system. 
• Conceptual design/formal design. Conceptual design creates detailed specifications of the 
requirements of the system (i.e. what the system is supposed to do, what data it needs for its 
operation, what users have to know in order to handle the system, etc.). Formal design 
specifies how the conceptual design can be achieved. Focus groups are a useful tool for 
generating ideas about the features of the system. However, the ideas produced have to be 
both feasible and compatible with the task and requirements specifications. 
• Prototyping. Prototyping creates different working models of the system to be built, which 
are refined (or discarded) depending on the results of the evaluation [INT 172]). Prototypes 
are often tested using the Wizard-of-Oz setup (cf. Section 15.3.2), in which potential users 
are exposed to a prototype of the system and missing functionality is simulated by a human 
‘wizard’ ([INT 173]). Prototyping is useful for developing preliminary ideas about the 
effects of different design features on representative users in particular settings. 
• Implementation. Implementation creates programs and data stores for a particular platform 
(cf. Chapter 14.3). At this stage, having a more or less functional system allows to conduct 
experiments (cf. Section 15.4.4.2) and case studies (cf. Section 15.4.4.3) that evaluate the 
system with respect to, for example, functionality, reliability, usability, efficiency, 
maintainability, and portability. The goal is to obtain information for future extensions, 
refinements, and updates. 
• Evaluation. The goal-directed, methodical, and systematic collection, analysis, and 
interpretation of information about a specific software system in a particular stage of 
development is an activity that ideally occurs at all the stages discussed above. Each stage 
poses different requirements with respect to what has to be evaluated and how. While 
evaluation activities at earlier stages are more explorative in nature, informing decisions to 
be made in design, evaluation at later stages focuses more on the assessment of outcomes of 
the design process. 
Software life cycle models are used to represent all the activities involved in software 
development and how they relate to one another. The classic waterfall model (Royce 1970) 
views the software development process as flowing through a cascade of four discrete stages 
(design, coding, testing, and maintenance), with later stages providing feedback for earlier 
stages ([INT 174]). Later models describe software development as an iterative, user-centered 
process. Iterative means that the software is developed incrementally over a series of iterations 
([INT 175]). Each iteration cycle contains all the stages of the development process 
(requirements analysis, design, implementation, and testing) and produces a functional partial 
version of the final system, which grows from one cycle to the next ([INT 176]). The 
development process is user-centered in that it is driven by the people who will use the system, 
and their goals, needs, and preferences, rather than by technology alone (Preece et al. 2002: 
285). One example is the spiral model (Boehm 1988), which describes an iterative and 
incremental software development process that makes repeated use of prototyping (and other 
means) and performs risk analysis at every stage in order to keep the risks involved in the 
development process to a minimum ([INT 177]). Another very influential model of iterative, 
user-centered software development, the star life cycle model (Hix & Hartson 1993) shown in 
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Figure 88, explicitly acknowledges the central role of evaluation in the software life cycle by 
connecting all other stages to it (Stone et al. 2005: 19). In this model, the order of activities is 
less important than evaluation of all phases of development. As shown by the bidirectional 
arrows in the diagram, it is possible to move from the current activity to any other, provided 
that evaluation of its results happens first (Helms et al. 2006). Development can also start with 
any activity (indicated by the unidirectional arrows) (Costabile 2001; Stone et al. 2005: 19), 
rather than with an obligatory analysis of the task and the necessary functions, which reflects 
the common practice of entering the development process at different activities that is found in 
real-world projects. However, the high degree of flexibility provided by the star life cycle 
model may also be its greatest weakness because there is no indication where development 
should start or stop and, importantly, after how many iterations the process should end (Sevik 
2003: 29). As a result, managing a project according to the philosophy of the star life cycle 
model can be a difficult task. 
15.3.2  Formative Evaluation 
When the cook tastes the soup, that’s formative, when the guests taste the soup, that’s summative. 
(Robert Stakes; quoted in Scriven 1991: 169). 
Formative evaluation is a process-oriented, typically exploratory type of evaluation, which 
collects information at various stages while the application is being developed, in order to shape 
ideas, guide decisions, and identify opportunities for improvement from early on (Sanders & 
Scholtz 2000: 2; Christoph 2004: 71f.). In general, formative evaluation studies should be cheap 
to perform because they recur regularly during the development process ([INT 170]). Important 
types of formative evaluation include: 
• Heuristic evaluation. The goal of heuristic evaluation is to assess the usability (cf. Chapter 
6.3) of a given user interface design. Experts carefully and systematically look over the user 
interface to identify problems related to the usability of its design, using heuristics that 
include established usability principles, such as visibility of system status, error prevention, 
aesthetic and minimalist design ([INT 178]), as well as their own knowledge of potential 
stumbling blocks for users (Nielsen 1994; Sanders & Scholtz 2000: 2). Heuristics establish 
 
Figure 88. The star life cycle model. Adapted from Christoph (2004: 69, Figure 3.1). 
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themselves as valid rules of thumb for design through repeated successful application in the 
development of different systems, as determined by way of correlation with ratings of user 
satisfaction and quantitative measurements (Sanders & Scholtz 2000: 9). 
• Cognitive walkthrough. This is another usability inspection method (Wharton et al. 1994) in 
which a group of evaluators walk through the steps of a task to be carried out via interaction 
between the user and the system and ask themselves whether the user will (1) realize that the 
current subtask is instrumental to achieving his or her goal and thus try to achieve it; (2) 
notice that the correct action is provided by the interface; (3) understand that the current 
subtask can be achieved by the action; (4) obtain feedback afterwards that he or she has 
performed the correct action ([INT 179]; [INT 180]). The focus is on identifying issues 
related to the comprehensibility and learnability of the user interface. The cognitive 
walkthrough method can produce results quickly at low cost, and it can be applied early in 
the design process, to a prototype, or even a paper mock-up of the interface ([INT 179]). 
• User studies. This is the most important type of formative evaluation used in practice 
(Sanders & Scholtz 2000: 2). Think-aloud studies (Ericsson & Simon 1984) involve asking 
users to say aloud what they are thinking while they are working with a computer- or paper-
based prototype of the system. The analysis of the resulting think-aloud protocols reveals 
what confuses them about the user interface (Sanders & Scholtz 2000: 2). Wizard-of-Oz 
(WOZ) studies248 (Kelley 1984; Dahlbäck et al. 1993) involve real users interacting with a 
(partially) human-simulated version of the system. Subjects are led to believe that they are 
dealing with a machine, but the machine’s responses are actually simulated by a hidden 
human ‘wizard’ ([INT 173]). There is no (fully) functional system behind the ‘fake’ 
conversational or other user interface (cf. Figure 89). Wizard-of-Oz setups have become 
quite popular for the prototyping and usability testing of user interfaces, including those with 
embodied agents (e.g. Buisine & Martin 2003; Chateau et al. 2005; Brown & Barrett 2006). 
The goal of these studies is to gain insights into how users would behave toward the system 
in a natural language dialogue (cf. Chapter 11.3) or some other kind of (unimodal or 
multimodal) interaction (cf. Chapter 11.2), before actually having the (complete) system in 
place. 
In general, user studies and evaluator-driven approaches are complementary types of 
formative evaluation, as discussed by Sanders and Scholtz (2000: 8f.). Heuristic evaluation by 
experts can be used to systematically test a pre-defined set of abilities of a particular embodied 
interactive software agent. Evaluators can define test cases that cause the agent to exhibit 
certain qualities. In contrast, user studies cover only those abilities that were elicited by users 
during their interactions with the agent. However, these interactions may include unanticipated 
cases that generated unexpected responses from the agent. The information obtained from these 
unanticipated interactions is invaluable for assessing the robustness of the agent outside its 
familiar interaction patterns and for detecting opportunities for improvement. 
15.3.3  Summative Evaluation 
Summative evaluation is an outcome-oriented type of evaluation, which is performed toward 
the end of the development process, using the (almost) finished system (Sanders & Scholtz 
                                              
248  The name of this type of experimental dialogue scenario was chosen because such simulations recall 
the Wizard of Oz’s deception in the 1939 movie ([INT 181]). 
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2000: 2; Christoph 2004: 71f.). The main goal of summative evaluation is to determine how 
users actually perceive and use the system and what can be improved in future versions. 
Therefore, a summative evaluation should show that people can (or cannot) use the system in its 
intended context or for its intended purpose ([INT 170]), and possibly also whether they like (or 
dislike) using it. In other words, summative evaluation has to test if the system is accepted by 
users who are representative of the target group ([INT 170]). 
While formative evaluation (cf. Section 15.3.2) is largely exploratory, summative evaluation 
focuses on a well-defined set of research questions (cf. Section 15.4.2), which are answered on 
the basis of measures of performance (benchmarks) and user satisfaction (Sanders & Scholtz 
2000: 1) collected in an experiment (cf. Section 15.4.4.2) or survey (cf. Section 15.4.4.1), using 
quantitative methods. Often, the results are compared to the measures obtained from other 
systems (of the same kind) that compete with the system being evaluated or are used as a 
baseline for comparison. Since users can differ considerably along multiple dimensions, (cf. 
Section 15.2.2), comparison studies need to control for differences between participants in 
order to exclude the possibility that observed differences can be attributed to the users taking 
part in the study rather than the qualities of the systems being compared. Each participant 
should work with all the candidates and spend the same amount of time with each of them. By 
measuring performance and user satisfaction, summative evaluation studies can help to identify 
the ‘better’ system. However, they do not reveal reasons for this superiority (Sanders & Scholtz 
2000: 2). 
15.3.4  Macro (System-Level) Evaluation 
Macro (or system-level) evaluation investigates what a given embodied interactive software 
agent contributes to a particular application. The following questions are of interest in a macro-
evaluation context (Ruttkay et al. 2004: 41f.): 
 
Figure 89. The basic setup of a Wizard-of-Oz experiment. Double-headed arrows mean ‘interaction,’ 
whereas single-headed arrows represent flows of information. 
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• What kinds of value does a particular agent add to the application (cf. 7.1)? To answer this 
question, researchers have to evaluate the effects of a specific agent design in the context of 
the application and with a group of users that are representative of the target population. 
• What agent is the most suitable for the application? Here, it is necessary to compare different 
configurations of agent design parameters (cf. Section 15.2.1) for the application and the 
target group of users. 
Macro evaluation assesses the performance of the overall system consisting of the agent (cf. 
Section 15.2.1), the user (cf. Section 15.2.2), and the application, taking into consideration 
contextual factors (cf. Section 15.2.3) that might have an impact on the performance of this 
system. System-level evaluation has to be performed with a functional version of the agent that 
can interact with users, in a context of use that closely resembles the agent’s target domain, and 
with a representative sample of real (potential) users of the system (Johnson et al. 2004a). It 
contributes to an understanding of the agent’s role in the system by evaluating (Johnson 2004; 
Johnson et al. 2004a): 
• The user-agent interaction. How efficient, fluent, pleasant, successful, etc. are the exchanges 
between the agent and the human user? Rather than just the agent itself, the evaluation 
addresses the ways in which the agent contributes to these aspects in the context of its 
interactions with users. 
• The user’s experience. What impression does the user get from its interaction with the agent? 
Unlike an observer, the user interacts with the agent in the context of a task or narrative and 
thus does not have a passive, observing role. Three major stages can be identified in the 
user’s experience of an agent (or other system): the first encounter (the ‘lure’), the first 
extended session, and repeated use over a longer period of time (Johnson 2004). Users may 
not pass through all these stages in their experience of an embodied interactive agent. In fact, 
only a few users so far have reached the third stage, and quite a number have never got 
beyond the first (e.g. users of the Microsoft Office Assistant, cf. Chapter 8.2). The user’s 
experience is often assessed in the guise of his or her satisfaction with the agent and/or the 
user-agent interaction. User satisfaction is a multidimensional concept (Sanders & Scholtz 
2000: 2; Ruttkay et al. 2004: 56f.), which consists of user perceptions of and responses to 
agent characteristics such as attractiveness (cf. Chapter 9.2), expertise (cf. Chapter 12), 
conversational abilities (cf. Chapter 11), voice quality (cf. Chapter 10.1.1), and personality 
(cf. Chapter 13.5). 
• The effectiveness of the agent-enabled application. Is the agent instrumental in achieving the 
goals of the application in which it is embedded (e.g. promote learning, increase customer 
satisfaction, improve the user’s health)? The application domain determines what measures 
of effectiveness should be selected for the evaluation. Usually, the effectiveness of an agent 
cannot be determined by measuring it once; instead, it has to be assessed over longer time 
periods. People may be drawn to an agent initially because of its novelty, but they may soon 
grow tired of it. Or they might be hesitant at the beginning but come to appreciate the agent 
eventually. In other words, while short-term evaluations can produce some suggestive 
evidence, it is usually problematic to use this evidence to predict the effectiveness of an 
agent in the long run (Kim 2005; Kim et al. 2007). However, long-term evaluation studies of 
embodied interactive agents (e.g. Bickmore 2003; Bickmore et al. 2005) with a timeframe of 
days, weeks, or months are still the exception rather than the rule. Furthermore, since 
embodied interactive agents are often included in applications to make these systems more 
accessible and to increase user engagement, a diverse sample of users should participate in 
the evaluation (cf. Section 15.2.2), especially if it is not possible to make reliable predictions 
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about the range of people that will use an agent, as in web-based applications. Finally, 
evaluations of effectiveness should not only look at the user’s performance but should also 
examine the motivational effects of the agent, which are critical for learning, for example 
(cf. Chapter 12.3.8). 
15.3.5  Micro Evaluation 
Micro evaluation is concerned with the embodied interactive agent itself. Its goal is to assess 
how individual design parameters (cf. Section 15.2.1) of the agent or combinations of them 
impact the user’s performance and/or his or her perception of the agent (Ruttkay et al. 2004: 
41), preferably in a context of use (cf. Section 15.2.3) similar to the one of the overall system 
([INT 182]). Important issues for micro evaluation are summarized below (Ruttkay et al. 2004: 
41f.): 
• Does an agent with specific attributes meet a set of expectations (of designers, clients, end-
users, and researchers, cf. Section 15.1)? The object of the evaluation is a particular agent 
design, which is tested in a controlled setting. Such evaluations are important when design 
cannot resort to established guidelines (cf. Section 15.1) but has to rely on the designers’ 
intuitions and skills. Since solid design guidelines for embodied interactive agents are still 
sparse, the latter is still a quite common strategy. 
• What configuration of design parameters achieves desired attributes of an embodied agent 
(e.g. intelligible, natural-sounding and expressive speech, believable emotional expressions, 
capacity for delivering effective and timely instructional interactions, etc.)? To answer this 
question, it is necessary to test different configurations from the space of design options. 
Embodied interactive software agents typically include implementations of relevant models 
of (human) audio-visual speech, non-verbal behavior, natural language, dialogue, personality, 
emotion, culture, etc. taken from the literature (on phonetics, conversation analysis, cognitive 
science, social psychology, anthropology, etc.) (Beskow et al. 2004; [INT 182]). A number of 
these models were discussed in the previous chapters. The micro evaluation paradigm (cf. 
Figure 90), as discussed by Beskow et al. (2004), is a framework for assessing if a particular 
model, in the way it has been implemented in a given agent, is understood by users interacting 
with the agent as intended by the agent’s designers (cf. the relationship between the design 
model, system image, and user’s model discussed in Chapter 6.3). This component-level 
evaluation is a necessary pre-condition for demonstrating the added value (cf. Chapter 7.1) of 
embodied interactive agents at the system level (macro evaluation). Judgment studies involve 
implementing a given model in an agent and testing with users if the agent appears and behaves 
in a way that is close to the model ([INT 182]). Usually, the desired information cannot be 
reliably obtained by asking participants directly whether the agent being evaluated possesses 
certain properties, such as competence, likeability, and trustworthiness. Instead, this should be 
tested indirectly by engaging participants in an interaction with the agent showing that they 
assign these properties to the agent ([INT 182]). 
Many models borrowed from the literature are incomplete, controversial, and were not 
designed to be implemented in embodied interactive agents, lacking necessary information or 
detail (Beskow et al. 2004). This is especially true of higher-level models (e.g. of emotion and 
personality, cf. Chapter 13), which describe aspects of an individual that are not directly 
observable, in contrast to lower-level models (e.g. of audio-visual speech and non-verbal 
behavior), which account for aspects that are more open to inspection ([INT 182]). To fill gaps 
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in a particular model or obtain information for building data-driven models for embodied 
interactive agents, it is necessary to collect data (from human subjects) and check its validity. 
This is done in data elicitation studies and data validation studies, respectively (Beskow et al. 
2004; [INT 182]). 
15.4  Evaluation Methodology 
Embodied interactive software agents have to be evaluated in a methodologically sound way. 
Fortunately, the design of agent evaluation studies can draw on a vast body of existing know-
how for doing evaluation research. The following sections review different aspects of this 
know-how in the context of evaluating embodied interactive agents. The discussion is largely 
based on two articles by Christoph (2004) and Ruttkay et al. (2004) that were published in the 
volume on evaluating embodied interactive agents249 edited by Ruttkay and Pelachaud (2004). 
15.4.1  The Research Model 
Any evaluation study should be based on a clear view of the basic research design. The research 
model provides a visual, schematic overview of a particular evaluation study that shows the 
main stages involved in the research, which include the following (Christoph 2004: 72ff.): 
• Formulation of the research objectives. Researchers may intend their evaluation study to 
contribute to the building or extension of a theoretical framework, or they may hope that it 
helps them (or others) to solve some practical problem. A third possibility is that they may 
be interested in deriving design guidelines for embodied interactive agents (cf. Section 15.1). 
• Description of the nature and setup of the study, i.e. what kind of research will be conducted, 
and how. For example, theory-testing research is concerned with the formulation and testing 
of hypotheses (i.e. tentative and testable suppositions or explanations to be confirmed or 
                                              
249  In the contributions to that volume, these agents are called “embodied conversational agents.” 
 
Figure 90. The micro evaluation paradigm for embodied interactive agents. Adapted from Beskow et al. 
(2004). 
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disproved (falsified) by further investigation250). Evaluation research with a diagnostic 
perspective attempts to determine the nature or cause of a particular phenomenon. 
• Identification of information sources. This typically involves reviewing relevant publications 
from the research literature (cf. Section 15.4.4.4) and the interviewing of domain experts (cf. 
Section 15.4.5.2). 
An example of a research model for evaluating an embodied interactive agent is shown in 
Figure 91. Such a research model provides the basis for formulating the main question to be 
answered by the evaluation research. 
15.4.2  The Research Question 
The research question identifies the phenomenon that researchers plan to address in a particular 
evaluation study in order to achieve their research objective ([INT 185]). A strong research 
question clearly indicates what has to be done and what data has to be collected in the study, 
thus guiding the research and making it more efficient (Christoph 2004: 74). Good research 
questions provide information about the domain of the study, the constructs and variables to be 
used, the target population, the time and place (if they are relevant for understanding the study 
and/or interpreting its results), and the type of problem (e.g. descriptive, explanatory, or design-
related) with which the study will be concerned (pp. 74f.). Furthermore, the research question 
should be explicit about the anticipated benefits of answering the research question and the 
range of potential benefactors (and how the results of the research can help them) ([INT 185]). 
Research questions with a narrow focus can more feasibly be answered by a single evaluation 
study than broad questions. For example, the question “How can designers make agents more 
believable?” is too broad to be answered by a single evaluation study (and there may not even 
be a single, universally applicable answer). A more specific question would be a better starting 
point, such as: “What is the relationship between facial displays of anger, joy, and sadness and 
the perceived believability of an embodied interactive agent?” ([INT 185]). 
15.4.3  Constructs 
After the research question has been formulated, it is necessary to find a way to describe and 
measure the phenomenon of interest. Often, evaluation research addresses abstract phenomena 
which cannot be measured directly, such as the user’s subjective experience of an embodied 
interactive agent, the agent’s influence on the user’s attitudes and behaviors during and across 
interactions, and effects of the agent on the outcome of the interaction. These phenomena are 
described in terms of constructs (Christoph 2004: 75f.). A construct, or psychological construct 
as it is also called, is a hypothesized latent entity which is an abstract characterization of 
observable human behavior. It variably assumes the name of ability, attribute, trait, and other 
mental states, characteristics, or qualities that cannot be measured or observed directly (p. 75). 
Examples of constructs that may be involved in the evaluation of embodied interactive agents 
include trust, liking, frustration, motivation, intelligence, language proficiency, and personality. 
                                              
250  A hypothesis can only be confirmed or disproved if it is falsifiable, i.e. if it can be shown to be false 
by way of performing an experiment or making an observation ([INT 183]). However, even if 
confirmed, the hypothesis is not necessarily proven but retains its provisional nature ([INT 184]). 
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The intangible nature of constructs requires their operationalization, which involves the 
translation of a given construct into a set of variables251 for which researchers can obtain values 
directly through measurement or observation (Christoph 2004: 75, cf. Figure 92). For example, 
anger can be operationalized by measuring or observing facial expression, word selection, 
loudness and tone of voice ([INT 186]). For subjective constructs like trust and liking, finding 
an appropriate decomposition into measurable variables that can be related to aspects of agent 
design can be difficult a priori since these notions depend on the application context and on the 
user (Ruttkay et al. 2004: 47). In general, construct validity has to be verified in order to make 
sure that the instrument chosen measures the latent construct for which it has been adopted 
(Christoph 2004: 75; [INT 187]). 
Ryu and Baylor (2005) developed and validated an empirical instrument for measuring 
learners’ perception of a pedagogical agent persona. Their final agent persona instrument 
defined two constructs: Informational Usefulness, which corresponds to human instructor 
ability and refers to the pedagogical agent being perceived as a knowledgeable instructor; and 
Affective Interaction, which corresponds to human instructor personality and communication 
and refers to the agent’s caring and motivating social presence (cf. Chapter 5.4.5) and its ability 
to communicate naturally with the learner, including emotional expression (cf. Chapter 13.4.2) 
and non-verbal communication (cf. Chapter 10.1) (Ryu & Baylor 2005: 307ff.). Four factors of 
a pedagogical agent persona emerged: the first two, Credible and Facilitating Learning, 
constituted the construct of Informational Usefulness, whereas the remaining two factors, 
Human-like and Engaging, made up the construct of Affective Interaction. For each of the four 
factors, Ryu and Baylor proposed a set of questionnaire items (Ryu & Baylor 2005: 315), with 
each item measured in terms of a 5-point Likert scale (cf. Section 15.4.5.1). 
                                              
251  Variables are measurable characteristics of an individual or system that can assume different values 
and have a hypothesized influence on the situation being studied. A testable variable can capture at 
least the presence or absence of a particular characteristic, i.e. it has two (or more) values (Buisine et 
al. 2002). Variables can be aggregated and measured at different levels (Christoph 2004: 75). 
 
Figure 91. A research model for an empirical evaluation study aiming to determine effects of a speech-
driven anthropomorphic agent on student learning. Adapted from Christoph (2004: 73, Figure 3.2). 
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15.4.4  Research Strategies 
A research strategy is like an airport or a bus terminal. The terminal is not the destination. It is a 
facility that helps travelers get where they want to go. (James E. Page). 
Once researchers have a model for their research, a solid and feasible research question, and 
constructs and variables for measuring phenomena of interest, the next step involves devising a 
research strategy, i.e. a plan for conducting the evaluation research in a systematic and goal-
oriented manner (Christoph 2004: 76f.). Depending on whether researchers choose to collect 
their own data or to review the data collected by others, two major categories of research 
strategies can be identified. The first, empirical research (Beller 2004; Höfer & Tichy 2006), 
conducts systematic and controlled inquiry into a domain of interest that involves the first-hand 
collection of data from experience, observation, or experimentation, followed by the analysis of 
the collected data according to established and well-defined principles ([INT 188]). Three 
empirical research strategies are important for the evaluation of embodied interactive agents 
(Christoph 2004: 77): 
• Survey (cf. Section 15.4.4.1) and experiment (cf. Section 15.4.4.2) for summative evaluation 
(cf. Section 15.3.3); 
• Case study (cf. Section 15.4.4.3) for formative evaluation (cf. Section 15.3.2). 
In contrast, desk research (cf. Section 15.4.4.4) is the process of reviewing available material 
(data and publications) to answer a new research question (Christoph 2004: 77). All four 
research strategies (survey, experiment, case study, and desk research) are discussed in the 
following subsections. 
15.4.4.1 Survey 
Surveys (Krosnick 1999; Timmerman 2002; Glasow 2005; Dillman 2007) involve the 
systematic collection of data from a typically large number of individuals (more than 50), 
which are randomly selected rather than chosen deliberately (Christoph 2004: 77), by asking 
them individually a series of pre-determined questions (Houston 1997). Popular techniques for 
conducting surveys include low-cost and low-effort methods, such as questionnaires consisting 
of mainly closed questions (cf. Section 15.4.5.1) in paper or electronic format, telephone 
 
Figure 92. The operationalization of a construct into variables. Adapted from Christoph (2004: 76, 
Figure 3.3). 
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surveys, and structured interviews (cf. Section 15.4.5.2) (Christoph 2004: 77). To protect the 
privacy of participants, surveys are typically anonymous or anonymized (Leone et al. 2006: 20). 
Surveys provide a flexible and efficient way for developers of embodied interactive agents to 
collect a variety of information about the target group of people that will be using their agents 
(e.g. users’ attitudes, background, experience, wishes, etc.) from a relatively large subset of 
users ([INT 189]). A thoughtful survey design combined with a high number of respondents 
allows the generalization of the survey results to the overall population. Often, surveys produce 
quantitative (numerical) data (cf. Section 15.4.5) that can be analyzed statistically (cf. Section 
15.4.6.2) to investigate the relationships among (groups of) variables (Leone et al. 2006: 20). 
Well-defined techniques are available to assess if the results of a survey are valid, reliable, and 
statistically significant ([INT 189]). Surveys can also be used to compare subgroups of the 
population or results from one survey to the next, and to collect data that is representative of or 
allows predictions about the target population (Leone et al. 2006: 19). By using a standardized 
set consisting only of questions pertaining to the research, surveys provide for economy of data 
collection and analysis ([INT 189]). Finally, the data collected from electronic surveys can be 
automatically stored and pre-processed, which facilitates both data collection and analysis. 
However, these advantages should be weighed against several shortcomings. For one, 
surveys will only generate useful data if they have been carefully designed. But even well-
designed surveys can fail to reveal important (especially unanticipated) aspects if they only 
consist of pre-determined questions and answers (Leone et al. 2006: 20). Surveys adopt the 
individual as their unit of analysis, which may not be the best choice for studying social 
processes and other complex phenomena ([INT 189]). In general, surveys have to rely on 
participants’ motivation, honesty, and memory and that they have the time, technology, and 
mental/physical ability to respond. But people may not know or remember, they may be sloppy 
or deceitful, and they may wish to project a positive image of themselves ([INT 189]). They 
may also be inclined to give answers which they assume are ‘expected’ of them because those 
answers are “politically correct” or suggested by the format or content of survey items. Paulhus 
defined this response bias in general as “a systematic tendency to respond to a range of [survey] 
items one some basis other than the specific item content (i.e. what the items were designed to 
measure)” (Paulhus 1991: 17). Response bias affects survey validity (Leone et al. 2006: 19). 
People who choose to respond to a survey typically select themselves into a group with certain 
properties. For example, only people with a positive attitude toward computer technology may 
choose to fill in a computer-based survey. This self-selection can bias the results of a survey 
because of the potentially large number of non-respondents (Christoph 2004: 77). Therefore, 
surveys require high response rates to produce reliable results that are generalizable (Leone et 
al. 2006: 19f.). Both the response bias and the response rate are difficult to control in a survey 
study (p. 20). 
15.4.4.2 Experiment 
An experiment (Campbell & Stanley 1963; Weber & Skillings 2000; Heffner 2004a; 
Christensen 2006; Martin 2007; [INT 190]; [INT 191]) is an empirical scientific procedure 
performed to discover new things, support or falsify hypotheses (cf. Section 15.4.1), or 
demonstrate what is already known (OED 1998: 647; [INT 191]). Experiments are used to 
study cause and effect in a controlled setting by deliberately manipulating one variable and 
keeping all other aspects of the situation constant ([INT 190]). 
Participants are randomly assigned to one of two groups (conditions), the experimental 
group and the control group. A change (the intervention) is introduced for the experimental 
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group but not for the control group. The control condition is the standard or baseline to which 
the results of the experimental condition are compared ([INT 190]). Nass et al. argued that the 
comparison of varied conditions is necessary if the hypotheses to be tested in the experiment 
are relative and comparative in nature (e.g. “Users will perceive Agent A as more instructor-
like than Agent B” or “Users will find it easier to remember the agent’s messages if they are 
delivered using speech rather than text”), which they typically are in experimental studies on 
embodied interactive software agents (Nass et al. 2000a: 376). 
It is essential to match the experimental and control groups on all relevant characteristics, 
including age, gender, experience, etc. ([INT 190]). According to Nass et al., if the differences 
between the experimental and the control condition are restricted to one or two well-defined 
characteristics (e.g. use of synthetic speech vs. recorded speech), the results allow very specific 
conclusions that provide answers to specific design-related or theoretical questions. However, 
larger effects will likely go unnoticed. In contrast, if the conditions differ at a gross level (e.g. 
agent vs. no-agent), only very broad conclusions are possible, which may be useful at the early 
design stages (e.g. should the application feature an agent at all?) but do not help with particular 
design decisions (Nass et al. 2000a: 376). 
Nass et al. provided two reasons why random assignment of subjects to the conditions of an 
experiment is important. First, if users are deliberately assigned to a particular condition based 
on gender, computer literacy, personality, or some other characteristic, observed differences 
between conditions cannot be attributed clearly to the manipulation but may also result from the 
properties or qualities of the subjects in a condition. Second, if users can choose their condition, 
the result may be an imbalanced distribution of subjects among the conditions. Furthermore, 
outcomes of the experiment may be influenced by subjects liking either the condition they 
chose (post-decision justification) or the other condition(s) which they did not choose (buyer’s 
remorse) (Nass et al. 2000a: 376). 
Experiments can be used to systematically evaluate the effects of design parameters of 
embodied interactive agents (cf. Section 15.2.1) by varying the value of a single parameter at a 
time while keeping the rest constant (Ruttkay et al. 2002). However, generalizations from the 
results of a single experiment may be problematic. But it is possible to replicate experiments, 
and the confidence in the validity of generalizations from an experiment will increase as more 
and more researchers repeat the experiment with the same results ([INT 190]). Replication 
presupposes that the research question (cf. Section 15.4.2), the constructs and the variables 
operationalizing them (cf. Section 15.4.3), the agent being evaluated (cf. Section 15.2.1), the 
group of subjects (cf. Section 15.2.2), the context (cf. Section 15.2.3), the experimental setup, 
and the methods for data collection (cf. Section 15.4.5) and data analysis (cf. Section 15.4.6) 
are clearly described. Well-established metrics and methods should be preferred to facilitate 
replication of the experiment by other researchers. 
15.4.4.3 Case Study 
Case studies (Stake 1995; Yin 2003) involve the in-depth, long-term study of the development 
of a particular individual, group of people, event, or situation (the case) (OED 1998: 282; [INT 
192]). The case is described in terms of rich, mostly qualitative data (cf. Section 15.4.5), which 
helps the researcher to develop a comprehensive understanding of the case. This, in turn, is 
instrumental in identifying directions for future research. In particular, case studies can help 
researchers to formulate hypotheses, which can be tested by follow-up experiments (cf. Section 
15.4.4.2) ([INT 192]). 
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Because of their detail-oriented, long-term nature, case studies normally involve only a small 
number of participants (typically at most 8 to 10), which are selected deliberately rather than 
randomly (unlike in experimental studies). In contrast to surveys (cf. Section 15.4.4.1), case 
studies collect data using more time-consuming methods, such as interviews (cf. Section 
15.4.5.2) and observations (cf. Section 15.4.5.3). The data obtained is subjected to a qualitative 
rather than a quantitative analysis (cf. Section 15.4.6.1). All in all, case studies are a very 
flexible research instrument, but also one that (normally) does not produce generalizable results 
and may require a lot of effort (Christoph 2004: 79). 
Kroetz (1999) conducted a case study on a virtual reality training simulation featuring the 
pedagogical tutor agent STEVE (cf. Figure 17b). To shed light on the effects of adding an 
animated tutor to the simulation, three constructs (cf. Section 15.4.3) were adopted: tutor 
believability, active participation by the participants, and the mental models that they form of 
the simulation (cf. Chapter 6.3). Data was collected from relevant publications, personal 
interviews, system documentation, the program environment, and a simulation procedure, in 
which 10 deliberately selected individuals were studied as they interacted with STEVE, 
observing an operation procedure demonstrated by the agent and then performing the procedure 
themselves. The results of the study indicated that STEVE was believable as a sentient virtual 
human (although it did not express emotions), induced participants to respond to the agent in 
human-like ways, helped them to efficiently learn a complex procedure, and ensured that they 
actively participated in the simulation (Kroetz 1999). 
15.4.4.4 Desk Research 
While empirical research is concerned with collecting and analyzing primary data, i.e. ‘raw’ 
data obtained directly from the source, desk research finds and analyzes secondary data, i.e. 
existing data which has been collected, processed, and published before, typically by other 
researchers and for a different purpose. Sources of secondary data include books, journal 
articles, conference proceedings, web sites, discussion forums, newsgroups, mailing lists, 
weblogs, corpora, databases, statistics, and others. 
Often, desk research is conducted as a preparation for other kinds of (empirical) research, to 
find out about the work of others, identify interesting research questions (cf. Section 15.4.2), 
inform study design, etc. Successful desk research involves ([INT 193]): 
• Knowing where to look and what to look for. Desk research should start with compiling a list 
of sources that provide both information and pointers to other sources. 
• Understanding the quality of the source material. Sources differ with respect to how they 
obtain, analyze, and process their information, and for what purposes. Hence, the challenge 
is to harmonize information from different sources and to identify the best sources for the 
study. 
• Obtaining the right information. Most information might be interesting, but it is not 
important to answering the research question. 
Meta studies are a particular type of desk research which reviews secondary data published 
in other studies and draws conclusions from their results, methods, etc. (Christoph 2004: 77). 
Previous meta studies on embodied interactive software agents have identified, for example: 
• The impact of animated interface agents on the user’s subjective experience of the overall 
system, his or her behavior during interactions with the system, and the outcome of the 
interaction measured in terms of the user’s performance (Dehn & van Mulken 2000); 
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• Major categories of embodied interactive agent research (Isbister & Doyle 2002); 
• Criteria for agent quality (Haddad & Klobas 2002); 
• A framework for summarizing evaluation studies on embodied interactive agents (Ruttkay et 
al. 2002); 
• A conceptual framework for describing the design space of embodied interactive agent 
systems (Xiao 2006). 
15.4.5  Data Collection 
Data collection is the process of gathering information from the participants in an evaluation 
study. What method is chosen to collect the data for the study depends largely on the research 
strategy adopted (Christoph 2004: 80). Table 31 lists the methods commonly used for the 
different empirical research strategies discussed in the previous section. These methods fall into 
two categories: 
• Qualitative methods collect detailed descriptive, non-numerical data in audio, visual, or 
verbal format that is captured on a nominal scale252. Common examples of qualitative data 
include interview transcripts, field notes, video and audio data, images, and documents (e.g. 
reports, minutes, e-mails, stories, etc.) but also colors, smells, tastes, textures, brands, ethnic 
backgrounds, marital status, feelings, judgments, and so on. 
• Quantitative methods collect data that is counted or measured (on an ordinal,253 interval,254 or 
ratio scale255) and expressed as numbers. Many kinds of survey data (cf. Section 15.4.4.1) 
are of this type, in particular Likert scale category responses (cf. Section 15.4.5.1). Other 
examples include test scores, checklists, time to complete a task, age, weight, heart rate, IQ 
scores, voltage, temperature, etc. Nominal data is also sometimes regarded as quantitative 
data. 
                                              
252  Nominal scales provide a set of distinct, unordered categories that can be attached as labels to items 
([INT 194]). Examples of nominal categories include male/female (participants), positive/negative 
(judgments), different colors, etc. (Christoph 2004: 80). 
253  Ordinal scales measure degree (but not amount) of difference in terms of an ordered set of categories 
([INT 195]). 
254  Interval scales consist of ordered categories with an equal distance between them ([INT 196]). Their 
zero point is arbitrary ([INT 194]). 
255  A ratio scale is characterized by ordered, equidistant categories, and it has an absolute zero value 
([INT 197]; Christoph 2004: 80). 
Table 31. Data collection methods for empirical research strategies. Adapted from Christoph (2004: 80, 
Table 3.2). 
Data Collection Method Survey Experiment Case Study 
Questionnaire  Yes Yes  
Interview  Yes  Yes 
Observation   Yes Yes 
Log Files   Yes  
Physiological Measures   Yes  
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Data collection methods should generate reliable data, which is repeatable or reproducible. 
That is, similar results should be obtained if the study is performed again with the same method 
under the same circumstances (Christoph 2004: 88). The data collected should also be valid, i.e. 
accurately reflect the construct being measured (pp. 90ff., cf. Section 15.4.3). The most 
informative and valid data can be obtained from using a combination of data collection methods 
in the study (e.g. questionnaire, observation, and interview) (p. 80). 
15.4.5.1 Questionnaire 
Questionnaires (Houston 1997; Krosnick 1999) are by far the most popular data collection 
method used in conducting surveys (cf. Section 15.4.4.1), but they are also used to collect data 
in experiments (cf. Section 15.4.4.2), for example to quantify the effects of the personification 
of agents (cf. Chapter 9.1) on the user (e.g. Koda & Maes 1996; Lester et al. 1997b; Cassell & 
Thórisson 1999). A questionnaire consists of a set of questions, on paper or in electronic form, 
which participants are invited (by mail, in person, or over the Internet) to answer. The filled-in 
questionnaires are collected and analyzed. Questionnaires may involve two kinds of questions 
(Christoph 2004: 82f.): 
• Open-ended questions give participants the opportunity to freely formulate their answers. 
The resulting qualitative data has to be interpreted manually, which requires more time and 
can lead to less objective analyses. In addition, it may be difficult to motivate participants to 
write longer answers. 
• Closed questions provide participants with a limited set of answering options to choose 
from. There are several different types of closed questions, including semantic differentials, 
rating scales (in particular the Likert scale for measuring participants’ degree of agreement 
or disagreement with a statement on a scale with an odd or even number of categories that 
allows them to give a neutral answer or forces a choice, respectively), item ranking, and 
option selection (Houston 1997). Closed questions generate quantitative data. 
15.4.5.2 Interview 
The research interview is a more or less structured one-to-one social interaction between a 
researcher and a subject. The interviewer attempts to collect data from the interviewee by 
asking him or her questions, face-to-face, over the telephone, or via the Internet, that aim to 
elicit the interviewee’s views, knowledge, or whatever aspect is the focus of the research. 
Structured interviews are formal, systematic, and standardized exchanges in which the 
interviewer asks each participant the same catalogue of pre-determined questions in the same 
order and wording in order to maximize consistency from one interview/interviewee to the next 
(TV&C 2001; [INT 198]). For the most part, structured interviews use closed questions, and 
they generate quantitative data for statistical analysis. Structured interviews are appropriate in 
situations where researchers are (quite) certain about what data they wish to collect and the data 
can be expressed in quantitative terms ([INT 199]). The range of replies should be predictable, 
whereas the magnitude of each reply has to be determined (Bonato et al. 2007: 38). 
Unstructured interviews are spontaneous, free-flowing conversations between interviewer 
and interviewee ([INT 199]), which follow some general themes but are mainly intended to 
give respondents freedom in talking about the topic and to allow them to steer the interview in a 
different direction. The data obtained during an unstructured interview is normally qualitative 
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in nature. Due to their flexible nature, unstructured interviews have applications in explorative 
studies where the nature of the desired information is not known ([INT 199]), for example to 
develop a general understanding of the problem to be solved at the beginning of a project. For 
instance, unstructured interviews may be conducted with representative users from the target 
group of an embodied interactive agent to be designed in order to find out about their attitudes 
toward and previous experiences with agents and other kinds of intelligent user interfaces. 
However, researchers require considerable interview skills to carry out successful unstructured 
interviews because they have to maintain the overall focus of an interview while giving the 
interviewee as much freedom as possible. 
Semi-structured interviews are somewhere between the two previous types. On the one hand, 
the researcher follows a pre-determined schedule for the interview specifying the questions and 
their order, but on the other hand, the interviewer may deviate from the schedule to explore 
interesting topics or issues that emerge during the interview ([INT 199]). This hybrid interview 
form is particularly useful in studies where researchers have a fairly good idea of the questions 
or issues of interest but are less sure about the range of responses from the participants (Bonato 
et al. 2007: 38). In general, the need to integrate flexible exploration with the pre-specified 
schedule presupposes quite sophisticated interview skills on the part of the person conducting 
the interview. 
Focus groups (Powell & Single 1996; Gibbs 1997; Morgan 1997) are small groups of people 
(up to 10) that are brought together by researchers to discuss and share their views on the topic 
under investigation in an interactive group setting (Powell & Single 1996: 499). The group 
interaction is guided and facilitated by a moderator who is responsible for ([INT 199]): 
• Making transparent the purpose and goals of the group; 
• Putting participants at their ease; 
• Facilitating interaction within the group by asking open questions; 
• Requesting clarification, details, or examples from the participants; 
• Maintaining progression and focus of the discussion; 
• Making sure that each group member contributes to the discussion. 
Focus groups discussing the design of an interactive software system (e.g. an embodied 
interactive agent) are commonly shown a computer- or paper-based prototype of the system and 
asked to express their attitudes, feelings, impressions, etc. with respect to the design prototype. 
It is essential that the members of the focus group can do this freely. Therefore, the focus group 
should not be moderated by a developer of the system under review because he or she would be 
unable to perform the duties of the moderator with the necessary neutrality (Christoph 2004: 
81). 
15.4.5.3 Observation 
Observation is a process that involves the carefully planned, prepared, and executed perception 
of a person or thing in a specific environment over a certain period of time in order to obtain 
information. “An observation is always preceded by a particular interest, a question, or a 
problem – in short, by something theoretical” (Popper 1979: 342). 
Formal or systematic observation works with a simplified view of reality that is created by 
selecting and studying particular aspects of this reality. This complexity reduction is achieved 
by following explicit rules in order to facilitate replication of the results by other researchers. 
The observation produces quantitative results indicating, for example, the frequency with which 
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a particular observed behavior occurs (Christoph 2004: 83f.). Systematic observation involves 
the two principles of selectivity of perception (i.e. the need to choose a subset of reality for 
observation) and subjectivity of perception (i.e. the tendency of observers to make mistakes and 
to be biased by their previous experiences, knowledge, and ideas) (p. 84). 
Informal or descriptive observation is an unstructured and exploratory process that is usually 
carried out when little is known about the target population and its behavior. The researcher 
observes the behavior, conversations, and other interactions of the participants. This kind of 
observation generates qualitative data in the form of notes, sketches, pictures, audio and video 
recordings, and so on (Christoph 2004: 81). For example, the researcher can observe a master 
teacher of linguistic fieldwork who supervises a group of apprentice fieldworkers as they 
interact with one or several native speakers to elicit linguistic data, and take notes of any 
aspects of the roles and behaviors of the native speaker, the master teacher, and the apprentices 
that could inform the design of embodied interactive software agents for the roles of virtual 
native speaker, coach, and peer (cf. Chapter 16.2). Informal observation helps to refine research 
questions (cf. Section 15.4.2) and develop appropriate research strategies (cf. Section 15.4.4) 
when a research project is still in its early stages (p. 81). 
Participant observation (Spradley 1980; DeWalt & DeWalt 2002) is a kind of informal 
observation where the observer is directly involved with the people, environment, and events 
that he or she is studying ([INT 200]). The researcher’s immersion in the group of participants 
allows him or her to become privy to events which participants might be reluctant to share with 
an outside observer. However, a participant observer will never be objective, and keeping 
participants in the dark about the fact that they are being observed by one of their own group 
gives rise to ethical concerns. Finally, the data collection process can be difficult because the 
participant observer has to find a way to unobtrusively collect data from the other participants 
(Christoph 2004: 82). 
15.4.5.4 Log Files 
Computer-based systems commonly maintain log files that record events occurring during the 
operation of the system or an application for the purpose of diagnostics, surveillance, statistics, 
or improvement. In evaluation studies, log files can be used as an automatic data collection 
mechanism. While users are interacting with the system being evaluated, their behaviors, 
including commands, errors, messages, navigation paths, etc., are automatically captured and 
written to one or several log files or databases (Christoph 2004: 84f.). 
Log files are an inexpensive and (similar to physiological measures, cf. Section 15.4.5.5) 
unobtrusive method for collecting data from users. However, they are not without problems 
(Christoph 2004: 85). First, the fact that data can be gathered unbeknownst to users raises 
ethical issues with respect to what subset of the user-related information that can be feasibly 
collected should in fact be collected. Second, logs can be used to accumulate data, but how 
should this data be analyzed to discover useful information, which may be buried deep within 
the data? To extract relationships and correlations hidden in the data, data mining techniques 
(Hand et al. 2001; Hearst 2003) can be useful. Third, low-level data in log files may support 
different interpretations of the user’s behavior, so it may be necessary to (unobtrusively) collect 
further data for disambiguation from the user during the study, e.g. by adding auditory and 
visual input channels to the setup. 
The information in log files can also be used directly to improve the performance of systems. 
For example, the exchanges between chatbots (cf. Chapter 11.3.2) and users can be logged to 
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identify user inputs to which the bot did not have an (appropriate) response and to enhance the 
chatbot’s database of response categories to enable the bot to handle these new cases. 
15.4.5.5 Physiological Measures 
Physiological data consists of variations in motor output and body readouts of human subjects 
that provide subconscious indicators of their emotional, mental, and physical state. Some kinds 
of physiological responses are readily observable by other people (e.g. facial expressions, voice 
inflection, gestures, etc.) while others, such as body temperature, perspiration, and blood 
pressure, can be detected through physical contact or measured by means of special instruments 
(cf. Chapter 13.1.1). 
The attractiveness of collecting physiological data from participants comes from the fact that 
an individual has only limited conscious control over these responses. Hence, physiological 
measures are believed to generate more objective data than, for example, questionnaires (cf. 
Section 15.4.5.1) and observational studies (cf. Section 15.4.5.3), whose results may be affected 
by the self-selection and self-presentation of the participants and the subjectivity of the 
observer, respectively (Christoph 2004: 85).256 
But evaluators should be careful when drawing conclusions about a particular construct on 
the basis of measurements obtained for the physiological variables that operationalize it (cf. 
Section 15.4.3). For example, participants’ experience of stress indicated by physiological 
measures may not be due to the experimental intervention (e.g. being watched by an embodied 
interactive agent, cf. Chapter 10.4) but result from the experience of being subjected to 
physiological measurement, since the experimental apparatus necessary to collect physiological 
measures may create some kind of hospital or laboratory atmosphere that evokes negative 
associations and memories (Christoph 2004: 85f.). 
15.4.6  Data Analysis 
Data analysis (Christoph 2004: 92ff.; Hardy & Bryman 2004) processes the data collected in an 
evaluation study to extract information and draw conclusions from the data ([INT 201]). 
Ideally, all stages of the evaluation research (study design, data collection, data analysis, report 
writing and review) involve consideration of data analysis to some extent (Wisler et al. 1992). 
The results of data analysis are used to answer the research question (cf. Section 15.4.2). The 
answer should include conclusions from and explanations for the results, any generalizations 
that can be made from the results, influencing factors that might explain unexpected results, and 
questions that could be addressed by future research (Christoph 2004: 95f.). 
                                              
256  Prendinger et al. (2007) used an eye tracker to collect quantitative data about their subjects’ focus of 
attention indicated by their eye movements during interactions with a life-like animated interface 
agent. They argued that “[t]he tracking of eye movements lends itself to reliably capturing the 
moment-to-moment experience of interface users, which is hard to assess by using post-experiment 
questionnaires” (p. 282). Prendinger et al. found that the agent’s deictic gestures (cf. Chapter 10.1.2) 
more effectively guided participants’ attention toward relevant parts of the interface than a text box 
or spoken comment. 
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Depending on the type of data being analyzed, two major types of data analysis can be 
distinguished: qualitative analysis is concerned with non-numerical (qualitative) data, whereas 
quantitative analysis processes numerical (quantitative data). 
15.4.6.1 Qualitative Data Analysis 
Qualitative data analysis (Miles & Huberman 1994; Denzin & Lincoln 2003; Hardy & Bryman 
2004: Part V; Silverman 2005) examines and interprets any non-numerical data collected during 
an evaluation study, including the textual, narrative, and visual data generated by informal 
observations (cf. Section 15.4.5.3), unstructured interviews (cf. Section 15.4.5.2), focus group 
transcripts (cf. Section 15.4.5.2), document analysis, etc. (Morra-Imas & Rist 2002). The goal is 
to discover common words, phrases, issues, themes, or patterns (e.g. changes over time, causal 
relationships, etc.) in the data (Morra-Imas & Rist 2002), to identify connections between them, 
and to formulate conclusions and explanations with respect to the categories and relationships 
found in the data. Approaches to qualitative data analysis include grounded theory (Strauss 
1987; Glaser 1992; Charmaz 2006), semiotics (Eco 1979; Chandler 2002; Deely 2005), and 
conversation analysis (Sacks 1995; Hutchby & Wooffitt 1998; ten Have 1999). Important tasks 
in qualitative data analysis are listed below (Miles & Huberman 1994: 44; Beusch & Zäch 
1997): 
• Coding. Assigning descriptive labels (codes) to segments of the data; 
• Search and retrieval. Locating and retrieving coded segments from the data; 
• Aggregation. Developing codes into superordinate codes or categories; 
• Data linking. Establishing relationships between coded parts of the data; 
• Data display. Representing data, codes, categories, memos, and their relationships; 
• Memoing. Recording ideas, questions, notes, etc. about data, codes, and categories; 
• Theory building. Developing concepts and theories based on the network of codes, 
categories, and memos. 
Seidel (1998) presented a model of qualitative data analysis that is shown in Figure 93. 
According to Seidel, the analysis of qualitative data involves “noticing things,” “thinking about 
things,” and “collecting things” as activities in a non-linear process that is iterative and 
progressive (the analysis process is cyclic and moves upward like a spiral), recursive (a given 
activity can take the analysis back to a previous activity), and holographic (the entire analysis 
process is involved in each step). 
The qualitative approach is appropriate for the early stages of research projects ([INT 202]) 
when little is known about the target domain and population since its open-ended nature makes 
it particularly suitable for exploratory research. In contrast to quantitative studies, which use 
tools such as questionnaires, sensory equipment, and statistics software to collect and analyze 
numerical data, in a qualitative study, the investigator is the primary instrument for gathering 
and processing data ([INT 202]) from interviews, observations, focus groups, etc. (although 
different computer-based tools to facilitate the tasks of qualitative data collection and analysis 
are available). The data that can be collected and analyzed in a qualitative study is much more 
varied and detailed than numbers and statistics ([INT 202]). The research process is also much 
less pre-structured (and hence more flexible but also less predictable) than in quantitative 
studies. On the downside, because qualitative research relies heavily on people for data 
collection and analysis and qualitative methods are commonly labor-intensive and time-
consuming (Morra-Imas & Rist 2002), the number of participants in a study has to be kept 
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small. Furthermore, the inevitable subjectivity of investigators must be addressed to ensure the 
validity of the data and the analysis. Finally, due to the small sample sizes involved, it is usually 
more difficult to make generalizations from the results of qualitative data analysis ([INT 202]). 
15.4.6.2 Quantitative Data Analysis 
Quantitative data analysis (Wisler et al. 1992; Blaikie 2003) is concerned with the 
transformation of numerical data, which can be counted, classified, measured, and sorted using 
formal, objective methods. The data may come from a questionnaire (cf. Section 15.4.5.1), 
structured interviews (cf. Section 15.4.5.2), formal observations (cf. Section 15.4.5.3), analysis 
of log files (cf. Section 15.4.5.4), and/or physiological measures (cf. Section 15.4.5.5). Analysis 
of quantitative data is performed using two major kinds of statistics257 (Coolidge 2006; Triola 
2006): descriptive and inferential statistics (Morra-Imas & Rist 2002; Christoph 2004: 92ff.). 
As a first step, descriptive statistics summarizes and presents the collected data in terms of 
graphs, tables, and calculated numerical values ([INT 203]). It shows the distribution of 
variables (i.e. the frequency of occurrence of their values) using frequency tables or histograms 
(Wisler et al. 1992). The distributions of the different variables in the data set are summarized 
by calculating measures of central tendency, which describe typical values of variables ([INT 
204]), including the arithmetic mean (average), median (mid-point), and mode (most frequent 
value) (Morra-Imas & Rist 2002), and measures of dispersion (or variability), which indicate 
the scattering (or diversity) of the data ([INT 205]). One very popular way to measure the 
dispersion of interval or ratio data (cf. Section 15.4.5) is the standard deviation (SD), whose 
value represents the average distance of a set of values from the mean ([INT 206]). The higher 
the standard deviation, the more deviation in the data, and vice versa (Christoph 2004: 93; [INT 
207]). Measures of relationship (or association) indicate the strength of the relationship 
between variables (Morra-Imas & Rist 2002). Correlation is a measure of association that 
shows both the strength and the direction of the relationship between two variables (Chen & 
Krauss 2004: 1035). Two variables may change in the same direction (direct relationship) or in 
opposite directions (inverse relationship) (Morra-Imas & Rist 2002). 
                                              
257  Statistics is the branch of applied mathematics concerned with the collection, analysis, interpretation, 
and presentation of numerical data in large quantities and the use of probability theory to make 
generalizations or predictions from the data ([INT 209]). 
 
Figure 93. A model of qualitative data analysis. Adapted from Seidel (1998, Figure 1). 
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Inferential statistics uses known statistical descriptions of data about a random sample of 
subjects to infer information about certain unknown aspects, including assumptions about the 
overall population (generalization) and predictions about future observations (Heffner 2004b; 
[INT 208]). Two important aspects of inferential statistics include parameter estimation and 
hypothesis testing (using statistical tests). Parameter estimation performs calculations on data 
collected from a representative sample consisting of randomly selected members of a statistical 
population (cf. Section 15.2.2) to estimate quantities (parameters) that describe this population. 
Any number that characterizes the distribution of a variable measured on a given population is a 
potential population parameter (Wisler et al. 1992). Examples include the mean and the 
standard deviation. Estimates for population parameters may be single ‘best’ values (point 
estimates), or they may consist of the upper and lower boundaries of an interval (interval 
estimates), which represent confidence limits defining an estimated range of values that 
contains the unknown value of a particular population parameter with a certain probability (the 
confidence level) (Wisler et al. 1992; [INT 210]). 
Statistical hypothesis testing involves comparing the likelihoods of the null hypothesis (the 
observations have occurred by random chance) and its competitor, the alternative hypothesis 
(the observed effect is real) ([INT 211]; [INT 212]). If the probability p that the observed effect 
will be obtained if the null hypothesis is true (called the p-value or the level of significance) is 
small (p < 0.05), the null hypothesis is rejected because there is at least a 95% certainty that the 
observed effect did not occur by chance, and the effect is called statistically significant. 
Otherwise, it is statistically non-significant ([INT 212]). However, a significant effect is of no 
real practical value if the observed difference between two groups or conditions is small. In 
other words, the effect size, rather than the effect alone, is important (Christoph 2004: 93). 
The major advantage of quantitative data analysis is that it generates reliable and valid 
(‘objective’) results in the form of numbers and statistics by means of well-defined and 
established mathematical methods (provided that the input data is also reliable and valid; 
otherwise, it is “garbage in – garbage out”). The calculations involved in the analysis are 
nowadays performed by computers, which increases efficiency and makes the analysis of large 
samples feasible. The same data set can be subjected to different kinds of statistical analysis 
([INT 209]). The obvious disadvantage of quantitative analysis methods is that they are not 
applicable to data that does not have a numerical format, such as the data generated by informal 
observations (cf. Section 15.4.5.3), unstructured interviews (cf. Section 15.4.5.2), and focus 
groups (cf. Section 15.4.5.2). In general, quantitative approaches should be used in later stages 
of research projects, when the goal and object of the research are clear beforehand, precise 
measurements and analyses of constructs are aimed for, and all details of the study can be 
worked out before the data collection stage ([INT 202]). 
15.5  Guidelines for Agent Evaluation 
The evaluation of embodied interactive agents is a core activity of the development process. 
Given the many opportunities for making less than optimal design decisions, careful and 
systematic investigation of the precise nature and benefits of different (characteristics of) 
embodied interactive software agents in different contexts and with different users becomes an 
essential task in order to reduce the number of ad-hoc choices based on the intuitions and 
opinions of a small group of developers or even a single person. However, the evaluation of 
embodied interactive agents is also not an easy task. Various issues can be identified: 
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• As the research field of embodied interactive agents is still quite young, researchers have 
focused more on building agents and developing the technologies involved than on 
evaluating them. In publications on embodied interactive agents, evaluation has tended to be 
an afterthought, which was described only at the end of the paper (Ruttkay et al. 2004: 30). 
Large-scale evaluations have been quite rare (and still are). 
• Isbister and Doyle pointed out that the field lacks formal theories of embodied interactive 
agents as well as standard criteria for evaluating them. The fundamental research problem 
has not yet been formulated in a way that is accepted by (almost) everybody, and the same is 
true of the definitions of central concepts, including ‘believable,’ ‘embodied,’ ‘social,’ and 
‘conversational.’ The various contributing research communities (cf. Table 30) have 
different views of the nature of embodied interactive agents and what qualities play a role in 
their evaluation (Isbister & Doyle 2004: 5f.). 
• Embodied agents have only recently begun to see commercial application on a larger scale, 
e.g. as chatbots on the World Wide Web (cf. Chapter 11.3.2). Consequently, feedback from 
end-users and the market on the strong points and deficiencies of agent-based applications 
has been sparse. 
• The diversity of designs, tools, terminologies, settings, and methods makes it difficult to 
compare the outcomes of different evaluation studies. As a result, evaluations of embodied 
interactive agents often seem to produce inconsistent results with respect to the effectiveness 
of agents and their components while the actual problem is that the studies concerned differ 
in so many respects that they cannot be compared (Berry et al. 2005: 306). 
• According to Sanders and Scholtz (2000: 3), evaluation is more difficult for interactive 
systems (including embodied agents) than for other kinds of software. Sanders and Scholtz 
provided the following reasons for this (p. 3). First, the nature and priority of performance 
metrics depends on the goals that the user wants to achieve with the system. Second, users 
differ and so do their needs and their expectations of the system. Third, from the user’s point 
of view, the system being evaluated is more than the sum of its components. It is possible to 
design a badly received system made up of high-quality components but also to compensate 
for weak components with an effective interface design. Evaluation has to address both the 
system as a whole (cf. Section 15.3.4) and the effects of individual components (cf. Section 
15.3.5). Finally, as interactive systems grow in complexity, so does their evaluation. 
Enhancing a system with speech and dialogue capabilities and embodying the interface 
might simplify the interaction with the user, but evaluation complexity increases. 
• Embodied interactive agents are often designed to play their part in face-to-face dialogues 
with the user (cf. Chapter 10.1 and Chapter 11). However, embodied communication is very 
complex and still not completely understood, neither in the human-human nor in the human-
agent context (Ruttkay et al. 2004: 40). Hence, both the design and the evaluation of 
embodied interactive software agents have to be based on incomplete theories of human 
communication (cf. Section 15.3.5). Comparing agents to humans according to a partial 
account of human communicative abilities is unlikely to produce definitive results that can 
inform the design of human-agent communication. The same is true of current models of 
emotion and personality (cf. Chapter 13), language processing (cf. Chapter 11.1), expertise 
(cf. Chapter 12), etc. 
• The empirical evaluation of embodied interactive agents requires a methodologically sound 
approach. The problem with early evaluation studies was that they often did not meet the 
standards of empirical research methodology (Dehn & van Mulken 2000: 17ff.). Problems 
found in these studies include: 
Chapter 15: Evaluation 435 
• In system-level evaluations (cf. Section 15.3.4), the effects of the agent were not clearly 
separated from those of the application in which the agent was embedded. Micro 
evaluations (cf. Section 15.3.5) that addressed the effects of certain aspects of an agent 
did not distinguish them from the effects of other aspects that were not investigated. 
• Experimental and control conditions (cf. Section 15.4.4.2) differed in several aspects, not 
just the one to be studied, and in some cases, there was no control group. 
• Studies used vague notions like ‘believability’ or ‘trustworthiness’ as constructs 
(cf. Section 15.4.3) and either did not define them at all or gave their own definitions,258 
which did not necessarily concur with those of other researchers (Ruttkay et al. 2004: 
29f.). 
• Variables were tested only on a small set of items (e.g. a single instance of a female and a 
single instance of a male character to assess how the gender of an embodied agents affects 
the user), which made it impossible to control for random variations in the items (e.g. hair 
style, facial expression, etc.) that might influence user ratings. 
• The studies failed to demonstrate the validity of the variables defined to measure the 
constructs adopted for the study. 
• Participants in evaluation studies were typically recruited from among university or 
college students and/or staff because researchers had convenient access to them. 
However, those individuals were not necessarily representative of the target group of 
users for the agent being evaluated. 
Given these issues and based on the discussion in the previous sections of this chapter, a 
number of guidelines for evaluating embodied interactive software agents can be formulated: 
• Iterative evaluation and design. Design and evaluate your embodied interactive agent 
iteratively, performing formative evaluations early and regularly throughout the development 
process while not neglecting the effectiveness of the overall user-agent system (Johnson 
2004). Take advantage of the complementary contributions from expert reviews and user 
studies in your formative evaluations. Use the results of consecutive evaluations of designs, 
prototypes, and alternative versions of the agent to successively improve the products of the 
development process. 
• Focus on user-agent interaction. Evaluate users’ interaction with the agent rather than only 
the agent (Johnson 2004). Have subjects interact with the agent and not merely watch a 
presentation given by the agent because the true potential of embodied interactive agents lies 
in their interactional capabilities, in particular their capacity for emulating face-to-face 
communication (Dehn & van Mulken 2000: 19, cf. Chapter 7.1). Use these evaluations to 
identify both factors that hinder smooth user-agent interaction and factors that promote 
successful interaction, and eliminate or exploit them, respectively (Johnson 2004). 
• Separate the agent from the application. Make sure that the agent and not the application is 
evaluated by separating the effects of the agent from those of the application (Ruttkay et al. 
                                              
258  One attempt to provide succinct definitions of constructs like believability, efficiency, helpfulness, 
learnability, and trust for the evaluation of embodied interactive agents was made by Ruttkay et al. 
(2002). However, quite a number of these definitions remain vague. For example, Ruttkay et al. 
stated that an agent is believable “if it acts according to the expectations of the user.” Apart from the 
fact that this definition does not mention the “illusion of life” criterion (Bates 1994) found in many 
other definitions of believability, it is not clear what the “expectations of the user” are, although they 
are the central component of the definition. 
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2004: 43f.). (However, keep in mind that in the eyes of the users, the effectiveness of an 
agent also depends on the effectiveness of the system in which it is embedded.) If the 
evaluation targets particular aspects of the agent, it is necessary to separate the effects of 
those aspects from effects of other aspects that are not under investigation. 
• Research question. Formulate a clear and focused research question. Broad questions like 
whether the use of embodied interactive software agents is beneficial or not cannot be 
answered, neither with a single evaluation study nor in general, due to the diversity of the 
factors involved (cf. Section 15.2). Clearly state the goal of your research (understanding the 
effects of embodied interactive agents, comparing alternative agent designs, assessing the 
performance of component technologies, determining conformity to standards, etc.) and who 
will benefit from it (cf. Section 15.1), and how. 
• Constructs. Provide clear descriptions of the constructs and their operationalization. Avoid 
vague constructs like ‘believability,’ ‘effectiveness,’ or ‘trustworthiness.’ Prefer established 
measures to allow others to understand and replicate your results (Isbister & Doyle 2004: 9). 
Demonstrate the validity of the variables used to measure effects (Dehn & van Mulken 2000: 
18). In general, there is a need for standardized evaluation measurements for embodied 
interactive agents (Isbister & Doyle 2004: 6). 
• Selection of subjects. Choose the participants for the study carefully. Those who are 
conveniently available may not be the best choice if they are not representative of the agent’s 
target group of users. Be sure to match the experimental and control groups on all important 
aspects (except for the one being investigated, of course). Developers should not be involved 
as subjects in testing and evaluation because they are naturally biased when it comes to 
judging the qualities of their brainchild (Isbister 2006: 267). Still, they should watch tests 
that involve users from the target group interacting with their agent, either live or later on 
video, because “[s]eeing is believing” (p. 269). 
• Novelty effect. Beware of the novelty effect and how it influences users’ judgment and 
performance (Ruttkay et al. 2004: 50). Given that embodied interactive agents are not as 
common as other types of software systems yet, it is quite likely that they will be a new 
technology for the participants in the study. When users are exposed to an embodied 
interactive agent for the first time, their increased interest in the new technology may 
initially cause them to perform better and to rate the agent more positively ([INT 213]), but 
these effects are likely to fade as the agent ceases to be new and surprising and becomes 
familiar and predictable. Hence, reliable information about the long-term effects of agents 
cannot be obtained by means of studies that have users interact with an agent only once and 
for a short time. 
• Random assignment to varied conditions. When conducting experimental research, assign 
users randomly to a range of different conditions (cf. Section 15.4.4.2). The relative and 
comparative nature of hypotheses on embodied interactive agents forbids evaluating a given 
agent on its own. Instead, the study should compare the agent to one or several different 
versions of the agent or to other agents, an interface without an embodied interactive agent, 
or a human being. What condition(s) the user is exposed to (and in what sequence) should be 
decided by random chance rather than by the user or the experimenter (Nass et al. 2000a: 
375ff.). 
• Control group. In experimental studies, be sure to include a baseline for comparison in the 
form of an appropriate control group that does not receive the manipulation of the 
experimental condition. Design the experimental condition and the control condition in such 
a way that they only differ in terms of the dimension under investigation to make sure that 
any effects found are attributable to differences on that dimension rather than other factors. 
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For example, compare an agent with a 2D cartoon character representation to a 3D cartoon 
agent rather than a 2D cartoon to a 3D photorealistic character (Ruttkay et al. 2004: 62, cf. 
Chapter 9.5). Based on the results of such controlled comparisons, specific guidelines for the 
design of embodied interactive agents can be formulated (cf. Section 15.1 and Section 
15.4.4.2). 
• Economy. Provide for inexpensive evaluation (Sanders & Scholtz 2000: 14). Limit the 
participants in the study to a feasible number. More participants can mean more accurate 
results, but they also mean more work during data collection and analysis. Keep the number 
of constructs and the variables for measuring them to the necessary minimum. Prefer metrics 
that are easy to measure and do not require costly manual analysis (p. 14). Collect as much 
data as possible automatically using, for example, log files or sensory equipment (cf. Section 
15.4.5.4 and Section 15.4.5.5) (p. 14). Use quantitative rather than the more labor-intensive 
qualitative data analysis techniques where possible (cf. Section 15.4.6). Evaluations that are 
inexpensive to do will be performed more often, with larger numbers of users (which may be 
distributed across several evaluation runs), and with several different versions of an agent or 
its components (p. 14). 
• Ethical dimension. Embodied interactive agents have the potential to form social-emotional 
relationships with users (cf. Chapter 7.16) and to influence their attitudes and behaviors 
(Fogg 2003). It follows that agent developers are morally (and possibly someday also 
legally) responsible for their ‘offspring’ and its actions. For example, a chatbot (cf. Chapter 
11.3.2) for children that uses abusive, racist, sexist, etc. language or tries to attract its young 
interlocutors to drugs or to buying the products of its employer gives rise to serious ethical 
concerns.259 Therefore, embodied interactive software agents should also be evaluated with 
respect to their ethical code, not just their technical or task-related capabilities (Barker 
2006). 
• Use of evaluation results. Know how and when to apply the results of evaluation studies and 
who to entrust with their implementation. Shape the culture within the development team to 
ensure the openness of team members to constructive criticism based on evaluation research 
(Isbister 2006: 268f.). 
• Postproduction evaluation. Do not deploy an agent and then forget about it. Instead, collect 
information about its effects in the real world to inform the design of future versions of the 
agent or the design of other agents. Examples include user and peer reviews, reported 
annoyances, “fan mail,” etc. (Isbister 2006: 274). 
15.6  Summary 
The design of embodied interactive software agent depends on evaluation, i.e. the goal-directed, 
methodical, and systematic process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting data about the 
effects of a particular agent in a particular state of development on a particular group of users in 
a particular context. Drawing on the extensive existing knowledge of evaluation methodology, 
                                              
259  Interestingly, an incident was reported on the web site of a German computer magazine in December 
2007, where a Santa Claus chatbot employed by the world’s largest software company had to be 
‘retired’ because it involved minors in a conversation about certain sexual practices and its 
developers were unable to remove the parts responsible for this inappropriate behavior from its 
programming ([INT 214]). 
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this chapter reviewed various methods, strategies, and techniques for conducting different kinds 
of evaluation research and, based on this review, compiled a list of guidelines for the evaluation 
of embodied interactive agents. 
Motivations for doing evaluation research on and with embodied interactive agents were 
identified in Section 15.1. In general, evaluation helps developers to focus their efforts, identify 
progress, make the best choice, and determine success (Sanders & Scholtz 2000: 1). In addition, 
evaluation research can produce guidelines for the design of embodied interactive agents and 
their components. In the next section, it was argued that the evaluation of these agents is 
influenced by three categories of factors: design parameters of the agent, characteristics of the 
user, and aspects of the context of use. Each of these categories was discussed in detail in 
Section 15.2. 
Section 15.3 described different types of evaluation research that differ with respect to the 
time and level at which the evaluation is carried out. First, Section 15.3.1 outlined the stages of 
the software development process and presented several software life cycle models. The next 
two sections covered process-oriented, exploratory (formative) evaluation (cf. Section 15.3.2) 
and outcome-oriented (summative) evaluation (cf. Section 15.3.3). Macro (or system-level) 
evaluation (cf. Section 15.3.4) is concerned with the overall system consisting of the agent, the 
user, the application, and the context of use. In contrast, micro evaluation (cf. Section 15.3.5) 
investigates whether an agent with certain attributes meets expectations, and further identifies 
configurations of design parameters that achieve desired attributes of agents. 
Section 15.4 reviewed evaluation research methodology. Fundamental concepts include the 
research model (an overview of the main steps involved in the research, cf. Section 15.4.1), the 
research question (the question that the research purports to answer, cf. Section 15.4.2), and the 
(psychological) construct (a latent mental entity that cannot be measured directly and therefore 
has to be operationalized in terms of variables, cf. Section 15.4.3). The research strategy (cf. 
Section 15.4.4) provides a plan for the conducting the research. A broad distinction was made 
between empirical research, which collects data first-hand from experience, observation, or 
experimentation, and desk research, which reviews available material from the perspective of a 
different research question. Three empirical research strategies were reviewed: surveys (cf. 
Section 15.4.4.1), experiments (cf. Section 15.4.4.2), and case studies (cf. Section 15.4.4.3). 
Desk research was discussed in Section 15.4.4.4. For each of these research strategies, different 
methods can be used to collect data (cf. Table 31). The various data collection methods 
commonly used in empirical research were reviewed in Section 15.4.5. They include 
questionnaires (cf. Section 15.4.5.1), interviews (cf. Section 15.4.5.2), observations (cf. Section 
15.4.5.3), log files (cf. Section 15.4.5.4), and physiological measures (cf. Section 15.4.5.5). The 
process of data collection generates descriptive, non-numerical and/or numerical data, from 
which the data analysis stage (cf. Section 15.4.6) extracts information, draws conclusions, and 
makes generalizations. Qualitative data analysis (cf. Section 15.4.6.1) examines and interprets 
non-numerical (textual, narrative, and visual) data, which involves collecting, noticing, and 
thinking about items in a process that is iterative and progressive, recursive, and holographic. In 
contrast, quantitative data analysis (cf. Section 15.4.6.2) deals with numerical data, which it 
processes using the methods of descriptive and inferential statistics. 
Finally, Section 15.5 derived a set of guidelines for designing and conducting evaluation 
studies of embodied interactive software agents. These guidelines are summarized below: 
• Design and evaluate the embodied interactive agent iteratively. 
• Focus on user-agent interaction. 
• Separate the agent from the application. 
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• Formulate a clear and focused research question. 
• Provide clear descriptions of the constructs and their operationalization. 
• Choose the participants for the study carefully. 
• Beware of the novelty effect and how it influences users’ judgment and performance. 
• In experiments, assign users randomly to varied conditions. 
• In experiments, include a control group to have a baseline for comparison. 
• Prefer inexpensive ways to perform evaluations. 
• Evaluate agents with respect to their ethical code, not just their capabilities. 
• Have a plan for the use of evaluation results. 
• Keep evaluating after the agent has been deployed. 
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16 Pedagogical Agent Roles on the VLC 
The high priority placed by most educational theorists on the social construction of knowledge 
has provided a powerful new vehicle for the expansion of research and development in the area of 
software agents. Unless the socially interactive aspects of face-to-face learning environments can 
be shown to have a digital equivalent, online courses, while convenient for many students, will 
inevitably be regarded by a large number of educators as second best. (Dowling 2000: 44). 
The previous chapters discussed the design of different components of embodied pedagogical 
software agents in detail, including embodiment, behavior, conversation, expertise, and emotion 
and personality. Two further chapters were concerned with agent architectures and technical 
platforms and with the evaluation of embodied interactive software agents, respectively. In this 
penultimate chapter of the thesis, the insights from the previous chapters are applied to a 
discussion of different pedagogical agent roles in a particular scenario provided by the 
linguistic fieldwork classes on the Virtual Linguistics Campus. First, Section 16.1 outlines the 
current setup of the linguistic fieldwork classes. Section 16.2 then identifies and describes three 
potential roles for pedagogical agents to assist the learner in this scenario: the virtual native 
speaker, the coach, and the peer. Section 16.3 discusses the design of one of these roles (the 
virtual native speaker) in detail. Finally, Section 16.4 summarizes the chapter. 
16.1  The Linguistic Fieldwork Classes 
Linguistic fieldwork (Crowley 2007) involves the in-situ collection of raw linguistic data from 
speakers of unknown (and typically unexplored) languages, followed by the analysis of the 
collected data in order to uncover the linguistic structures (e.g. sound inventory, word and 
sentence structure, and vocabulary) of these languages. In general, fieldwork settings can 
provide authentic, explorative learning experiences for students of linguistics. Learners actively 
construct knowledge (cf. Chapter 2.2.3) about how to do linguistic fieldwork and about the 
target language as they uncover more and more of its grammar (i.e. the native speaker’s 
subconscious knowledge about his or her first language). Unfortunately, for many learners and 
institutions, going to some linguistically unexplored area to do linguistic fieldwork is neither 
feasible nor affordable. 
The linguistic fieldwork classes on the Virtual Linguistics Campus have been created to 
bring linguistic fieldwork scenarios to learners, using the interactive and multimedia features of 
the VLC (Unger 2006b). In October 2007, fieldwork classes were available for the following 
languages: Arabic, Bulgarian, Chinese, Georgian, German, Hindi, Hungarian, Japanese, Polish, 
Romanian, and Welsh (Cymraeg). Classes for Italian, Korean, and Turkish are currently under 
construction. 
As their name implies, the linguistic fieldwork classes are not language courses. Students 
will not learn the language they are investigating, but they will learn about the language as they 
explore its structure using the methods of linguistic fieldwork. The emphasis of the fieldwork 
classes is on providing an environment in which learners can apply and develop their linguistic 
analysis skills in a fieldwork setting that is as authentic as it can be created with the capabilities 
of a state-of-the-art e-learning platform. Learners’ construction of knowledge about the target 
language is a useful side effect but not the primary goal of a fieldwork class on the VLC. 
Each linguistic fieldwork class consists of the same basic set of units in the same sequence 
(cf. Table 32), which are made available (activated) successively (Handke 2006a: 25f.). Of 
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course, the contents of the individual units are specific to the language that is the topic of the 
fieldwork class. Each unit builds on its predecessor (if available) and begins with a cumulative 
summary of the hypotheses that can be formed about the target language on the basis of the data 
collected up to this point. Learners compare these hypotheses to their own, which they built 
during their previous explorations and wrote down in the obligatory Workbook of the class 
(Unger 2006a). 
The core of a typical fieldwork unit is the virtual room (shown in Figure 94), which provides 
the setting for learners to listen to and explore the language. The central element of this room is 
the virtual native speaker, an animated character playing the role of the learner’s informant (i.e. 
primary source of linguistic data) about the language being explored. Using a virtual instead of 
a real native speaker in the linguistic fieldwork classes makes it possible to address a number of 
problems with human informants: 
• They are not always available when the learner has time to do fieldwork. 
• They may be less than fully cooperative and might even try to deceive the learner. 
• They may lose their patience when the learner asks them to repeat things (again and again). 
• They are sensitive to, and may be unforgiving of, faux pas in the learner’s behavior (even 
inadvertent ones). 
• They are unpredictable in their linguistic and other behaviors, so eliciting the required data 
about specific linguistic phenomena from them may take considerable time and skills, which 
(beginning) learners of linguistic fieldwork may not have. 
In contrast, the virtual native speaker is always available, cooperative, patient, tolerant, and 
predictable. When the learner enters the virtual room, he or she finds the speaker sitting behind 
a table and ready for the learner to start exploring. The virtual native speaker is surrounded by a 
number of objects in the room. When the learner clicks on one of these objects, the speaker 
Table 32. The units of a linguistic fieldwork class on the VLC. Compiled from Unger (2006b: 172–175). 
Unit Title Central Topics 
Class Preliminaries General information about how to study the fieldwork class online 
Fieldwork Methodology Background on methods and tools for linguistic analysis; introduction of 
the (real) native speaker; general information about the target language 
Simple Objects The sound system of the language (i.e. its vowels and consonants) 
Number More on the sound system; formation of the plural and the dual of nouns 
with and without a determiner 
Adjectives Use of adjectives in attributive and in predicative function 
Adpositions Structure of adpositional phrases (i.e. noun phrase plus preposition or 
postposition) 
Simple Sentences Structure of sentences with intransitive and monotransitive verbs (i.e. 
verbs without and with a single object) 
Time and Tense Representation of time relationships (past, present, and future, both simple 
and progressive) 
Interrogatives Structure of simple interrogative sentences (yes-no and wh-questions) 
More on Sentences Structure of more complex sentences (e.g. sentences with ditransitive 
verbs (two objects), semantic-role relationships, etc.) 
Summary Summarization of all observations made in the class; identification of 
gaps, loose ends, and areas for further study; vocabulary test 
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produces the word for the object in its260 native language or uses the word in a more complex 
phrase or sentence, depending on what type of linguistic structure was selected for investigation 
by the learner from a list of options. Each utterance of the virtual native speaker is accompanied 
by an English gloss, its representation in the writing system of the language, and its phonetic 
transcription (if enabled). In later units dealing with more complex actions and relationships in 
the language, a second virtual actor is added to the room where required, which is from the 
same culture but of a different sex than the speaker. This actor does not speak but only acts out 
the virtual native speaker’s utterance. 
Learners collect linguistic data from the virtual native speaker and from the environment and 
use this data to speculate about various structural aspects of the language, including the sound 
system, patterns of plural formation, the use of adjectives, whether the language has 
prepositions or postpositions, the structure of simple and more complex declarative and 
interrogative sentences, the representation of time relationships, etc. Each unit of a linguistic 
fieldwork class focuses on one of these aspects, starting with the sound system and successively 
moving toward higher structures, but the learner’s knowledge of previously encountered aspects 
may be consolidated and further developed as well, depending on what additional linguistic 
data is presented in the unit. Along the way, learners build up a small vocabulary of words in 
the target language. 
                                              
260  The neuter form of reference to the virtual native speaker is deliberately used here and throughout the 
remainder of the chapter to emphasize that ‘it’ is not a real speaker but an artificial character. 
 
Figure 94. The virtual room of the fieldwork class Japanese on the VLC, featuring the virtual native 
speaker Reiko and various clickable objects. Screenshot taken on 6 December 2007. 
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There is no script for learners’ exploration of the virtual room or their interaction with the 
virtual native speaker, apart from some general instructions and a broad description of the task 
to be accomplished by the learner, such as “Find out how Japanese constructs interrogative 
structures.” Learners decide for themselves how they explore the virtual room to complete the 
task, and how often; there are no pre-defined learning paths through a fieldwork unit (although 
the overall sequence of the units in a fieldwork class is fixed). Through the coordinated use of 
auditory and visual elements in the virtual room, learners can easily establish the connection 
between an object, relationship, or action on the one hand and the virtual native speaker’s 
utterance on the other. The material used consists of authentic and concrete linguistic samples 
recorded from a real native speaker of the language. A help screen for the current virtual room 
is available on demand. Further information about linguistic topics can be accessed through the 
options in the menu bar (Cross-Searcher, Glossary, and Language Index, cf. Chapter 2.4.1). 
For languages with an alphabetic writing system (which are easier to handle given a Western 
keyboard layout), some fieldwork units integrate a vocabulary test that allows learners to check 
how many words from the previous units they already know. The test takes place in a different 
virtual room that is modeled after a classroom and features two virtual actors. One of them is 
the virtual native speaker of the fieldwork class, the other a native speaker of English. The 
procedure of the vocabulary test is as follows: the virtual native speaker produces a word in its 
native language. Additionally, the unknown word is presented in its written and transcribed 
form on a card behind the virtual native speaker. Furthermore, the card provides the option to 
listen to the word again. Next, the learner has to type the English translation of this word into an 
input box. The solution is pronounced by the speaker of English and additionally presented both 
in spelling and transcription on a card behind that speaker, also with the option to listen to the 
word again. Depending on the setting, words that were not correct will be presented again in the 
current round. 
The linguistic fieldwork classes have proven a valuable addition to the Virtual Linguistics 
Campus, not only because they enrich the VLC’s repertoire of courses but also because they 
take a constructivist approach (cf. Chapter 2.2.3) which differs from other courses on the VLC 
that focus more on the delivery of content. Each fieldwork class provides authentic linguistic 
material and offers learners the freedom and the challenge to actually do linguistics (rather than 
just read about it). During this process, learners formulate hypotheses which may or may not 
turn out to be correct. Incorrect hypotheses, revealed by the summary at the beginning of the 
following unit, encourage the learner to reflect on his or her analyses and knowledge and make 
adjustments where necessary. 
16.2  Agents for Linguistic Fieldwork 
While the linguistic fieldwork classes on the VLC are already a promising concept, there is 
room for improvement, in particular with respect to the social dimension of learning and the 
support provided by the environment for the individual learner. A general problem with the 
current format of the fieldwork classes is that learners by and large have to tackle the fieldwork 
tasks on their own. Although learners can get in contact with their instructor and peers through 
e-mail, the discussion forum, and the chat room (Unger 2006b: 170), their access to timely and 
individualized guidance, encouragement, companionship, and other kinds of support while they 
are doing field research in the virtual room is limited. Some of the shortcomings are analyzed in 
the following, and potential roles for embodied pedagogical software agents are identified. 
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16.2.1  Roles for Pedagogical Agents 
Learners already have a companion in the virtual room when they study the units of a linguistic 
fieldwork class: the virtual native speaker. However, that character currently does not invite 
rich and flexible exchanges of the kind possible with human native speakers in real-world field 
situations because it can only react with pre-recorded utterances to the learner’s point-and-click 
actions in the virtual room. The virtual native speaker lacks the linguistic competence to 
describe a wider range of situations in the room with its utterances, in particular unanticipated 
ones created by the learner or by another virtual actor, and to participate in interactions and 
performances with other virtual actors and with the learner. Furthermore, the speaker’s options 
for bodily interactions with its environment are limited to a small set of idle behaviors (cf. 
Chapter 10.2), which are performed randomly to enhance the speaker’s believability. If the 
virtual native speaker had a complete articulate body (cf. Chapter 9), it could not only use it to 
act on other virtual actors and the virtual room but also to complement its verbal utterances with 
non-verbal communicative behaviors involving combinations of facial expressions, gaze, 
gestures, posture, and locomotion (cf. Chapter 10.1), similar to a human speaker. 
Another shortcoming of the virtual native speaker concerns its underexploited potential for 
building a relationship with the learner. The virtual native speaker is the one individual that 
learners (have to) interact with regularly throughout the entire fieldwork class. However, so far, 
the speaker does not even acknowledge the learner’s presence in the virtual room, let alone 
remember the learner on subsequent visits or show any interest in him or her. Furthermore, 
since the virtual native speaker makes no effort to portray an interesting personality or to share 
details about itself, the learner has little opportunity to get to know the speaker as a person. In 
contrast, an enhanced virtual native speaker presenting itself as a ‘deep’ character and showing 
a perceptible interest in the learner may be more inviting as a regular interaction partner in the 
fieldwork experience. 
Linguistic competence, non-verbal behavior, and relationship building are three areas in 
which the virtual native speaker can be improved to become a more competent, flexible, and 
interesting informant for learners. The role of the enhanced virtual native speaker is described 
in Section 16.2.2 below while detailed ideas for its design are presented in Section 16.3. 
From the perspective of the cognitive apprenticeship model (cf. Chapter 2.2.3), the learners 
participating in a fieldwork class on the VLC can be regarded as apprentices in linguistic field 
research, who have different levels of proficiency and hence require different kinds and degrees 
of support. However, this apprenticeship is not complete without a master teacher coaching the 
learner while he or she is solving linguistic problems in the environment. So far, the fieldwork 
classes do not offer a personal coach for the individual learner. The virtual room gives learners 
freedom of exploration, but it does not provide guidance when the learner is unsure about how 
to proceed, encouragement when he or she is frustrated, or that one useful hint which helps the 
learner to get back on track after running into a dead-end with his or her analysis. Especially for 
learners who are new to linguistic fieldwork, the scaffolding and motivational support (cf. 
Chapter 12.3.2 and Chapter 12.3.8) given by a personal fieldwork coach could be useful. Since 
the (constant) availability of qualified human coaches for each learner is an issue, the second 
job opening for pedagogical agents in the fieldwork scenario is the role of coach or facilitator of 
learners’ problem solving in the fieldwork process. This role is described in Section 16.2.3. 
The third role of pedagogical agents in the linguistic fieldwork classes to be discussed in this 
chapter addresses the problem of the limited opportunities for social learning provided by the 
current virtual fieldwork environment (Unger 2006b: 170). Section 16.2.4 outlines a peer agent 
that explores the virtual room together with the learner. The peer role is inspired by the social-
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constructivist view of learning as a social and cooperative process in which learners construct 
knowledge through their interaction with others in their environment (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). Peer 
agents are designed to be similar to the learner in terms of age, status, and/or ability. Learners 
can cooperate or compete with them, enjoy their company, follow their example, avoid their 
mistakes, and teach them or be taught by them (cf. Chapter 12.3.10). These aspects of peer 
agents are addressed in detail in Section 16.2.4. 
16.2.2  The Virtual Native Speaker 
The virtual native speaker is a central character of the linguistic fieldwork classes because it 
provides learners with the linguistic input that allows them to speculate about the structure of 
the unknown target language. The speaker is a fixture in the virtual room in every fieldwork 
unit and the only individual that is always with the learner when he or she is exploring the 
room. In the course of a fieldwork class, the virtual native speaker and the learner have regular, 
extended sessions together over several weeks. Hence, there is ample opportunity for the 
speaker agent to engage the learner in interactions that expose him or her to more and more 
varied data from the target language and to build a social-emotional relationship with the 
learner (cf. Chapter 7.16), which preferably develops into a cooperative partnership. While the 
language barrier between the learner and the virtual native speaker is a problem for relationship 
building, there are still ways for the speaker to establish rapport with the learner. Relationship-
building behaviors for the virtual native speaker are discussed in Section 16.3.2.4. 
A positive relationship between the learner and the virtual native speaker is the prerequisite 
for a successful cooperation between the two in the virtual room. The virtual native speaker has 
a considerable responsibility in this cooperation because the learner relies on the speaker as the 
provider of linguistic data from the language under investigation. Therefore, the speaker agent 
has to be equipped with authentic knowledge of its native language. A minimum level of 
competence is currently available in the form of pre-recorded utterances that are linked to 
clickable objects in the virtual room and delivered by the virtual native speaker. While simple 
to implement, this ‘stimulus-response’ approach offers little flexibility in the interaction 
between the learner and the speaker. In contrast, the enhanced virtual native speaker is a 
conversational agent (cf. Chapter 11.3) which, similar to a human native speaker, has the ability 
to both produce and understand its native language at the level of complexity that is required for 
the domain of the virtual room, and can hold up its end of restricted domain-specific dialogues 
with other virtual actors and with the learner using that language. For example, a presentation 
team of two or more virtual native speakers may act out a particular scene in the virtual room, 
which can involve a short dialogue between the actors that illustrates particular phenomena of 
the target language (cf. Chapter 12.3.12). The performance and the dialogue may be scripted in 
advance or may be dynamically made up by the participants (cf. Chapter 14.2.4). Learners can 
watch these virtual performances and, importantly, become involved themselves, by asking 
questions about the performance (e.g. “What is X doing?,” “Where is Y?,” “How many Ys does 
Z have?”) that elicit responses from the virtual actors involved; by making changes to the scene 
and collecting linguistic data from the reenacted performance; or by playing their own part in a 
performance and thus practicing and experimenting with structures of the language (cf. Chapter 
12.3.12). 
In addition, the speaker agent possesses knowledge about the entities in the virtual room and 
can use this knowledge to dynamically generate utterances expressing actions or relationships 
involving these entities. Ideally, learners can inquire about any entity (object, actor, or event) in 
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the room and combine it with any other entity or entities in any way that makes sense in the 
language and in the environment of the virtual room, and the virtual native speaker produces the 
appropriate utterances. Furthermore, entities can be added to or removed from the room, and 
their position, activity, or status may change in the course of a session and even persist across 
sessions. All these manipulations can be performed not only by the learner but also by the 
virtual native speaker and other virtual actors. Thus, the virtual room becomes a dynamic 
environment, in which learners have options for experimentation and exploration that go 
beyond the small, pre-defined set of interactions that are currently possible in the room. 
However, the space provided by the virtual room is still small and hence limits the learner’s 
possibilities for exploration and interaction. As a potential future development, computer game 
technology can be used to extend the virtual room to a larger, three-dimensional simulated 
world for doing linguistic fieldwork, which contains different settings (‘maps’) and is populated 
by a number of embodied pedagogical agents playing the roles of virtual native speakers, 
fieldwork coaches (cf. Section 16.2.3), and peers (cf. Section 16.2.4), as well as by other human 
learners. Learners explore this virtual fieldwork world and interact with different human and 
artificial agents to accomplish a variety of linguistic fieldwork ‘missions,’ alone or in a team 
with other learners and peer agents.261 
One significant obstacle to the interaction between the learner and the virtual native speaker 
is the language barrier. The learner knows very little about the speaker’s native language at the 
beginning (in fact, uncovering the structure of that language is the point of a fieldwork class), 
and even later in the class, his or her knowledge of the language does not grow to a level that 
would allow him or her to participate in unrestricted everyday conversations. In turn, the virtual 
native speaker generally does not speak the learner’s native language. To facilitate the 
interaction between the learner and the virtual native speaker, it is necessary to overcome or 
bypass the language barrier in some way. One possibility involves the use of non-verbal means 
of communication, including gestures, facial expressions, gaze, posture, and locomotion (cf. 
Chapter 10.1). In fact, the pointing gesture (using the mouse) is currently the only way for the 
learner to interact with the virtual native speaker. Further mouse-based gestures can be added, 
which allow learners to flexibly move, combine, or change entities in the virtual room, in order 
to increase the range of situations that the speaker agent can describe with its utterances. While 
current web-based learning environments offer learners few possibilities for non-verbal 
interaction apart from using the mouse, the virtual native speaker is portrayed as an animated 
embodied character and can use its face, hands, and body to perform various non-verbal 
communicative actions that complement its verbal utterances and otherwise support its 
interactions with the learner or enhance its believability as an individual. For example, to 
unambiguously refer to objects that are further away from its current location, the virtual native 
speaker could move through the virtual room toward the object of interest, and point at it or 
pick it up while producing its utterance. 
                                              
261  The model for this world is provided by the Tactical Language and Culture Training System 
(TLCTS) (Johnson et al. 2004b; Johnson et al. 2005a; Johnson et al. 2005b; Johnson 2007; Johnson & 
Valente 2008; Johnson et al. 2008), a simulated environment designed to help learners to develop the 
skills for accomplishing authentic communicative tasks in a foreign language and culture. Coached 
by a pedagogical agent, the virtual aide, the learner practices his or her communication skills by 
speaking the target language and choosing appropriate communicative gestures (cf. Chapter 10.1.2) 
in simulated social interactions with autonomous, animated native speakers of the language. The 
focus of these interactions is on spoken communication, (in-) appropriate non-verbal gestures, and 
cultural norms of etiquette and politeness (Johnson et al. 2004b). 
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A language is closely intertwined with the culture in which it is spoken. The virtual native 
speaker is a representative of that culture, which is reflected by its appearance, behavior, and 
interactions with others. Hence, apart from the language, learners can also construct useful 
knowledge about the culture from their interactions with the virtual native speaker and from 
observing (and participating in) the exchanges between several virtual actors. For example, 
interactions between actors of different status could reveal how the (power) relationships 
between the people portrayed manifest themselves in their utterances, which is particularly 
noticeable in languages like Japanese. Furthermore, the virtual native speaker’s utterances can 
be accompanied by gestures, facial expressions, and other non-verbal behaviors, which learners 
can watch (repeatedly), relate to the verbal utterances, and compare to the use of non-verbal 
communication in their own language and culture. As a result, the learner’s fieldwork addresses 
both the linguistic and the paralinguistic aspects of the target language, by analyzing and 
drawing conclusions from the integrated (verbal and non-verbal) performance of the virtual 
native speaker. 
The previous paragraphs have portrayed the virtual native speaker as the learner’s informant 
about the language he or she is exploring. But it is also possible to reverse the roles: the learner 
is a speaker of a native language (or several in the case of multilingual speakers) and can serve 
as the speaker agent’s source of data from that unknown language. The result is a “tandem 
situation,” in which both parties learn about the native language of the other. For the learner, 
this may be beneficial because it gives him or her first-hand experience of what it is like to be 
an informant. Furthermore, he or she can observe the virtual native speaker in its secondary role 
as linguistic field researcher and obtain insights into the structure of his or her own native 
language, which is subconscious rather than explicit knowledge for many native speakers. In 
addition, the virtual native speaker can also act as a role model for the learner that shows him or 
her how linguistic fieldwork should be done (cf. Section 16.2.4). 
16.2.3  The Coach 
Mace Windu: There’s no doubt that the mysterious warrior was a Sith. 
Master Yoda: Always two there are, no more, no less: a master and an apprentice. 
Mace Windu: But which was destroyed? The master or the apprentice? ([INT 68]). 
The coach implements the role of a master teacher in a cognitive apprenticeship relationship 
with the learner (cf. Chapter 2.2.3). A pedagogical agent in this role models various analysis 
and hypothesis formation skills involved in doing linguistic fieldwork for its apprentice (the 
learner) and then monitors and guides the learner as he or she is practicing these skills in the 
current fieldwork unit while working on the data supplied by the virtual native speaker, 
intervening at appropriate points to help the learner to solve the current problem (cf. Chapter 
12.3). 
The coach agent is embedded in a linguistic workbench environment, a potential extension of 
the current fieldwork-class setup that provides learners with tools and resources for collecting 
and organizing linguistic data from the virtual native speaker, performing different kinds of 
linguistic analysis on these data (phonological, morphological, syntactic, etc.), and formulating 
hypotheses about the structure of the target language (e.g. sound inventory, plural formation, 
word-order patterns, etc.) based on these results. Features of the linguistic workbench include: 
• A linguistic keyboard for the phonetic transcription of utterances; 
• Interactive chart diagrams for categorizing identified consonants and vowels; 
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• Vocabulary lists for organizing words and their translations; 
• Mechanisms for tagging utterances with morphological, syntactic, and semantic information; 
• Tools for decomposing words and sentences into their constituents and visualizing the 
resulting structures; 
• Facilities for formulating, testing, and revising hypotheses; 
• Record keeping of observations, analysis results, and hypotheses. 
The assistance provided by the coach is intended to further the process of learners’ linguistic 
problem solving in this environment. The coach typically does not deliver the final result of an 
analysis or the ‘correct’ conclusion from its results (this would undermine the constructivist 
approach of the fieldwork classes), but it provides the required scaffolding (cf. Chapter 12.3.2) 
for learners to accomplish tasks in linguistic fieldwork that he or she cannot (yet) do by himself 
or herself, always encouraging the learner to take the next step beyond his or her current 
abilities and ensuring that the learner manages to complete a given task successfully. The coach 
may supplant (take over for) the learner in steps which are necessary to complete the task but 
require skills that are too complex for the learner to master at his or her current stage of 
development (cf. Chapter 12.3.1). Skills that are within the learner’s reach can be modeled by 
the coach (cf. Chapter 12.3.4), which involves demonstrating the skill (cf. Chapter 12.3.3) and 
providing explanations at each step that make explicit the actions being performed by the coach 
and their underlying reasoning processes. For example, the coach may take the transcriptions 
and sound charts compiled by the learner and show how to formulate hypotheses about the 
grouping of different sounds into functional units (phonemes) of the sound system of the target 
language on the basis of this data, explaining which sounds it is grouping together and 
according to what linguistic rules and principles it is determining the potential members of a 
phoneme. The learner watches these integrated performances and explanations and develops a 
conceptual model of the skill (cf. Chapter 2.2.3), which he or she applies in the following to 
solve problems of the same kind in the fieldwork environment. The coach monitors the learner 
during his or her problem-solving activities and provides assistance at appropriate moments to 
guide the learner toward a successful completion of the task, intervening when it detects the 
need or the opportunity for instruction or when the learner explicitly requests assistance (cf. 
Chapter 12.3.5). The coach’s interventions may involve: 
• Additional modeling (of the same or another required skill); 
• Individualized feedback on the learner’s decisions, results, and problem-solving strategies; 
• Reminders, hints, and other information that help the learner to continue with the analysis; 
• Instructional conversations (cf. Chapter 12.3.9) with the learner on the current problem to: 
• Identify and address misconceptions and gaps in the learner’s task-relevant knowledge; 
• Guide the learner to a new perspective on the problem; 
• Demonstrate that the coach agent cares about the learner and his or her work; 
• Enkindle a genuine interest in the problem within the learner; 
• Encourage the learner to carry on with his or her work despite difficulties; 
• Increase the learner’s awareness of linguistic phenomena; 
• Introduce the learner to new knowledge and skills; 
• Assess the learner’s ability to solve problems in linguistic fieldwork. 
Situations requiring the intervention of the coach typically arise when the learner’s actions in 
the fieldwork environment do not yield the desired or expected outcomes (e.g. a particular 
analysis is not successful or produces a result that contradicts previous analyses and hypotheses 
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of the learner). The coach does not try to prevent the learner from experiencing these kinds of 
failure because they lead to questions from the learner concerning what he or she did wrong and 
how he or she can do better (Schank & Neaman 2001: 49). These questions can be answered by 
the coach in different ways, for example by giving a (more or less specific) hint, asking a 
leading question, or sharing stories about how it has experienced and dealt with failures and 
successes in different fieldwork activities (p. 49, cf. Chapter 13.2.1). The latter is also an 
example of how the coach can provide encouragement when it detects or deduces a state of 
frustration in the learner. 
Learners with different levels of proficiency in linguistic fieldwork require different degrees 
and kinds of support in their work. Beginning learners with little experience and much anxiety 
will require more assistance from the coach and more help with the basic skills involved in 
linguistic fieldwork than more advanced learners who have already mastered these skills. As 
learners are developing (and demonstrating) proficiency in linguistic field methods, the need for 
assistance from the coach agent declines, and the coach gradually fades from its initially 
prominent role into the background. However, it keeps monitoring the learner and is always 
ready to intervene, either taking the initiative or reacting to the learner’s request. 
The relationship between the learner and the coach agent is similar to the one between a 
human master and his or her apprentice. As indicated in the introductory quotation, this 
relationship is exclusive, between a single learner and his or her personal coach agent. Hence, 
unlike a human instructor, learners do not have to share their coach with other learners. Like the 
virtual native speaker, the learner has regular and extended interactions with the coach over a 
longer period of time. As a result, the coach has the opportunity to do its part in building a 
relationship with the learner (cf. Chapter 7.16). In contrast to the relationship between the 
learner and his or her peer agent (cf. Section 16.2.4), this is not a relationship between equals. 
The status of the coach as the master differs from that of the learner as its apprentice (although 
the learner as a human being is certainly superior to the coach as a computer program), which 
should be reflected in their interactions and mutual behavior. The coach should be portrayed as 
an individual that the learner perceives as more knowledgeable in linguistic fieldwork and 
capable of serving as a model and guide to help him or her to acquire the knowledge and skills 
of that ‘trade.’ As a master teacher, the coach is instructor-like and inspires respect and trust on 
the part of the learner (cf. Chapter 4.2). Most of the time, the interactions between the coach 
and the learner are serious and professional and focused on the learner’s development in the 
area of linguistic fieldwork. The coach may occasionally use humor to lighten things up (cf. 
Chapter 10.3.2), but its role is not that of the “court jester” with a responsibility to entertain the 
learner. The learner may banter with a peer agent but not with his or her personal coach. While 
the relationship between the learner and the coach deepens over time, a certain respectful 
distance remains between the two. However, the coach’s behavior to the learner should never 
be condescending. The respect shown by the learner should be returned by the coach. 
16.2.4  The Peer 
Individuals who are embedded in a group or community of learners can obtain information and 
support not only from their instructors and from educational material but also from their social 
interactions with other members of their “peer group.” The term ‘peer’ broadly refers to an 
individual from the same group that learners perceive as having similar attributes, such as age, 
status, and level of knowledge or ability. Peers can provide learners with cooperation, 
competition, companionship, positive or negative examples, and the opportunity to teach others 
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and be taught by them (cf. Chapter 12.3.10). The concept of the peer agent adds these kinds of 
social support to a linguistic fieldwork class. 
The peer agent is basically in the same situation as the learner: confronted with the scenario 
of the virtual room, provided with access to the coach and the virtual native speaker, and 
equipped with the tools of the linguistic workbench, it explores the virtual room and tries to 
find out as much about the unknown language as possible. Like the learner, the peer agent has 
the status of an apprentice in linguistic fieldwork; hence, its knowledge of both the language 
under investigation and the linguistic methods necessary for its analysis is comparable to that of 
the learner, although the peer may know more (or less) about certain aspects of the language or 
a particular analysis method than the learner. However, in general, it does not possess expert-
level knowledge of neither the language nor linguistic field methods. 
Learning about the target language and about linguistic fieldwork is not the chief task of the 
peer agent, though. Its major responsibility is to change the learner’s study of the linguistic 
fieldwork classes from a solitary into a social experience. (Both the virtual native speaker and 
the coach are working on this from their respective ends as well, but their primary roles are 
different.) The peer agent is equipped with skills in relationship building (cf. Chapter 7.16 and 
Chapter 10.3) and does its best to become acquainted with and form an amicable relationship 
with the learner. However, it does not force itself upon the learner and respects the sociocultural 
norms for approaching, addressing, and interrupting the learner (cf. Chapter 7.15). 
In its social role, the peer agent is not meant to be a replacement for the learner’s human 
peers (although it can serve as one if human company is not available). Instead, the peer is 
designed to blend into a hybrid community consisting of both human and artificial learners. 
This community is supported by a collaborative learning and research environment, to be 
added on top of the current platform of the Virtual Linguistics Campus, which provides: 
• User awareness tools (Who else is online? Who is working on the same fieldwork (or other 
linguistic) problem? What have they done? What are their results?); 
• Facilities for (a-) synchronous communication with one or several other (artificial or human) 
learners (chat, discussion forums, instant messaging, etc.); 
• Support for bilateral and multilateral cooperation on linguistic problems, including work 
schedules, team meetings, milestones, etc.; 
• Tools for collaborative authoring (e.g. weblogs and wikis, cf. Chapter 2.3.9); 
• Means for pooling, organizing, storing, processing, and presenting results. 
This collaborative environment provides the technical framework for different interactions 
between the learner and a peer agent in the linguistic fieldwork classes (cf. Chapter 12.3.10): 
• Cooperation. The learner and the peer agent explore the virtual room together, dividing the 
work between them and pooling their results. For example, the peer collects utterances from 
the virtual native speaker, and the learner transcribes them. Or the learner explores one 
sentence type and the peer agent another, and afterwards they compare their analysis results. 
For assessment purposes, it is important that the contributions of the peer agent and the 
learner to an analysis are clearly distinguishable. 
• Competition. The learner and the peer agent engage in a friendly contest about who manages 
to correctly describe a particular aspect of the target language (e.g. tense formation) first, 
who knows more words of the target language in a vocabulary test, who has more confirmed 
hypotheses in their portfolio, etc. The purpose of these competitions is to challenge the 
learner by setting him or her up against an opponent with comparable knowledge and skills, 
whom they have to outperform in their fieldwork activities in order to win. 
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• Companionship. The peer companion has no (current) fieldwork assignment of its own but 
takes an interest in the learner’s current task and keeps the learner company while he or she 
is engaged in it. Being sensitive to the needs of the learner and the situation, the companion 
agent may compliment or encourage the learner, show empathy, or banter with the learner, 
but also offer ideas, opinions, and suggestions that may be useful to the learner in the context 
of his or her task (e.g. about how to classify a particular sound, what aspect of the virtual 
room to explore next, what previous mistakes of the peer to avoid, etc.). As a rule, the peer 
companion does not behave in a way that disrupts the learner’s work or increases his or her 
extraneous cognitive load (cf. Chapter 2.2.2). When the learner makes it clear that he or she 
wants to be left alone, the companion does not bother him or her. 
• Troublemaker. Similar to the companion, the troublemaker is with the learner during his or 
her fieldwork activities and likewise contributes its own views and suggestions about the 
learner’s work. However, these contributions have to be taken with a pinch of salt because 
they are often incorrect or misleading (though not always). The challenge for the learner is to 
carefully evaluate the contributions of the troublemaker and to decide on their usefulness for 
his or her current work. The goal of pairing learners with an unreliable advisor is to put their 
knowledge and their confidence in their results and skills to the test again and again. It is 
also possible to give the learner both a companion and a troublemaker, which play the roles 
of a trustworthy and an untrustworthy advisor, respectively. These advisors both comment 
on the learner’s current fieldwork activities. Often, the two will disagree and argue among 
themselves. Learners can follow these exchanges and obtain valuable insights for their own 
learning from the arguments provided by both sides. 
• Role model. The peer agent performs a particular fieldwork task in a way that can serve as a 
model of best practices in linguistic fieldwork for other learners. The peer agent presents its 
work (cf. Chapter 12.3.12) in a public forum, making explicit the steps in its approach and 
the reasoning behind them. It is also possible for hybrid teams of learners and peer agents to 
become role models and give these presentations together. In general, peer agents as role 
models will only work if the learning culture in the linguistic fieldwork environment values 
cooperation higher than competition. It should be noted that a role model does not have to be 
positive. That is, the peer agent can also give a bad example illustrating how linguistic 
fieldwork should not be done. The performance of the negative role model can be dissected, 
for example by the coach agent or by the learner, to identify suboptimal practices which the 
learner should avoid. 
• Peer coaching. Advanced learners can coach a less knowledgeable peer agent on certain 
aspects of linguistic fieldwork, for example on how to analyze an utterance of the virtual 
native speaker into its sentence- and word-level components or how to extrapolate from the 
collected linguistic data to compose previously unseen forms of the target language. By 
serving as a model and guide for someone else, learners can deepen their own understanding 
of the subject matter.262 Conversely, peer-coach agents can also share their greater 
knowledge and skill in particular areas with the learner, for example by critiquing his or her 
                                              
262  The role of the peer ‘coachee’ is similar to the one of the teachable agent (TA) (Biswas et al. 2005). 
Learners teach this kind of pedagogical agent and then ask it questions or have it solve problems. The 
TA generates answers and solutions, making its reasoning visible in a graph structure called a 
concept map. Learners review the TA’s results and see where they need to revise its knowledge (and 
their own) (Blair et al. 2007). 
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analyses or offering hints and other information. Since a peer coach is perceived to be more 
like the learner than, say, the coach agent, the learner may be more open to its suggestions. 
In the course of a fieldwork class, the learner may meet a variety of peer agents with 
different attributes and qualities. With some of these agents, the learner may form a closer 
relationship than with others, in particular with those which he or she perceives to be like him 
or her with respect to their interests and personality, according to the principle of similarity 
attraction (cf. Chapter 9.2).263 In some units, the learner may interact with a single peer or with a 
small group of peer agents, whereas in other units, he or she may prefer to work on his or her 
own. Depending on the learner’s needs and preferences, peer agents can engage the learner in 
different interactions from among the set described above. However, care should be taken when 
casting a given peer agent for several of these subroles, to avoid inconsistent role assignments 
(cf. Chapter 7.14) across a series of fieldwork sessions. For example, the learner is unlikely to 
trust a peer agent that played the role of troublemaker in one session when it wants to be the 
learner’s companion in a later session. 
16.2.5  Summary of the Roles 
In this section, three roles for embodied interactive pedagogical software agents were described 
which provide learners with different kinds of support while they are studying a linguistic 
fieldwork class on the Virtual Linguistics Campus. The virtual native speaker produces 
utterances in its native language, which are analyzed by the learner in order to formulate 
hypotheses about that language. The role of the virtual native speaker has considerable 
(currently neglected) potential with respect to interaction and relationship building. Section 
16.2.2 described an enhanced virtual native speaker agent that can interact more flexibly with 
learners and works to establish a productive working relationship with them. 
Whereas the virtual native speaker is primarily responsible for providing learners with the 
raw linguistic data for his or her analysis, the coach (cf. Section 16.2.3) serves as a master 
teacher helping its apprentice (the learner) to develop the linguistic skills necessary to analyze 
that data and to form hypotheses about the target language based on his or her analysis. The 
coach provides modeling and guidance for the learner and gradually fades into the background 
as the learner becomes increasingly able to accomplish the fieldwork tasks on his or her own. 
The peer agent (cf. Section 16.2.4) adds a third element to the linguistic fieldwork classes: 
social learning with, through, and from other members of the same group in the context of a 
learning community, which are comparable to the learner in terms of status, situation, and level 
of ability. Peer agents can be designed to cooperate or compete with the learner in the virtual 
room, keep him or her company during fieldwork sessions, challenge his or her skills and 
confidence, serve as models of best (or worst) fieldwork practices, and provide or receive peer 
coaching on linguistic field methods. 
Each of these three roles is associated with its own set of capabilities, expectations, and 
responsibilities. Pedagogical agents that are designed for them not only need to be equipped to 
function effectively in their appointed role but also have to convincingly convey an appealing 
                                              
263  Kim (2007) found that a learning-companion agent with characteristics similar to those of the learner 
positively influenced the learner’s cognitive and affective accomplishments. A learning companion 
with about the same level of competence as the learner was perceived more favorably and led to 
higher self-efficacy and recall. 
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agent persona that is appropriate for the role and should do their best to develop a relationship 
with the learner (cf. Chapter 8.4). As the previous chapters have shown, to achieve the triple 
goal of function, persona, and relationship building, many different considerations must enter 
into the design of such an agent, which are illustrated in the following section using the role of 
the virtual native speaker as an example. 
16.3  The Design of the Virtual Native Speaker 
The linguistic fieldwork classes already feature an embodied agent: the virtual native speaker. 
However, as pointed out in the previous section, this agent currently underachieves with respect 
to its potential for interaction and relationship building. This section offers detailed suggestions 
for enhancements to the virtual native speaker that promote it from an automaton that plays 
back canned utterances on demand to a more flexible, competent, and interesting partner for 
learners. The enhancements are discussed in separate sections corresponding to the agent design 
components discussed in the previous chapters of the thesis: embodiment (cf. Chapter 9), 
behavior (cf. Chapter 10), conversation (cf. Chapter 11), expertise (cf. Chapter 12), emotion 
and personality (cf. Chapter 13), architectures and platforms (cf. Chapter 14), and evaluation 
(cf. Chapter 15). 
16.3.1  Embodiment 
In the current version of the linguistic fieldwork classes, the virtual native speaker is already 
implemented as an embodied character with rudimentary interactive capabilities. This section 
presents design considerations for the embodiment of the enhanced virtual native speaker agent 
described in Section 16.2.2. 
As discussed in Chapter 9.1, agent designers have to decide what kind of entity the body of 
their agent should represent. Given that the virtual native speaker is intended to portray a 
speaker of a natural human language, non-human embodiments, including animals, fictitious 
entities, objects, and shapes, do not qualify as personifications of the agent. Hence, the virtual 
native speaker is appropriately represented as a virtual human. However, portraying the virtual 
native speaker (or the coach or the peer agent, cf. Section 16.2.3 and Section 16.2.4) in the 
image of human beings involves the danger that learners might overestimate the agent’s 
capabilities. This danger increases as human-like conversational and other capabilities are 
added to the agent (cf. Section 16.3.3 and Section 16.3.4). In order not to mislead the learner 
with its human embodiment, the agent should exhibit cues that clearly indicate its role as the 
learner’s informant in the fieldwork setting and thus guide the learner’s expectations about its 
capabilities and limitations (cf. Chapter 7.14). These cues are provided by the agent’s 
appearance, behavior, and interactions. For example, if the agent looks like a speaker of a 
foreign language, greets the learner in that language, or is explicitly introduced as the learner’s 
informant, the agent’s role in the virtual room and the range of interactions that are possible 
become clearer to the learner. 
While the current virtual native speaker is essentially a ‘front-end’ for the human native 
speaker who provided its inventory of utterances, the enhanced speaker agent is a separate 
individual from the culture where the language of the fieldwork class is spoken, with its own 
identity, personality (cf. Section 16.3.5.2), back-story (cf. Section 16.3.5.3), and idiosyncrasies 
(cf. Section 16.3.2.2). The appearance of the virtual native speaker has different functions: 
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• It authentically portrays a contemporary native speaker of the target language and culture. 
• It manifests the agent’s status as a unique individual (cf. Chapter 9.3). 
• It helps the learner to quickly understand the speaker’s identity and its role as informant. 
• It attracts the learner and invites him or her to interact with the virtual native speaker. 
Age and gender of the virtual native speaker are currently determined by the human voice 
talent providing the speaker’s utterances; however, given access to a speech synthesis system 
with sufficient intelligibility, naturalness, and expressiveness (cf. Chapter 10.1.1 and Chapter 
11.1.2), it may be possible to overcome this restriction (the speaker’s voice is discussed in 
Section 16.3.2.1.1 below). The speaker agent portrays the ethnicity of a member of the culture 
in which the target language is spoken as the first language. The ethnicity manifests itself in the 
primary (physical) attributes of the agent, including its facial features, skin and hair color, 
physique, etc. but also in its secondary attributes, such as clothing, hair style, accessories, and 
so on. (Of course, the agent’s portrayed age and gender also play a role in shaping these 
aspects.) Designers may consider exploiting existing stereotypes about the appearance of 
members of the culture represented by the speaker (consider, for example, Reiko’s kimono and 
traditional hair style in Figure 94), but they should research the cultural background first to find 
out to what extent these stereotypes apply to the speaker they intend to portray. Currently, the 
majority of virtual native speakers in the VLC fieldwork classes represent younger people (due 
to the relatively young age of the human voice talents), who may rarely dress in the traditional 
attire of their culture (hence, the appearance of the virtual native speaker Reiko is probably 
inappropriate for the younger Japanese female it portrays). In general, the speaker agent’s 
appearance should be as authentic as possible with respect to the contemporary fashion and 
conventions of the target culture. However, authenticity does not imply uniformity. The virtual 
native speaker is an individual and as such has its own style, not least with respect to its 
appearance. Therefore, it should be designed to stand out from other actors in the virtual room 
in terms of hair style, clothing, accessories, bodily features, etc. In particular, learners’ attention 
will be attracted by attributes of the agent that appear unusual or unfamiliar to them, such as a 
tattoo, a feather in the hair, or brightly colored clothes. To support the impression that the 
virtual native speaker is a character with a life of its own even outside the fieldwork sessions, 
all these aspects should exhibit some variation in the course of a fieldwork class. For example, 
no person in the real world wears the same clothes for weeks in a row, so the virtual native 
speaker should also appear in different clothes in different fieldwork sessions. Similar to a real 
person, the speaker agent may have a favorite set of clothes or (occasionally) new clothes which 
it shows to the learner and other virtual actors. 
To appeal to the learners of a linguistic fieldwork class, the virtual native speaker should be 
made physically attractive for its target audience (cf. Chapter 6.4 and Chapter 9.2), however 
without sacrificing its sociocultural identity by trying to model the agent too closely on the 
learners’ concept of ideal beauty (which is subjective and from a different culture). The speaker 
needs physical attributes that are considered attractive across cultures, such as health, symmetry 
of face and body, and a straight profile. Hair style, cosmetics, costume, and accessories are 
further important visual clues of attractiveness, but these attributes are subject to individual 
taste and cultural acceptability (both from the learner’s and the designer’s perspective). In 
addition, their importance for expressing the agent’s cultural identity imposes restrictions on 
their design. In general, a culturally authentic virtual native speaker will exhibit at least some 
characteristics that appeal to members of its own culture, although not necessarily to members 
of other cultures, including the learner. 
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Movement (cf. Chapter 9.4) is a central capability of the enhanced virtual native speaker’s 
embodiment. The speaker agent uses movement of the body and body parts to communicate 
messages, act out scenes in the virtual room, and interact with the learner. Unlike the current, 
essentially immobile virtual native speaker, which always sits behind a table and therefore only 
requires a head, arms, and a torso, the enhanced speaker agent possesses a complete, animated 
body capable of expression, gesture, and locomotion, which it uses during its performances 
with other actors in the virtual room and during its interactions with the learner, as described in 
Section 16.3.2. To create the necessary animations for the virtual native speaker (and for the 
coach and peer agents as well), behavior sequencing (cf. Chapter 14.2.1) is the most 
straightforward approach given the current implementation of the virtual room and the 
capabilities of Adobe Flash ([INT 161]), the animation technology used to create the virtual 
room, the current virtual native speaker, and the other animations in the Virtual Linguistics 
Campus. The agent’s complex animations are composed by dynamically sequencing primitive 
animations from a pre-designed behavior space at run-time. The creation of this behavior space 
will require considerable work for each agent because the animations have to be more complex, 
individual, varied, and smoother than in the current implementation of the virtual native 
speaker. A behavior generation engine accepting motor commands from the agent’s brain and 
rendering the corresponding animations, as in the layered generation approach (cf. Chapter 
14.2.2), would require less work from animators and provide more flexibility with respect to 
handling interruptions of behavior sequences (for example by actions of the learner or another 
virtual actor). However, such a behavior generation engine may be costly to develop and 
difficult to integrate into the environment of the virtual room because it would have to be 
implemented as an additional plug-in component for the web browser to render the animations 
with sufficient speed. An enhancement to the behavior sequencing approach, which allows the 
combination of planned with unplanned agent animations, for example in response to the 
learner’s actions, as in state machine compilation (cf. Chapter 14.2.3), may be more feasible. 
While the (enhanced) behavior sequencing approach is sufficient for generating the animations 
of a single agent, performances involving interactions between multiple characters in the virtual 
room require a multi-character platform (cf. Chapter 14.2.4), which controls the individual 
characters and orchestrates the performance. 
Embodied agents can be rendered with different degrees of realism and depth of the images 
portraying the agent (cf. Chapter 9.5). For the virtual native speaker and the other agents in the 
linguistic fieldwork classes, a 2½D artistic representation will be adopted, similar to the way 
the virtual native speaker is currently represented (cf. Figure 94). There are several reasons for 
this decision: 
• The agent inhabits the virtual room and should therefore be created with the same depth and 
level of realism. A photorealistic, three-dimensional character would look out of place in a 
hand-drawn environment with smaller depth. 
• The camera position in the virtual room is fixed. Learners do not have the possibility to view 
the room and the virtual native speaker from different angles. Otherwise, a 3D model of the 
room and the speaker agent would be required. 
• 2½D (i.e. slightly deeper than 2D) is necessary because the virtual room has a certain depth 
and the agent should have the ability to move around and perform within the depths of the 
room without looking ‘flat’ in comparison. 
• By choosing an artistic rather than a realistic representation, the pitfall of the uncanny valley 
can be avoided (i.e. of creating a character that is almost human but still falls short and hence 
elicits strong negative responses from learners, cf. Chapter 9.5). Furthermore, a lower level 
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of realism may reduce learners’ expectations of human-like behavior and capabilities, which 
allows the design to compensate for the limitations of state-of-the-art machine intelligence. 
• A 2½D animated artistic embodiment can be easily created with Adobe Flash, using a 
behavior sequencing approach (see above). In general, representations below 3D are easier to 
draw and animate while permitting greater levels of detail, and require less processing (cf. 
Chapter 9.5). 
In the current implementation, the speaker has a partial human embodiment consisting of the 
upper half of the body. While this is sufficient as long as the speaker only has to deliver spoken 
utterances, a complete human body with a face, hands, feet, and a torso (cf. Chapter 9.1) allows 
the virtual native speaker to leave its current place behind the table (cf. Figure 94), move 
around the virtual room, and participate fully in interactions with the learner and other virtual 
actors. 
The embodiment of the virtual native speaker plays an important role in helping learners to 
locate their informant in the virtual room and to recognize the speaker agent as a virtual person. 
Hence, it is not appropriate for the virtual native speaker to switch to a different embodiment in 
the course of the fieldwork class or even during interactions with the learner. However, certain 
aspects of the agent’s appearance may change to enhance its believability as an individual (see 
above); still, these changes should never alter the identity of the virtual native speaker. 
16.3.2  Behavior 
As an actor in the virtual room of a fieldwork class, the virtual native speaker makes use of the 
features of its embodiment to perform a variety of behaviors, which serve to interact with the 
learner and other virtual actors, to enhance its own believability as a persona, and to build a 
relationship with the learner. This section discusses the design of communicative, believability-
enhancing, and relationship-building behaviors for the virtual native speaker. 
16.3.2.1 Communicative Behaviors 
The communicative behaviors of the virtual native speaker can be subdivided into verbal and 
non-verbal behaviors. The design of the former involves considering aspects of the speaker’s 
voice, whereas developing the latter is concerned with how the agent uses facial expressions, 
gaze, gesture, posture, and locomotion in its interactions with others. 
16.3.2.1.1 Voice 
The voice is a central property of the virtual native speaker, which the agent uses to provide 
linguistic data to the learner for analysis and to distinguish itself from other actors in the virtual 
room. The voice conveys the speaker’s utterances that contain the raw data which the learner 
has to analyze in order to write the grammar of the virtual native speaker’s language. Therefore, 
the articulation of the virtual native speaker has to be authentic and intelligible, accurately 
modeling the segmental and suprasegmental aspects of the language, i.e. its inventory of speech 
sounds (phonemes) and its prosody (as described by patterns of tone, intonation, rhythm, and 
stress), as well as allowing learners to identify higher-level units and constructions (word, 
phrasal, and sentence patterns). However, the speaker’s voice also has to be natural and 
expressive. It should not be tiresome for the learner to listen to the virtual native speaker, even 
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if its utterances are longer. Furthermore, the voice is a vehicle for expressing the speaker’s 
current emotional and cognitive state in its interactions with the learner and other virtual actors. 
Finally, the voice is a unique identifying characteristic of the virtual native speaker and hence 
should differ from those of other speakers of the same or a different language in the virtual 
room and the linguistic fieldwork classes. 
The speaker’s voice is currently implemented as recordings of a human native speaker of the 
language. While recorded human speech satisfies the criteria of authenticity, intelligibility, and 
naturalness, the current virtual native speaker is unable to generate its own utterances in order 
to describe new situations in the virtual room or to participate in conversations with other 
virtual actors or with the learner (cf. Section 16.3.3). For flexible utterance generation, the 
virtual native speaker has to use synthetic speech (cf. Chapter 10.1.1 and Chapter 11.1.2). The 
intelligibility of synthetic speech at the segmental level is no longer regarded as a problem (at 
least when the task is to synthesize a sequence of words that can be correctly recognized by 
speakers of the language; the situation might be different when the listener does not know the 
language and has to transcribe the utterances, as in the virtual fieldwork scenario). However, 
even the best concatenative speech synthesizers (cf. Chapter 11.1.2.2) are still inferior to a 
human voice in terms of naturalness and expressiveness, which becomes apparent when 
utterances are longer and/or consist of multiple sentences. The artificial-sounding prosody of 
synthetic voices is a problem for fieldwork tasks concerned with prosodic aspects of the target 
language (e.g. intonation and stress patterns). Still, the use of synthetic speech may be feasible 
for generating utterances that illustrate other aspects of the language than suprasegmental 
phenomena. The deficiencies of current speech synthesizers are the least perceptible in short 
utterances with simple prosodic patterns, which is a restriction that is often acceptable in the 
linguistic fieldwork setting because it limits the amount of linguistic data and the range of 
phenomena presented to the learner in a single utterance. (Currently, the recorded utterances of 
the virtual native speaker generally also consist of a single word, phrase, or sentence.) 
Concerning the expressiveness of the virtual native speaker’s voice, there are problems with 
using either human or machine-generated speech. A human voice can express a much wider 
range of different emotional and cognitive states than a synthetic voice, but only in pre-
recorded utterances. In contrast, synthetic speech can convey all kinds of dynamically generated 
messages, but creating the appropriate emotional (or other) tone for a synthetic utterance is 
difficult, although some experiments have successfully manipulated parameters of speech 
synthesizers to express different emotions in synthetic speech (cf. Chapter 13.4.2). The default 
prosody of many commercially available speech synthesis systems is neutral and typically not 
adaptive to the emotional tone of the message. However, it may be possible to compensate for 
the lack of expressiveness in the synthetic voice by relying more on non-verbal behaviors, such 
as facial expressions, to express the speaker’s emotions and other internal states. 
Casting the appropriate voice for the virtual native speaker is a problem that should not be 
underestimated because the voice chosen does not only affect the speaker’s ability to perform 
its primary task (i.e. to provide raw linguistic data from its native language) but also the 
speaker’s image as an individual and as a representative of the target culture. As an individual, 
the virtual native speaker has its own idiosyncratic ways of conveying its internal states through 
its voice and other means (cf. Chapter 13.4.2), which contribute to manifesting the speaker’s 
identity, as does the accent of the speaker’s voice, which indicates the place of origin of the 
individual portrayed (cf. Chapter 10.1.1). Several virtual native speakers of the same language 
may have different accents, introducing the learner to different varieties of the target language. 
The cultural background of the virtual native speaker establishes rules and conventions that 
determine what the agent expresses how, when, and to whom, using its voice and other means 
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(cf. Section 16.3.5.1.3). By observing the agent’s ways of expressing itself to others, the learner 
can identify these rules and conventions and compare them to those of his or her own language 
and culture. The design of the virtual native speaker’s voice should acknowledge both these 
cultural and individual influences. Again, this is easier to realize with a human voice talent than 
with a speech synthesizer. However, there are already speech synthesis systems that provide 
voices for different varieties of a language (e.g. American vs. British English). 
Whether a human or a synthetic voice is chosen for the virtual native speaker, it should be 
consistent with the other aspects of the agent, such as its embodiment and personality (cf. 
Chapter 7.5). For example, a male voice is clearly inappropriate for a female speaker, as is a 
soft and quiet voice for an extrovert character. Furthermore, the level of realism adopted for the 
virtual native speaker (artistic rather than photorealistic, cf. Section 16.3.1) influences the 
casting of the voice. As discussed in Chapter 10.1.3, people have been found in experimental 
studies to prefer consistent combinations of face and voice that do not mix human and synthetic 
faces and voices. Hence, the combination of an artistic face with recorded human speech (as in 
the current speaker) might be perceived as inconsistent, and a synthetic voice might be more 
appropriate for the virtual native speaker from the point of view of consistency (cf. Chapter 
10.1.3). It is difficult to reconcile the conflict between the requirements of consistency and 
speech quality because of the still inferior capabilities of speech synthesizers. However, the 
negative effects of using an inconsistent combination of artistic character and human voice may 
not be that severe given that this approach has been used in animated films to the present date 
and learners may be familiar with it.264 
Each fieldwork class has its own virtual native speaker, so a different voice has to be cast for 
each of them. Furthermore, a fieldwork class may feature several speaker agents that participate 
in multi-character performances including spoken conversations in their native language, which 
means that different voices for the same language are required. It can be difficult to find the 
necessary number of human voice talents to give each virtual actor a distinct voice. Synthetic 
speech has a similar problem: a number of commercial systems provide several voices for the 
same language, but typically only for the more ‘important’ languages, such as English and 
German. It is always possible to build new synthetic voices, but the time, effort, and cost 
involved may be considerable (cf. Chapter 11.1.2.2). 
Given that both recorded human and synthetic speech have their respective strengths and 
weaknesses, designers might consider using both for the virtual native speaker. However, a 
hybrid approach mixing synthetic and natural human speech is not acceptable for the virtual 
native speaker (or the other agents in a fieldwork class) because such a combination would be 
perceived as inconsistent by listeners (cf. Chapter 10.1.1). Developers should use either 
recorded human speech or synthetic speech for the virtual native speaker but refrain from 
mixing the two. 
If synthetic speech is considered for the virtual native speaker, a high-quality concatenative 
speech synthesis system should be chosen. Whereas a concept-to-speech approach (cf. Chapter 
11.1.2.3) allows a more seamless integration of speech synthesis with the process of message 
generation (cf. Chapter 11.1.4), such systems are still much rarer on the market than text-to-
speech synthesis systems. Since the resources for developing a proprietary solution are not 
available in the VLC team, existing text-to-speech products have to be acquired and integrated 
                                              
264  Having said that, there is an important difference between the virtual native speaker and characters in 
animated films: the learner interacts with the former while he or she only watches the performance of 
the latter. The effects of interaction on the importance of perceived consistency in virtual interaction 
partners are not clear yet and require more research. 
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with the other components of the virtual native speaker (cf. Chapter 7.11). While speech 
synthesizers have already been developed for many languages, including German, English, 
French, Dutch, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Swedish, Norwegian, Finnish, Estonian, Icelandic, 
Czech, Russian, Greek, Croatian, Turkish, Romanian, Breton, Japanese, Chinese, Korean, 
Hebrew, Arabic, and Indonesian ([INT 215]), less common languages can be a problem because 
no one has built a speech synthesizer for them (yet). In addition, the available systems for the 
same and for different languages do not exhibit the same level of output quality, which can 
make the process of finding the right voice difficult. 
16.3.2.1.2 Gestures 
In the current linguistic fieldwork classes, the virtual native speaker relies primarily on its voice 
to participate in interactions with the learner. In contrast, non-verbal communicative behaviors 
are generally underused by the actors in the virtual room, including both the virtual native 
speaker and its supporting actor (that appears in later units of a fieldwork class). However, as 
argued in Chapter 10.1, non-verbal communicative behaviors have important functions in 
regulating conversation, by contributing content to the ongoing interaction and conveying 
emotional and cognitive states of the speaker. Hence, gestures, facial expressions, gaze patterns, 
posture, and locomotion will be added to the behavioral repertoire of the enhanced virtual 
native speaker and the actors supporting it. Gestures are discussed below, whereas the other 
non-verbal communicative behaviors are covered in the following sections. 
The virtual native speaker performs gestures during its interactions with the learner and with 
other virtual actors. The range of gestures occurring in the speaker’s behavior includes not only 
the conscious emblematic and propositional gestures (where appropriate in the context of the 
interaction) but, importantly, also the iconic, metaphoric, deictic, and beat gestures that are 
performed spontaneously during the speaker’s utterances, as described in Chapter 10.1.2. The 
virtual native speaker requires a sophisticated model of face-to-face communication, which 
integrates the agent’s speech with its gestures (and other non-verbal behaviors) in ways that 
emulate the human use of non-verbal means in face-to-face conversations. One important 
requirement for the speaker’s multimodal communication is deictic believability. Since the 
virtual native speaker constantly refers to entities at different locations in its environment, its 
utterances should make use of natural and unambiguous combinations of speech, gesture, and 
body movement (cf. Chapter 4.2). For each embodied referential utterance, the appropriate 
verbal and non-verbal elements have to be identified, synchronized, and assembled into a 
coherent behavioral sequence. 
Similar to the speaker’s voice, its non-verbal behaviors not only serve to communicate 
messages but also reveal important things about the speaker as an individual. The manner in 
which the virtual native speaker performs gestures and other behaviors should be appropriate 
for its personality (e.g. an introvert speaker should not display emphatic gestures, cf. Section 
16.3.5.2), its cultural background, and its current internal state (e.g. an agent that is confused, 
tired, or sad may perform the same gestures differently from one that is unperplexed, rested, or 
happy). In addition, the speaker’s behaviors should not come “off the shelf.” While it may be 
tempting to design a single set of gestures (or other behaviors) and reuse them for all virtual 
native speakers, this approach does not help to create characters with individuality (cf. Chapter 
7.8). Instead, each virtual native speaker should add a personal touch to its performance of 
different communicative behaviors. Furthermore, the same behavior should be performed with 
some degree of variability (cf. Chapter 7.9) across different occasions. In a behavior sequencing 
approach (cf. Chapter 14.2.1 and Section 16.3.1), these requirements imply a considerable 
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workload for animators because the behavior space has to be populated with a much larger 
number of primitive animation elements. In contrast, both individuality and variability are much 
easier to achieve with a parameterized behavior generation engine. 
The virtual native speaker is designed to represent a different culture; hence, not only its 
appearance (cf. Section 16.3.1) but also its behaviors should be authentic with respect to that 
culture. The speaker agent should portray gestures, facial expressions, etc. in the way they are 
displayed in its own culture, not the culture of its designers or the culture of the learner. Since 
both the inventory of gestures and the ways of performing them are subject to cross-cultural 
variation, the cultural background of each virtual native speaker requires careful consideration 
before its gestures are designed. When there is a possibility for the speaker’s gestures to cause 
misunderstandings or offence, as in the case of some emblematic gestures (cf. Chapter 10.1.2), 
additional information should be provided that clarifies their meaning. 
16.3.2.1.3 Face 
Each virtual native speaker is a different individual, which is most immediately noticeable in 
the face with which it presents itself to the learner. The face manifests the speaker’s identity 
and cultural affiliation and portrays different kinds of expressions that convey the agent’s 
current state and social intent (cf. Chapter 10.1.3). Through direction of eye gaze, the face 
indicates the speaker’s current focus of attention. Furthermore, the speaker’s lip movements are 
synchronized with its verbal utterances. 
The face of a virtual native speaker is an important element by which it distinguishes itself 
from other speakers of the same language or different languages. When several virtual native 
speakers appear in a fieldwork class, each should have its own unique face to allow the learner 
to recognize and remember the speaker. The face should also identify the virtual native speaker 
as a member of its culture but without giving the impression of being stereotypical. That is, the 
‘typical’ facial features (eye shape, skin color, etc.) of the group of people represented by the 
speaker should be present but not overemphasized in the design of the face. 
The screen area occupied by the face of a fully embodied agent, such as the virtual native 
speaker, is small in comparison to the space available for the face of a talking-head or face-only 
agent. Still, the face of the virtual native speaker should exhibit sufficiently detailed features to 
convey its identity and to communicate different emotional, cognitive, and physical states. A 
photorealistic face is not required, but for the generation of facial expressions, the eyes, mouth, 
and eyebrows are essential components, which the speaker agent should be able to transform 
into different shapes and combine into different facial displays (cf. Chapter 10.1.3) that 
complement its utterances. 
While speaking, the auditory signal is synchronized to observable articulatory movements of 
the lower part of the face (i.e. the lips, tongue, teeth, and jaw). Audiovisual speech is natural 
human behavior and therefore also expected of the virtual native speaker. In fact, it would be 
very unusual if the virtual native speaker delivered its utterances without any visible 
articulation. So the current speaker already performs lip movements that accompany its 
utterances. However, the speaker’s visible articulation is a façade rather than an accurate 
display: neither are the different articulatory facial movements completely and faithfully 
implemented nor are they accurately synchronized to the auditory speech. In essence, the visual 
articulatory displays of the current virtual native speaker are a gross simplification compared to 
a real human speaker. While implementing a more faithful visual articulation and synchronizing 
it to the character’s speech would mean significantly more work, there are also a number of 
benefits. First, it would improve the intelligibility of the virtual native speaker’s articulation, 
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due to the complementary nature of auditory and visual information in speech (cf. Chapter 
10.1.3). Second, facial animation synchronized with speech can provide accurate displays of the 
articulation of speech sounds, which are instructive for learners. A function for zooming in on 
the virtual native speaker’s face could be added, which allows learners to focus on the speaker’s 
articulation. Unlike a human speaker, the skin of the virtual native speaker could become 
transparent and reveal the motion of the articulators. By observing the visual articulation, 
learners may obtain information that helps them to clarify what sounds they heard. Of course, 
the articulatory apparatus and movements of the enlarged face would have to be detailed and 
accurate for this purpose. Third, visible articulation that is only slightly out of sync with 
auditory speech disturbs human observers and therefore significantly reduces the speaker’s 
believability as an individual. This effect can also be observed in video clips of human speakers 
in which the audio lags behind the video: viewers’ comments on these clips are typically 
negative and mention the temporal inconsistency between the auditory and the visual signal. In 
short, people expect consistency between auditory and visual speech, which has to be taken into 
account when designing these aspects of the virtual native speaker. A similar preference for 
consistency between face and voice was discussed in Section 16.3.2.1.1 above and in Chapter 
10.1.3 with respect to different pairings of human and synthetic faces and voices. 
16.3.2.1.4 Gaze 
While eye gaze (the direction where an individual is looking with his or her eyes) has important 
functions in face-to-face communication (cf. Chapter 10.1.4), it serves none of these functions 
in the interactions of the current virtual native speaker, which does not exhibit any variation in 
its gaze patterns but rather always looks in the same direction, i.e. at the learner (although it 
may display some random eye movements). In contrast, the enhanced virtual native speaker 
varies the direction of its gaze to clarify its verbal messages, send social signals to other 
participants in the interaction, open channels to them in order to obtain information, manage the 
flow of the dialogue with the learner, and, finally, communicate social and individual emotions. 
These communicative functions of eye gaze were discussed in detail in Chapter 10.1.4. To give 
a simple example of how the use of eye gaze can improve the interaction between the learner 
and the virtual native speaker and enhance the speaker’s believability, when the learner clicks 
on an object in the virtual room, the current speaker instantly provides the corresponding word, 
looking at the learner instead of the object referred to, even if the object is behind the speaker’s 
back. In contrast, a human speaker would have to turn his or her head and/or body and gaze at 
the object of interest first in order to understand the target of the learner’s pointing gesture. By 
using gaze and head/body movement like humans do, the virtual native speaker can establish a 
common ground with the learner, confirming that it is referring to the same object as the learner 
with its utterance (Rickel et al. 1999). Furthermore, the speaker becomes more believable as an 
individual. In general, it is quite unnatural behavior for a human being to always look in the 
same direction, whether within or outside interactions with others. Instead, the enhanced virtual 
native speaker may choose to direct its attention toward different objects or events in the virtual 
room that draw its interest, even without being prompted by an action of the learner. Of course, 
the speaker’s gaze patterns should indicate that it is paying attention to the learner, but without 
giving the impression of monitoring him or her. The learner might feel uncomfortable if he or 
she is being watched all the time (cf. Section 16.3.2.3). 
When portraying eye gaze, the virtual native speaker should adhere to the rules of its culture 
for using gaze in communication. Speakers representing contact vs. non-contact cultures should 
be designed to exhibit different patterns with respect to the direction, duration, and frequency of 
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gaze (see the examples provided in Chapter 10.1.4). As with gestures, it may be necessary to 
provide additional information that explains differences between the gaze behavior of the 
virtual native speaker and the learner. 
16.3.2.1.5 Posture and Locomotion 
The human embodiment constrains the range of behaviors that the virtual native speaker is 
expected to be able to perform, which also includes the possible positions or arrangements of its 
body and limbs while not moving (i.e. its different postures, cf. Chapter 10.1.5) and the ways in 
which it can transfer itself from one location to another (i.e. locomotion, cf. Chapter 10.1.6). 
The current virtual native speaker only assumes a single posture: sitting upright behind a table 
in the virtual room (cf. Figure 94). There is neither variation in the speaker’s posture nor a 
change of location during a fieldwork session. Due to the lack of a complete body, the speaker 
cannot leave its place behind the table, i.e. it is incapable of locomotion. In contrast, the 
enhanced virtual native speaker has the ability to portray different postures and variants of the 
same posture, as well as to leave its default location behind the table in order to participate in 
interactions taking place at a different place in the virtual room (e.g. talking to another virtual 
actor at the door or at the window) and to move toward objects of interest in order to be able to 
manipulate or make unambiguous reference to them (e.g. walking toward the lamp and turning 
it on (or off) or picking up the glasses on the sideboard and putting them on while providing the 
appropriate utterance, cf. Figure 94). Locomotion not only involves crossing a distance but also 
moving around certain obstacles that may appear in the speaker’s path. 
Given the constraints imposed by the environment of the virtual room, it is not necessary to 
give the virtual native speaker the full range of human forms of locomotion (cf. Chapter 
10.1.6). For example, swimming is not possible in the virtual room. Other locomotive behaviors 
are restricted: there is not much room for running around, and even fewer opportunities exist for 
climbing, for instance. The virtual native speaker’s default mode of locomotion is walking. 
Concerning the range of postures for the virtual native speaker, the most common ones will be 
sitting and standing (cf. Chapter 10.1.5). 
Similar to the other behaviors, posture and locomotion should exhibit both individuality (cf. 
Chapter 7.8) and variability (cf. Chapter 7.9). Furthermore, posture and locomotion should 
provide cues as to the speaker’s personality, current state, cultural origin, and relationship to the 
learner and other virtual actors. For example, the speaker may show an upright posture and bold 
movements to portray a self-confident, extrovert individual. In contrast, a drooping posture and 
slow movements may signal fatigue or sadness. Japanese women (like Reiko in Figure 94) are 
said to be traditionally “pigeon toed,” i.e. to walk with their toes turned inward (although this 
may no longer be true for many modern women in Japan). A forward-learning posture can show 
that the speaker likes the learner (cf. Chapter 10.1.5). Since posture is also an indicator of 
physical attractiveness, the virtual native speaker should be designed with a well-balanced or 
erect posture, which is almost universally regarded as more appealing than a misshapen 
stooping figure. 
The virtual native speaker need not be in the same place every time a learner enters the 
virtual room. Instead, it could be busy dusting off the shelf in the back, looking out of the 
window, or even coming into the room through the door at the same time as the learner. 
However, as soon as the learner is there, the speaker should stop doing whatever it is doing and 
make itself available as the learner’s informant (a different behavior would be interpreted as 
uncooperative). The place behind the table may continue to serve as the default location of the 
enhanced virtual native speaker, providing a known and reliable place for the learner to obtain 
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linguistic data from the target language and functioning as the starting and end point for the 
speaker’s forays into the virtual room in the course of its interactions with the learner and with 
other virtual actors. 
16.3.2.2 Believability-Enhancing Behaviors 
Apart from lip movements that accompany its utterances, the only non-verbal behaviors that the 
virtual native speaker currently performs include a small set of animations that are intended to 
enhance the speaker’s believability as an individual, such as eye-blinking, smiling, sighing, 
yawning, pursing the lips, and small arm and chest movements. The speaker performs these 
behaviors when it is idle, i.e. waiting for the learner’s next action. As the set of idle behaviors is 
small (most virtual native speakers have only two or three of them) and the behaviors are 
performed randomly, they quickly become repetitive and contextually inappropriate, destroying 
the illusion of life that they are intended to create. Furthermore, the idle behaviors sometimes 
draw unnecessary attention to the virtual native speaker and may even give the learner some 
incorrect ideas about the speaker. For example, the virtual native speaker Reiko performs one 
idle behavior (yawning) that could be interpreted by the learner as suggesting boredom and lack 
of interest, which is not conducive to the process of building a relationship with the learner. 
The design of the enhanced virtual native speaker follows a different philosophy, which de-
emphasizes the role of explicit believability-enhancing behaviors and attempts to achieve 
believability more indirectly through verbal and non-verbal communicative behaviors that 
observers perceive as human-like, individual, and culturally authentic. The agent also performs 
behaviors to enhance its persona, but these behaviors are more subdued in comparison to the 
current implementation, providing the background for the speaker’s interactions and 
performances. 
Since the virtual native speaker portrays a human being, it shows a number of reflexive 
behaviors that are required by human physiology, such as breathing, eye-blinking, and wetting 
the lips (cf. Chapter 10.2). While they do not serve a real need, the speaker nevertheless 
performs these automatic behaviors with their natural regularity because they are expected of a 
human-like entity. (For example, it would be unnerving for learners if the speaker was always 
staring (at them) without ever blinking.) Furthermore, the virtual native speaker may possess 
idiosyncrasies, even quirks, to support its character (cf. Chapter 7.8). For example, it may have 
the habit of scratching its chin when thinking, playing with objects on the table when bored or 
nervous, shaking its hair out of its eyes when they get in the way, or looking over its glasses 
when they have slid down. The conditions listed for each example of idiosyncratic behavior 
indicate that these behaviors are performed in a context-sensitive fashion rather than randomly, 
and in a way that is prominent enough to be noticed by the learner but not eye-catching enough 
to be a distraction. As a general rule, no idiosyncratic behavior of the virtual native speaker 
should interfere with its primary role as the learner’s informant on the target language, by 
drawing the learner’s attention to a behavior that is irrelevant for analyzing the speaker’s 
current utterance. In addition, all believability-enhancing behaviors should exhibit sufficient 
variability (cf. Chapter 7.9) to avoid the impression of repetition. 
16.3.2.3 High vs. Low Profile 
As the learner’s informant, the virtual native speaker is essential for the learner to succeed in 
his or her fieldwork tasks. Therefore, it is present and available every time the learner visits the 
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virtual room, providing a familiar place where the learner can obtain the linguistic data for his 
or her analysis of the unknown language. The virtual native speaker has to be constantly 
available, which means that it cannot simply disappear when its services are not required. It 
should always be clear to the learner where he or she can find the speaker in the virtual room 
when in need of further linguistic input. However, constant availability does not imply that the 
virtual native speaker just sits there all the time and patiently waits for the learner to ask about 
things or events in the virtual room, as in its current implementation. This is unnatural behavior 
(no human informant would have the patience or the time to do that). Furthermore, it may give 
learners the feeling of being watched by the speaker, which, in turn, may increase their level of 
anxiety (cf. Chapter 10.4). As a result, the profile kept by the virtual native speaker involves 
maintaining an appropriate level of presence in the virtual room. The speaker has to be 
available without distracting or disturbing the learner. When there is nothing to do for the 
virtual native speaker, it may choose to occupy itself otherwise in the virtual room; however, it 
should stay in the room to meet the requirement of constant availability. Whatever the virtual 
native speaker does when it is idle should not draw the learner’s attention too much in order to 
avoid causing distraction. Furthermore, the speaker should interrupt its current idle-state 
occupation when the learner wants to interact with the agent again (it should be noted that this 
is a higher level of cooperativeness than the learner could expect from a human informant). 
Finally, even while serving its main function as the learner’s informant, the virtual native 
speaker should not draw more attention to itself than is appropriate for its role, especially when 
other agents (other virtual native speakers, the coach, or peer agents) are present. 
16.3.2.4 Relationship-Building Behaviors 
The virtual native speaker interacts with the learner both regularly and over longer periods of 
time in the course of a fieldwork class. This provides opportunities for the speaker to work on 
its relationship with the learner in order to develop it into a productive, cooperative partnership. 
One obstacle to relationship building is the fact that the learner does not know the language 
of the virtual native speaker (yet), and vice versa. Therefore, verbal relationship-building 
strategies, such as engaging the learner in small talk (cf. Chapter 10.3), are not a very promising 
option for the speaker.265 
However, there are other ways for the virtual native speaker to reach out to the learner. As a 
first step, before any regular sessions between the speaker and the learner take place, they meet 
and become acquainted. In this first meeting, it is critical for the virtual native speaker to signal 
a positive attitude toward the learner through its face, body, and voice, in order to contribute to 
a favorable first impression. Some other individual (e.g. the coach agent as the master teacher 
                                              
265  The virtual native speaker could resort to an auxiliary natural language, such as English, for its social 
interactions with the learner. In principle, there is no reason why the speaker should know only its 
native language. Still, it is already difficult enough to develop language processing capabilities for a 
single language without adding a second (although processing components for a common language 
like English may be readily available). Furthermore, the same voice would have to be available for 
both the first and the second language. The English voice would also require an appropriate foreign 
accent. All this is hard to realize with speech synthesis technology. On the positive side, since the 
auxiliary language is not the virtual native speaker’s first language, the agent might be able to get 
away with shortcomings of its linguistic performance, which are unavoidable given the current state 
of human language technologies (cf. Chapter 11.1). 
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of the apprentice learner, cf. Section 16.2.3) may introduce the learner and the virtual native 
speaker to each other, or they introduce themselves. For example, this can happen during a 
virtual warm-up meeting, where the learner meets the members of his or her hybrid fieldwork 
community, including the human class instructor, the other human class participants, the 
learner’s personal coach agent, and the peer agents (cf. Section 16.2.4) that will take the 
fieldwork class together with the learner. Apart from names, the learner and the virtual native 
speaker may exchange further information about themselves for the purpose of getting to know 
each other. One way for the virtual native speaker to obtain some personal information about 
the learner is to access the learner’s user profile on the Virtual Linguistics Campus. The 
advantage of this method is that the learner can decide beforehand which information about 
himself or herself is visible to other individuals, including the virtual native speaker. Another 
possibility is for the learner to answer a small set of closed questions about his or her personal 
background, his or her reasons for taking the fieldwork class, his or her expectations, and so on. 
In general, if the learner chooses to share personal details with the virtual native speaker, 
whether at the beginning or later in a fieldwork class, he or she must be able to trust the speaker 
to keep this information confidential. In case the learner does not wish to disclose information 
about himself or herself, the virtual native speaker should accept that decision and treat the 
learner with the same respect as otherwise. 
Whether or not the learner wants to share personal information with the virtual native 
speaker, for the latter to play its part in the relationship-building process and to gain depth and 
credibility as an individual, it is vital that a rich personal back-story of the virtual native speaker 
is (gradually) revealed to the learner (see Section 16.3.5.3 for a detailed discussion). It should 
be emphasized at this point that the virtual native speaker is not a copy of the human native 
speaker who provided the voice talent. Instead, it has a personality and a (virtual) life of its 
own, which progresses and changes in the course of the fieldwork class (cf. Section 16.3.5.2 
and Section 16.3.5.3). 
In the fieldwork sessions following their introduction to each other, it is important for the 
growing relationship between the virtual native speaker and the learner that the speaker 
remembers the learner and its previous interactions with him or her (including exchanges of 
personal information). When the learner enters the virtual room of a fieldwork unit for the first 
time on a given day, the virtual native speaker should acknowledge the learner’s presence by 
turning toward him or her and welcoming the learner in its native language. On return visits of 
the learner, the greeting should be adapted accordingly. While the speaker’s way of greeting the 
learner may be more formal and reserved in the early stages of their relationship, it can change 
to less formal and more intimate forms over time. 
If the speaker is occupied with something when the learner enters, it should stop this activity 
as soon as possible and tend to its visitor (cf. Section 16.3.2.3). In fact, the virtual native 
speaker could treat the learner as a guest and show him or her hospitality according to the 
customs of its culture (although the options for offering things such as food and drink to the 
learner are obviously limited). In the beginning, when the relationship between the speaker and 
the learner is not that close yet, the speaker’s behaviors may still indicate some reserve, which 
may be expressed through its voice, facial expressions, gaze patterns, and posture (modulated 
by the rules for expressing interpersonal relationships in the culture represented by the virtual 
native speaker). The reserved speaker’s voice may be polite but not too warm; its smiles may be 
less frequent and intense; it may maintain less eye contact; its stance may be closed and 
relaxed; and it may stay further away and lean away from the learner (cf. Table 14). During the 
following sessions, as familiarity and liking (at least on the part of the virtual native speaker) 
increase, these behaviors gradually change toward friendliness to reflect the closer relationship 
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with the learner (Bickmore et al. 2005). A virtual native speaker that is familiar with and likes 
the learner may have a warm, energetic voice and a smiling face, maintain steady eye contact, 
show an open and relaxed stance, and close the distance between itself and the learner (again 
subject to cultural modulation). Unfortunately, the virtual native speaker is unable to determine 
if the learner reciprocates because the technical possibilities for obtaining feedback, in 
particular non-verbal feedback, from the learner in a web-based environment are restricted (cf. 
Chapter 7.10). However, given the general hedonic preference of people for positive 
expressions (of emotion) shown by others (cf. Chapter 13.4.2), the displays of increasing 
friendliness by the virtual native speaker may be well-received by learners. 
16.3.3  Conversation 
The current virtual native speaker produces spoken utterances in response to the learner’s point-
and-click actions in the virtual room. In contrast, the enhanced speaker agent is a conversational 
agent (cf. Chapter 11.3) that is equipped with the capacity to participate in a wider range of pre-
scripted and dynamic exchanges with other virtual actors and with the learner as well as with 
the ability to produce more varied utterances. The verbal messages of the virtual native speaker 
(and other virtual actors) are integrated with its other behaviors for communication, enhancing 
believability, and relationship building, which were described in the previous sections. The 
interactions and performances taking place in the virtual room are recorded by the virtual 
fieldwork environment and can be played back by the learner as often as necessary. The learner 
can also modify or script performances, including dialogues (cf. Section 16.3.4). 
The function of the virtual native speaker’s enhanced communicative abilities is first and 
foremost to expose the learner to more and more varied linguistic data from the language of the 
fieldwork class. The domain of the conversations in this language is limited to the environment 
of the virtual room. The interlocutors (which may include virtual native speakers as well as the 
learner) talk about the objects and events in the virtual room which they observe or in which 
they participate. The complexity of the utterances occurring in these dialogues is restricted to a 
comparatively simple level (e.g. a single declarative or interrogative sentence) that is within or 
just beyond the learner’s present knowledge and may expose him or her to a new phenomenon 
of the target language that is the focus of the current fieldwork unit (e.g. word-order or question 
formation) while keeping the amount of new linguistic material to be collected and analyzed by 
the learner from the utterance of a speaker to a manageable size. In the early units of a 
fieldwork class, the exchanges may be as simple as a word or phrase produced in response to a 
question like “What is X?” (to make the virtual native speaker identify an object) or “Where is 
Y?” (to elicit utterances illustrating how spatial relations are expressed or whether the language 
uses prepositions or postpositions). In order to make its responses to such queries unambiguous 
for the observing learner, a virtual actor uses believable deictic behaviors (cf. Section 
16.3.2.1.2), which may involve pointing gestures, locomotion, eye gaze, and other non-verbal 
behaviors to support its verbal utterance. 
Learners need facilities for formulating queries to the virtual native speaker or to a team of 
speakers (and for otherwise participating in interactions taking place in the virtual room). The 
most sophisticated option allows the learner to use combined speech and mouse input within a 
multimodal interface (cf. Chapter 11.2) to the virtual room. In the beginning, when the learner 
is new to the language, he or she will make more use of the mouse to build queries. In the 
simplest case, the learner may select an object with the mouse and then pick a type of query 
from a menu, such as “What is X?,” “Where is Y?,” and “What color is Z?.” If there are several 
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actors present that can be queried, the learner can simply click on the addressee of his or her 
question. In the following, as the learner is picking up more and more vocabulary and 
constructions along the way of exploring the target language, he or she may feel increasingly 
confident (and may also be encouraged) to speak the language in order to ask questions and 
make other contributions to conversations in the virtual room. Mouse-based gestures may still 
be used to clarify verbal meanings, such as the referents of objects. As a useful side effect, the 
learner’s utterances can be assessed with respect to their grammaticality and accuracy of 
pronunciation,266 which adds further aspects of language courses to the fieldwork classes 
(although their focus remains on linguistic fieldwork rather than language learning). 
However, equipping the virtual native speaker with the ability to interpret multimodal speech 
and mouse input is ambitious implementation-wise. While the interpretation of mouse-based 
gestures is quite straightforward in the context of the virtual room, especially if supported by 
appropriate menu options (see below), speech recognition (cf. Chapter 11.1.1) and natural 
language understanding (cf. Chapter 11.1.3) still pose considerable challenges with respect to 
working around their present limitations and integrating them into a web-based environment 
(cf. Chapter 14.3.2). 
Similar to speech synthesis systems (cf. Section 16.3.2.1.1), speech recognizers are available 
for English, German, and other more common languages but not necessarily for the less 
common ones, such as Welsh (Jones 2003). In addition, speech recognition products are often 
trained to recognize the speech of proficient speakers of the language and may require 
considerable adjustments to enable recognition and diagnosis of the less than perfect spoken 
inputs from fieldwork learners. On the other hand, both the vocabulary size and the perplexity 
(cf. Chapter 11.1.1.1) of the speech recognition task in the virtual fieldwork environment are 
way below those of a general-purpose dictation system. However, the speech recognizer would 
have to be speaker-independent and should permit continuous input. Concerning the technical 
integration of speech recognition into the web-based fieldwork environment, there are three 
options: as a client-side plug-in for the web browser, as a separate speech recognition server, or 
as a hybrid of these two approaches, which divides the workload between the client side and the 
server side. The first option has the advantage of reducing the network traffic and the workload 
on the server side, but it is dependent on the capabilities of the learner’s computer and the 
successful installation of the necessary components on that machine. The second option 
minimizes local installation and performance problems, but the network between the speech 
recognition server and the learner’s computer may become the performance bottleneck, leading 
to perceptible latencies that disrupt the immediacy and continuity of responses from the virtual 
native speaker and annoy the learner. The third option addresses the issues of installation, 
performance, and network latencies by trying to find an appropriate distribution of processing 
components between server and clients (cf. Chapter 14.3.2.1). This hybrid strategy may also be 
appropriate for the other components of the virtual native speaker as an embodied interactive 
software agent (cf. Chapter 3.3). 
As discussed in Chapter 11.1.3.5, the ability of machines to interpret natural language 
utterances above the level of individual sentences is still quite limited. With current NLU 
technologies, single sentences can be analyzed morphologically, syntactically, and semantically 
to produce a logical form or a conceptual structure of the sentence, whereas the interpretation of 
                                              
266  This assessment is not performed by the virtual native speaker because foreign-language tutoring is 
outside of its domain of expertise. It could be the responsibility of a separate language-tutor agent or 
of some kind of disembodied intelligent tutoring component, as in the Tactical Language and Culture 
Training System (cf. Footnote 261). 
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the sentences with respect to their role in the discourse and the communicative intentions of the 
speaker or writer is much more difficult. In general, the deeper the desired level of analysis, the 
more it may be necessary for developers to narrow the domain. In the context of the virtual 
room, the use of natural language understanding may be feasible, though, because the domain is 
quite small (being essentially limited to the actors, objects, and events of the virtual room) and 
the utterances that have to be analyzed are comparatively simple (usually consisting of single 
sentences that follow a limited set of patterns and involve a small vocabulary). However, the 
NLU process must be prepared to handle ill-formed input and to diagnose the mistakes in the 
learner’s utterances (so another tutoring agent or system can address them). Concerning the 
implementation of the NLU functionality, the same problem arises as with the other human 
language technologies involved in the design of the virtual native speaker: it may be difficult to 
obtain the required knowledge sources (grammars, lexicons, etc.) and processing components 
(morphological analyzers, syntactic parsers, etc.) for the language of a particular fieldwork 
class because no one has considered building them. 
Apart from developing the processing of spoken language and mouse input as individual 
capabilities, it is also necessary to integrate and coordinate these two modes when the learner 
uses them in combination. Since speech and mouse actions are less coupled temporally than, 
say, speech and lip movements, and provide complementary information, the two input modes 
can be processed in some depth in parallel first and then integrated (fused) later at a higher 
semantic level (cf. Chapter 11.2). 
At present, multimodal input, while technologically possible, is difficult to implement, in 
particular as regards the speech and language processing components and their integration into 
the environment and with mouse input. Hence, it is more feasible to consider combined speech 
and mouse input as an option for future versions of the fieldwork classes and to rely for the time 
being only on mouse input. Given that spoken language input is not crucial for the learner’s 
interaction with the virtual native speaker (after all, the speaker produces utterances for the 
learner, not vice versa), this is an acceptable compromise, although it means an asymmetry 
between the input modes available to the learner and the output modes available to the virtual 
native speaker (cf. Chapter 7.10): while the speaker uses spoken utterances in the interaction, 
the learner does not have this option. 
In order to increase the flexibility of the learner to construct all kinds of queries with the 
mouse, to which the speaker responds with dynamically generated utterances describing the 
learner’s constructions (see below), a wider range of mouse-based actions should be possible in 
the virtual room, including: 
• Selecting both individual and multiple objects and actors; 
• Grouping objects and actors; 
• Changing the properties of objects, actors, and events; 
• Dragging objects and actors to different locations; 
• Combining objects, actors, and activities into events; 
• Specifying the locations of events; 
• Sequencing multiple events. 
The larger inventory of mouse actions is supported by an extended set of menu options that 
allow the learner to specify what types of actions or utterances should be performed by the 
virtual actors given the objects, actors, and events that have been arranged with the mouse. 
Examples include: 
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• Label the selected object or actor. 
• Describe the specified event or arrangement of objects and/or actors. 
• Perform the specified event or sequence of events. 
• Ask the selected actor about a particular aspect of the current performance. 
• Discuss a particular event with other actors. 
• Refer to previous and future events and states of the virtual room. 
The resulting user interface to the virtual room provides many more options for learners than 
the current interface. Therefore, it is important that the enhanced functionality does not increase 
the complexity of using the interface (cf. Chapter 6.3). Ideally, the learner should not require 
instructions on how to interact with the room and the virtual actors; if they are necessary, they 
could be provided by the learner’s personal coach agent (cf. Section 16.2.3) as part of 
introducing the learner to the virtual fieldwork environment. 
The ability of the virtual native speaker to respond flexibly to the learner’s actions and 
inquiries in the virtual room requires a natural language generation component (cf. Chapter 
11.1.4) for the language of the fieldwork class, which dynamically generates the appropriate 
utterance for the current context from an internal non-linguistic representation derived by 
processing input from the learner or other virtual actors. Given that natural language generation 
systems are still not widely available, even for the more ‘important’ languages, it is very likely 
that this component will have to be a proprietary development. However, it is not necessary to 
create a full-fledged natural language generator with the ability to produce unrestricted 
linguistic outputs in the target language. The length and complexity of the utterances that have 
to be generated are restricted by the goal and environment of the fieldwork classes. Typically, 
the utterances of a virtual native speaker will consist of a single sentence with a structure of 
limited complexity and a small vocabulary. The generative capabilities of the speaker have to 
be sufficient to create the set of utterances that describe the range of objects, actors, 
arrangements, and events which are (or were or will be) present in or can be created in the 
virtual room. In general, the utterances of the virtual native speaker should cover the range of 
linguistic aspects to be explored by the learner in the fieldwork class in adequate breadth and 
depth, providing enough raw material to cover all phenomena of interest and each individual 
phenomenon in sufficient detail. 
While natural language generation components typically produce text output, the utterances 
of the virtual native speaker have to be delivered in spoken rather than written format. Text 
output in its native language is not an option for the virtual native speaker because learners need 
the spoken utterances to uncover the sound system of the language, given that the relationship 
between spelling and pronunciation is quite unpredictable in human languages. In addition, the 
language of the fieldwork class may not have a writing system, or it may have one that uses 
characters which are unknown to the learner. Finally, it is the spoken rather than the written 
form of language that is regarded as primary by modern linguistic science. For these reasons, 
the natural language generator has to be coupled with a speech synthesis system that delivers 
the utterances of the virtual native speaker in spoken format (cf. Section 16.3.2.1.1). 
Unlike the dialogues between other types of conversational agents and human users, the 
interactions between the learner and the virtual native speaker are open-ended, in the sense of 
not being directed toward achieving a particular pre-set goal, such as booking a flight or solving 
a computer problem. Instead, the continuing goal of the exchanges between the learner and the 
speaker is to elicit more and more varied linguistic data from the virtual native speaker in the 
context of the topic of the current fieldwork unit. The interactions do not develop along a 
predictable path because the speaker does not know what situation the learner might refer to or 
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create next in the virtual room. But the virtual native speaker nonetheless has to keep track of 
its interactions with the learner and with other virtual actors, both during the current fieldwork 
session and across the series of sessions in the current fieldwork class, in order to know what 
has been talked about before and what entities (objects, actors, and events) are currently in 
focus, so it can generate the appropriate utterances. Furthermore, it is important for the speaker 
to maintain a history of previous interactions and performances because the learner should be 
able to replay them in order to hear the utterances illustrating the relevant linguistic phenomena 
again in the context in which they originally occurred. 
In the current implementation of the virtual native speaker, the learner has the initiative in 
his or her interactions with the speaker while the latter patiently waits for him or her to request 
the next utterance. The fieldworker-informant relationship largely defines the pattern for the 
interactions between the learner and the enhanced virtual native speaker as well, including the 
allocation of control. Since the purpose of these exchanges is to give the learner the opportunity 
to elicit data from the virtual native speaker (although the roles might be reversed, cf. Section 
16.2.2), the learner will be in control of the interaction most of the time. However, the virtual 
native speaker might also take the initiative occasionally and make contributions proactively 
(cf. Chapter 3.1.6), including both utterances and performances, that provide further data for the 
learner’s analysis of a given phenomenon or even expose him or her to a new aspect of the 
target language, giving the learner’s exploration of the virtual room a new direction (and hence 
some implicit guidance). 
While learner initiative (or user initiative, cf. Chapter 11.3.3.2.1) characterizes the exchanges 
between the learner and the virtual native speaker, the virtual actors involved in dialogues as 
part of their performances in the virtual room share control over their interactions, each of them 
being able to take the initiative as appropriate. The structure of these dialogues may be given by 
the script or plan for the performance (cf. Section 16.3.4) or may develop as the interaction 
progresses (when the learner is involved). In both cases, the actual utterances occurring in the 
dialogue are dynamically generated by the virtual actors based on the script/plan or the current 
state and requirements of the interaction. To the observer, the exchanges between the virtual 
actors may give the appearance of an actual dialogue; however, it is not necessary for a virtual 
actor to use natural language understanding technology in order to interpret the contributions of 
other actors. Either the meaning of the utterances is given in the script or plan for the 
performance, or the actors internally exchange messages in an agent communication language 
(cf. Chapter 14.1.5) while producing the appropriate natural language utterances for the current 
stage of the interaction. 
16.3.4  Expertise 
To be useful for learners, pedagogical software agents should possess substantial and relevant 
expertise that they can offer to learners (cf. Chapter 7.1 and Chapter 12). The virtual native 
speaker provides essential expertise in its native language and culture for learners exploring the 
virtual room of a fieldwork class to uncover the structure of this language and the conventions 
and customs of the culture in which it is spoken. Without the virtual native speaker, learners 
would not obtain linguistic data for their analysis. Furthermore, their opportunities for learning 
about the culture would be severely reduced. The virtual native speaker does not have to be able 
to teach its native language to learners or coach them in the linguistic fieldwork methods 
necessary for its analysis because these tasks are outside the scope of its role (although the 
speaker’s utterances can highlight particular features of the language and may even guide the 
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learner toward new ones, cf. Section 16.2.2). Instead, the expertise of the virtual native speaker 
manifests itself primarily in the ability to produce utterances in its native language which are 
authentic as regards pronunciation, vocabulary, and word and sentence structure, and which 
accurately and appropriately describe states of affairs in the virtual room. 
The learner relies on the authenticity and accuracy of the virtual native speaker’s utterances, 
so building this part of its expertise requires special attention and care. Components, resources, 
and models for speech and language processing in combination with non-verbal communicative 
and other behaviors have to be developed, which allow the speaker agent to put all the events 
and states that are possible in the virtual room into spoken utterances and to accompany them 
with contextually appropriate gestures, facial expressions, gaze, posture, and locomotion. Since 
the emphasis of the speaker’s role is on language production rather than understanding, and the 
option for learners to address the speaker or other virtual actors with spoken inputs in the 
language of the fieldwork class is desirable but not crucial, development may focus, at least for 
the short term, on the natural language generation and speech synthesis capabilities of the 
virtual native speaker and on their coordination and integration with the speaker’s non-
linguistic behaviors. The design of these aspects was discussed in depth in the previous section. 
In addition, the virtual native speaker requires detailed knowledge about its environment to 
make sure that its utterances (and other behaviors) correctly reflect the current (or some 
previous or future) state of affairs in the room. Given that the enhanced virtual room will be a 
dynamic environment offering the learner, the virtual native speaker, and other virtual actors 
many more options to manipulate the objects, actors, and events in the room than before, any 
attempt to anticipate and pre-define the entire range of potential situations in the virtual room is 
unlikely to succeed. Instead, it is necessary to maintain a dynamically updated model of the 
entities and relationships in the virtual native speaker’s environment (including the learner and 
his or her actions), from which relevant information is selected and organized in order to 
generate utterances that describe the situation of interest. Furthermore, as competence in a 
language also involves the ability to talk about the past, the future, and potential or hypothetical 
actions and situations, the speaker’s model should extend beyond the current state of the virtual 
room and include knowledge about what was, what will be, and what might be taking place in 
the room. While maintaining this model would be a formidable task for large and complex 
environments, the relatively small setting of the virtual room makes it possible to manage the 
complexity of the interactions and of the modeling required (although this is likely to change if 
the virtual room is extended to a virtual world, as proposed in Section 16.2.2). 
The model of the virtual room could be implemented as an internal representation that is 
built only for the virtual native speaker and cannot be accessed by others, but it seems more 
appropriate to externalize this representation and encode it as part of the environment (the 
virtual room), using the languages of the Semantic Web, as proposed in Chapter 12.1.2.5. In 
this approach, semantic markup is added to the virtual room, which annotates the room, its 
entities (objects, actors, and events), and their relationships in terms of metadata statements 
whose terminology is provided by a shared ontology created for the linguistic fieldwork classes. 
New entities added to the virtual room are described by their own semantic metadata which 
integrates seamlessly with the existing semantic markup because it uses the same formalism 
and the same ontology. Changes to an entity in the virtual room modify its markup. A history of 
changes is maintained for the entity, which allows the virtual native speaker to refer to a 
previous location of an object, for example. 
The use of an external model of the virtual room based on semantic metadata has a number 
of advantages over an internal representation. First, it is not necessary to maintain separate 
models for different virtual actors. The individual agents only require the ability to read and 
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process the semantic annotations associated with entities in the virtual room. They do not have 
to encode and keep track of their properties or status themselves. Second, since the virtual room 
has the same layout and inventory in all fieldwork classes, it becomes possible to create a single 
shared ontology that describes the structure of this domain. This ontology will be quite small 
because the virtual room only contains entities of a limited number of types. Third, the whole 
metadata and ontology mechanism is based on logic (cf. Chapter 12.1.2.1), which allows agents 
to process retrieved metadata and deduce new facts from it through the application of inference 
rules. The new facts can then be used by the virtual native speaker to talk about aspects of the 
virtual room in its utterances that are not explicitly encoded in the metadata structures. 
The metadata statements describing the virtual room have to be organized and stored in a 
way that facilitates their controlled retrieval, modification, addition, and removal by different 
(distributed) parties (learners, developers, and virtual actors), both within and across fieldwork 
sessions. Basically, the metadata model of the virtual room could be maintained on the server, 
on the learner’s computer, or both. If each learner works with his or her own view of the virtual 
room independently of others (i.e. the virtual room is not a shared environment), a local copy 
can be maintained during the fieldwork session and stored on the server after the session. 
However, if the virtual room is shared by several learners at different computers, the issue of 
synchronizing the different local copies of the model of the virtual room needs to be addressed. 
Apart from providing learners with authentic and accurate linguistic data, a further aspect of 
the virtual native speaker’s expertise concerns its ability to participate in virtual performances 
that may involve other virtual actors, objects in the virtual room, and possibly the learner (cf. 
Chapter 12.3.12). One way to create these performances is to author them in advance and have 
the virtual actor(s) perform them later. Performances can be scripted by learners, instructors, 
and developers, using a visual authoring tool (to be developed) that provides an intuitive 
graphical interface for modeling the scene to be performed. This tool generates a script for the 
performance that specifies the actors, roles, props, location, and the temporally ordered 
sequence of actions to be carried out (cf. Chapter 14.2). The script can be stored in the system 
to be executed later, either at the learner’s request or proactively initiated by the virtual native 
speaker or by the coach agent. At run-time, the character player executes the script to create 
(sequence) the animations of the virtual actors plus the necessary animations of objects in the 
virtual room, e.g. the opening of the door or the ball bouncing off the wall, cf. Figure 94). The 
visual authoring tool should give learners and instructors the possibility to author character 
performances at a high, non-technical level and leave the details of coordinating and sequencing 
the verbal and non-verbal behaviors to the behavior generation component. Developers may be 
given more control over the scene by allowing them to define more fine-grained details of the 
characters and the performance. 
It is also possible for learners to initiate dynamically generated virtual performances by 
specifying a particular linguistic concept from the target language (e.g. SVO-sentences267 or wh-
questions268) plus a number of parameters (actors, props, etc.) and having the virtual actors 
improvise a scene that illustrates the concept through the utterances and behaviors produced by 
the actors, based on a dynamically constructed plan for the performance and the embedded 
                                              
267  SVO is an abbreviation for “Subject-Verb-Object” and labels a particular linear ordering pattern of 
constituents with these syntactic functions in sentences. 
268  Wh-questions are interrogative sentences whose first constituent (the wh-element) begins with or 
consists of one of the following interrogative words (called wh-words): who, whom, whose, what, 
which, when, where, how, and why). They are typically posed to elicit information of the kind 
indicated by the wh-word from the addressee. 
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dialogue (cf. Chapter 11.3.3.2.2 and Chapter 12.1.3.3), whose building blocks are provided by a 
library of plans, partial plans, and plan operators. Furthermore, an actor or a group of actors 
may take the initiative, develop a plan for illustrating a phenomenon of the language or a 
convention of the culture, and stage their own performance by executing this plan, without 
directions from the learner or other parties. 
An important feature of the virtual performances is their interactivity: learners can interrupt a 
performance to query the actors about aspects of the scene, modify elements of the performance 
and observe the results, and even participate in the performance via (combined) speech and 
mouse input (cf. Chapter 16.3.3). If the learner interrupts a performance in progress with a 
query, the execution of the underlying script or plan should stop at the next appropriate point 
(which means that the current utterance or other action may have to be finished first). After 
dealing with the learner’s query, the performance should continue where it left off, provided 
that the learner does not choose to abort it. The situation becomes more complicated when an 
ongoing performance is modified by the learner. The first concern is to check if the 
modification is legal, i.e. does not violate any constraints or lead to undefined states of the 
environment. If a legal modification happens while the performance is halted, the plan for the 
remainder of the performance has to be updated accordingly before the actors continue. If the 
learner changes something during the performance, the necessary modifications to the plan 
have to be made on the fly. Depending on the nature of the learner’s manipulation, minor or 
major plan revisions may become necessary, even to the extent that the current plan becomes 
obsolete and a new one has to be generated. In the latter case, the performance cannot continue, 
and the actors have to start again. Other revisions may be less radical, but it may still be 
necessary for the actors to go back and redo earlier parts of the performance. To simplify the 
task of the planner, the range of possible modifications to a performance could be restricted to 
those that do not render aspects of the plan inappropriate that have already been executed. 
Handling modifications to script-based performances presents another challenge because unlike 
plans, scripts are static representations and therefore cannot be changed on the fly. A simple 
solution would be to modify and re-execute the script. However, repeating the performance 
every time a change is made can be tiresome for the learner. Alternatively, upon execution, the 
script could be converted into an internal plan which, in turn, could be flexibly changed at run-
time. 
The most challenging scenario for the virtual performances arises when the learner is given 
the opportunity to become involved in a performance as an actor playing his or her own part 
(rather than as a director or inquirer), in which he or she interacts both with virtual actors and 
objects, using mouse-based actions and/or speech input (in the future). In these performances, 
not just the interactions among the virtual actors but also between the virtual actors and the 
learner have to be modeled (cf. Chapter 12.3.12). In the simplest case, the script or plan for the 
performance specifies the learner’s part completely, including his or her options for utterances 
and other actions. At each stage of the performance, the learner selects (or speaks) an utterance 
or an action from the limited set of options made available. However, this restricted form of 
participation does not give the learner the freedom to produce his or her own utterances and to 
influence the direction of the performance, reducing his or her opportunities for practicing and 
experimenting with structures of the language. If the restrictions on the learner’s possibilities 
for participation are removed, virtual performances and their embedded dialogues may develop 
unpredictably (although within the boundaries of the virtual room). As a result, there can be no 
advance script or plan for a performance; rather, the plan evolves as the human and virtual 
actors move on with their interaction. The evolving plan integrates the goals and plans of the 
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virtual actors with those inferred from the learner’s observed actions and utterances during the 
performance. 
To make these hybrid interactive performances manageable, several restrictions can be 
applied. First, the virtual room provides visual clues (objects, actors, and events) that indicate 
potential actors, roles, props, and plots. Furthermore, the virtual actors can perform utterances 
and behaviors that strongly suggest how the learner should respond, guiding the performance 
toward topics and patterns that can be handled. Finally, the limited knowledge that the learner 
has been able to pick up about the language from the previous fieldwork sessions restricts the 
range of his or her contributions to a performance. In fact, everything the learner knows about 
the language comes from the virtual room, the very domain of the performance in which he or 
she is participating. 
Allowing for human authoring of interactions in the virtual room involves the risk that the 
resulting performances become too long and lack focus. However, as a general requirement, 
whether pre-scripted or dynamic, each performance delivered in the virtual room has to be short 
and should focus on a small set of linguistic concepts of the target language that are determined 
by the topic of the current fieldwork unit. In other words, it is necessary to build restrictions 
with respect to focus and duration into both the authoring tool and the performance planning 
component. The performance-authoring feature should be used as a research tool rather than as 
a toy. After all, the purpose of the virtual performances is not to entertain the learner or even 
distract him or her from the fieldwork tasks but to expose him or her to further data from the 
target language. This is not to say, though, that the virtual performances, including the 
dialogues, should be boring and repetitive (except when a replay of a performance has been 
requested by the learner). In fact, each of the actors involved may choose to add its own touch 
to a performance, which includes a distinctive verbal and non-verbal style. 
The virtual native speaker has regular and extended interactions with a particular learner in 
the course of a fieldwork class, during which the learner elicits data from the speaker. To 
increase the effectiveness of these interactions and to promote its relationship with the learner 
across a series of fieldwork sessions, the speaker should be able to adapt its behaviors to the 
individual learner over time. In order to adapt to the learner, the virtual native speaker collects 
information about the learner and uses it to construct a long-term student model (cf. Chapter 
12.2). The modeling starts from a set of assumptions about a typical learner of the linguistic 
fieldwork classes on the Virtual Linguistics Campus and successively refines these assumptions 
as the speaker becomes more and more acquainted with the individual learner and his or her 
preferences and habits. As the fieldwork class goes on, the following information gradually 
accumulates in the student model: 
• Personal details of the learner (e.g. name, sex, country, reasons for taking the fieldwork 
class, expectations regarding the class and the virtual native speaker, etc.); 
• The learner’s preferred input mode (mouse, speech, or a combination of the two); 
• Adaptations of the speaker’s behavior (e.g. speech rate, speech volume, animation speed, 
repetition of utterances (at a slower rate) by default, utterance length and complexity, etc.); 
• Typical patterns underlying the learner’s interaction with the virtual native speaker, other 
virtual actors, and with the virtual room; 
• Inferred recurring strategies of the learner for exploring the virtual room; 
• Types of situations, events, and performances created or manipulated by the learner (e.g. 
single-actor vs. two-actor vs. multi-actor performances); 
Chapter 16: Pedagogical Agent Roles on the VLC 475 
• Linguistic data (and the underlying concepts of the language) to which the learner has 
already been exposed, both in the current and in previous sessions, through the speaker’s 
own utterances and those provided by other virtual actors; 
• Cognitive and emotional states of the learner (e.g. boredom, excitement, frustration, etc.). 
Unlike the student models found in intelligent tutoring systems or pedagogical tutor agents 
(cf. Chapter 12.2), the virtual native speaker does not have to model the learner’s developing 
knowledge of the language of the fieldwork class or his or her skill level in linguistic fieldwork, 
including any misconceptions that the learner may have in either area (modeling the learner’s 
knowledge and skills is of greater value for the coach agent, cf. Section 16.2.3), although it 
could borrow this information from the coach agent to be able to present more challenging 
linguistic data to advanced learners and to simplify its utterances for novices or learners with 
low ability. 
Some of the information for building the student model is specified by the learner (e.g. his or 
her preferences regarding input mode and speaker behavior) while other aspects can be 
obtained from external sources (e.g. the learner’s VLC user profile or the student models built 
by other agents). Still others have to be inferred from observations of the learner’s behavior 
(e.g. the learner’s internal state, interaction patterns, and exploratory strategies), which can be 
difficult because only limited information about the learner can be reliably collected from the 
few input channels that are available in a web-based environment (cf. Section 16.3.5.1.2). 
16.3.5  Emotion and Personality 
With the ingredients described in the previous sections, the virtual native speaker becomes a 
competent and communicative actor in the virtual room that can interact verbally and non-
verbally with the learner and with other virtual actors as well as participate in virtual character 
performances in the room. However, the speaker’s “inner life” still requires some work for the 
agent to be perceived as an emotionally adept, appealing, and deep individual. Three aspects are 
discussed in the subsections below: the virtual native speaker’s ability to model, interpret, and 
express emotions, including its own as well as those of the learner and other virtual actors; the 
design of the speaker’s personality; and the crafting of its individual back-story. 
16.3.5.1 Emotion 
The role of the virtual native speaker requires an embodied pedagogical software agent to serve 
the learner as an effective informant and performer, to project a believable agent persona, and 
to build a productive relationship with the learner. Each of these three aspects (task, persona, 
and relationship building) involves the need for the agent to handle emotions (cf. Chapter 13.4) 
in a competent way, given its own restrictions and those of its environment. Emotional 
intelligence is important for the virtual native speaker’s task because it makes interactions and 
performances more lively, interesting, and informative. It increases the believability of the 
speaker’s persona because an agent that expresses (and responds to) emotions is more likely to 
be perceived as a sentient and sensitive individual rather than as a cold and uncaring automaton. 
Finally, it facilitates relationship building because the learner perceives that the virtual native 
speaker cares about him or her. Emotional competence includes the three capabilities of 
emotion modeling (cf. Chapter 13.3), emotion interpretation (cf. Chapter 13.4.1), and emotion 
expression (cf. Chapter 13.4.2), which are discussed in the following. 
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16.3.5.1.1 Emotion Modeling 
The purpose of a computational model of emotion is to provide a symbolic representation of 
emotion and emotional dynamics that facilitates the recognition, interpretation, disambiguation, 
management, and synthesis of emotions in an agent’s application context (cf. Chapter 13.3). In 
principle, the virtual native speaker can model the emotions of the learner and the other virtual 
actors as well as its own emotional state and use this information to understand and predict the 
emotional states and reactions of other individuals in the fieldwork environment and to come up 
with its own emotional responses to them and to its own appraisal (cf. Chapter 13.1.2.1) of 
situations and events in the virtual room. 
Computational models of emotion differ with respect to whether they focus on enabling the 
deliberate communication of emotion to achieve certain communicative or manipulative effects 
(cf. Chapter 13.3.1), or attempt to give an agent ‘true’ emotions by simulating aspects of 
emotion processes (cf. Chapter 13.3.2). For the virtual native speaker, a communication-driven 
approach to emotion modeling is adopted because it is more important for the speaker to be able 
to successfully communicate contextually, culturally, and individually appropriate emotions to 
the learner than to simulate internal emotional mechanisms and states. The more sophisticated 
simulation-based emotion models discussed in Chapter 13.3.2 would allow the virtual native 
speaker to appraise (evaluate) states of affairs in its environment more deeply and accurately 
and offer different (problem- and emotion-focused) strategies for coping with them. However, 
given the comparative simplicity of the virtual room and the interactions taking place in it, as 
well as the pragmatic emphasis on the social utility of the speaker’s surface emotional behavior 
(for communication, enhancing believability, and relationship building), rather than the 
adaptive functions of complex internal mechanisms, the complexity of simulation-based models 
outweighs the appeal of endowing the virtual native speaker with genuine (simulated) emotions. 
16.3.5.1.2 Emotion Interpretation 
Effective social functioning of agents requires emotional intelligence (cf. Chapter 13.4), which 
includes the ability to interpret the emotions of the user, other agents, and the agent itself. For 
the virtual native speaker, emotional intelligence is useful to understand the behavior of the 
learner and other virtual actors and to respond with appropriate emotional expressions of its 
own (cf. Section 16.3.5.1.3). Unfortunately, while the speaker has access to the emotional states 
of other virtual actors, its possibilities to determine the learner’s state are limited, due to the 
restricted range of input modes that learners can use (or choose to make use of) in a web-based 
environment (cf. Chapter 7.10), the continuous and variable nature of the auditory and visual 
input signals, and the shortcomings of the recognition technologies required. The most feasible 
input option is still the mouse (and the keyboard, but the latter is not used very much in the 
virtual room). However, when only the learner’s mouse actions are available for analysis, it 
becomes very difficult to deduce the learner’s emotional state from his or her action patterns 
(e.g. click paths and click frequencies). For example, does the learner’s repeated request for the 
same utterance mean that he or she does not know how to analyze it and begins to feel 
frustrated? Does erratic clicking indicate anger or confusion? How should longer periods of 
inactivity be interpreted? Is the learner thinking, unsure about how to proceed, or did he or she 
leave? Without a camera and a microphone, the virtual native speaker is essentially ‘blind’ and 
‘deaf’ as far as the learner’s actions outside the virtual room are concerned. In future versions 
of the virtual fieldwork environment, the auditory and visual channels may be available as 
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additional input options to broaden the range of emotional cues that can be collected from the 
learner’s face and voice (cf. Table 23 and Table 26). These cues will then have to be integrated, 
both with each other and with the learner’s mouse input (cf. Chapter 11.2). Some pedagogical 
agent projects already experiment with the use of multiple input channels for emotion 
interpretation. For example, “AutoTutor [(cf. Figure 17d)] has been enhanced to identify and 
assess learners’ affective states through dialogue assessment techniques, video capture of the 
face, learner body posture, and a pressure sensitive mouse and keyboard” (Graesser et al. 2007). 
While using advanced input devices is possible in experimental setups in the laboratory, it is not 
an option for a real-world e-learning environment, where developers have to consider the 
devices that are available to all or at least the majority of learners. 
Overall, for the time being, the insecurity of the virtual native speaker, and the coach and 
peer agents as well, with respect to how they should behave toward the learner if they cannot 
reliably detect the learner’s emotional state, remains unresolved. Having said that, the direct 
approach of explicitly asking the learner about his or her feelings is always open to all agents in 
the fieldwork environment. 
16.3.5.1.3 Emotion Expression 
While the virtual native speaker’s options for emotion interpretation are limited, on the 
output side, it has the whole spectrum of verbal and non-verbal behaviors enabled by its face, 
body, and voice at its disposal to create emotional displays for the learner that combine visual 
and vocal signals. As a general requirement, the emotional expressions of the speaker (or any 
other agent in the fieldwork environment) have to be both easy to interpret and believable but at 
the same time should also be culturally and contextually appropriate. 
The primary devices for conveying emotions are the face and the voice, but gaze, gesture, 
posture, and locomotion also provide visible cues as to the speaker’s emotional state (cf. 
Chapter 10.1 and Chapter 13.4.2). The facial expressions of the virtual native speaker can be 
described in terms of different shapes of the eyes, eyebrows, and mouth (cf. Section 16.3.2.1.3). 
A more elaborate system for the classification and specification of human facial expressions is 
provided by the Facial Action Coding System (cf. Table 24 and Table 25), but the resulting 
descriptions would possibly contain more detail than necessary for controlling the emotional 
expressions of the cartoon-like face of the speaker character. 
Similar to the face, different aspects of the speaker’s voice provide emotional cues, including 
speech rate, pitch average, pitch range, intensity, voice quality, pitch changes, and articulation 
(cf. Table 26). However, while animated faces can believably portray a variety of emotions, the 
vocal expression of emotion using synthetic speech is more difficult (just like the generation of 
natural language utterances with emotional content), although the expressive capabilities of 
machine-generated voices are developing and people have been demonstrated to be able to 
detect emotions in synthetic speech with an accuracy that is not too far below the recognition 
rates for emotions in human voices (cf. Chapter 13.4.2). 
Neither the face nor the voice can convey the full range of emotions unambiguously on its 
own. In fact, both facial and vocal expressions of different emotions are characterized by a 
number of overlapping features (cf. Chapter 13.4.2). To clarify what emotion is being expressed 
by the virtual native speaker, it is necessary to integrate the facial and vocal expressions with 
each other and with further cues (utterance content, gaze patterns, gestures, postures, and 
locomotion). Furthermore, it is essential to maintain coherence and consistency (cf. Chapter 7.4 
and Chapter 7.5) among the different verbal and non-verbal components of the speaker’s 
478 Chapter 16: Pedagogical Agent Roles on the VLC 
emotional displays, and of each display with the content of the speaker’s utterance which it 
accompanies. 
By choosing its emotional expressions carefully and portraying them believably, the virtual 
native speaker can achieve different communicative, social, and task-related goals in its 
interactions and performances involving the learner and other virtual actors. Some emotional 
displays serve an identifiable function, e.g. as part of a virtual performance or to encourage the 
learner to approach the speaker. In contrast, other emotional displays give the impression of 
being spontaneous reactions of the speaker to an event or situation in the virtual room (although 
the speaker’s displays are always the result of internal deliberation). 
There are a number of sources from which the speaker draws information that influences its 
selection and portrayal of emotional displays: 
• The content of the speaker’s next utterance; 
• The script or plan underlying a virtual performance; 
• The speaker’s assessment of the current state of affairs in the virtual room; 
• Emotional states detected in or inquired from the learner; 
• Knowledge of the (communicated) emotional states of other virtual actors; 
• The speaker’s personality and expressive style; 
• The display rules of the culture which the speaker represents. 
Considerations of what kinds of emotions should be expressed by the virtual native speaker 
toward the learner involve a tension between satisfying the hedonic preference of people for 
positive emotions and the need to make emotional displays appropriate for the current context 
and the speaker’s cultural background (cf. Chapter 13.4.2). To create a comfortable atmosphere 
in the virtual room, the speaker generally should communicate positive emotions to the learner, 
exploiting his or her hedonic preference. The intensity of the positive emotions expressed by 
the speaker may grow as it develops a closer relationship with the learner (cf. Section 16.3.2.4). 
However, the virtual native speaker should also adapt its expressions when the context of the 
interaction or performance requires it. For example, the speaker should not show a happy face 
or speak with a happy voice if another actor hits it with an umbrella or steals an object from its 
possession. 
As an individual, the virtual native speaker should be designed to exhibit idiosyncratic ways 
of expressing different emotions. Likewise, the other virtual actors as well as the coach and 
peer agents each require their own distinctive styles of emotion expression. Through regular 
interactions with the virtual native speaker and the other agents, the learner becomes more and 
more familiar with their individual expressive styles and improves his or her ability to interpret 
their emotional displays correctly. 
As a representative of its culture, the virtual native speaker should behave in a way that 
observes the customs and conventions of that culture, which includes the emotional displays of 
the speaker. When interacting with others, the speaker should choose the appropriate time, 
place, manner, and addressees for expressing or suppressing different emotions, adhering to the 
display rules of its culture (cf. Chapter 10.1.3). The resulting authentic emotional displays are 
instructive for the learner, who can study them and speculate about the display rules of the 
target culture that underlie the displays observed. 
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16.3.5.2 Personality 
Each fieldwork class has a different virtual native speaker plus a number of other virtual actors. 
All these agents are individuals in their own right, and each of them should be designed with a 
personality (cf. Chapter 13.5) that distinguishes this particular agent from other virtual actors 
and the learner, although similarities may exist and can be exploited to make interactions more 
effective and enjoyable. The personality not only defines a virtual native speaker as a distinct 
individual, but it also influences how the speaker interprets and reacts to different situations or 
events in the virtual room, which may differ from the ways in which other agents perceive and 
react to the same situations or events. 
The personality of a virtual native speaker and its differences and similarities to the 
personalities of others are reflected in the speaker’s appearance (cf. Section 16.3.1) and 
behaviors (cf. Section 16.3.2), as well as its interactions with the learner (cf. Section 16.3.3) and 
with other actors during virtual performances (cf. Chapter 16.3.4). The personality is conveyed 
through all available channels, i.e. both visually and auditorily, which includes characteristic 
ways in which the agent speaks, bears its body, moves through the virtual room, performs 
gestures, and maintains eye contact, as well as the speaker’s distinctive facial features and 
movements. Given that various aspects are involved in creating and communicating a 
personality, it is crucial to maintain coherence (cf. Chapter 7.4) and consistency (cf. Chapter 
7.5) among the different components. The personality of a virtual native speaker (or a coach or 
peer agent) and its expression have to be designed with careful consideration for the necessary 
level of detail of the individual aspects, but without losing sight of the “big picture” of how 
these aspects interact. 
While distinct rather than uniform personalities for virtual native speakers are the goal, there 
are certain traits (cf. Table 27 and Table 28) that should be shared by all speakers because they 
are conducive to both their interactions and relationships with learners. First, a virtual native 
speaker should be open to new experiences, in particular to meeting new people (learners) from 
a culture different to its own. This includes a certain degree of curiosity about the learner as a 
person and as a representative of another culture, but also tolerance for different views and 
behaviors. Second, the virtual native speaker should be portrayed as an approachable, 
cooperative, and courteous individual, in order to encourage learners to engage in interactions 
with and request linguistic data from the speaker. Third, given their important role as learners’ 
informants in fieldwork classes, virtual native speakers have to be dependable individuals. The 
learner has to know that he or she can rely on the speaker for data and trust the utterances 
provided by the speaker to be authentic and accurate descriptions of the state of affairs in the 
virtual room. Fourth, the virtual native speaker should portray an emotionally stable rather than 
a neurotic persona. In particular, patience is a virtue for virtual native speakers because learners 
may ask them to repeat the same utterance or performance again and again, or they may 
repeatedly interrupt and modify performances (cf. Section 16.3.4). 
To a certain extent, the virtual native speaker may be able to adapt its personality to the one 
it detects in the learner, for example along the extroversion-introversion dimension, in order to 
exploit the positive effects of similarity attraction (people like other people and things better 
that they perceive as similar to themselves) on the learner’s impression of the agent (cf. Chapter 
9.2 and Chapter 10.1.1). To assess the learner’s personality, the direct approach of asking the 
learner questions that reveal different personality traits could be used. Alternatively (or in 
addition), in a future version of the fieldwork environment that permits speech input, the 
learner’s voice characteristics (volume, pitch, pitch range, and speech rate) could be analyzed 
and mapped to different personality dimensions or types. For example, an extrovert voice 
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exhibits a loud volume level, a high pitch, a wide pitch range, and a fast speech rate (cf. Chapter 
13.5).269 When using a synthetic voice, these parameters can be manipulated to express 
personality characteristics through the voice that are more similar to those of the learner. Of 
course, as discussed above, changing the voice personality typically also requires adjustments 
of an agent’s non-verbal behavioral tendencies (e.g. an extrovert voice combined with introvert 
gesturing would be perceived as inconsistent). While subtle changes in the speaker’s 
personality expression can be made during and across interactions with the learner, more radical 
adaptations should happen before the first interaction with the learner, since relatively sudden 
shifts in personality are very likely to be perceived as signs of emotional instability or even a 
personality disorder. 
16.3.5.3 Back-Story 
The current virtual native speaker is a relatively ‘flat’ character, not just with respect to its 
embodiment (cf. Chapter 16.3.1) but also regarding the story behind the character. All the 
information that the learner can ever obtain about the speaker is restricted to its name and to a 
small number of biographical details about the human native speaker who provided the voice 
talent for the character. In contrast, the enhanced virtual native speaker is designed to be a 
deeper character with an identity of its own, which includes a distinct back-story that provides 
significantly more detail than the sketchy vita in the first unit of the fieldwork class. 
The back-story of a virtual native speaker requires sufficient breadth and depth to enable the 
learner to understand what individual (or character) the virtual native speaker is. It integrates 
the speaker’s biographical background with a (growing) collection of scripted experiences, 
memories, stories, etc. (cf. Chapter 13.6). The contents of the back-story not only allows the 
learner to get to know the virtual native speaker better as an individual but may also give him or 
her valuable background information about the culture (through the eyes of one that ‘lives’ in 
it). For example, the back-story could include special events in the life of the virtual native 
speaker, some of which might even happen in the course of the fieldwork class (e.g. birthday, 
graduation, marriage, death of a family member, etc.). The back-story could illustrate how these 
events are handled in the culture of the virtual native speaker. By taking an interest in accounts 
of such events, the learner is getting closer to both the virtual native speaker and its culture. 
Back-stories of virtual native speakers (and also of coach agents and peers) should be 
interesting to learners and help them to relate to the agent as an individual. The back-story of a 
virtual native speaker may (by accident or by design) exhibit some similarities to the learner’s 
own background, but that is not a requirement. Having said that, it is not necessary to give the 
character a back-story that oozes with adventure or tragedy either. In fact, such an overdrawn 
character would be inappropriate for its role in the fieldwork scenario. Real life writes the best 
stories after all, and portraying a virtual native speaker (or coach or peer) as a ‘normal’ person, 
like the learner, makes it easier for the latter to identify with the agent. 
The back-story of a particular virtual native speaker should be revealed gradually in the 
course of the fieldwork class. Letting out the whole story at once might overwhelm the learner 
and can lead to a loss of interest in the speaker on his or her part because the mystery that was 
the virtual native speaker was resolved too quickly. Instead, disclosing one aspect at a time 
helps to maintain the learner’s interest in the speaker. Due to the language barrier between the 
                                              
269  However, since the virtual native speaker should be perceived as competent, it may be necessary to 
lower the pitch of its voice (Nass & Brave 2005: 42). 
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learner and the virtual native speaker, the back-story cannot be told in the language of the 
fieldwork class but has to be written in English. Learners can read the story or may listen to the 
narration provided by a coach or peer agent that reveals a particular aspect at the appropriate 
time. 
Each virtual native speaker is a different individual and therefore requires its own back-
story. This means that at least one back-story per fieldwork class has to be written for its virtual 
native speaker. In addition, the other actors that appear in a fieldwork class also each require 
their own back-story. To manage the amount of writing necessary, several virtual actors may 
share certain aspects of their backgrounds (due to being close friends or relatives, for example). 
Furthermore, the back-story of a fieldwork character is not static but progresses in the course of 
a fieldwork class and from one run of the class to the next because life goes on for these 
artificial individuals as well. Constantly authoring the life of a single virtual actor, let alone the 
lives of multiple actors, is not feasible. However, certain changes to the back-story of a virtual 
native speaker or other agent should be made, at least between two runs of the fieldwork class, 
to show that the agent’s story continues.270 
16.3.6  Evaluation 
Evaluation is an important activity throughout the development life-cycle of software systems, 
including embodied interactive agents (cf. Chapter 15). In the design and implementation of the 
virtual native speaker (as well as the coach and the peer),271 repeated evaluations are essential to 
generate options for design decisions, guide the choice among design options, assess the effects 
of the resulting designs, and iteratively improve the overall system. Furthermore, they can help 
to derive guidelines for the design of future agents for the Virtual Linguistics Campus and other 
environments, roles, and applications (cf. Chapter 15.1). The following paragraphs discuss 
some preliminary ideas about what aspects of the virtual native speaker should be evaluated, 
and how. 
From a macro (system-level) evaluation perspective (cf. Chapter 15.3.4), the design of the 
virtual native speaker can be considered a success if the resulting agent fulfills its functions of 
informant, performer, individual, cultural representative, and partner of the learner in ways that 
enhance and facilitate the learner’s experience and outcomes of studying a linguistic fieldwork 
class, both according to objective measures and to the learner’s subjective perception. In 
particular, the virtual native speaker should help the individual learner to develop proficiency in 
linguistic fieldwork and to construct knowledge about the speaker’s language and culture while 
playing its part in making the time spent by the learner in the virtual room as productive and 
enjoyable as possible. A successful virtual native speaker serves the learner as a flexible and 
competent informant that provides relevant and accurate data for the analysis of the target 
language. In performances with other virtual actors and with the learner, the speaker plays its 
part believably, comprehensibly, and with its own personal touch. Through all aspects of its 
appearance and behavior, it presents itself as an appealing individual with a distinct personality 
                                              
270  However, from a pragmatic point of view, the question is how likely it is for the same learner to take 
the same fieldwork class twice. Still, the life stories of virtual native speakers, coach agents, and peer 
agents should be updated at regular intervals. 
271  While the following discussion only makes reference to the virtual native speaker, it is clear that all 
virtual actors designed for the fieldwork environment have to be evaluated, which includes the coach 
and peer agents (cf. Section 16.2.3 and Section 16.2.4). 
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and as an authentic representative of its culture. Finally, in the course of a fieldwork class, 
learners come to appreciate the speaker as a reliable and trustworthy regular partner in the 
fieldwork process. 
The above criteria for the success of the virtual native speaker as part of the virtual fieldwork 
environment can be met by developing designs for the individual components of the speaker 
(embodiment, behavior, conversation, expertise, and emotion and personality) that contribute 
desired attributes, such as an authentic and inviting appearance; a distinct, intelligible, natural-
sounding, and expressive voice; deictically believable combinations of speech, gesture, and 
locomotion; the ability to produce linguistically and factually accurate verbal descriptions of 
different states of affairs in the virtual room; and a supportive personality backed up by a deep, 
interesting back-story. For each design component of the virtual native speaker discussed in the 
previous sections, a set of questions is provided below as examples of issues that are of interest 
for evaluating the contribution of that component to the overall success of the speaker (micro 
evaluation, cf. Chapter 15.3.5): 
Embodiment 
• Does the speaker’s embodiment authentically portray a contemporary representative of the 
target culture, according to judgments by people from the same culture and from different 
cultures? Do the speaker’s appearance and/or behavior offend either of these groups? 
• What are the effects of exploiting cultural stereotypes in the speaker’s appearance (and 
behavior) on the speaker’s perception by members of different cultures? 
• Do the speaker’s physical attributes, clothes, and accessories appeal to learners from the 
target group? Do they invite learners to interact with the speaker? 
• Does the speaker’s appearance help learners to understand the speaker’s role in the fieldwork 
environment? 
• Does the speaker’s appearance support learners’ perception of the speaker as an individual 
that is distinct from other virtual actors? 
• What are the effects of the speaker’s anthropomorphic embodiment on learners? What 
expectations with respect to the speaker’s characteristics and capabilities does it raise? How 
does it influence learners’ behavior toward the speaker? 
• Was the right level of realism chosen for the speaker’s embodiment? If not, is the speaker’s 
level of realism too low (below the threshold of believability) or too high (pushing the 
speaker into the uncanny valley) (cf. Chapter 9.5)? 
• Is the quality of the animations created for the speaker acceptable? Are the movements 
smooth and without perceptible glitches? 
Voice 
• Does the voice accurately convey the segmental and suprasegmental aspects (i.e. sounds and 
prosody) of the target language? 
• Is the speech sufficiently intelligible for learners to be able to correctly transcribe the 
speaker’s utterances? 
• Is it easy and pleasant for learners to listen to the speaker’s voice? 
• Does the voice have the accent of a native speaker of the target language? 
• Is the speaking style (speech rate, volume, pitch, etc.) appropriate? 
• How effectively does the voice contribute to the speaker’s expressions of different emotions? 
• Is the voice chosen perceived as a distinctive characteristic of the speaker as an individual? 
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• Can the requirements above be satisfied by a synthetic voice or is it necessary to cast a 
human voice? 
Non-Verbal Communication 
• Do the speaker’s non-verbal communicative behaviors seamlessly integrate with each other 
and with the speaker’s utterances during its performances and interactions with the learner? 
For example, does the speaker integrate speech, gestures, and locomotion in a natural and 
unambiguous way when referring to actors, objects, and events in the virtual room? 
• Does the speaker follow the conventions of its culture when displaying non-verbal behaviors 
in its interactions with others? Are potential misinterpretations of behaviors by the learner 
due to cultural differences cleared up timely and appropriately? 
• Is the degree of variability in the speaker’s non-verbal behaviors sufficient to prevent the 
impression of repetitiveness? 
• Is the speaker’s manner of performing different non-verbal behaviors perceived as consistent 
with its personality? 
• Do modulations of non-verbal behaviors successfully contribute to the communication of the 
speaker’s different emotional, cognitive, and physical states? 
• Are the speaker’s auditory and visual speech accurately synchronized? 
Believability 
• What is the relative contribution of human-like communicative behaviors and explicit 
believability-enhancing behaviors to the speaker’s believability as an individual? Which of 
the two is more important to this end? Do learners notice any difference between a virtual 
native speaker with and without explicit believability-enhancing behaviors vs. a speaker with 
and without communicative behaviors? 
• Are the speaker’s believability-enhancing behaviors sufficiently subdued to be recognizable 
without being a distraction for learners? Or do they attract too much attention? 
• Does the speaker perform its reflexive and idiosyncratic behaviors in a way that is perceived 
as human-like? 
• Does the speaker observe the context of the interaction or performance when carrying out 
behaviors that enhance its persona? 
• Do believability-enhancing behaviors, when displayed in a particular context, cause any 
misunderstandings regarding the attitudes and intentions of the speaker in that context? 
• Does the speaker perform its believability-enhancing behaviors with sufficient variability to 
avoid the impression of repetitiveness? 
• Do learners associate the speaker’s idiosyncratic behaviors with its persona? Can learners 
recognize and remember the speaker better because of these behaviors? 
High vs. Low Profile 
• Do learners always know where they can find the speaker in the virtual room? 
• Do learners know that the speaker is always available for them, even if it is doing something 
else in the virtual room? 
• How much attention does the speaker draw to itself (a) when it provides its services as the 
learner’s informant; and (b) when it is occupied otherwise? Does it attract too much attention 
in either case? 
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• How do learners react to the speaker’s constant presence? Do they perceive it as comforting 
or as a source of additional stress? Or are they indifferent to it? 
• Does the speaker succeed in maintaining a level of presence in the virtual room that indicates 
its constant availability without being a source of distraction or disturbance for learners? 
Relationship Building 
• Do learners perceive the speaker’s relationship-building behaviors as intended? 
• How do learners react to the speaker’s efforts to form a relationship with them? 
• If the speaker discloses information about itself, do learners reciprocate in kind? 
• What observable changes occur in learners’ attitudes and behaviors toward the speaker in the 
course of a series of virtual fieldwork sessions? 
• How do learners view their relationship with the virtual native speaker? 
• Do learners accept the speaker as a regular partner in the fieldwork process? 
• Do learners think that they can trust and rely on the speaker? 
Conversation 
• Are the speaker’s utterances grammatical? 
• Are the utterances delivered with a native pronunciation and prosody (or at least one that 
comes sufficiently close to it)? 
• Do the speaker’s vocabulary, constructions, and articulation reflect how the target language 
is spoken today? 
• Do the speaker’s utterances provide accurate descriptions of different actors, objects, and 
events in the virtual room, in the present, past, and future? 
• What are the limits of the speaker’s descriptive capabilities? What situations in the virtual 
room is the speaker able or unable to describe with its utterances? 
• Are the speaker’s utterances appropriate for the context of the interaction or performance in 
which they occur? 
• Do the utterances generated by the virtual native speaker have the right level of complexity 
for a given learner’s knowledge and capabilities? 
• How easy (or difficult) is it for learners to elicit the relevant or desired linguistic data from 
the speaker? Does the graphical (or multimodal) user interface to the virtual room facilitate 
or hinder this process? Is this interface usable by learners from the target group? 
• How accurately can the speaker recognize and interpret the learner’s speech and mouse 
inputs, alone or in combination? 
• Does the speaker’s dialogue model correctly reflect the development and the current state of 
the interaction with the learner and/or with other agents? 
• Is learner control a successful strategy for the interactions between the learner and the virtual 
native speaker, or should the speaker take the initiative more often? 
Expertise 
• Does the speaker’s model of the virtual room provide an accurate and constantly up-to-date 
representation of this dynamically changing environment over time, including previous, 
future, and hypothetical states and events of the virtual room? 
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• Is the information in the model sufficiently broad and deep to enable the speaker’s language 
generation component to produce utterances that describe the specified actor, object, or event 
with accuracy and in appropriate detail? 
• Does the ontology created for the virtual room capture the structure of this domain in a way 
that allows to economically and unambiguously describe the full range of entities and their 
relationships and facilitates making inferences from the current model of the virtual room? 
• Does the use of an external model of the virtual room have the anticipated advantages 
(cf. Section 16.3.4), or is it necessary to think of an alternative? 
• Does the visual authoring tool facilitate the scripting of virtual performances at different 
levels of detail and complexity that are appropriate for particular groups of users (learners, 
instructors, and developers)? 
• Are the performances scripted using the tool performed by the virtual actors as the user 
imagined and specified them? 
• Do dynamically generated performances illustrate the linguistic (or cultural) concept set as a 
goal for the improvised scene in a way that is comprehensible and interesting for the 
individual learner? 
• Do both pre-scripted and dynamically generated virtual performances observe restrictions 
with respect to focus and length? That is, are the performances short and to the point? 
• Are interruptions of performances handled smoothly by the virtual actors? Are the break and 
continuation points chosen appropriately? 
• How well does the system deal with learners’ modifications to a performance? Are illegal 
modifications detected and rejected? Are the revised plans for the performance consistent, 
and do they appropriately reflect the changes requested by the learner? 
• In performances with flexible learner participation, are the learner’s goals and plans inferred 
correctly during the performance? Can the virtual actors successfully adapt their respective 
parts to the learner’s actions and intentions? 
• Do the virtual performances in general achieve the goal of exposing the learner to more and 
more varied data from the language of the fieldwork class? 
• Do the virtual actors play their parts in a performance in a way that is believable, individual, 
culturally appropriate, and easy to interpret for the learner? 
• Does the information accumulating in the speaker’s model of the individual learner enable 
the speaker to become a better informant, performer, and/or partner in the relationship with 
the learner? 
• Is the learner-specific information obtained from various sources (the learner, external 
databases, and through observation) accurate and consistent (in itself and with each other)? 
• What types of information in the student model (cf. Section 16.3.4) are necessary for the 
speaker to adapt successfully to the learner? Which ones are superfluous? 
Emotion 
• Does the speaker’s emotion model enable the agent to communicate contextually, culturally, 
and individually appropriate emotions to the learner and to other agents? 
• Is it sufficient for the speaker to deliberately communicate emotions, or does it require an 
internal simulation of emotional states and mechanisms that condition its emotional 
responses? 
• What emotions should the speaker be able to detect in learners? Which ones should it be able 
to express itself? 
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• How accurately can the speaker detect and interpret the spectrum of learners’ emotional 
states that are relevant for its role? 
• How does the speaker’s failure to confidently identify the learner’s emotional state affect its 
interactions and relationships with learners? 
• Are the speaker’s emotional displays easy to interpret for learners? Do learners recognize the 
emotion communicated by the speaker as intended? 
• Are the emotional displays of the speaker believable for learners? 
• Do learners recognize the speaker’s distinctive style of emotion expression? 
• Are the emotions expressed appropriate for the current context and addressees? How closely 
does the speaker adhere to the display rules of its culture when displaying or suppressing 
emotions to other actors and to the learner? 
• Do the speaker’s emotional displays exhibit cross-modal consistency? That is, is the emotion 
communicated through the voice consistent with the one portrayed non-verbally and with the 
(emotional) content of the speaker’s utterances? 
Personality 
• Is the speaker’s personality clearly and consistently communicated through the interplay of 
its appearance, behavior, and communication? 
• Does the speaker portray a personality that is perceived as distinct from the personalities of 
other agents? Can learners identify the differences and similarities between the speaker’s 
personality and other personalities in the virtual room as well as their own? 
• Do learners recognize the speaker’s personality as intended, in particular the essential traits 
openness, approachability, cooperativeness, courtesy, dependability, emotional stability, and 
patience? 
• Do learners think that the speaker’s personality is appropriate for its role? 
Back-Story 
• Does the speaker’s back-story provide the appropriate elements and level of detail that allow 
learners to get to know the (scripted) person behind the virtual native speaker? 
• Does the back-story contain elements that appeal to learners and help them to relate to the 
speaker as an individual? 
• What elements of the speaker’s back-story draw learners’ interest in particular? 
• Is the pace at which the speaker’s story is revealed in the course of a fieldwork class 
conducive to maintaining learners’ interest in the speaker? 
• Is the rate at which the speaker’s story is updated sufficient for sustaining the illusion of a 
progressing life? 
Following the principle of participatory design (cf. Chapter 7.13), the development of the 
virtual native speaker and the other pedagogical agents for the linguistic fieldwork classes 
should incorporate inputs from all parties that can make contributions to its design, including 
learners from the target group of the fieldwork classes; experts on linguistic fieldwork; 
instructional design experts (with knowledge of constructivist methods); experts on usability, 
affective and social design (cf. Chapter 6); experts on (different design aspects of) embodied 
interactive software agents; and native speakers of the language of the fieldwork class (who 
provide expertise on their native language as well as their culture). 
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Formative evaluations of the virtual native speaker (cf. Chapter 15.3.2) should begin early 
and recur at regular intervals during the development process to provide guidance at appropriate 
points (e.g. when casting the voice for the speaker). These evaluations are largely exploratory in 
nature, generating design options and guiding design choices. They may focus on individual 
components of the virtual native speaker (see above) but also examine more or less functional 
prototypes of the virtual room featuring the enhanced speaker. 
Preparations for the actual design process involve a substantial amount of desk research (cf. 
Chapter 15.4.4.4) to collect and review insights from previous work done by others that pertain 
to the design of embodied interactive software agents in general and of the pedagogical agents 
for the linguistic fieldwork classes in particular. The results of this desk research were 
presented in the previous chapters of this thesis. Furthermore, right from the beginning, it is 
important for developers to have a clear picture of the people that will work with the virtual 
native speaker. A survey (cf. Chapter 15.4.4.1) in questionnaire format (cf. Chapter 15.4.5.1) 
could be used to elicit broad user-related information (cf. Chapter 6.1 and Chapter 15.2.2). 
Longitudinal case studies (cf. Chapter 15.4.4.3) are another useful exploratory tool in the early 
phases of design. By observing a small number of learners (which may be selected from the 
respondents of the initial survey) over a series of sessions in the current fieldwork environment, 
it is possible to obtain detailed descriptive data from which their patterns and strategies of 
exploring the virtual room and interacting with the current virtual native speaker can be 
derived. These case studies may also include exploratory interviews with the participants, 
which elicit their expectations about desirable qualities of a virtual native speaker, influenced 
by their interactions with the current speaker (cf. Chapter 15.4.5.2).272 The data obtained from 
these exploratory studies, while difficult to generalize because the subjects studied are few and 
selected deliberately rather than randomly, nonetheless provide insights for designing improved 
facilities for exploration and interaction into the virtual room and the enhanced virtual native 
speaker. 
Experimental user studies (cf. Chapter 15.3.2) are another important instrument for both the 
formative and the summative evaluations of the virtual native speaker because they allow the 
design team to assess how representative members of the target group of learners perceive and 
interact273 with different versions of the improved speaker agent, including the one that is 
eventually deployed. Even before a fully functional implementation is available, a series of 
Wizard-of-Oz experiments with successively refined prototypes of the virtual room and the 
speaker agent can be conducted to elicit (by way of questionnaires, observations, and think-
aloud protocols) how learners behave in their interactions with the virtual native speaker, what 
learners think of the interactions and the speaker, what confuses them, what they like and 
dislike, what features they would like to see or change, etc. 
Focus groups (cf. Chapter 15.4.5.2) can be employed to broaden the range of voices that can 
comment on the design of different prototypes of the virtual room and the virtual native 
speaker. Apart from learners, focus groups may involve experts, instructors, and native speakers 
                                              
272  Kim (2007) conducted such interviews with a small group of learners to collect their opinions on 
desirable characteristics of pedagogical agents as learning companions (PALs), based on their 
previous experience with such agents. 
273  A problem with many evaluation studies of embodied interactive software agents to date is that they 
do not involve interaction between the subjects and the agents being evaluated (cf. Footnote 66 and 
Chapter 15.5). In contrast, for determining the success of the design of the virtual native speaker, it is 
essential to assess the informativeness, pleasantness, and smoothness of learners’ interactions with 
the speaker. 
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of the target language, who share their attitudes, feelings, impressions, etc. regarding a given 
prototype presented for discussion. The moderators of the focus groups should not be affiliated 
with the team designing the virtual native speaker, so they can remain neutral. 
Formative evaluations of the virtual native speaker can also benefit from reviews provided 
by experts on linguistic fieldwork, the language and culture of the fieldwork class, instructional 
design, and embodied interactive software agents. Expert reviews may be based on heuristics 
(cf. Chapter 15.3.2), for example when assessing the usability of the enhanced graphical (or 
multimodal) user interface to the virtual room (cf. Section 16.3.3). For graphical interfaces, 
established usability principles are already available. A number of heuristics for the design of 
multimodal systems are indicated as ‘implications’ in Table 15. Heuristics for the evaluation of 
dialogue interfaces are discussed by Sanders and Scholtz (2000). The situation is more difficult 
for the virtual native speaker as such because generally accepted heuristics for the evaluation of 
embodied interactive software agents do not yet exist. The design principles developed in 
Chapter 7 are a first step toward developing such heuristics. In general, heuristics for embodied 
interactive agents have to go beyond concerns for usability and include affective and social 
aspects (cf. Chapter 6). 
Apart from using general heuristics, a collection of domain-specific test cases can be defined 
by evaluators that cause the virtual native speaker to exhibit certain qualities, such as language 
generation, emotion expression, and deictically believable communicative behaviors. Test cases 
for the speaker may include pre-scripted performances; goals for improvised performances; sets 
of entities, relationships, and events providing topics for the speaker’s utterances; and different 
emotion-generating situations. While pre-defined test cases can be used to systematically test 
the speaker’s capabilities, it is also helpful to give learners in user studies the freedom to 
spontaneously create situations and performances because this allows evaluators to see how 
well the speaker handles these unanticipated cases. 
When the virtual native speaker is reaching its final development stages, outcome-oriented 
(summative) evaluations (cf. Chapter 15.3.3) come to the fore. At this stage, experiments (cf. 
Chapter 15.4.4.2) with subjects representative of the target group of learners should be 
conducted that evaluate the (almost) finished speaker in its application context (the virtual room 
in a particular fieldwork class) in terms of quantitative measures of performance and user 
satisfaction, relative to an appropriate control condition (at the coarsest level, the original 
virtual room and virtual native speaker) in order to answer specific research questions. These 
studies should assess the actual value (as opposed to the anticipated value) that the enhanced 
virtual native speaker adds to the virtual fieldwork environment (cf. Chapter 7.1), demonstrate 
that learners can (or cannot) interact with the speaker and use the enhanced features of the 
virtual room (authoring of performances, manipulation of the room, speech and multimodal 
input) successfully to achieve the goals of a linguistic fieldwork class, and identify aspects of 
the speaker, the room, and the user interface that need to be improved in future versions. 
Furthermore, it is important to determine if learners accept the virtual native speaker in its 
different functions of informant, performer, individual, cultural representative, and partner in 
the learning process. To determine the long-term effects of the virtual native speaker, its 
behaviors and components on learners, it is not enough to examine one-time, short interactions 
between learners and the speaker. Instead, extended evaluation studies have to be conducted 
that assess how learners’ perception of and interaction with the virtual native speaker change 
over time. These long-term evaluations are conducted with the final, deployed speaker agent in 
the context of an actual fieldwork class, using real students of that class as test subjects. They 
can be implemented as case studies documenting the series of interactions between individual 
learners and the virtual native speaker during a fieldwork class in detail or, at a coarser level, by 
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administering appropriate questionnaires at different points in the course of the class. The data 
collected from these long-term postproduction evaluations will inform the next development 
cycle for the virtual native speaker and the virtual room. 
16.4  Summary 
This chapter worked out a detailed design for the virtual native speaker, an embodied 
pedagogical software agent which serves as the learner’s informant about an unknown language 
that is explored by the learner in the context and course of a particular linguistic fieldwork class 
on the Virtual Linguistics Campus. The design extends the existing virtual native speaker role 
known from the current setup of the fieldwork classes in substantial ways. The enhanced virtual 
native speaker is no longer just a machine with a face and a voice that plays back recorded 
utterances at the learner’s request but a more flexible, competent, and interesting interaction 
partner and performer with its own personal and cultural background, which provides various 
opportunities for the learner to discover aspects of the speaker’s language and culture and 
works to establish a long-term cooperative relationship with the learner. 
The design of the virtual native speaker was divided into five components, embodiment, 
behavior, conversation, expertise, and emotion and personality, to mirror Chapter 9 to Chapter 
13 of the thesis that were concerned with these components. Considerations regarding the 
technical architecture and platform of the virtual native speaker (cf. Chapter 14) were integrated 
into the description of the speaker’s design. A further section discussed preliminary ideas for 
the evaluation of the enhanced virtual native speaker. 
For the embodiment of the virtual native speaker, a full-body, animated 2½D artistic 
humanoid representation was chosen, whose appearance authentically portrays a distinctive 
individual representing the target culture. The speaker’s appearance helps the learner to quickly 
understand its identity and role and invites him or her to interact with the speaker. 
The virtual native speaker makes use of its embodiment to perform various behaviors that 
serve different communicative functions during its interactions with the learner and other 
virtual actors, enhance the speaker’s believability as an individual, and facilitate the process of 
building a relationship with the learner. The communicative behaviors of the virtual native 
speaker involve the coordinated use of voice, facial expressions, gaze, gesture, posture, and 
locomotion, whose design was discussed in separate subsections. These behaviors have to be 
coherent and consistent with each other, as well as appropriate for the current context and the 
speaker’s personality and cultural background. The virtual native speaker achieves believability 
by behaving in human-like, individual and culturally authentic ways during its interactions with 
others rather than through explicit believability-enhancing behaviors. The speaker performs a 
number of reflexive and idiosyncratic behaviors but plays them down so they do not distract the 
learner. Due to its essential role in the fieldwork environment, the virtual native speaker has to 
be available all the time, which involves maintaining an appropriate level of presence in the 
virtual room without drawing unnecessary attention to itself. Relationship building is hindered 
by the language barrier separating the virtual native speaker and the learner, so several 
alternative ways for the virtual native speaker to develop its relationship with the learner were 
described. 
The enhanced virtual native speaker is a conversational agent that participates in interactions 
and performances with other virtual actors and with the learner, which involve short (simulated) 
dialogues in its native language, in order to present more and more varied linguistic data from 
that language to the learner. Conversations in the virtual room are restricted both with respect to 
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the domain and the complexity of the utterances produced by the speaker and the other actors. 
In future versions of the fieldwork environment, learners may be able to use spoken language 
input to talk to the virtual actors and even to combine speech with mouse actions. Until that 
time, learners can use an enhanced graphical user interface to the virtual room, whose features 
were described. More critical than spoken language understanding or multimodal interpretation 
is the ability of the virtual native speaker to dynamically generate utterances in its native 
language that describe any state of affairs that is (or was or will be) present or can be created by 
the learner in the virtual room. The interactions between the virtual native speaker and the 
human learner are open-ended rather than goal-oriented and do not develop along a predictable 
path. Still, the virtual native speaker has to maintain both a model of the current interaction and 
a history of previous interactions. The initiative in learner-speaker interactions lies with the 
learner, who inquires about events and situations in the virtual room to elicit the corresponding 
utterances from the speaker. In contrast, virtual performances are characterized by mixed-
initiative exchanges among the actors. 
The primary expertise of the virtual native speaker lies in its ability to produce authentic and 
grammatical utterances in its native language that provide accurate and appropriate descriptions 
of different states of affairs in the virtual room. The speaker requires a dynamically updated 
model of the virtual room to keep track of changes happening in the room over time as a result 
of manipulations by the learner, other virtual actors, and the virtual native speaker itself. The 
possibility of implementing such a model as an external representation consisting of semantic 
markup written using the languages of the Semantic Web and encoded as annotations to the 
speaker’s environment (the virtual room) was discussed. 
The virtual native speaker is not just an informant but also a performer that plays its part in 
performances involving other virtual actors, objects in the virtual room, and possibly the 
learner. These performances are interactive experiences for the learner, who can interrupt a 
performance to query the actors, modify the performance and observe the results, and even play 
his or her own part in it. Virtual performances can be scripted in advance by developers, 
instructors, and learners using an authoring tool, or they may be improvised by the actors 
(possibly including the learner) according to a plan that is either constructed beforehand to 
illustrate a particular linguistic concept or evolves in response to the learner’s involvement. 
Both pre-scripted and dynamic performances should have a clear focus (on a small set of 
linguistic concepts) and a restricted duration. 
To be able to adapt to the individual learner in the course of a fieldwork class, the virtual 
native speaker builds and maintains a long-term student model, which accumulates personal 
details of the learner; his or her preferred input mode; adaptations of the speaker’s behavior; the 
learner’s interaction patterns and exploration strategies; what types of situations, events, and 
performances he or she creates or manipulates; linguistic data and concepts to which the learner 
has already been exposed; and, finally, the learner’s cognitive and emotional states. The speaker 
obtains information for the student model from the learner or from external sources or by way 
of making inferences from the learner’s observable behavior, although the options for the latter 
were argued to be limited in the environment of the virtual room. 
For the virtual native speaker to be perceived as a sentient and sensitive individual with its 
own distinctive traits and background, three ingredients were discussed: emotional intelligence, 
personality, and back-story. First, the speaker requires the ability to handle emotions in order to 
support its task, persona, and relationship-building efforts. A communication-driven approach 
to emotion modeling was adopted for the virtual native speaker, given that the simulation of 
genuine emotions is less important than the need to communicate contextually, culturally, and 
individually appropriate emotions to the learner. The speaker’s options for detecting the 
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learner’s emotional state are quite limited given the few input channels available in a web-based 
environment. In contrast, the virtual native speaker can make use of its face, body, and voice to 
portray a variety of emotions, both with an identifiable function and (seemingly) spontaneously. 
The role of the face and the voice in creating the speaker’s emotional displays was discussed in 
some detail. Furthermore, a number of factors that influence the selection and portrayal of 
emotional displays were identified. Emotional displays of the virtual native speaker should 
meet the hedonic preference of people for positive emotions while still being appropriate for the 
current context and the speaker’s cultural background. Furthermore, they should be delivered in 
the speaker’s own distinctive style of expression and observe the display rules of the speaker’s 
culture. 
The virtual native speaker is endowed with a personality consisting of a set of traits which 
distinguish the speaker from other individuals and determine how it interprets and reacts to 
actors, situations, and events in its environment. The personality is communicated through all 
aspects of the speaker’s appearance and behavior, paying attention to detail as well as the “big 
picture” of the interplay between the characteristics. While each virtual native speaker has its 
own personality, a number of traits were identified that all speakers should have because of 
their utility for both their interactions and relationships with the learner. A virtual native 
speaker should be open to new experiences and people, approachable, cooperative, courteous, 
dependable, emotionally stable, and patient. On the other hand, the virtual native speaker can 
also adapt its personality to match the one of the learner. Ways to assess the learner’s 
personality and to change the speaker’s personality expression accordingly were described. 
The personality of the virtual native speaker is enriched with a detailed back-story that 
provides biographical details along with scripted experiences, memories, stories, etc. in order to 
deepen the learner’s knowledge of the speaker as an individual and to give the learner insights 
into the life of a representative of the target culture. The back-story of a virtual native speaker 
should be interesting but not exaggerated, portraying the speaker as a ‘normal’ individual that 
the learner can relate to. In order to sustain the learner’s interest, the back-story should be 
revealed bit by bit in the course of a fieldwork class. Authoring and regularly updating the 
different back-stories of the virtual native speaker and the other agents involve a lot of work, so 
strategies for reducing the workload of writers were discussed. 
The final section on the design of the virtual native speaker was concerned with its 
evaluation. The speaker’s design (as well as those of the coach, the peer, the enhanced virtual 
room, the linguistic workbench, the collaborative learning and research environment, and the 
visual tool for authoring character performances) will be subjected to repeated evaluations that 
begin early in the development life-cycle, continue throughout, and extend into the deployment 
of the finished agents and systems. The success of the virtual native speaker is marked by its 
ability to serve the learner as an informant, performer, individual, cultural representative, and 
partner in ways that make the learner’s work in the virtual fieldwork environment more 
productive and enjoyable. Extensive sets of detailed questions for the evaluation of the different 
components of the speaker’s design were provided. The remainder of the discussion contributed 
ideas on how the formative and summative evaluations of the virtual native speaker could be 
performed, using case studies, desk research, surveys, and experiments. 
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17 Conclusion 
In the dawning age of embodied interactive software agents, computers have moved beyond the 
old cliché of the cold, dull, and socially inept machine. Instead, they can portray believable, 
interesting, and sentient social actors that can interact with users in human-like ways and build 
relationships with them. This thesis investigated the design of embodied interactive software 
agents as autonomous, adaptive social actors embedded in computer-based environments and 
equipped with the ability to use their digital embodiments to act on users and their environment 
through bodily actions, including verbal and non-verbal communicative behaviors. These 
embodied (inter-) actors can engage users in multimodal dialogues emulating the socially 
interactive experience of face-to-face communication. In these dialogues, ideally both artificial 
and human interlocutors can make use of speech, facial expressions, gesture, gaze, posture, and 
locomotion to regulate the conversation process, contribute content to the ongoing exchange, 
and convey their emotional and cognitive states. Apart from being effective communicators, 
embodied interactive agents can attract, engage, and bond with users by portraying themselves 
as appealing, empathetic, sentient, and deep individuals that exhibit an attractive appearance, 
believable behaviors, emotional intelligence, an interesting personality, a rich back-story, and a 
noticeable interest in and persistent efforts to form a relationship with each user. 
Embodied interactive software agents can play a variety of roles in different application 
domains, some of which were described in Chapter 3.2 of this thesis. However, the focus of the 
present work was on the design of embodied interactive software agents for roles in computer-
assisted learning, in particular e-learning (cf. Chapter 2). The potential of these pedagogical 
software agents lies in their capacity to implement a wide range of instructional interactions (cf. 
Chapter 12.3) that provide contextualized, qualified, personalized, and timely assistance, 
cooperation, instruction, motivation, and services for the individual learner as well as groups of 
learners, without being a distraction or a nuisance to learners (cf. Chapter 4). 
To achieve the qualities outlined in the previous paragraphs, it will not do to conceptualize 
and design an embodied interactive software agent for a given role as anything less than a 
complete artificial individual that combines communicative, social, and task-related knowledge 
and skills with an attractive and expressive exterior as well as a rich inner life and background. 
In essence, the task is to craft a unique character with depth, appeal, and a history and bring it to 
life as well as teach it to communicate and behave naturally and effectively in its appointed role 
and toward the user. Many previous efforts to build embodied agents suffered from not having 
this comprehensive view that, eventually, the whole package (agent) delivered to users matters, 
rather than just the performance of particular components (e.g. non-verbal behavior, emotion 
modeling, dialogue capability, etc.), just as little as it is possible to reduce a human being to 
individual characteristics or capabilities (cf. Chapter 7.6). 
A complete agent cannot be effectively designed with the knowledge and techniques of one 
discipline alone; it is way too complex for that. Neither computer scientists nor artists and 
animators nor social psychologists can build a successful embodied interactive software agent 
on their own. Agent developers require expertise from a variety of academic and non-academic 
sources, including the arts, computer science, linguistics, psychology, pedagogy, robotics, 
graphics and animation, the social sciences, computer game research and development, the 
science-fiction literature, (animated) movies, and others. In fact, one important insight of the 
present research is that to build an embodied interactive software agent which can effectively 
function in its role, maintain an appealing and believable persona, and establish productive 
relationships with users, it is necessary to integrate virtually everything that has ever been 
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learned about what is involved in being human, physiologically, psychologically, socially, 
culturally, and so on, whether inside or outside science. After all, agents are built after as well 
as for people. Humans provide the positive and negative examples of behaviors, characteristics, 
and capabilities, according to which embodied interactive agents are modeled, and they will be 
the partners of these agents in tasks, interactions, and relationships. Therefore, the goal of the 
present research was to develop a comprehensive, multidisciplinary, and user-oriented view of 
the design of embodied interactive software agents. 
A further concern of the research was to put embodied interactive agent design on a more 
principled footing. The field is still quite young, and a theory of embodied interactive agents 
that could provide guidance during design has yet to emerge (although agent designers have 
heavily borrowed theories and models about human behavior, communication, intelligence, 
emotion, personality, etc. from other academic fields to inform their work). On the other hand, 
embodied interactive software agents are complex artifacts, with regard to both their individual 
components and the interplay of those elements. Their design is an art as well as a craft and a 
science, involving knowledge and technique as much as intuition and inspiration. There are 
many opportunities to make less than optimal decisions during the design process, which often 
impair the perception and/or performance of the final agent. To help designers to avoid a 
number of pitfalls in agent development, sixteen principles for the design of embodied 
interactive software agents for education and other domains were proposed in Chapter 7 of the 
thesis. The summary of the design principles given there is repeated below: 
• Added value. The agent should possess knowledge and skills (in particular in verbal and non-
verbal communication) that induce users to take advantage of the agent’s services regularly 
and over a longer period of time. 
• Perceptible qualities. The agent should exhibit cues that allow users to perceive that the 
agent possesses certain desirable qualities (e.g. believability, competence, conversational 
ability, empathy, and personality). 
• Balanced design. Designers should avoid mindless maximization of the sophistication of 
particular components of an agent and instead attempt to keep all aspects of an agent in 
approximate balance with respect to quality. 
• Coherence. All behaviors of the agent (speech, gestures, facial expressions, gaze, postures, 
and locomotion) should fit seamlessly together and into the ongoing flow of the interaction. 
• Consistency. Agents should not exhibit contradictions within and among their appearance, 
behaviors, and capabilities but convey the same general persona through all these aspects. 
• Completeness. A complete agent should integrate all relevant components (including face, 
body, ears, eyes, brain, tongue, heart, and life) into a coherent and consistent whole. 
• Comprehensibility. Users should be able to build an accurate interpretation of the agent’s 
actions, beliefs, personality, etc. from the appearance and behavioral cues displayed by the 
agent. 
• Individuality. The agent should reveal and express its personal and social identity in every 
aspect of its being and behavior, which includes emotional dynamics, personality, back-
story, idiosyncrasies, and signature behaviors. 
• Variability. The agent’s behavior should not seem repetitive but vary incidentally and 
unconsciously with respect to the kind, timing, and manner of the behavior being performed. 
• Communicative ability. The agent should be able to communicate with users and other 
agents. In human-agent interactions, this involves using all available communication modes 
(speech, gestures, facial expressions, etc.) in mixed-initiative multimodal conversations with 
the user. 
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• Modularity. The agent and its components should be designed in a way that facilitates their 
reuse in other application domains or in other agents. The design should consist of a system 
of domain-independent and domain-specific modules that are embedded in an overall 
architecture. 
• Teamwork. Agent development is a multidisciplinary team effort involving a wide range of 
human talents that contribute knowledge and techniques ideally covering the entire spectrum 
of academic and other efforts to understand the human nature and condition. 
• Participatory design. The agent should be designed with early and continuous involvement 
of its future users and employers during the development process. 
• Role awareness. The agent should portray its social role (including its skills, capacities, and 
limitations) in a way that helps users to understand the role and to appropriately adapt their 
behavior toward the agent based on its role. 
• Cultural awareness. The agent should be viewed as both a representative and a product of a 
particular culture. Its cultural background should be modeled explicitly by (re-) considering 
the agent’s identity, back-story, appearance, content and manner of speech, manner of 
gesturing, emotional dynamics, social interaction patterns, role, and role dynamics. 
• Relationship building. The agent should be made relational, i.e. equipped with strategies and 
behaviors conducive to building and maintaining long-term social-emotional relationships 
with individual users. 
Following these principles, diverse components have to be designed and combined in order 
to create an embodied interactive software agent which, both in reality and in the user’s 
perception, achieves the three goals of effectively functioning in its appointed social role, 
believably creating and maintaining an attractive agent persona, and successfully establishing a 
productive cooperative relationship with the user (cf. Chapter 8.4). A major part of the thesis 
was devoted to a detailed discussion of the design of the different components of an embodied 
interactive software agent for education and other areas. These components include: 
• The digital representation (embodiment) through which the agent appears in and acts on its 
environment (cf. Chapter 9); 
• The behaviors performed by the agent to communicate with the user, enhance the 
believability of its own agent persona, maintain an appropriate level of presence in the 
environment, and build a relationship with the user (cf. Chapter 10); 
• Technologies, components, and resources enabling the agent to participate in conversations 
with the user that involve the use of (spoken) natural language, multiple combined input 
modes, and embodied communication (cf. Chapter 11); 
• The agent’s expertise consisting of its knowledge of the domain (domain model), the learner 
(student model), and instructional interactions (instructor model) (cf. Chapter 12); 
• Mechanisms and techniques for modeling, interpreting, and expressing emotions; specifying 
and conveying the agent’s personality; and writing the agent’s back-story (cf. Chapter 13). 
The discussion of each component contributed specific guidelines for its design and involved 
critical reviews of pertinent theories, concepts, approaches, and technologies. A further chapter 
dealt with technical aspects of agent design, including different agent architectures, approaches 
to generating believable behaviors of embodied agents, and hardware and software platforms 
for software agents (cf. Chapter 14). The importance of evaluation for shaping the process and 
products of embodied interactive agent development was acknowledged by including a separate 
chapter on this topic (cf. Chapter 15), which reviewed the host of evaluation techniques 
described in the literature from the perspective of the evaluation of embodied interactive 
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software agents and further contributed a set of guidelines for the design and implementation of 
such evaluations. 
The first fifteen chapters of the thesis provided an in-depth coverage of the principles and 
components of embodied interactive software agent design and evaluation. Equipped with the 
insights from that discussion, Chapter 16 addressed the remaining topic of designing roles for 
embodied interactive software agents in e-learning. A particular e-learning scenario was chosen 
as the context for these roles: the linguistic fieldwork classes on the Virtual Linguistics 
Campus, which provide a constructivist learning environment for linguistic fieldwork in which 
learners construct knowledge about an unknown language by exploring a virtual room and 
interacting with a simulated native speaker. Three pedagogical agent roles for the linguistic 
fieldwork classes were described in Chapter 16: 
• The virtual native speaker serves as the learner’s informant about the unknown language and 
culture of the fieldwork class. Extending the original virtual native speaker role, this agent is 
designed to become a more flexible, competent, and interesting interaction partner that is 
portrayed as an individual with its own personal and cultural background. Instead of 
delivering pre-recorded utterances on demand, it has the ability to describe any situation in 
the virtual room about which the learner inquires, including in particular situations that have 
been created or changed by the learner. The enhanced virtual native speaker is also a 
performer that can act out pre-scripted or dynamically generated scenes in the virtual room, 
alone or together with other virtual actors and/or the learner, in order to illustrate particular 
phenomena of the target language and culture. Furthermore, it makes use of its regular and 
extended interactions with the learner in the course of a fieldwork class to work toward 
building a relationship with him or her, which preferably becomes a long-term cooperative 
partnership. 
• The coach plays the role of a master teacher in a cognitive apprenticeship relationship with 
the learner. It models relevant analysis and hypothesis formation skills involved in doing 
linguistic fieldwork for its apprentice (the learner), monitors and guides the learner while he 
or she is practicing these skills, and intervenes with problem-solving and motivational 
support when and where opportune or necessary. The coach’s support gradually fades as the 
learner gains proficiency in accomplishing linguistic fieldwork tasks on his or her own. 
• The peer is a virtual co-learner whose characteristics, knowledge, and status are comparable 
to those of the learner. It explores the language and the virtual room together with the 
learner, providing different kinds of support for social learning in hybrid communities of 
artificial and human learners. Peer agents can cooperate or compete with the learner in the 
virtual room, provide companionship during fieldwork sessions, challenge the learner’s 
skills and confidence as troublemakers, serve as a model of best (or worst) practices in 
linguistic fieldwork, and coach learners on linguistic field methods or be coached by them. 
While the coach and peer roles have been documented in the literature (e.g. Chou et al. 2003; 
Ryokai et al. 2003; Johnson et al. 2004b; McNamara et al. 2004; Baylor & Kim 2005; Biswas et 
al. 2005; Graesser et al. 2005; Cassell et al. 2007; Tartaro & Cassell 2008), although not for 
linguistic fieldwork, the virtual native speaker is a new pedagogical agent role that has not yet 
been described elsewhere.274 Therefore, Chapter 16 elaborated a design for the virtual native 
                                              
274  The Tactical Language Training System (cf. Footnote 261) also provides animated native speakers of 
foreign languages, but these agents are conversation partners that help learners to practice their 
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speaker consisting of the five components embodiment, behavior, conversation, expertise, and 
emotion and personality. Furthermore, some initial ideas for the evaluation of the speaker’s 
design were presented. Insights from the previous chapters were incorporated into the design 
wherever appropriate. In addition, the discussion illustrated the breadth and depth of the 
considerations that need to go into the design and evaluation of an embodied interactive 
pedagogical software agent. 
The research presented in this thesis has made contributions to both the theory and practice 
of designing embodied interactive software agents for roles in e-learning and beyond. However, 
there are a number of things that remain to be addressed by future research. The ultimate goal is 
for all three types of pedagogical agents discussed in Chapter 16, the virtual native speaker, the 
coach, and the peer, to become regular partners of the learner in the linguistic fieldwork classes 
on the Virtual Linguistics Campus. In other words, the intention is to turn written designs into 
computer programs that students of the VLC will routinely make use of in their virtual field 
research. To achieve this ambitious goal, not only the three agent roles and their components 
have to be developed but also the set of new supporting systems proposed in Chapter 16, 
including the linguistic workbench (cf. Chapter 16.2.3), the collaborative learning and research 
environment (cf. Chapter 16.2.4), and the tool for authoring virtual performances (cf. Chapter 
16.3.4). Since the resources for building all these agents and systems in parallel are not 
available, they will be developed one after the other, starting with the virtual native speaker and 
the authoring tool for the virtual performances, followed by the coach and the linguistic 
workbench, and finally the peer and the collaborative learning and research environment. 
Having said that, it is also possible to assign a separate team, possibly at a different institution, 
to the development of each agent-system combination. 
While the supporting systems can be used in all fieldwork classes, a different virtual native 
speaker has to be created for each fieldwork class, plus a number of virtual actors playing in the 
performances. Furthermore, several different coach and peer agents are required. In order to 
reduce the amount of development, at first, one virtual native speaker, one coach, and one peer 
agent will be built, one by one, for a single linguistic fieldwork class. Once the designs of the 
different agents are mature, it will be necessary to think about how they can be recreated for 
other fieldwork classes (or within the same fieldwork class) without producing identical twins 
or cheap copies, i.e. how to simultaneously achieve economy and individuality in embodied 
interactive agent design. 
Each agent and system will be developed iteratively by building and evaluating a series of 
successively refined prototypes (cf. Chapter 15.3.1). Real students of the VLC will use these 
prototypes, both in controlled contexts and as part of their actual work in the linguistic 
fieldwork class. For the time being, learners will interact with the agents via a graphical user 
interface; however, speech and multimodal input are options for future versions of the virtual 
linguistic fieldwork environment (cf. Chapter 16.3.3). 
True to the philosophy of the Virtual Linguistics Campus “What has been built for the 
Campus, becomes a part of the Campus,” the virtual native speaker, the coach, and the peer will 
be developed with a view to giving them a permanent employment in the linguistic fieldwork 
classes. As a result, some day in the (hopefully not too distant) future, the Virtual Linguistics 
Campus will have a number of new members that are not made of flesh and blood but of bits 
and bytes. An interesting area of research will be to investigate how the humans on the Campus 
                                                                                                                                                
communication skills in the target language, rather than informants from which learners elicit data 
for linguistic analysis. 
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will respond to the virtual native speaker, the coach, the peer, and a host of other agents that do 
not even have a name yet, including how their responses to these agents will change over time 
once novelty gives way to routine. Do the virtual native speaker, the coach, and the peer, each 
in its own particular way, add actual value to the learner’s experience in the linguistic fieldwork 
classes on a continuing basis? Do learners perceive the qualities and capabilities of these agents 
and make use of them as intended? Do they still enjoy interacting with the agents after several 
weeks into a fieldwork class, or have the interactions and performances become dull and 
predictable? Do learners accept each agent as a partner in the learning process? Do they treat 
the agents well or abuse them? These are just some of the questions that will have to be 
addressed by long-term studies of the different agents in their respective roles and environments 
(cf. Chapter 16.3.6). 
Deploying any piece of software in the real world inevitably involves the risk of failure. The 
software may not be what people need; it may be unusable or boring. Through careful design 
and evaluation, with early and continuous involvement of the target audience, the embodied 
interactive pedagogical software agents on the VLC may be spared the fate of rejection suffered 
by previous unsuccessful agent designs, such as those analyzed in Chapter 8. It is the goal of 
the author’s work and his hope that the users of the Virtual Linguistics Campus will come to 
accept and appreciate the different pedagogical agents described in this thesis. If learners value 
the services provided by each of these agents, acknowledge its individuality, make it their 
partner in learning, and look forward to the next session with the agent, then the agent’s design 
can be called a success. Anything less would have to be considered a failure. 
 
Eben-Ezer. 
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